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The relationship between the United States and the
People's Republic of China is developing rapidly in the
realm of military and security affairs. The thesis of this
paper is that, although the Sino-American relationship has
been founded upon a mutual interest in opposing the Soviet
military threat, the long-term development of the relation-
ship will depend on the extent to which the scope of mutual
interests can be broadened and the many latent sources of
tension between China and America alleviated. A broad defi-
nition of national security, encompassing political and eco-
nomic as well as military factors, and an alternative
conceptual framework for analyzing international politics are
proposed for defining security interests. Security issues
examined include the Soviet threat to China; the U.S. inter-
est in the security of China; China's role in Soviet-American
relations, cooperation on world order issues, and Asian
security; and American interests in a military relationship




A. DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST 10
B. THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK I 7
C. AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE: INITIATIVE,
CONSULTATION, AND PERSEVERENCE 19
II. UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA 23
A. THE EFFECT OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS ON
AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF ITS SECURITY
INTERESTS IN CHINA 24
B. SOVIET CHINA POLICY: CONTAINMENT AND
COEXISTENCE









3. The Soviet Military Threat to China 71
C. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE SECURITY OF CHINA - ]_Q1
1. Threats to the Security of China ]_Q2
2. Potential Consequences for American
Interests 107
D. CHINA IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP 112
1. China's Geopolitical Importance 114
2 China in the Soviet-American
Strategic Balance 120
3 . China and Containment of Soviet
Expansionism 145
4. China and Soviet-American Arms
Limitations 159
5. China and Soviet-American Detente 187
5

E. CHINA AND AMERICAN WORLD ORDER INTERESTS 200
1. China and the Management of Global
Problems 201
2. China and the Peaceful Resolution of
Local Conflicts 218
F. CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN ASIAN
SECURITY 226
1. China and American Security
Commitments in Asia 237
2. China's Interests in the Trouble
Spots of Asia 254
3
.
China and the American Commitment
to Taiwan 261
4. China and American Naval Strategy
in the Western Pacific 277
G. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN A MILITARY
RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA 285
1. Security Consultations 287
2. Arms Sales and Technology Transfers 290
3. Intelligence Cooperation 301
4. Mutual Defense 307
5. Naval Operations 313
III. CONCLUSIONS 316
A. UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA 316
B. PROSPECTS FOR SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 319
APPENDIX A: SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND AMERICAN
SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA 321
APPENDIX B: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SINO-
AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 331
FOOTNOTES 364
BIBLIOGRAPHY 458




1. Sino-American Two-Way Trade, 1971-1980 340
2. China's Trade Balance, 1970-1980 347
3. China's Surplus From Trade With
Developing Countries, 1970-79 356

I. INTRODUCTION
United States policy toward the People's Republic of China
has undergone dramatic change over the past decade. The evo-
lution of American policy during this period both reflected
and was a cause of much broader changes in the international
political arena, in great power strategic relationships, and
in Sino-American relations. Not least among the factors which
have shaped the evolution of American China policy have been
changes in Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics--
changes which made possible the rapid improvement of Sino-
American relations.
The Sino-American relationship of today can still be said
to be young. The nine years since President Nixon's surprise
visit to Beijing have not given the relationship what could
reasonably be called a heritage, especially when viewed in
the context of the much different relationship of the 21 years
prior to the Nixon China trip. Although there have been defi-
nite trends toward improvement in Sino-American relations over
the past two years, including the establishment of diplomatic
relations, it is still true today that whatever course Ameri-
can policy toward China takes will be a new direction.
To emphasize the rapid pace of change and the uncertainty
of the future is not to say, however, that a critical examina-
tion of the basis of United States policy toward China would
be a futile endeavor. Quite to the contrary, such a fluid

state of affairs makes it all the more important that Ameri-
can interests in China be clearly perceived. That is the
purpose of this paper: to define American interests in China,
particularly in terms of national security.
The defining of interests is- not a purpose that lends it-
self readily to formulation as a hypothesis whose validity
can be tested by observations made in the course of a paper.
Almost by definition, the validity of a policy study such as
this can only be judged in the light of history. Even then
the intellectual and political predispositions of the indi-
vidual doing the judging will have as much to do with the
verdict as the weight of historical evidence.
Be that as it may, there are three hypotheses upon which
the procedure used herein is based that must be stated. The
first is that the manner in which the concept of national
interest is defined directly affects the perception of inter-
ests in a given situation. The second is that the conceptual
framework used to define the structure of the international
system directly affects the perception of interests in a given
situation. The third is that the particular world role de-
picted as being appropriate or necessary will directly affect
the perception of interests in a given situation.
The focus of this paper is on American interests in China
rather than on methodological questions, therefore no attempt
will be made to test the three hypotheses. Such a test would
require operationalizing and then varying the three independent

variables—definition of the national interest, conceptual
framework of the international order, and appropriate world
role--to observe whether they do indeed directly affect the
dependent variable
—
perception of interests. Instead, one
specific definition of each of the independent variables will
be stated and the three hypotheses treated simply as under-
lying assumptions. In a broader methodological context, what
this paper will have accomplished is a case study of one
particular given situation: Sino-American relations in the
world today.
The title of the paper indicates a further limitation on
the scope of the study: only security interests will be
examined. This restriction will not be imposed, however,
until after the concepts of national interest, international
order, and world role are examined in the abstract— lest the
specific interests to be discussed should bias the definitions
of these underlying concepts.
A. DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Any discussion of United States foreign policy or of
American interests in another country must ultimately come
to grips with the perennial problem of defining the national
interest. Without exception, every study that seeks to evalu-
ate past foreign policy or to recommend contemporary policy
is founded, whether implicitly or explicitly, upon a particu-
lar definition of the national interest. Even though the
resulting observations may not demonstrate any greater
10

perspicacity for having done so, it is best that the concept
of national interest be defined explicitly.
A definition of the national interest must answer three
questions: From what source are interests deemed to be
national to be derived? How is the concept to be broken
down into functional interests that are manageable for analy-
sis? And, how are such 'abstract' interests to be applied
to a particular country, their magnitude measured, and pri-
orities established among them?
United States national interests derive from the goals and
guiding principles of the Constitution. This is, of course,
vague to the point of not being a useful concept for the
study of foreign policy—but vagueness is the price of uni-
versality. The central point is that a distinction must be
drawn between national interests and the "circumstances of
time and place" which determine the actual policies pursued:
Yet the kind of interest determining politi-
action in a particular period of history depends
upon the political and cultural context within
which foreign policy is formulated. The goals
that might be pursued by nations in their foreign
policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any ,
nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue.
The domestic processes by which the goals and guiding princi-
ples of the Constitution are translated into stated interests
are beyond the scope of this paper, but the concept of 'nation-
al interests ' itself can be analyzed by breaking it down into
categories of functional interests.
Various scholars have proposed a variety of formulations
of the national interest in terms of its functional components
11

Ralph N. Clough, for example, has stated that: "The national
interests of any state can be regarded as comprising physical
survival as a nation; preservation of the most cherished
values of the people of the nation and enhancement of their
material well-being; and creation of an international environ-
2
ment favorable to these interests." Donald E. Nuechterlein,
who has made a significant effort towards the rigorous analy-
sis on national interests, uses a taxonomy of four interests:
3defense, economic, world order, and ideological. These two
formulations are quite similar and both are useful. For the
purposes of this paper the "world order" or "favorable inter-
national environment" interest will be combined with the
"defense" interest and certain aspects of "economic" interests
as one broad category of security interests
.
•The goals and guiding principles of the Constitution can
be seen as imposing three requirements on the conduct of United
States foreign policy in order that it be in the national
interest:
First, it must promote national security, "the defense of
4internal values against external threats." As Morton H.
Halperin has observed: "Whatever the shape of the international
situation, the fundamental goal of American foreign policy
must be the prevention of actions which could threaten the
existence of the United States or its way of life." This
requires, however unpleasant the prospect, unflagging attention
to national power and international power relationships in
all their complex forms.
12

Second, American foreign policy must strive continuously
to create an international political and economic environment
conducive to the enhancement of American economic and physi-
cal welfare. "Economic and physical welfare" covers a myriad
of objectives and problems such as economic growth, employ-
ment, inflation, population, environmental protection, health,
food and water, energy, and ocean and mineral resources. It
is in this category of interests that the United States faces
the greatest dilemmas over the long run, for the physical
welfare of the nation may well demand certain sacrifices in
economic welfare.
In an interdependent world it is not feasible to think
strictly in terms of domestic problems in these areas, for
problems abroad could defeat even the best-planned domestic
programs. To an uncomfortably large degree, modern technology
has robbed the United States--and every nation—of full sover-
eignty over its own economy and environment. Even the use of
the term "robbed" is misleading. In most cases sovereignty
was gladly ceded, albeit a minute portion at a time, in order
to gain the undeniably vast economic benefits of global inter-
dependence. The United States finds itself, therefore, com-
mitted to forums and agencies pursuing the cooperative and
peaceful management of the international problems of economic
and physical welfare.
The third requirement imposed upon American foreign policy
by the Constitution is that it must be conducted in such a
manner as to uphold and defend the democratic principles upon
13

which the nation was founded. From this requirement is de-
rived the ideological interests category of Nuechterlein and
the "most cherished values of the people" mentioned by Clough.
Harry G. Gelber, writing from the vantage point of Tasmania,
has observed of this ideological interest:
...America is a nation unlike any other. It is
not a nation state in the same sense as Japan or
France. Ethnic and racial matters are important
as reflections of more fundamental values rather
than as issues in their own right. America's
primary obligation is the domestic cultivation
and elaboration of that value system, which is
the very cement of U.S. society.
In addition to generating ideological interests abroad,
this third requirement imposes constraints on the formulation
and execution of American foreign policy— thereby affecting
all of the categories of interests. The most significant con-
straint is that the Executive Branch of government does not
have a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. Congress,
in particular, but also the judicial branch and public opinion
have a part in policy formulation. Another consequence of the
Constitutional constraints on the Executive is that, in the
execution of policy, the ends do not justify the means. Al-
though foreign policy debates do not often focus on this issue
in these terms, it is only with the greatest of trepidation
that any President can assert that national security or eco-
nomic interests demand the sacrifice of ideological interests.
Having identified the source of American national interests
and derived from it functional categories of interests, the
question of how to apply these to a particular country can now
14

be addressed. The first problem encountered is that American
interests in a particular country must take into account not
only the bilateral relationship, but also American global and
regional interests, the interests the other country has in
third parties, and the interests third parties may have in
the country of interest. Ralph N. Clough has devised four
"clusters of interests" that are useful for sorting out these
various interests: general, intrinsic, derived, and created. °
General interests are "those with a global reach" and in-
clude "deterrence of attack against the United States," the
"avoidance of nuclear war," and "the creation of a more stable
world order" among others. Intrinsic interests are "inherent
in its direct relationship with a particular country or area
at a particular time, " and include the "economic stake in a
country, traditional ties with the people of that country,"
and the "ability of that country to help protect U.S. general
interests." Derived interests "are not intrinsic to its rela-
tions with a particular state, but flow from its important
interest in a third state," with the American interest in
Korean security being cited as an interest derived in part
from American intrinsic interests in Japan. Finally, created
interests are "those that the United States itself creates in
a given country by taking actions (especially by making defense
commitments or by actually deploying its armed forces) that
create an expectation that the United States would use armed
9force in order to protect other types of interests."
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Although these "clusters of interests" will not be used
to structure this paper, reference will be made to them in
specific instances because of their value in describing the
broad origins that interests can have.
Measuring the magnitude of specific United States inter-
ests in another country and assigning priorities to those
interests are by far the most difficult problems in using the
national interest approach to the study of American foreign
policy. Devising a scheme for stating the level of American
interests, as Nuechterlein has done with his four "intensities
of interest" (survival, vital, major, and peripheral), is
the easy part. While such a scheme does enforce clearly stated
levels of interest, it cannot eliminate the subjective judgment
required to assign a particular interest to a particular level.
It also tends to treat any specific issue as autonomous, when
in fact most interests are closely interrelated with numerous
other interests. The issue of American credibility is proba-
bly the most knotty example of this problem. If American policy
makers sacrifice a peripheral or major interest on one occasion,
how will that decision affect an ally's or an adversary's per-
ception of American willingness to defend a vital interest
on another occasion?
This paper offers no panacea for the levels of interest
problem. In all probability, there is none. Where there is
no need to do so, levels of American interest will not even
be assigned other than in general terms. Two observations can
16

be made to justify this. First, there is no absolute scale
on which one can compare specific interests--all interests are
relative and there is no single list of priorities among them.
This is not to say that specific interests cannot be compared
or that priorities cannot be established: they can and must.
Rather, the point is that perceived levels of interest and
priorities are specific to given "circumstances of time and
place," even though the interests themselves can be derived in
the abstract.
The second observation on the level of interest problem
is that the short-term interest in an issue may well conflict
with the long-term interest in the same issue, especially
when its influence on other interests is considered. The
investment that is unprofitable today might be the one with
the greatest payoff in twenty years. Thus, any particular
assignment of priorities must specify short-term versus long-
term interests.
Introduction of the dimension of time brings the discussion
back to the theme of the opening paragraph: change. In a
rapidly evolving international context as exists today, under-
standing American interests in China is better served by focus-
ing on deriving the interests themselves and stating priorities
only in general terms.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A second task which must be undertaken prior to discussing
American interests in China is to explicitly state the
17

conceptualization of the international "system" that underlies
pronouncements on the role of Sino-American relations in world
politics. All too often debate on foreign policy issues is
muddled by unstated but critical assumptions on the nature
of international relations.
There has for some years been an on-going debate as to the
structure of the international system, and even on whether it
can indeed be called a "system. " The debate centers around
the concept of "polarity" as a feature of the international
system, but has been complicated by the rise of the non-aligned
movement and the growing importance of so-called "north-south"
disputes. This debate on the structure of the international
system would be inconsequential, a matter of theoretical aca-
demic interest only, were it not for the fact that crucial
foreign policy decisions are often made in the context of such
models—even if only implicitly.
Morton Kaplan has proposed four models of the international
system based on the polarity concept: tight bipolar, loose
bipolar, multipolar (balance of power) , and unit veto. More
recently, Gerald Segal has attempted to systematize a tripolar
12
model derived from behavioral research.. Other observers,
however, deprecate polarity as a fundamental factor. Joseph
Nogee, for example, concludes that: "Polarity as a component
of structure of the international system cannot by itself pre-
dict the behavior of the system or the nations in it, " and




Between these two views lie theories which recognize that
the complexities of the international system make any one
model based on polarity inapplicable in many circumstances,
but which also recognize that distinct patterns based on
power relationships do emerge in other circumstances. Stanley
Hoffmann has proposed a "latent bipolar system" that emerges
only when the interests of the two superpowers clash directly.
On a routine day-to-day basis, however, the international sys-
14
tern operates on the basis of "de facto polycentrism.
"
Donald Lampert, et al.
,
proposed a more complicated but com-
plementary model described as "multiple issue-based systems."
This model contends that the perceived structure of the inter-
national system varies, depending on the particular issue at
stake and the power alignments around it. Synthesizing these
two models: except when a particular issue directly involves
the superpowers as the principal actors—when bipolar rela-
tions predominate— the international system operates simul-
taneously at several levels of complexity and with varying
structural relationships, depending on the issues involved.
C. AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE: INITIATIVE, CONSULTATION AND
PERSEVERENCE
What is America's role in such a world? This also must
be understood before discussing United States interests in
China. Experiences of the recent past certainly tend to
indicate that the United States cannot be the "world's
policeman," if only because the American people quickly tire
19

of the burdens of such a role. On the other hand, the United
States cannot seriously consider retiring into a "Fortress
America" to let the rest of the world fend for itself. As
Morton H. Halperin has observed, in the context of Asia:
America should not become the world's police-
man, and the U.S. has no intention of acting like
one. Neither are Americans irresponsible citi-
zens of the world who will stand by when other
nations are threatened by external aggression,
or when other citizens of this planet are living
in hunger and misery. The necessary U.S. role
in Asia is well within the U.S.'s economic and
political capability. To do less is to invite
disaster. To do more would be to neglect American
domestic problems, and to seek to do what the
United States cannot do and should not attempt.-'-"
The United States still has a vital leadership role to
play in the world, but it is a role constrained by the nature
of the international political arena in the world today.
The United States can no longer act as a command figure, for
not even the reawakening of awareness of the continuing cold
war in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has
altered the "de_ facto polycentrism" character of the inter-
national system.
Nor can the United States act as a savior figure, up-
lifting the grateful world masses from hunger, disease and
ignorance. The developing nations have been at least as
stingy with their good will as the developed nations have
been with their aid. Furthermore, the Third World rejects
the notion that our moral obligation to provide them with aid
implies any right for the United States to claim leadership




What then is America's world role? Walter J. Stoessel,
Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, des-
cribed it as follows in a speech in April 1981:
First, we have recognized that, beyond simply
asserting our role as leaders of the free world,
we must act as leaders. Responsible American
leadership is of the utmost importance in achiev-
ing our aim of a just and stable world order.
We must be strong, balanced, consistent, and re-
liable in our policies and our actions, and we
must proceed with prudence and sensitivity with
regard to the interests of our allies and friends,
consulting fully with them as we work together for
the more secure and prosperous world we all
desire. 17
The image of the world role appropriate for the United
States today is not particularly romantic, and probably is
not amenable to being a catchy phrase--as is so popular in
American politics—but it can be summed up rather simply:
initiative, consultation and perseverance.
Initiative, because the world does need leadership-
today more than ever. Only a few of the more than 15 inde-
pendent nations perceive the magnitude or complexity of the
many global problems facing mankind, and no other nation
has the broad range of interests and abilities of the United
States. Whether or not America desires a leadership role,
the responsibility is thrust upon it. The question, then,
becomes how to best fulfill that leadership role.
Consultation, because post-war experience has shown it to
be an effective tool of American foreign policy. Consultation
has two forms: bilateral, with friends and allies, and
multilateral in the various international forums and agencies.
21

Consultation is the key to avoiding the "command figure"
image of leadership that grates against the nationalistic
sensitivities of other nations. Even when agreement on a
course of action cannot be reached and the United States pro-
ceeds alone, consultations will have enhanced the prestige
of the leaders consulted—better enabling them to cope with
their own domestic politics.
Perseverance, meaning patient but unflagging dedication
to initiative and consultation, because of the magnitude of
the problems facing the world—and therefore facing the
United States—and because the effort must be put forth in
a flawed and sometimes chaotic international system. Neither
glory nor gratitude is inherent in any leadership role. The




II. UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA
China has been perceived as having an important role in
the security of American interests in East Asia since the
United States insisted upon, and was granted, "most favored
nation" status in the Treaty of Wanghsia, signed July 3, 1844.
This early American recognition that the monopolist trade
policies and imperialist ambitions of the other Western powers
could threaten American commercial interests became more ex-
plicitly linked with interest in the security of China—that
is, in the territorial integrity of China--in the "Open Door"
notes of 1899. Over the next fifty years, however, there was
a significant shift in the American perception of the nature
of China's importance: from being the most pitiable victim
of imperialism to being the most dangerous source of aggres-
sion and revolution. For the first two decades after its
founding, the People's Republic of China would be an ideo-
logical rival and cold war enemy.
Henry Kissinger's secret 1971 visit to Beijing dramatic-
ally marked the beginning of another swing in the American
perception of China's role in United States security inter-
ests. The swing in American perceptions has not been smooth
or steady: every step toward closer Sino-American relations
has intensified the debate over security issues. Although
China and the United States have achieved normalization of
relations, there is still no consensus in America as to
China's role in American security interests and policies.
23

A broad definition of national security considers the
impact of diplomacy and economic policies as well as military
relationships. Those 'world order' interests that have an
impact on national security will be considered along with
'defense' interests. The following discussion will, as a
consequence, be seen to include issues not normally associated
with security policy in a narrow sense.
Examination of United States security interests in China
will begin with a discussion of the conceptual framework
within which American policy toward China is formulated. A
brief overview of Soviet policy toward China will then be
presented as background for subsequent discussions of the
security of China and the role of China in the Soviet-American
strategic relationship. The role of China in American world
order and Asian security interests will then be examined,
followed by a discussion of the implications of bilateral
military relations between the United States and China.
A. THE EFFECT OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS ON AMERICAN
PERCEPTIONS OF ITS SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA
This section will present the conceptual framework being
used by virtually every observer today, the "strategic tri-
angle," and compare the perceived interests that result from
its use with those that derive from the alternative concep-
tual framework described in the Introduction: the latent
bipolar, de facto polycentric, multiple issue-based systems
approach to the study of international power relationships.
24

Richard Burt has observed that: "Ever since President
Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972, American officials
have been fascinated with the notion of a 'triangular rela-
tionship' among the United States, the Soviet Union and
1
8
China. " Even a cursory review of the literature reveals
that Burt's observation is correct: virtually every discussion
of the strategic aspects of the Sino-American relationship
uses the strategic triangle as its conceptual framework.
The strategic triangle concept can be used in three ways:
First, as a simple description of the scope of a discussion-
one that is limited to relations among the United States, the
Soviet Union, and China. Second, the strategic triangle can
be used as a strategy for the formulation of American foreign
policy. Third, the strategic triangle can be viewed as a
systemic relationship operating on the basis of observable
principles independent of the motivations of the three nations
it encompasses.
The first use of the strategic triangle concept can be
accepted at face value in that it makes no theoretical pre-
suppositions. The second and third uses, however, deserve a
closer examination. There has arisen an assumption, apparently
derived from analogy to the geometry of triangles, that a
triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet
Union, and China is the natural or most stable form of inter-
action among the three powers, and that an "equilateral" tri-
angular relationship should be a primary strategic goal of
25

United States foreign policy. John King Fairbank, for exam-
ple, perceives that "great power triangles naturally tend to
19become equilateral," and Harold C. Hinton has observed
that "it appears that stability is best served when the Sino-
Soviet-American relationship is an approximately equilateral
i .,2triangle.
Observers using the strategic triangle concept in this
manner do not, however, necessarily agree in their policy
prescriptions for maintaining the triangular relationship.
Michael Pillsbury, on the one hand, believes that: "to main-
tain a rough parity in the global triangle of power, we need
a policy which explicitly recognizes that Peking has a legiti-
mate interest in improving its deterrence against the threat
21
of Soviet attack." Ralph N. Clough, on the other hand,
has warned that: "Their triangular relationship will require
delicate handling, however, because the purpose of the United
States is not simply to tilt toward Peking and against Moscow,
22
as the PRC wishes." In the face of this debate, Richard H.
Solomon has called for "greater consensus on the issue of
how to relate to China in the 'triangular' context of Sino-
23Soviet relations and the Sino-Soviet dispute."
The prominence of the strategic triangle concept in the
analysis of United States policy toward China is an example
of what could be called the "systematization" problem. Ideas
that prove to be convenient for conceptualizing what are in
fact highly complex relationships--such as "deterrence" and
"detente "--come to be viewed as systems operating on their
26

own terms independent of the dynamics of the overall inter-
national system and the varied goals of the nations con-
cerned that cannot be fit within the particular relationship
being discussed. This is what has happened to the Sino-
Soviet-American strategic triangle concept. The individual
who has probably gone the farthest in this direction is
24Gerald Segal. Using the results of behavioral research on
relations among three individuals, he has devised a model
for the strategic triangle and has attempted to prove that
Chinese foreign policy is best understood in terms of his
model.
When the strategic triangle is used as the conceptual
framework within which analyses of United States foreign
policy are made, policy choices tend to be defined in narrow
terms with a focus on short-term considerations of power re-
lationships. The debate on American policy toward China has
become limited to essentially four policy options: the bal-
anced approach, tilting toward China, playing the 'China
card', or playing off the Soviet Union and China against one
another.
Advocates of the balanced approach to relations with the
Soviet Union and China have suffered a series of setbacks
over the last decade, especially since the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, but are still fighting a rear-guard action to
defend their views. The concept of maintaining a balanced
approach has been applied to both the overall Sino-American
relationship and to specific issues, such as arms sales and
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technology transfers to China. Paul C. Warnke has given the
balanced approach an especially altruistic tone by advising
that the United States act "as the enemy of neither, with
25
malice toward none." Cyrus R. Vance has been one of the
more influential advocates of the balanced approach. In a
January 1979 interview with James Reston, the then-Secretary
of State identified maintaining an "even-handed" policy toward
China and Russia as one of the main problems of American
foreign policy. The United Nations Association of the United
States in a 1979 study of American China policy recommended
a balanced approach in the form of what it called an "equi-
27librium strategy."
The justifications that are given for the balanced approach
are that it is necessary to preserve detente and avoid a re-
turn to the cold war and that to move too close to China will
2 8provoke Soviet paranoia about the China threat. A Los
Angeles Times editorial in March 1980 neatly summarized these
views :
The United States, while moving toward closer
economic and political cooperation with Beijing,
should avoid an embrace so tight as to feed Rus-
sian paranoia about foreign encirclement and
foreclose the possibility of an eventual change
for the better in Soviet policy. 29
"Tilting" toward China is, of course, the policy that has
been pursued by the United States. But having tilted does
not necessarily mean a deliberate rejection of the balanced
approach as a policy objective. The level of cooperation or
tension in a relationship does, after all, depend on the
28

attitude and—most importantly--on the behavior of both
parties. From this perspective the American tilt toward
China is as much the product of Soviet and Chinese foreign
policies as it is the product of American policy. As Michel
Oksenberg has pointed out:
Rather than imagery of a China "tilt," how-
ever, it is more accurate to note that both China
and the United States are eager to move forward,
while our Soviet relations have deteriorated in
the face of Soviet assertiveness from Ethiopia
to Afghanistan to Indochina. To retard develop-
ment of Sino-American relations because Soviet-
American relations have soured would be to pun-
ish Beijing for Moscow's aggression . 30
Supporting this view, the Los Angeles Times editorial men-
tioned earlier observed that: "Because Soviet behavior in
the world is threatening to American interests and Chinese
behavior isn't, a certain pro-Chinese tilt in U.S. relations
31
with the two countries is inevitable."
Playing the 'China card' is the policy option that has
generated the most controversy in debates on American policy
toward China and the Soviet Union. Playing the China card
refers to unilateral United States initiatives toward China
taken to overtly attempt to influence Soviet foreign policy
behavior. Some observers implicitly treat any American tilt
toward China as playing the China card, and warn that the
Soviet Union would also view it as such. There is a differ-
ence between the two policies, however, in that a tilt is
not necessarily directed against any other nation, whereas
playing the China card is done with malice of forethought.




card but a deck of cards, so to speak. There are numerous
actions the United States can take toward China to play the
China card against the Soviet Union—with as much subtlety
or bluntness as an administration may desire.
Although none of the American administrations has ever
admitted playing the China card, various observers have per-
ceived such an intention in United States initiatives toward
China. John Newhouse, while not using the China card term,
has linked President Nixon's 1972 visit to Beijing with the
successful conclusion of the SALT I agreement and quoted un-
named Administration officials as saying that Nixon's visit
33
would "keep the Russians honest" in the talks. Rowland
Evans and Robert Novak have accused the Carter Administration
of playing the China card in its decision to sell airborne
34
scanning equipment to China on May 16, 1978. More recently,
remarks made to reporters by Secretary of Defense Caspar W.
Weinberger on April 4, 1981 concerning arms sales to China
have been interpreted as playing the China card. The Washington
Post observed that: "The Weinberger statement together with
the emphasis placed on it suggest a Reagan administration
attempt to signal Moscow that the United States may play the
China card if Soviet troops march into Poland to suppress the
35independent labor movement."
Despite this apparent willingness to play the China card
over the years, most observers believe that this policy is
counterproductive or at least ineffective. John Newhouse,
as previously noted, believes the approach worked during the
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SALT negotiations, and Richard H. Solomon has recommended
that arms sales to China be handled as a China card to be
played "in response to Soviet actions that threaten U.S. and
PRC interests," but they stand virtually alone against the
tide of opinion. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs specifically recom-
mended in December 1979 that "the United States must not be
perceived as playing nor should it play the so-called 'China
37
card' against the Soviet Union." Ironically enough, Henry
A. Kissinger, who as National Security Advisor to President
Nixon first played the China card, has issued a stern warning
against reliance on the approach and, as one would expect,
has denied that American initiatives toward China were directed
38
against the Soviet Union.
Four reasons are commonly given for opposition to playing
the China card. The first and most common is that it will
provoke Soviet paranoia and harm detente. Soviet leaders
themselves have repeatedly warned the United States against
playing the China card. Communist Party General Secretary
and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Leonid
I. Brezhnev warned in January 1979:
There are some in the U.S. and in other Western
countries who have found the course hostile toward
the Soviet Union followed by the present Chinese
leadership so much to their liking that they are
tempted to turn Peking into an instrument of
pressure on the world of socialism. Such a policy
appears to me to be adventurous and highly danger-
ous for the cause of universal peace. 39
More to the point, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
has specifically warned against playing the China card:
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In recent years the United States, as well as
other Western countries, have resorted ever more
frequently to playing the 'China card' in order
to use to their own advantage the great-power am-
bitions of Beijing—which is itself keeping pace
with the most zealous proponents of the position-
of-strength policy, stubbornly and cynically ad-
vocating the idea of the inevitability of another
world war, never giving up this thought. . .
.
Aside from the question of who is playing
whose card more, it must be emphasized that this
game is a phenomenon dangerous to the cause of
peace . 4
Such soviet warnings are obviously self-serving, but they do
illustrate the point that the United States must carefully
consider its priorities before playing the China card.
A second objection to the China card approach is that
the Chinese do not want to be treated as a card. Such an
American attitude is in fundamental conflict with one of the
most important of China's national goals. China is seeking
a position of prestige and influence in the world in general
and in Asia in particular. Treating China as a card to be
played against the Soviet Union grates against China's deeply-
rooted nationalism. This sentiment is apparent in a January
1981 Beijing Review commentary that used Ray Cline's remarks
in Singapore as a pretext to issue a warning to the incoming
Reagan Administration: "People like Ray Cline who think of
China in terms of a card to be played in the game with the
Soviet Union cannot possibly understand the national aspira-
41tions of the Chinese people for modernization." Richard
Holbrooke, formerly the Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has pointed out Mao
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Zedong's warning that the United States must not attempt to
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stand on China's shoulders to strike at the Soviet Union,
which is the essence of the China card approach. Henry
Kissinger's warning against the China card approach, mentioned
above, was based at least partly on this objection.
The third objection to the China card approach is that
there is a parallel tactic open to the Chinese: playing their
'American card' against the Soviet Union. Robert Scalapino,
among others, has observed that "China's 'punishment' of
Vietnam immediately afterward strongly suggested that it was
43China which had played the American card, not vice versa."
Although on this occasion the consequences for the United
States were not particularly grave, the implication is that
actions taken by the Chinese in pursuit of their own inter-
ests could drag the United States into a conflict it other-
wise would not have been involved in.
The fourth objection to the China card approach is that
it diverts American attention from the need for developing
its own capabilities for deterring aggressive actions by the
Soviet Union. Instead of playing the China card, Edward
Luttwak suggests, "we should play the American card, muster-
44mg more of our own strength for our own purposes."
Playing off the Soviet Union and China against one another
is the final policy option derived from the strategic triangle
framework. The China card is half of this approach, the other
half is to use American relations with the Soviets to manipu-




If not worked too openly, or with too much
fine tuning, this mutual hostility can be turned
to American advantage. The trick is to engage
Russia in negotiations on arms control, trade
and other matters useful in themselves. The
Chinese are then obligated to court Washington,
seeking the support of America and its allies
against Soviet pressure. 45
Although it is doubtful that this was the intended purpose
of the early stages of Soviet-American detente, a case can
be made that the breakthrough in Sino-American relations in
1971-1972 was at least partially the result of American
initiatives toward the Soviet Union.
By the time Joseph Kraft made his recommendation, however,
the payoff to be gained from manipulating the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute had diminished considerably. Allen S. Whiting observed
in 1980 that: "The expedient exploitation of Sino-Soviet
tensions has outlived its short-run advantages, considerable
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as they may have been ten years ago." Almost every analy-
sis of American policy towards China and Russia made over the
past few years supports Whiting's conclusion. A common theme
of these analyses is that the Sino-Soviet dispute has its own
internal dynamics which are not subject to external manipula-
tion. Leslie H. Brown observed in 19 77 that:
The Sino-Soviet split is not a variable that can
be manipulated from outside. It exists as a con-
sequence of geographic proximity, the personalities
and outlook of the present leadership on both sides,
the competition for primacy, a long history of
difficult party-to-party and state-to-state rela-
tions and deep cultural dif ferences . 47
This view is also that of Kenneth Lieberthal, who goes on to
recommend the approach the United States should take in
dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute:
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The basic contours of the Sino-Soviet relation-
ship are relatively firmly fixed along the lines
analyzed at the beginning of this section, and
there is little the United States can do to ma-
nipulate this Sino-Soviet interaction. United
States policies toward each of these communist
powers should be based, therefore, primarily on
U.S. bilateral interests with each, and should
not take as a central concern a desire to pro-
duce an effect on the Sino -Soviet leg of the
triangle . 48
After having reviewed the policy options that can be de-
rived from the conceptual framework of the strategic tri-
angle, one is left with the uncomfortable feeling that
adherence to a strategy based on maintaining or exploiting
the triangular relationship is not a tenable basis for
American foreign policy. Geometric perfectionism--that is,
attempting to keep the triangle equilateral using the bal-
anced approach--proved to be impossible in the face of quite
divergent Soviet and Chinese behavior. Playing the China
card and playing off the Soviets and Chinese against one
another are both short-term tactical moves, rather than strate-
gies, and both have serious long-term adverse consequences.
That leaves tilting toward China as the only viable policy
within the strategic triangle framework. But having tilted,
where do we go from here?
There is emerging an awareness that the strategic tri-
angle is not an adequate framework for policy formulation.
Richard Holbrooke expressed such an awareness, which could
reasonably be taken as representing a Carter Administration
awareness, in a June 1980 speech: "While strategic factors
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remain a central consideration in our relations, the famous
triangular diplomacy of the early 1970s is no longer an ade-
49quate framework in which to view relations with China."
Michel Oksenberg has supported this view in a recent Foreign
Affairs article, but neither Holbrooke (and the administra-
tion he represented) nor Oksenberg offered an alternative con-
ceptual framework—with the result that their analyses of
strategic issues tended to reflect the triangular framework
nonetheless
.
It is not sufficient to attempt to innovate new policy
options within the framework of the strategic triangle con-
ceptual framework. In addition to being incapable of provid-
ing a basis for a sound strategy toward China, as discussed
above, the strategic triangle concept has a fundamental theo-
retical flaw: triangular relationships are inherently un-
stable. Great power triangles do not naturally tend to become
equilateral, nor is an equilateral relationship among the three
powers in the triangle necessarily any more stable than any
51
other geometric depiction of their relationships.
It is not a coincidence that Morton Kaplan, who made a
thorough study of the concept of polarity, did not even
propose a "tripolar model," and that none of the analyses
which advocated maintaining a triangular relationship could
cite a historical example of a great power triangle that
naturally tended to become equilateral or stable. The tri-
angular relationship between the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany
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and the Western powers during the 1930s certainly did not
obey the rules of triangular models. The triangular rela-
tionship between the Soviet Union, China and Japan during
the same period also did not adhere to geometric propriety.
Such comparisons undoubtedly are subject to a host of
objections. The objections are welcome, for they will al-
most certainly illustrate the basic cause of the inherent
weakness of the triangular model: a systemic relationship
among the Soviet Union, the United States, and China cannot
be defined without reference to the goals and strategies
of the three powers. As described above, the balanced
approach to relations with the Soviet Union and China—in
theory the optimum policy for maintaining the triangular
relationship— failed because of the widely divergent foreign
policies of the Soviet Union and China. The failure of the
balanced approach was not a quirk: it was symptomatic of
the fundamental theoretical flaw of the strategic triangle
as a conceptual framework.
The national interest requires that the United States
abandon 'geometric determinism' in defining its security
interests in China. The international political arena and
the strategic relationships among the United States, the
Soviet Union and China are far more complex than the tri-
angular approach would suggest. There is an alternative
conceptual framework, albeit not a neat, compact one, that
better describes the current international system and pro-
vides a more suitable basis for the formulation of American
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policy toward China and the Soviet Union. The alternative
conceptual framework that will be used herein is the "latent
bipolar/de facto polycen trie/multiple issue-based systems"
approach. For brevity, this conceptual framework will be
referred to simply as the "multiple systems framework."
It must be stressed that this approach will be used merely
as a conceptual framework, not as a model. No claim is made
that there are patterns of international power relationships
that have their own dynamics independent of the policies and
behavior of the nations under discussion. Even more impor-
tant: there is no one structural relationship that is super-
ior to any other, and no normative judgment will be passed
on particular foreign policy options based on structural cri-
teria. The multiple systems framework is a tool for descrip-
tion, not a standard for prescription.
What are the consequences of using this • alternative con-
ceptual framework? First of all, the national interest is
not defined in terms of maintaining any particular structural
relationship with the Soviet Union and China. The focus is
on issues and their impact on American interests, rather than
on their impact on structural relationships.
This does not mean that American security interests in
China will be defined in a strictly bilateral context, ignor-
ing the broader international context. Nor does use of the
multiple systems framework imply that there are no security
issues for which the triangular Sino-Soviet-American relation-
ship is the most important consideration in defining American

interests. The triangular strategic relationship is, however,
just one of numerous structural relationships that might apply
A second consequence of shifting from the strategic tri-
angle to the multiple systems framework is that the element
of time as a factor in defining American security interests
in China is more fully taken into account. As was noted
earlier, the policy options that derive from the strategic
triangle concept all tend to focus on the short-term. This
problem has been recognized as such by several observers.
Steven I. Levine, for example, has suggested that policy
makers "should differentiate between short-term power-maximiz-
52ing and long-term problem-solving approaches," and Allen
S. Whiting has called for "long-range policy planning" to
cope with the problems of the Sino-American security rela-
53tionship. By addressing issues on their own merits and in
terms of the particular international power relationship that
applies in each case (if any does apply) , the multiple systems
framework allows more careful consideration of the long-term
aspects of security problems.
The third, and probably the most significant, consequence
of adopting the multiple systems framework is that it high-
lights the fragility of a Sino-American relationship founded
primarily on a common concern with the Soviet threat to each
nation's own national interests. Although this weakness in
the Sino-American relationship has been pointed out on numer-
ous occasions, it is of such great importance that it deserves
to be discussed in detail.
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Under Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. observed
of Sino-American ties in April 1981 that: "These ties, now
over two years old, are firmly grounded on both sides in
54
enlightened self-interest and mutual respect." This obser-
vation is essentially correct, but great care must be taken
not to read into it more than was intended. The ties were
not said to be irreversible, all-encompassing, or based on
historical friendship. Moreover, when the scope of the "en-
lightened self-interests" that are common to the United States
and China is compared with the scope of the self-interests-
enlightened or otherwise—that each holds individually, the
actual weakness of the foundation on which Sino-American ties
is based becomes apparent.
Harry Schwartz, writing in the Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science in 1974, warned that:
. . .we need to understand that neither the Soviet
Union as it exists today nor the Chinese People's
Republic as it exists today is a friend to the
United States.... Their willingness to be coop-
erative comes from their mutual fear of each other.
The United States has been the beneficiary of the
Sino-Soviet split. 55
Today, seven years later, that observation is still largely
true. Of course, there has been a rapid growth in Sino-
American trade, especially since normalization of relations,
and various types of visits and exchanges have also increased
in numbers and in the diversity of subjects being discussed,
but the growth of these relationships has been a fringe bene-
fit of ties established on the basis of the strategic rela-
tionship—opposition to the Soviet Union.
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Western observers have tended to overstate the magnitude
of the shift that has occurred in Chinese foreign policy.
In terms of the specific policies being pursued, the swing
from ideological hostility to the West to joining with the
West in a united front against Soviet hegemonism--as the
Chinese describe their present policy--has certainly been
great. On a deeper level, however, there is a surprising
degree of continuity in the basic national goals being pursued.
One of the major reasons why Western observers quite
often have difficulty understanding and predicting Chinese
foreign policy behavior is the apparently widely held assump-
tion that pragmatic and ideological objectives can be differ-
entiated, and that to a large degree they are mutually ex-
clusive. The debate over the relative importance of ideology
versus national interest in the foreign policies of communist
countries— the Soviet Union as well as China—is one manifes-
tation of this implicit assumption. The frequently observed
overreaction to shifts in Chinese foreign policy, which results
from an ethnocentric perception of the notion of "pragmatism,
"
is another result. For example, Thomas W. Robinson noted in
198 that:
For the first time since the early 1950s, the
Chinese Communist Party seems to be consider-
ing China's welfare in a reasonably objective
sense, conducting a foreign policy to assure
the country's political and social health,
economic modernization, and external security. 56
Observations such as Robinson's are not necessarily wrong,
the problem is that—from China's point of view—foreign policy
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decisions are always pragmatic and "reasonably objective."
At the same time, every foreign policy decision must support
the ideological objectives of the Chinese Communist Party,
even if that requires what Western observers view as seman-
tic gymnastics to bring the two into line. It is best, there-
fore, to not attempt to make the pragmatism-ideology
differentiation and instead to be honest with ourselves and
judge shifts in Chinese foreign policy in terms of their
impact on American interests.
The Chinese decision to improve its relations with the
West in order to gain political, economic and—indirectly--
military support in its rivalry with the Soviet Union was
certainly based on a pragmatic assessment of China's weak-
nesses and of what the West potentially had to offer. That
decision also reflected strategic implementation of the ideo-
logical principle of the "united front": identifying the
number one enemy to China—the Soviet Union—and seeking the
support of those countries presenting less of a threat—the
United States, Western Europe, and Japan in particular.
Geng Biao, a Vice Premier and member of the Politburo, is
reported to have stated in a 1976 speech: "If we force
these two superpowers to stand together, and deal with them
one by one, the consequences would be unthinkable. ... Hence,
we must strive to develop better Sino-U.S. relations to have
5 8
one less enemy, and to be united with more friends."
This is the foundation on which Sino-American ties have
been builts since 1971. It has been strong eneough a motive
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to allow both the United States and China to set aside for
the time being numerous issues upon which there is little if
any agreement, such as Taiwan and Chinese territorial claims
against countries allied or friendly with the United States.
Despite the strength that common opposition to the Soviet
Union has shown as a basis for expanding the Sino-American
relationship, over the long-term this motive will not be an
adequate foundation for the pursuit of American interests in
China. There are two reasons for this pessimism.
First, the United States and China do not see eye to eye
on how best to cope with the Soviet threat. There appears
to be, at least for the time being, more of a consensus among
China's leaders than among American leaders as to how to re-
spond to Soviet expansionism. On the American side, Allen
S. Whiting has described the problem quite well:
If Soviet expansionism is seen as inexorable and
susceptible to being checked only by counter-
vailing power, then Moscow's reaction should not
inhibit the West in strengthening China, whether
as a tacit or a full ally. If, however, the
Soviet-American relationship is to be a blend of
confrontation and cooperation, whereby coercion
and persuasion mix military deterrence with
economic inducements, then each move that in-
creases Beijing's potential anti-Soviet posture
must be assessed for its impact on Moscow.^
Which of these two views is held by the Reagan Administration
is not entirely clear: based on the tone of public state-
ments on the Soviet Union, the first view would appear to be
prevalent; but based on actions taken toward the Soviets
—
such as ending the grain embargo and reopening theater nuc-
lear talks—the second view is probably closer to that held
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by the Administration. It is likely that the second view,
which has more or less prevailed during the four administra-
tions prior to this one, will continue to prevail in the
future—unless the Soviet Union abandons completely its inter-
est in detente in order to pursue its interest in expansion.
Chinese leaders, on the other hand, have made it clear
how they intend to deal with the Soviets, and how they expect
the West to deal with the Soviets. An April 1981 Beijing
Review commentary asserted that: "History has proved that
no agreement or negotiation can stop the Soviet hegemonists
6from pursuing their policies of aggression and expansion."
The contrast between the Western carrot-and-stick approach
and the Chinese defiance-and-stick approach has been pointed
out by Michael Pillsbury:
There could hardly be a sharper contrast between
those in the West who seek to reassure a paranoid
Soviet leadership that it can trust the. West and
should participate in normal international life
and the Chinese vision of a Soviet bully that
must be punished and tamed whenever and wherever
it misbehaves in order to dissuade it from




It seems inevitable that sooner or later the Western and
Chinese strategies for dealing with the Soviet threat will
come into conflict. When that day comes, a Sino-American
relationship founded primarily on mutual opposition to the
Soviets would be severely strained. It is not reasonable to
expect either side to sacrifice what it perceives to be its
own vital security interests in order to accommodate to the
44

other. Commentary in the Beijing Review has been quick to
warn that "it would be a blunder to think that China has much
to ask of the United States and, consequently, would submit
to the latter' s dictate."
The second reason for doubting that common opposition to
the Soviet Union will be an adequate long-term basis for Sino-
American relations is that the many potential sources of con-
flict between the United States and China have not been
resolved, they have merely been set aside until the common
threat has been dealt with. Edward E. Rice has pointed out
that: "In sum, the longer-term relationship between the
People's Republic of China and the United States may depend
heavily on the extent to which the sources of mutual conten-
tion, which now lie latent, are removed during the present
period of detente - . " These points of potential conflict will
be discussed as specific U.S. security interests are examined.
These latent sources of tension have deep historical and
even cultural roots. One important warning that must be kept
in mind is that the current Chinese strategy of joining with
the West in a united front against the Soviet Union is the
product of a pragmatic assessment of the international power
balance, and reflects goals that are much more fundamental
than simple anti-Sovietism. Should the Chinese in the future
perceive the Soviet threat as subsiding—admittedly a dim
prospect—then those same fundamental Chinese goals could
bring China into conflict with the West again. Along these
lines, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. has warned that:
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American policymakers must ask whether Beijing's
interest is simply the replacement of Soviet
"hegemonism" by the PRC as the dominant political
influence in Southeast Asia? If it is, then
China's aims, in the longer term, would not co-
incide with those of the United States or with
other countries in the region. 64
The current Sino-American relationship has even been
able to moderate tensions arising from basic cultural dif-
ferences in order to focus on common cause against the Soviet
Union. Once again, however, the long-run prospects are not
so bright. Lucian W. Pye has pointed this out:
Thus the historic conflict between Chinese arro-
gance and Western avariciousness has been, at
least temporarily, set aside in favor of a state
of cooperative euphoria; but it is questionable
how enduring a relationship can be when it is
based upon this unlikely combination of the
Chinese cultural sin of pride and the Western
cultural sin of greed. 65
It seems unlikely that a Sino-American relationship founded
on opposition to the Soviet Union could have the breadth of
view or the flexibility to cope with the tensions one can ex-
pect to arise out of cultural differences, differing foreign
policy goals, and differeing views on how to cope with the
Soviet threat. Therefore, the pursuit of American security
interests over the long-term will require that deliberate
efforts aimed at broadening the scope and basis of the Sino-
American relationship be made.
The strategic triangle model does not provide a suitable
basis for broadening the scope of the Sino-American reslation-
ship, in that it focuses attention on and gives priority to
the anti-Soviet tactical moves that are already the basis of
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the relationship. The multiple systems view of the inter-
national arena, on the other hand, does provide a framework
for broadening the scope of the relationship. Broadening the
basis of the Sino-American relationship by addressing issues
on the basis of mutual interests, rather than on the basis
of maintaining or exploiting the strategic triangle, will be
a primary theme of the remainder of this paper. The national
interest, particularly as affected by the Sino-American re-
lationship, requires that the American strategy toward China
be founded on this approach--the broadening of the scope of
the relationship. Paul C. Warnke has well described the long-
term need for this approach:
The way in which we look at China, however,
should not be limited to the perspective of our
own complex rivalry with the Soviet Union. The
value of a reasonably normal relationship with
China does not turn on its availability as a
counter against expansion of Soviet power and
influence. If the Soviet Union did not exist,
it would still be important that we try to work
with the government of one-quarter of the
world's people to deal with the global problems
of peace, development, and environmental pro-
tection. 66
B. SOVIET CHINA POLICY: CONTAINMENT AND COEXISTENCE
A rigorous examination of American security interests in
China requires an understanding of the Soviet view of their
security interests in China. This is necessary because there
has been somewhat of a gap in the study of the Sino-American
security relationship. On the one hand there have been made
several studies of the Sino-Soviet relationship detailing
the complexities of their relations and of Soviet motives
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toward China. On the other hand, however, analyses of the
American security interest in China have tended to simply
assume that a Soviet threat to China does (or does not, de-
pending on the author's point of view) exist, and then focus
on how rather than why the Soviets threaten China. The pur-
pose of this section is to attempt to fill that gap--to gain
an understanding of Soviet policy toward China as a founda-
tion for examination of America's interest in the security
of China.
Soviet strategy toward China will be developed in three
steps, beginning with the objectives of Soviet foreign and
defense policy--overall objectives, Asian objectives, and
objectives vis-a-vis China. Next, Soviet perceptions of the
Chinese threat to Soviet security will be described. Finally,
the nature of the Soviet military threat to China will be
discussed.
1 . Objectives of Soviet Foreign and Defense Policy
There are many areas of disagreement among Western
observers of Soviet foreign and defense policies. For example,
there is no consensus as to whether the expansionist tendency
of Soviet foreign policy is due to communist ideology, Russian
imperialism, or merely to opportunism and lack of Western
resolve. Likewise, there is disagreement as to whether the
Soviet military and naval buildup has been drived by Soviet
"paranoia"--the memory of the many invasions Russia has suffered
in its history—or by a Soviet desire to achieve absolute stra-
tegic superiority in order to pursue a course of global
domination.

Despite such disagreements—which are to be expected
given the ambiguity and sparseness of the information—it is
possible to describe in at least general terms the objectives
of Soviet foreign and defense policies. In a January 1981
article in the Soviet journal Communist of the Armed Forces
,
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko described the goals
of the Soviet Union as follows:
The foreign policy course of the Soviet State,
implemented under the leadership of the Communist
Party, is aimed at ensuring favorable international
conditions for the development of communism in the
USSR, defending the Soviet Union's state inter-
ests, strengthening the positions of world
socialism, supporting the people's struggle for
national liberation and social progress
,
prevent-
ing aggressive wars, attaining general and com-
plete disarmament, and at consistently imple-
menting the principle of peaceful co-existence
among states with different social systems. 67
This statement, while reasonably straightforward and compre-
hensive in broad terms, cannot be understood at face value.
Like any other Soviet public pronouncement, each term has
precise ideological meaning—distinct from the dictionary
definition it would have in the West—and each of the goals
has a historical context which gives it operational meaning
when estimating future Soviet behavior.
The first two objectives—ensuring favorable inter-
national conditions for the development of communism in the
USSR and defending Soviet state interests—have five aspects
in Western terms: (1) military security of the Soviet home-
land; (2) expansion of Soviet influence at the expense of
its global and regional rivals; (3) expansion of Soviet access
49

to Western markets and finance, particularly for foodstuffs
and high technology, but also for Western investment in Soviet
resource extraction projects and possibly for future access
to Third World raw materials; (4) ideological isolation of
the Soviet social and political order from potentially com-
petitive ideas; and (5) active participation in international
forums dealing with world order issues affecting Soviet inter-
ests, such as the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, to achieve
short-run political or economic gains or at least to disrupt
initiatives that would hinder the achievement of long-range
goals
.
"Strengthening the positions of world socialism"
refers to what has come to be called the 'Brezhnev Doctrine 1
in the West. Although the name for the doctrine is somewhat
misleading, in that the concept it labels dates back at least
to Stalin's rule, the name has stuck because the most force-
ful articulation of the doctrine of limited sovereignty among
socialist nations was made in September 1968 after Soviet and
Warsaw Pact forces crushed the "Prague Spring" in Czechoslo-
fi ft
vakia. This objective of Soviet foreign policy has special
impact for the people of Afghanistan, who have been rendered
fraternal assistance and are now enjoying its fruits, and for
the leadership and people of Poland, who live in daily fear
of being rendered fraternal assistance should the Soviets de-
cide the Polish reforms threaten the socialist camp.
"Supporting the people's struggle for national liber-
ation and social progress" refers to the type of operations
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the Soviets undertook in Angola in 1975 and in Ethiopia in
1978, as well as to lesser levels of support rendered to vari-
ous revolutionary movements. Lest there be any doubt as to
Soviet intentions regarding such support, in the article men-
tioned above Foreign Minister Gromyko went on to state that:
"Proletarian internationalism as the fundamental principle of
Soviet foreign policy means that this policy consistently up-
holds the basic interests of world socialism, of the forces
of the international communist and workers movements, as well
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as of the national liberation movement."
"Preventing aggressive wars" means deterring, by means
of military power and an assertive foreign policy backed by the
threat of its use, attacks by the West or China on the allies
or clients of the Soviet Union. For example, the Chinese at-
tack on Vietnam was an aggressive war in the Soviet view. By
(Soviet) definition, revolutionary wars and wars of national
liberation—as well as Soviet intervention in support of them--
are "just" wars.
"Attaining general and complete disarmament" refers
to a specific proposal first put forward by the Soviet Union
on September 18, 1959 and pursued with varying degrees of enthu-
siasm ever since. General and complete disarmament includes
conventional forces as well as nuclear weapons, and, although
the basic Soviet intention may well be a sincere desire for
disarmament, the history of Soviet exploitation of the proposal
for propaganda purposes and a lack of serious proposals for
implementing it both suggest that other arms control proposals
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are of more immediate interest to the Soviet Union. Bringing
up general and complete disarmament puts both the United States
and China on the defensive regarding arms control (both nations
oppose the Soviet proposal) and could well be designed to spur
the U.S. to participate in discussions the Soviets do take
seriously: European theater nuclear force limitations and
strategic arms limitations.
The final objective described by Gromyko, "consistently
implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence among states
with different social systems," has been the Soviet foreign
policy objective least understood in the West. The Soviet
view was described clearly by G.Kh. Shakhnazarov, President
of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences, in a 1979
speech before the International Political Science Association
in Moscow:
Detente and peaceful coexistence assure what
is most important for all peoples, for all humanity:
prevention of the threat of a global nuclear con-
flict. So far as social progress is concerned,
those who are dissatisfied with the situation can
only submit their complaints to history itself,
for it alone predetermined the inevitability of
the downfall of the capitalist system and the
affirmation of socialism. "70
This Soviet view, that detente referred only to Soviet-American
bilateral tensions and not to Third World conflicts or Soviet
intervention in them, became a subject of great controversy
when its implications sunk in after the Soviet actions in
Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviets had not, however, made any
attempt to conceal their intentions and must have thought
therefore that the American euphoria with detente represented
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a tacit acceptance of their view. In 1974 Soviet leader Leonid
Brezhnev warned that: "Lenin, the greatest of revolutionaries,
said revolutions are not made to order by agreement. It might
be added that revolution, or a liberation movement also cannot
be canceled by order or agreement. There is no power on
earth that can turn back the inexorable process of renovation
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of the life of society."
Summarizing the points (implicit as well as explicit)
made in the Gromyko statement on Soviet foreign policy objec-
tives results in a list of ten goals: (1) defense of the home-
land, (2) expansion of Soviet influence, (3) access to Western
markets, (4) ideological isolation, (5) shaping of world order
issues, (6) the Brezhnev doctrine, (7) support for revolu-
tionary movements, (8) defense of allies and clients, (9) arms
limitations, and (10) peaceful coexistence.
The basic goals of Soviet defense policy are also
encompassed in this list: six of the ten objectives are re-
lated to defense of the Soviet Union or its interests. Thomas
W. Wolfe has deduced three "governing assumptions and priori-
ties" of the military policy of the Brezhnev regime: (1) avoid-
ance of general nuclear war through deterrence based on
strategic nuclear power; (2) maintenance of the strong Soviet
continental military position, due to its European interests
and the Chinese threat; and (3) the development of more mobile
and versatile conventional power to support its interests in
72the Third World. Although Wolfe's analysis is over ten years
old, the continuing momentum of the Soviet effort to modernize
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and increase the firepower of its forces—an effort that is
widely documented and need not be detailed herein— indicates
that the same three principles are supporting the objectives
described by Gromyko in 19 81.
Before going on to discuss Soviet objectives in Asia,
a final point on the purposes served by Soviet foreign policy
must be made. As in any highly centralized authoritarian or
totalitarian regime whose legitimacy is based upon the ideology
of the ruling elite, foreign policy plays an important role in
Soviet politics. Morton Schwartz has provided a good overview
of the reasons for this linkage of foreign policy to legiti-
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macy in the Soviet Union. Adam Ulam has summarized the
connection as follows
:
...there is little foundation in the hope often
expressed in the West that the growth and ma-
turity of the USSR as a modern and industrial
state will necessarily be reflected in more
peaceful and less expansive policies. As we
have seen, the growing power and prosperity of
the USSR as a state , even the increased mater-
ial well-being of its citizens, accentuate
rather than diminish the ideological crisis.
...in the measure that the Communist movement
achieves its objectives, it becomes increasingly
difficult to preserve the totalitarian system,
to continue to exact sacrifices and deny basic
freedoms and amenities of life. The program of
ideological revival devised by the despot's
successors has aimed at preventing communism
from "withering away," and thus at preserving
the rationale of Soviet totalitarianism. An
increasingly great part in this revival has
been played by the renewed missionary character
of communism. Thus the success of communism as
a self-proclaimed worldwide liberation and peace
movement, and as a tenable basis for the asso-
ciation of Communst states, becomes increasingly
important to the present form of the Communist
regime in the USSR. 74
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Ulam's observations, made in 1959, have surely been proven
by the course of events over the succeeding 22 years. If
anything, his observations understated what was in store. The
Brezhnev regime would sacrifice improvement in the material
well-being of the Soviet people to build up military forces
capable of projecting Soviet power to ensure the success of
the worldwide liberation movement.
The linkage of foreign policy to the legitimacy of
the regime, caused by the ideological justification for Com-
munist Party rule, has a negative side. As was mentioned above
(objective number four) , Soviet foreign policy must ensure the
ideological isolation of the Soviet people. This has concrete,
sometimes brutal, manifestations. It has forced the Soviets
to engage in semantic gymnastics in an effort to justify their
intention to essentially ignore the provisions of basket three
of the Helsinki Accords of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Vernon V. Aspaturian has noted that:
"The Soviet leaders are painfully aware that Basket Three is
incompatible with the nature of their system as it now exists,
but they are determined to preserve the essential character
of the Soviet social order and will adopt all necessary measures
to maximize its maintenance. There are too many glaring weak-
nesses and obvious malfunctions in Soviet society for the
Soviet leaders to risk the importation of competing ideas or
to allow the expression of dissident and critical views on the
75part of its own citizens."
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The so-called Brezhnev doctrine, although primarily
intended to prevent Soviet satellites from leaving the Soviet-
led socialist camp, is also related to the ideological isola-
tion of the Soviet people. In the case of the Soviet intervention
in Czechoslovakia in 19 68 this Soviet motive is reasonably
clear and there is a consensus among Western observers that
7 fi
it was a factor in the Soviet decision. In the case of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, however, it is not so
clear that ideological isolation of the Soviet Muslim popula-
tion from fundamentalist Islamic beliefs was a major factor
in the decision: Alexander Dallin asserts that it was not and
that there is no evidence of Soviet fear of this problem;
Vernon Aspaturian believes it was not "an immediate or critical
concern" because the problem could be managed; and Jiri Valenta
perceives it was a major concern because of "potentially grave
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side effects for Soviet Central Asia." Contrary to Dallin 1 s
assertion, there is evidence—though hardly conclusive—of
Soviet concern for the loyalty of its Muslim minorities prior
to the Afghan operation, and clear indications that this prob-
7 8lem will grow in the future. Soviet concern over the turmoil
in Poland today has again been linked with the problem of
ideological isolation, even more solidly than was concern over
79Czechoslovakia in 1968, strongly suggesting that the ideologi-
cal isolation of the Soviet people will become an increasingly
important foreign policy objective.
According to Thomas W. Robinson, the Soviet Union had




it, and previous Tsarist regimes, had so long sought."
Becoming an Asian power was not an end in itself, it was the
consequence of Soviet pursuit of well-defined foreign policy
and security objectives in the region. Those Soviet objec-
tives have been summarized well by Alfred Biegel:
Generally, the Soviet Grand Design for Asia
represents a broad security framework to bolster
the USSR's global position while accomplishing
the following important regional objectives:
-Deterring potential threats to the territorial
integrity of the USSR.
-Increasing the Kremlin's regional power and
influence at the expense of China and the Western
world.
-Maintaining ideological primacy over the PRC and
other Communist governments and parties of Asia.
-Achieving a rapprochement with China during the
post-Mao era on Moscow's terms.
-Minimizing the effects of the growing Sino-
American rapproachement
.
-Improving relations with Japan.
-Preventing a Sino-Japanese partnership with de
facto U.S. backing. 81
Two other Soviet objectives perceived by other observers,
although closely related to points listed above, could be
added to Biegel 's analysis: ensuring freedom to deploy naval
82forces to deep water, and breaking out of the relative
political isolation the Soviet Union has experienced in Asia.
China figures prominently in the Soviet Union's
strategy for Asia. This is apparent from the list of objec-
tives deduced by Biegel, and is emphasized by Robinson, who
observed that "by 1980 most of the direction and the variance
in the Soviet Union's Asian policy and position was traceable
directly to the felt need, for a combination of offensive and




in Asia." Furthermore, the China factor has given Asia a
much higher priority in Soviet foreign policy than the region
had in the past. Biegel believes that East Asia is now "no
less vital than the political-military front between NATO and
8 5
the Warsaw Pact" to Moscow. His view is supported by Joseph
Schiebel, who has provided the rationale for it:
...the Soviet Union can live with the status quo
of her strategic position vis-a-vis Europe for
some time even if it means having to defer some
current expectations of expanding her political
influence there; but, having lost the initiative
in East Asia as a result of losing strategic
access to Asia with the activation of U.S.-PRC
strategic cooperation, the Soviet Union must
move to regain her ability to project her power
to that battleground of global competition.
Soviet policies toward Europe, the United States
and related areas are, then, in the first instance,
functions of Soviet strategy toward China.
Schiebel ' s analysis was made in 1977. Over the next two
years it would become apparent that the lynchpin in the
Soviet strategy for regaining strategic access to East Asia
would be Vietnam: on June 28, 1978 Vietnam announced it was
joining the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON)
;
on November 3, 1978 the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed their
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance; and
in the Spring of 1979, after the Chinese invasion of Vietnam,
the Soviets began to regularly use ports and airfields in
Vietnam for deployments of its navy and air force.
There is somewhat of a consensus among western observ-
ers that the Soviet Union has a dual strategy for dealing with
China: containment and coexistence. Harry Gelman has des-
cribed this dual strategy as follows:
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On the one hand the Soviets would like to do every-
thing possible to weaken, subdue, or isolate the
Chinese; on the other hand they would like to re-
duce Chinese hostility. . . . Neither element in the
Soviet posture— the unrelenting competitive pres-
sure and the unabashed effort to improve selected
aspects of bilateral dealings—is likely to be
abandoned by Brezhnev's heirs, for it is clear
that this has been a very characteristic line of
Soviet policy, practiced toward other powers with
some success.^
Kenneth Lieberthal has referred to this Soviet dual approach
as a "carrot and stick" policy--the carrot being offers to
normalize relations and the stick being diplomatic encircle-
ment and military buildup around China—both courses of which
are aimed at the same objective: "to steer the PRC onto a
less anti-Soviet course and thereby diminish somewhat the im-
mense national security threat that it perceives looming from
8 8
across the disputed Sino-Soviet border."
The Soviet encirclement of China has two aspects:
political and military. The political objective is to expand
8 9Soviet influence and limit Chinese influence in Asia. The
military aspect is manifest in the Soviet military buildup and
force modernization in the Soviet Far East, the expansion and
modernization of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the deployment of
Soviet forces in Afghanistan and Vietnam, and in the Soviet
treaties with those two nations and India—all of which have
defense provisions. The Soviet proposal for a Collective Se-
curity System in Asia is also widely regarded as an element in




Another aspect of the Soviet containment policy is an
apparent effort to keep China militarily weak. Gelman men-
tioned this in passing in the citation on the previous page
as one of three elements of Soviet pressure on China. Donald
Zagoria believes that keeping China weak is the key to the
Soviet strategy toward China:
The Soviets are interested in isolating China in
Asia, and in encircling her militarily until the
time comes to improve relations with China. They're
interested as well in keeping Chinese ties to the
United States, Japan, and other Asian countries
at a minimum. And they're intent upon keeping
China economically, technologically, and militarily
weak. All of these goals, in fact, are part of
a Soviet effort to keep China weak, for the
Soviets want and need a weak China. Should China
become a great power, they know that it will, in
the long run, almost certainly be a dangerous
adversary. 91
There is ample evidence to support Zagoria 's contention. The
Sino-Soviet dispute over nuclear weapons and arms control from
1957 to 1963 is said by Alice L. Hsieh to have "confirmed Mos-
cow' s reluctance to see Peking acquire an independent nuclear
92
capability." Similarly, Joseph E. Thach, Jr., has concluded
that during the ten years of Soviet military assistance to
China (1950-1960) , "the USSR never planned to give the PRC the




Why should the Soviet Union desire to keep China mili-
tarily weak? The obvious answer is because of the deeply
rooted Russian fear of the Chinese threat, and this will be
discussed in the next section. There is, however, another
possible explanation—one that complements the first one. 0.
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Edmund Clubb, in his exhaustive study of Sino-Russian rela-
tions, proposed that the Soviet Union needs buffers for its
Asian frontiers:
In Asia, Moscow proposes similarly to keep China
functioning as a barrier between the Soviet Union
and American sea and air power in the West Pacific,
and to have the Mongolian People's Republic per-
form a valuable buffer role against China itself.
^
4
Even though it is passe to think in terms of buffers in the
West now that strategy has entered the nuclear era, the
Russians—as their strategy in Europe today attests—still
attach great value to the possession of buffers of some
form along its lengthy frontiers. The danger to China is
that, if the People's Republic cannot be cajoled or intimidated
into adopting a foreign policy posture appropriate for being
a Soviet buffer, the Soviet Union may settle for chunks of
China instead: repetition of the Mongolian solution of 1921
95in Xinjiang and Manchuria.
The second half of the Soviet dual strategy toward
China is coexistence. In his January 1981 article, Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko reaffirmed this objective and in the
process illustrated the dual nature of the Soviet approach to
relations with China:
The Soviet Union, while consistently opposing
Beijing's expansionist aspirations and the aggres-
sive nature of its policy permeated with pathologi-
cal anti-Sovietism, nevertheless considers it
necessary to normalize Soviet-Chinese inter-
state relations on the principles of peaceful co-
existence. And it is prepared to go its share
of the way in this direction. 9 6
The first part of Gromyko 's statement is representative of the
way in which the Soviet Union describes its containment policy
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toward China. It also illustrates the Soviet conception of
a "carrot and stick" policy: when one holds forth the carrot,
one does not put away the stick--one waves it menacingly lest
its reality be discounted by the rival.
The second part of Gromyko's statement is significant
for three reasons. First, it illustrates the Soviet focus on
state-to-state, vice party-to-party, relations with China.
Improving interstate ties is a much more modest goal than
improving interparty ties, therefore is a more realistic goal,
but also has less of a payoff for the Soviets. In particular,
the ideological rivalry between the two communist powers would
be left unresolved. This ideological rivalry is not just a
semantic debate: it cuts across several of the foreign policy
goals of the Soviet Union discussed earlier and even affects
the critical issue of the legitimacy of the Soviet regime.
The second significant point in Gromyko's statement
is that relations are to be normalized on the principles of
peaceful coexistence. The concept of peaceful coexistence was
originally meant to apply only to relations between countries
with different social systems—socialism and capitalism--and
is still used in that sense today. This is an implicit re-
affirmation of the Soviet position that China is no longer a
member of the socialist camp, but is an ideological rival to
it. Soviet propaganda against China routinely makes the point
that China is an enemy of the socialist and revolutionary
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movements. Once again, this is far more than mere semantics:
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China being in opposition to the socialist camp implies the
threat of military action, and is further illustration of the
principle of waving the stick while offering the carrot.
Joseph Schiebel succinctly described the implications of this
Soviet view of China:
At the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev
proclaimed that it was no longer enough to say
that Maoist ideology and policy were incompatible
with Marxist-Leninist teaching, but that "they are
plainly hostile to it." This substantially re-
vises the position the Soviet Union had taken on
the Maoist 'heresy' until then: Communist China
is no longer to be treated as a temporarily er-
rant fraternal socialist country, subject to the
restraints prescribed for adversaries in that
category, but as an out-and-out enemy nation in-
stead. This redefinition provides the doctrinal
and, more importantly, propaganda base for dras-
tic and theoretically unlimited action against
China. 98
The third significant point in Gromyko's statement is
the Soviet offer to "go its share of the way" toward normali-
zation of state-to-state relations. This indicates that the
Gromyko statement is not merely propaganda—though it certainly
has propaganda value. Soviet statements whose primary purpose
is to score political points with third parties rather than to
open a dialogue with Beijing tend to emphasize the need for
China's leaders to come around to the Soviet view. This implied
offer of concession is the real carrot in the Gromyko state-
ment, and is typically and deliberately left vague. The pri-
mary reason for this is that the Soviets have been unwilling
to offer the one carrot that the Chinese demand as an absolute
minimum Soviet concessions: that the Soviets put down their
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stick by making a significant reduction in the military
threat to China.
What incentives does the Soviet Union have to seek
normalization of relations with China? Donald Zagoria has
deduced five: (1) to reduce Soviet fears of a two-front war;
(2) to reduce the threat of an anti-Soviet combination of
China, the United States, Japan, and Western Europe; (3) to
increase Soviet diplomatic leverage on the United States and
China; (4) to increase Soviet prestige in the international
communist movement and the Third World.; and (5) to accrue
99prestige to the Soviet leader that achieves the thaw. These
five incentives directly and significantly support the ten
Soviet foreign policy objectives discussed earlier, and,
in the case of the fifth of Zagoria' s incentives, affects the
crucial legitimacy issue as well. Given such important pay-
offs from a normalization of relations with Beijing, it is
reasonable to expect that the Soviet strategy toward China
will continue to be the dual approach of containment and
coexistence
.
2. Soviet Perceptions of the Chinese Threat
It seems difficult for Americans to understand the
depth and emotion of the Soviet fear of the Chinese and the
reality with which they take the military threat perceived
to emanate from their continental neighbor. Visitors to
the Soviet Union and others who have worked closely with the
Russians consistently report on the intensity of such Russian
fears. Charles Douglas-Home observed:
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The Russians are clearly obsessed with a fear
of the yellow peril. In Moscow the visitor from
West Europe is assailed by warnings about the
Chinese menace. At a very basic, almost primi-
tive level, they fear that the Far east region
will soon be swamped by China's growing popula-
tion. . . 10 °
Nor are such warnings merely well-orchestrated repetitions of
the party line, designed to indoctrinate the visitor in the
official Soviet view. Hedrick Smith noted that, while the
Soviet people are apolitical, even cynical, about many of the
burning issues that the official media raise as immediate con-
cerns, this is not the case when it comes to perceptions of
China: "On no other issue did private opinion seem to coin-
cide more closely with the official line than in the deep-
seated Russian fear and mistrust of the Chinese." A 1980
study of the views of the middle-level Soviet elite revealed
that whereas their views of the United States were ambivalent--
admiration and sense of a common cause against China as well
as distrust—China was feared as an enemy.
Attributing these fears to Russian or Soviet paranoia
is too simplistic of an explanation for them. Having made
such an attribution, the tendency is either to dismiss them
as merely one of the unpleasantries of coexistence with the
Russians, or to sanctify the assuaging of those fears as an
inviolable article of detente. Neither course is a suitable
basis for United States policy toward China or the Soviet Union
Historical fears, even traditions of paranoia or xenophobia,
do not generate the conscious and apparently widely-held
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concerns observed by Douglas-Home and Smith unless there is
perceived to exist today the means and motivation for the
Chinese to threaten Russia.
Western perceptions of the nature of Soviet fears of
the Chinese threat have been clouded by the incessant polemical
debate, with its attendant hurling of accusations and denuncia-
tions back and forth, between the Soviet Union and China.
Keeping in mind the importance of the ideological imperatives,
it would be expected that even statements made solely for
propaganda purposes would reflect some aspect of the real
Soviet fears of China. That expectation, it turns out, is
valid—so statements from the Soviet press will be quoted
herein—but caution must still be exercised in interpreting
Soviet views due to the tactics employed by the Soviets in
their propaganda duels with the Chinese. Appendix 'A' analyzes
an important aspect of Soviet propaganda tactics that has lead
to misinterpretations of Soviet fears of the Chinese threat
and Soviet intentions toward China.
Allen S. Whiting has pointed out that there are con-
crete bases for the Soviet perception of a threat from China:
Soviet concern is not the expression of a
simple paranoia. So long as China contests ter-
ritory controlled by the USSR, the possibility
exists that aggressive local activity will trig-
ger clashes, as happened in 1969. The volatil-
ity of Chinese politics and the xenophobia of
the people, both dramatically evident during the
Cultural Revolution, offer little assurance that
this irrational behavior will not occur again. 103
Regardless of whether Chinese behavior is rational or not,
it has, from the Soviet point of view, been erratic,
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provocative, and prone to violence. Soviet press accounts
of the series of Chinese provocations along the Sino-Soviet
border prior to the March 2, 1969 clash mentioned by Whiting,
though perhaps embellished and naturally one-sided, are al-
104
most certainly not fabrications. The Chinese attacks on
India in 1962, the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea,
which were seized from South Vietnam in 1974, and on the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1979--along with what the
Soviets consider to be armed provocations against the Soviet
Union itself—provide evidence to support the Soviet percep-
tion of an aggressive China, at least in the minds of Soviet
leaders. The Soviets view the threat, according to Leon
Goure (et al) , as "beyond any predictability as to the ex-
tremes to which Peking might go in furtherance of its anti-
Soviet course, regardless of consequences.
Soviet perceptions of the Chinese threat focus on
Siberia. Because of its enormous economic potential, es-
pecially its energy resources, and the strategic importance
of naval and air force bases near the Pacific, the Soviet Far
East is of much greater significance than its vast empty
10 6
stretches of permafrost might at first indicate. Despite
having deployed massive forces along their border with China
since the mid-1960s, the Soviets apparently still feel Siberia
is vulnerable to Chinese attack and perceive that the Chinese
will have a growing motivation for such an assault as their
107population and economy expand.
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The Soviet Union takes the Chinese threat seriously,
and there is substantial evidence to indicate that during the
latter half of the 1970s the Soviets re-evaluated the danger
of war with China—concluding that the danger was indeed real
and was, in fact, greater than ever. The result of this up-
grading of the Chinese threat has been a second buildup and
modernization of Soviet forces along the Chinese border and
in the Far East in general, including the Pacific Fleet. The
intensity of Soviet concerns is demonstrated by the deploy-
ment of the latest in Soviet military equipment and weapons
systems to the Far East, some of it with higher priority than
108deployments to the European theater.
The Soviet perception of the Chinese threat extends
far beyond a fear of People's Liberation Army hordes pouring
over their borders followed by masses of land-hungry peasants,
The Soviets also apparently fear the consequences of the
Chinese rapprochement with the United States and improved
relations with Japan and Western Europe. The consequences
of the Chinese opening to the West affect virtually every
major objective of Soviet foreign policy as well as creating
new security problems for the Soviet Union.
Just as China has not made a secret of its desire to
form a 'united front' against Soviet ' hegemonism, ' the Soviet
Union has made clear its opposition to such a grouping. As
one would expect, the Soviets attribute this Chinese policy
goal to aggressive aspirations:
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The expansionist and dangerous nature of
China's present foreign policy course, a constant
source of tension and a threat to peace, is re-
vealed by the Peking rulers ' drive for a military
and political bloc with the American imperialists,
Japanese revanchists and aggressive NATO... 109
Peking wants a militarisation of Asia, a
strengthening of the American-Japanese military
alliance and of other military-political blocs
directed against the USSR. It calls for the
creation of an anti-Soviet 'broad united front'
and persistently offers itself as an ally of
imperialism. ^^
The primary purpose of such statements is, of course, to
attempt to deter Japan and the West from cooperating with
China against the Soviet Union, but there is a consensus
among most Western observers that underlying those statements
is a genuine fear of being encircled by an alliance of ideo-
, . , .111logical enemies
.
Chinese-American cooperation against the Soviet Union
is the linkage that generates the greatest concern in Moscow.
Even though "the Soviets do perceive an immediate and growing
threat from the Chinese, it is still the United States
—
economically and militarily the most powerful member of the
capitalist camp—which is referred to as the "main antagonist"
112
of the Soviet Union. Whether or not the Soviets actually
expect either the United States or China to attack them, for
the military planner the prospects of a Sino-American alliance
is cause for grave concern.
The Soviets see the Sino-American strategic alignment
—
even though currently still informal—as having two threatening
aspects. The first is that the United States is using its
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ties with China to tip the strategic balance back in its favor
113
and increase pressure on the Soviet Union. The second is
that, in time of war, China might take advantage of Soviet
preoccupation with defeating the West to launch an attack on
Russia—either for strictly Chinese motives or as a diversion
for NATO. The possibility of such a two-front war apparently
has been a factor in the revision of Soviet military doctrine
to include the possibility of having to fight a protracted
114
war.
Second only to concern over Sino-American military
ties—in the strictly Asian context, of even greater concern
—
is the possibility of the Sino-Japanese relationship crystal-
lizing as an anti-Soviet alliance. Soviet opposition to the
"anti-hegemony" clause in the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friend-
ship Treaty signed August 12, 1978, and Soviet efforts to
forestall closer Sino-Japanese ties by offering Japan an
economic carrot—investment opportunities in Siberian resources-
while waving a military stick—the buildup of forces on the
Northern Territories claimed by Japan—reflect the Soviet con-
115
cern over the course that Sino-Japanese ties may take.
Given the Soviet perception of a Chinese threat, it
comes as no surprise that the Soviets are vehemently opposed
to the sale of arms to China by the United States and Western
Europe. The Soviet Union unleashed a barrage of public state-
ments over the past decade warning against the arming of China
—
ultimately to no avail. The most intense Soviet concern
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appears to be that the West will cooperate in the moderniza-
tion of China's nuclear arsenal. Leonid Brezhnev has been
reported as having stated to a French visitor that the Soviet
Union "would not tolerate" such Western involvement in China,
and as having threatened a nuclear strike against China should
117
it occur.
The foregoing discussion has shown that the Soviet
Union does perceive a threat to its security form China, par-
ticularly to the security of Siberia. Soviet perceptions of
the Chinese threat are founded upon deeply-rooted Russian fears
of China that have been compounded by the unhappy Soviet rela-
tionship with China since the late 1950s, and which are supported
by what the Soviets believe to be evidence of a Chinese pro-
pensity to violence and of Chinese motives for an attack on
Russia. The improvement in Chinese relations with the United
States, Japan and Western Europe is also viewed as threatening
Soviet security. These Soviet threat perceptions cannot be
explained away as inconsequential expressions of 'Russian
paranoia, ' or as groundless because of the relative military
weakness of China. Soviet fear of the Chinese has found con-
crete expression in Soviet foreign policy and military strategy.
3. The Soviet Military Threat to China
The primary Soviet response to what its perceives to
be a threat from China has been in the political-diplomatic
realm: the dual strategy of containment and coexistence. This
aspect of Soviet China policy was discussed in the first part
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of this section. There has also been, as noted above, a
military aspect to the Soviet strategy for containment of
the Chinese threat. Such military activities, while not con-
clusively demonstrating a Soviet intention to seek a final
solution to their China problem through the use of force,
does indicate a strong desire to have the capability to do
so. Military strength also gives weight to its diplomacy.
Two questions concerning the Soviet military threat
to China must be answered before attempting to determine
United States interests in the security of China: First,
under what circumstances would the Soviet Union resort to
military action against China? Second, what would be the
Soviet objectives and strategy in an armed conflict with
China?
There are two aspects to the question of circumstances
under which the Soviets would resort to military action
against China. One aspect concerns scenarios: the situa-
tions in which the Soviets would consider military action.
The other aspect, which is probably of greater importance for
judging Soviet intentions, concerns the oft-noted element of
caution in Soviet decisions regarding the use of military
force: they do not strike unless the circumstances indicate
an overwhelming probability of success in achieving the ob-
jectives of the operation.
The scenarios in which the Soviets would consider the
use of military force against China can be grouped into three
categories : those that result from the escalation of local
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conflicts or spillover from fighting with third parties; those
that are based on the Soviets seizing the opportunity to
strike a blow at China in a moment of Chinese weakness; and
those which represent a pre-meditated Soviet plan to per-
manently solve its China problem.
In the escalation and spillover category can be placed
three scenarios: (1) escalation of a conflict involving clients
of the Soviet Union or China to the level of a Sino-Soviet war;
(2) escalation of an incident on the Sino-Soviet border into
an all-out war; and (3) eruption of fighting between China
and Russia during the course of a war between the Soviet Union
and the United States.
As part of its strategy of containment of Chinese power
and influence, the Soviet Union has been gathering into its
fold a collection of clients around the periphery of China.
Friendship treaties, all of which included some form of mili-
tary cooperation, have been signed by the Soviet Union with
India on August 9, 1971, with Vietnam on November 3, 1978, and
with Afghanistan on December 5, 1978. An attempt has also
been made to formalize this strategic containment of China
in the form of an Asian collective security system, first pro-
posed by Leonid Brezhnev on June 8, 19 69 at a World Conference
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of Communist Parties in Moscow.
The Soviet collective security proposal has foundered:
only the Mongolian People's Republic and Afghanistan (in arti-
cle eight of the friendship treaty) have endorsed it, and
China has been able to counter it by improving its relations
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with its neighbors. Japan agreeing to inclusion of the "anti-
hegemony" clause in its Peace and Friendship Treaty with China
was probably the death-knell for the Soviet plan.
The failure of the Soviet collective security pro-
posal was more than just a diplomatic setback, it had impor-
tant consequences for Soviet security policy as well. Arnold
L. Horlick accurately foresaw the significance of the failure
of the Soviet plan in his 1974 analysis of it. His observa-
tions are quite important in that they have been borne out by
the course of events over the seven years since they were made:
There is a danger, therefore, that the com-
bination of (1) Soviet ambition to acquire a
leadership role in Asian politics, driven by
profound concern over the long-term implications
of Sino-Soviet hostility, and (2) severely lim-
ited means for achieving that role either by
conventional commercial or traditional diplo-
matic means, could channel Soviet assertiveness
in Asia in directions far removed from the pro-
motion of order and stability. Unable to find
takers for its proposal to join in building a
collective security system on a pan-Asian basis,
the Soviet Union might instead offer security
selectively to those Asian states embroiled
in regional conflicts that might find themselves
without access to other external sources of
effective political-military support. It is
precisely the provision of such support that has
been the Soviet Union's stock in trade so far
in the Third World. Where the USSR has been
successful in planting its presence and ex-
panding its influence abroad, it has done so by
massive transfers of military resources and by
flexing its muscles on behalf of clients engaged
in regional conflicts with their neighbors . H"
This is precisely the direction that Soviet policy in Asia
has taken over the last decade. India, Afghanistan, and
Vietnam (including now occupied Kampuchea) are the clients
in the Soviet "Asian selective security system."
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The potential for these states to involve the Soviet
Union in a conflict of interests with China is great. India
is involved in a deeply-rooted dispute with neighboring Pakis-
tan—a client of China—and has unresolved border disputes
with China that have in the past flared into war. Afghanistan,
now an occupied Soviet satellite, disputes its border with
Pakistan, accuses Pakistan of supporting the Islamic revolt
in Afghanistan, and in turn supports the independence claims
of ethnic groups in Pakistan--Pushtus and Baluchis--whose
homelands sit astride the Afghan border. Vietnam has con-
quered and occupied China's ally Kampuchia, disputes its border
with China and the sovereignty of several islands in the South
China Sea, has been persecuting ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, and
threatens--to the extent of having sent its troops into—
Thailand, another friend of China.
Because the entire South and Southeast Asian region
is a tinderbox waiting for the spark that will set it aflame
with violence, the Soviet Union is clearly playing with fire
by expanding its direct political and military presence in the
region—especially its presence in countries neighboring on
China. The pattern of Soviet support for its clients—in the
Middle East, Africa, and Latin America as well as in Asia-
shows a considerable degree of caution and restraint when the
determination of other powers to counter the actions of Soviet
clients has raised the possibility of escalation to a war in-
volving the Soviet Union. The most recent example of this
pattern of Soviet restraint came when China invaded Vietnam
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in February 1979 to teach the Vietnamese a lesson for occupy-
ing Kampuchea. The Soviets did respond with a show of force
in support of Vietnam, it was carefully calculated to avoid
the appearance of an imminent attack on China. Only a col-
lapse in the Chinese and Western will to resist Soviet expan-
sion or a significant shift in the balance of power in favor
of the Soviets would cause the Soviet Union to abandon its
120
restraint in the support of clients. Thus, although the
possibility does exist, the likelihood is small that a local
conflict would escalate into a full-scale Sino-Soviet war.
Escalation of an incident on the Sino-Soviet border
into an all-out war is a possible scenario, but is even less
likely than escalation of a conflict involving client states.
Although the border issue does have a life of its own, and
has, in the events leading up to the March 19 69 clashes,
generated changes in broader Soviet and Chinese policies, it
is generally more of a symptom than a cause of Sino-Soviet
tensions. Border incidents of various types occur year after
year: only when the Soviets or the Chinese are looking for an
excuse to pressure the other party do such 'routine' incidents
make the headlines or result in retaliatory gestures. A
border incident may well be used as the polemical pretext for
a Sino-Soviet war, but it certainly will not be the root cause
* uu 121for the war.
An outbreak of fighting between the Soviet Union and
China during the course of a Soviet war with the United States
is becoming a more and more likely scenario as Sino-American
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ties in the military field grow more extensive. As was
pointed out earlier, the Soviets take seriously the threat
of a Chinese attack while Russia is preoccupied in the Euro-
pean theater or recovering from an American nuclear strike.
The Soviet military buildup in the Far East appears to be de-
signed to allow the Soviets to fight a 'two-front' war without
having to divert forces from either front to support the
other.
Do the facts that the Soviets fear a predatory Chinese
attack and are preparing to fight a two-front war also indi-
cate that a Soviet attack on China is inevitable in the event
of a war with NATO? Much would depend on the actions of China
just prior to and after the outbreak of the Soviet-American
war, but nothing short of a Chinese decision to join in an
alliance—or at least a non-aggression pact--with the Soviets
would be sufficient to allay the deeply-rooted Soviet suspicions
of Chinese intentions. A Chinese declaration of neutrality
in a conflict of such destructiveness would not satisfy Soviet
fears, *as Douglas and Hoeber have observed:
In the Soviet view, a country is either for
them or against them, a distinction that would
be most severely drawn in a general war situa-
tion. . . . Rules of war and traditions of neutral-
ity appear to be of little concern. 123
In all probability, therefore, unless there were to be a sud-
den reversal of Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union, the
Soviets would take military action to substantially diminish
China's capability to threaten the Soviet Union in the event
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of a Soviet-American war.
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The second category of scenarios in which the Soviets
would be tempted to attack China can be labeled as 'oppor-
tunistic' attacks. There are two scenarios in which the
Soviets might take advantage of China's distress to launch
an attack: (1) political collapse or revolution in China,
and (2) political isolation of China from the international
community. Either scenario would greatly reduce the military
and political costs of a Soviet military operation against
China if the Soviet Union could in some way portray its inter-
vention as being in the best interest of China or the world
community.
If political collapse in China or isolation of China
from the international community would make China a more in-
viting target for an opportunistic Soviet Union, why then did
the Soviets not strike during the period of the Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution in China? China at that time was
both isolated and in turmoil, so there must be strict limits
to the risks the Soviet are willing to take to seize an oppor-
tunity like that. Other factors must have weighed more heavily
in the minds of the Soviet leaders than the fact that an
opportunity had presented itself to them.
The Soviet Union did not intervene in China during the
Cultural Revolution for two reasons. First, even though it
was the most severe disruption of authority in China since
the civil war of 1947-1949, the Cultural Revolution did not
result in the collapse of authority in China. In particular,
the People's Liberation Army remained largely intact and under
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tight centralized control—even though it too had been be-
seiged by the Red Guards and had been ordered to support them
at one point. Radical xenophobia in China had been directed
as much against the Soviet Union as against the West and there
does not appear to have been an organized faction that looked
to the Soviets as a force for restoring order. Thus, the
Chinese could be expected to resist--and to resist violently.
The second reason for Soviet non-intervention in
China's chaos was that China was not sufficiently isolated
from the international community that the Soviets could
strike without serious repercussions for its other foreign
policy objectives. China's isolation was mainly of its own
making, especially the recall of almost all of its ambassa-
dors, rather than resulting from Western reaction against
Chinese foreign policy. Chinese behavior simply had not been
very threatening to Western interests, and the anti-Western
name-calling was correctly seen to be directed more toward
a Chinese audience (the "capitalist-roaders" who dared to
propose openings to the West) than toward the West.
The Soviet Union could expect a Western outcry against
a predatory Soviet attack on China—the typical Western
response to such aggression since the days of the Open Door.
Whether or not the West would have retaliated with economic,
or even military, sanctions is less certain, but some form of
response had to be expected. Even a moderate Western reaction
could have set back initiatives the Soviets had launched to
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improve relations with the West. Moreover, the Soviets had
other pressing concerns which would have suffered from a
diversion in China: enforcing the Brezhnev doctrine in
Czechoslovakia, expanding its influence in the Middle East
in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and supporting
Vietnam against the United States in the Indochina War, among
others. Thus, the Soviets also had to expect that a costly
intervention in China would, at least temporarily, be costly
to Soviet foreign policy as well.
The two 'opportunistic' scenarios
—
political collapse
or diplomatic isolation—should be viewed more as prerequi-
sites for Soviet military action against China than as sce-
narios in themselves. This point will be brought up again
shortly when the discussion turns to the circumstances the
Soviets desire to ensure a victory when embarking on a mili-
tary operation.
The final category of scenarios for a Soviet attack
on China are those that can be attributed to a pre-meditated
Soviet plan for solving its China problem. The likelihood
of these scenarios is not dependent on the occurrence of some
event outside the control of the Soviets—as is the case in
the escalation and opportunism scenarios. Their likelihood
is based primarily on the basic Soviet fear and distrust of
the Chinese, and on how much erosion of their primacy over
China the Soviets will tolerate before deciding to put the
Chinese in their place by force.
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The scenarios in this 'masterplan' category are all
basically one scenario—the premeditated Soviet attack de-
signed to solve the China problem—with various different
military objectives being attributed to the Soviets. The
most common objectives the Soviets are said to be interested
in are to pre-empt Chinese military modernization, to force a
change in leadership in China, to inflict heavy damage on
China in order to humiliate the Chinese and keep them weak,
and to dismember China by occupying certain provinces along
the Soviet border. The scenario of a Soviet 'bolt from the blue'
attack on China to pre-empt its military modernization has
become particularly fashionable as the debate over American
125
arms sales to China has heated up.
The Soviet objectives given for this scenario are all
to some degree plausible, as will be discussed in greater
detail later, but the scenario itself is questionable. The
Soviets do have an image of the type of China they would feel
comfortable with on their border. Likewise, the Soviets do
have a strategy for dealing with China that they hope will
result in a China somewhat close to their image. Neither the
objective nor the strategy, however, is carved in stone.
Stalin learned in the 1930s, and then relearned in the 1950s,
that the Soviet Union could not shape the course of events in
China except at a cost that would be exorbitant given the com-
peting demands on Soviet economic, military, and political re-
sources. As the Sino-Soviet dispute worsened and as China grew
81

stronger and more closely aligned with other rivals of the
Soviet Union, the Soviets have had to increase the priority
of China and Asia in their foreign and military policies.
This does not indicate, however, that China is approaching
some immutable point beyond which the Soviets will feel they
have no choice but to destroy their rival.
While some of these scenarios for a Soviet attack on
China are more plausible than others, none seems likely to
occur in the near future. At least, that has been the con-
sensus of most observers of Sino-Soviet relations—that war
12 6
is not likely to occur. But this reassuring conclusion,
generally based on simple numerical comparisons of the mili-
tary balance between Russia and China, has too much of a taint
of the 'conventional wisdom' to be accepted at face value.
It would perhaps be more accurate to state that Americans
in the shoes of the Soviet leaders would not attack China.
Vernon Aspaturian has warned against reliance on such re-
assuring conclusions:
The unprecedented but not necessarily inex-
plicable or unpredictable Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan demonstrates that past Soviet be-
havior is not a reliable guide to future behav-
ior. Many of the turning points, or perhaps
more accurately, milestones, in Soviet foreign
policy have been without precedents: the Nazi-
Soviet Pact of 19 39; the unprovoked attack upon
Poland and its dismemberment; the forcible es-
tablishment of Communist regimes in territories
outside the former Russian Empire; the Soviet
invasion of Hungary; the attempt to establish
missile bases in Cuba; the use of Cuban troops
in Africa; and now the invasion of a nonaligned
country in the Third World. Those who were
surprised by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
fail to appreciate that Soviet foreign policy
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is not only routine and reactive but also inno-
vative and initiatory . 127
Taking heed of Professor Aspaturian's warning, how,
then, does one assess the likelihood of an unprecedented
Soviet action such as an attack on China? First of all, the
Soviets do have motives for seeking a military solution to
their China problem: Russian fear of the Chinese is pervasive
and deeply-rooted. The Soviets perceive the Chinese as hav-
ing, now and in the future, motives and a growing capability
for threatening the Soviet Union. The current state of af-
fairs, with China becoming ever more closely aligned with the
West, is clearly unsatisfactory, a setback for several impor-
tant Soviet security and foreign policy objectives. If the
Soviet Union is deterred from attacking China, it is not be-
cause the Soviets lack the motives for launching the attack:
it is because under current and anticipated international
circumtances the costs of military action are greater than the
cost of tolerating the Chinese threat.
The calculus of deterrence that urges restraint on
the Soviet Union in its relations with China is not inherent
in the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Nor are the
Soviets deterred by a simple tallying of the military balance
with the Chinese. The Soviets are deterred by the complex
circumstances of the international context of the Sino-Soviet
relationship. Those circumstances are subject to sudden,
rapid, and drastic change. Lucian Pye has well described
this aspect of the Soviet attitude towards China:
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Soviet strategy is much more likely to take the form
of waiting for the propitious moment in which to
strike so as not only to have the maximum damaging
effects on the Chinese but also to embarrass all
those who have been trying to help her modernize
her forces
.
There are two aspects to the circumstances in which the Soviet
Union would launch an attack on China: the internal situation
in China and the international political situation.
The Soviets are deterred from attacking China not so
much by the growing strength of China's armed forces—which
are, in fact, falling behind in the balance with the Soviet
Union—as they are deterred by their perception of the charac-
ter of the Chinese people. Soviet public statements to the
world on the vile nature of the Chinese are matched by popular
images of the Chinese held by the Russians. Hedrick Smith
reports that: "Intellectuals talked of the Chinese as the new
barbarians: peasants brainwashed in the fields with loud-
speakers, life entirely militarized, people mindless with
..129Maoism.
"
Neutralization of this militant Chinese character is
a prerequisite for a Soviet attack on China. Uri Ra'anan has
pointed out that, "given the tenacity and bitterness of her
leadership," as well as military factors, "China does not rank
as the most inviting target in the world, to be lightheartedly
attacked by the Soviet Union—until and unless unique condi-
130
tions arise which make prolonged Chinese resistance unlikely."
As was mentioned when disucssing scenarios for a Soviet attack,
political collapse in China could provide the circumstances
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neutralizing the Chinese will to resist an invasion. A loose
parallel can be drawn to the period from 1842 to 1945, when
the decaying Manchu Dynasty was unable to resist incursions
by the Western powers—Russia included—and its successor,
the Nationalist regime, was unable to consolidate its power
before the onslaught of the Japanese. The magnitude of the
task of maintaining control over a billion people must not be
underestimated
.
A political collapse in China would have to be wide-
spread, near total, to tempt the Soviets to intervene. Joseph
Schiebel has observed that "it will be in the Soviet Union's
interest to have a prolonged period of turmoil during which
the basic conditions and forces opposed to it can be elimin-
131
ated or altered. " This is the key to understanding just
how severe a political collapse would be desired by the Soviet
Union, and why the Cultural Revolution was not enough of a
disruption of authority in China to tempt the Soviets.
Two important conditions would have to result from
political turmoil in China in order to the Soviets to per-
ceive that prolonged Chinese resistance to a Soviet attack
would be unlikely: First, the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
would have to be greatly diminished as an effective fighting
force. This could occur if the Chinese armed forces were di-
vided against themselves in a succession struggle among various
military commanders. Warlordism has a long history in China,
and has even cropped up under Communist rule—though the Party
has succeeded thus far in controlling it. The PLA could also
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be neutralized by being preoccupied with suppressing rebellions
in the cities or provinces. This is another outstanding fea-
ture of Chinese history. The rebellions would have to be so
severe as to require that front-line PLA units, and not just
provincial garrisons, be diverted to suppress the violence.
The second condition that would have to result from
political turmoil in China is the coalescence of an organized
faction in the Chinese Communist Party, preferably one includ-
ing some top members of the PLA, that has a pro-Soviet leaning.
They might be useful to the Soviets as an interim tool for
political control should the Soviets decide to occupy portions
of Chinese territory, as was the Soviet tactic in Eastern
Europe when the Red Army rolled in after defeating Nazi forces,
but the primary value of a pro-Soviet faction would be to re-
strain the central authorities in China from ordering a nuclear
strike against the Soviet Union until the Soviets had eliminated
the Chinese nuclear force. After that any pro-Soviet groups
would be expendable.
The international political situation would also have
to be conducive to Soviet victory over China for the Soviets
to commit themselves to an attack. Two Western reactions to
a Soviet attack would have to be forestalled: direct aid to
the Chinese, including possible military intervention, or
political and economic reprisals that would seriously damage
other Soviet foreign policy objectives. Direct aid would not
only strengthen the Chinese militarily, but would also sitffen
their will to resist the Soviet onslaught. Even the prospect
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of receiving aid could enable the Chinese to hold out long
enough to cause a Soviet offensive to lose its momentum.
The Western record of reprisals against Soviet expan-
sion is not particularly frightening to the Soviets. In
recent years, particularly, the West has not shown the unity
of policies that is needed to make economic and political
reprisals against the Soviets effective. There are also
serious questions as to the efficacy of such sanctions.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the Soviets could defuse the
anticipated Western outcry against an attack on China, the
overall cost to the Soviet Union of the operation would be
reduced. In this regard, Lucian Pye has observed that:
"depending on the circumstances surrounding the context of
such a move, they might even be able to do it without un-
duly stirring up world opinion, much as China has gotten
132
away with 'teaching lessons' to India and Vietnam."
There are two situations in which the West would be
unwilling or incapable of making more than a token response
to a Soviet attack on China. The first would be if the West
were already engaged in a war with the Warsaw Pact. In this
situation, however, a Soviet attack on China—unless it re-
sulted in a quick and decisive Soviet victory—would actually
be in the interests of the NATO countries. This could not
be admitted publicly, of course, but the Chinese have already




The West would also be unwilling to come to China's
defense, either directly or through sanctions, if China had
taken some action prior to the Soviet attack that appeared to
be an unwarranted provocation of the Soviet Union, and which
violated the Western norms of appropriate international be-
havior. The most likely example of such a Chinese action
would be a full-scale invasion of a Soviet client. The cases
of the Chinese attacks on India and Vietnam both evoked Western
censure, though not sufficient to clear the way for Soviet
intervention in either case (and India was not, at the time,
a Soviet client) . The 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam, in
particular, put the Soviet Union, and the world as well, on
notice that China would not be intimidated by a Soviet commit-
ment to defend another nation. In addition to neutralizing
the Western interest in the defense of China, a military
operation against a Soviet client would further divert the
PLA from being able to defend against a Soviet assault.
Are not these two preconditions for a Soviet attack--
internal disorder in China and a Chinese military provocation
of Russia—to some degree mutually exclusive? Not necessarily,
though the suggestion that an internally divided China would
launch an invasion of a neighboring country does seem far-
fetched. China was able to intervene in the Korean War, and
with devastating effect initially, while it was still fighting
Kuomintang forces in southern China and attempting to subdue
Tibet (Tibet was invaded at the same time that PLA "volunteers"
went into action in Korea) . Another possibility would be for
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domestic violence to erupt after the PLA had gone into action--
perhaps partially as a consequence of the invasion—should dis-
agreement within the leadership over the invasion result in a
power struggle or if undue hardship resulted from having to
support the action. The mandate of heaven, and the right of
the people to withdraw it by rebelling, may not be an accepted
tenet of Chinese Communist ideology, but it is alive among
the masses of China.
These conditions for a Soviet attack on China estab-
lish a loosely-defined scenario, one with several variations.
It needs to be emphasized that a Soviet attack on China under
these conditions would not be motivated solely by opportunism.
The Soviets would also have to perceive a growing Chinese threat
to Soviet vital interests, a Chinese intent and capability to
use its military power to the detriment of the Soviet Union.
Sino-Soviet relations would have to be stagnated or deteriorat-
ing, with little Soviet hope of bein able to coerce or cajole
the Chinese into less hostile behavior. The attack on China
would have to fit into the overall Soviet foreign policy strate-
gy at the time: dealing with the Chinese threat is a Soviet
priority, but it is not of such high priority that the Soviets
would abandon their entire foreign policy in mindless pursuit
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of the emasculation of China.
The second question posed at the beginning of this
discussion of the Soviet military threat to China was what
would be the Soviet objectives and strategy in an armed con-
flict with China? It will be useful to discuss Soviet military
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strategy in general first, to gain an understanding of the
doctrinal principles that govern the Soviet definition of
objectives for an assault on China.
The central doctrine of Soviet military strategy is
the 'primacy of the offensive. 1 The Soviets take seriously
the long-standing principle that 'the best defense is a good
offense,' and have structured their armed forces for precisely
that purpose. In their study of the relevance of the Soviet
invasion of Manchuria in 1945 to modern Soviet military strat-
egy, Peter W. Vigor and Christopher Donnelly observed that:
Little is gained, in the Soviet view, by fighting
defensive wars. The purpose of starting a war,
the Russians believe, is to gain some political
objective; and there are few political objectives
of any kind (and fewer still of any great impor- , -..
tance) that can be gained by fighting defensively.
The Soviet principle of the 'primacy of the offensive' applies
to Soviet strategy in all theaters, but it is significant to
note in this discussion of the Soviet military threat to China
that, although Soviet offensive doctrine has been revised over
the years as military technology advanced, the Manchurian cam-
paign remains, as Eugene D. Betit pointed out, "a prototype
135for Soviet offensive operations today."
In a war with China, whether defensive in the sense
that China had struck first against the Soviet Union itself,
or offensive in the sense that the Soviets were striking
first (though certainly with some pretext to justify their
action) , the Soviet Union would move as rapidly as possible
to launch a full-scale combined arms offensive into Chinese
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territory. There is no evidence to support the oft-quoted
contention that Soviet fear of involvement in an Asian land
war would cause them to abandon this fundamental principle of
Soviet military strategy. Moreover, the disposition of
Soviet forces in the Far East supports the view that they
would be used offensively, as Uri Ra'anan has observed:
Conversely, the fifty-odd Soviet divisions in
the far east are deployed offensively, and there
are few who would dispute that their contingency
plan is not to fall back in a straggly line to
defend the long Trans-Siberian Railroad, but
rather to thrust forward in a series of armored
punches across Manchuria, Mongolia, and probably
Sinkiang. 137
In a war against China, as in a war against NATO, the
Soviet combined arms offensive into enemy territory would be
supported by the use of nuclear weapons to the extent neces-
sary to achieve the objectives of the offensive. This does
not mean the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable—Soviet mili-
tary writings have discussed, with an obvious lack of enthu-
siasm, the possibility of purely conventional warfare--but it
does mean that a potential adversary of the Soviet Union must
expect that nuclear weapons would be used. Edward L. Warner
has described the role of nuclear weapons in the Soviet com-
bined arms offensive:
The theater campaigns included in the Soviet
world war scenario are massive, mobile, and fully
adapted to the nuclear era. They are supposed
to commence simultaneously with the initiation
of the strategic nuclear exchange and feature
their own nuclear character provided by the peri-
pheral-range strategic missiles and bombers of
the SRF and LRA as well as the operational tac-
tical missile units that are an integral part of




The Soviet Union has made it clear, in its military writings
and in Radio Moscow broadcasts directed at Beijing, that it
would not hesitate to use its nuclear arsenal against China,
nor would it hesitate to launch a first strike against the
139Chinese nuclear force. These Soviet warnings are backed
up by Soviet force deployments to the Far East, including the
priority deployment of SS-20 mobile intermediate range ballis-
tic missiles (IRBMs).
The ultimate Soviet objective in a war with China
would be victory. That may seem obvious, but it had to be
stated explicitly because of the trend among some Western
strategic analysts to presume that the Soviet leadership
thinks in terms of the models fashionable in the West. The
Soviets do not think in terms of 'war termination, ' they
think in terms of victory.
Joseph Douglas and Amoretta Hoeber have deduced from
Soviet military writings that the Soviet Union has four con-
ditions for victory: (1) defeat of enemy forces and potential,
(2) seizure of strategic areas, (3) occupation and control,
140
and (4) ideological conversion of the defeated foe. In-
tuitively, not all of these four objectives could be fully
realized by the Soviet Union in China—not even the conquest
of all of Eastern Europe and its subsequent satellitization
could compare with the magnitude of the scale of operations
that would be required in China. Flexibility and adaptation
to the circumstances at hand, as long as it serves long-range
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objectives, are key tenets of Soviet ideology, however, so
it is reasonable to expect that there are variants of these
four Soviet warfighting objectives that apply to China.
There is a general consensus among Western observers
that the Soviet Union does have the military capability neces-
sary for achieving the first of its four conditions for victory:
the defeat of enemy forces and potential. Most observers, how-
ever, add the caveat that the Soviets must avoid, as Lucian
Pye put it, "entrapping themselves in the morass of continental
141China." The task of defeating the Chinese forces and destroy-
ing their war potential, which Douglas and Hoeber specified
must include (a) disrupting and disorganizing political and
military control, and (b) destruction of nuclear and conven-
142tional ready military forces, would be made easier for the
Soviets by the conditions under which they would attack.
Weakened by internal turmoil, with their leadership divided
and the PLA preoccupied with internecine conflict or rebellion
in the provinces, the Chinese would not be able to put up an
effective defense against the modern Soviet war machine.
The Sino-Soviet nuclear equation is somewhat less
clear, even though there is agreement that the Soviets are
far superior and that the gap appears to be widening when
measured strictly in numerical terms. Donald Zagoria, among
others, believes that even a far inferior Chinese second-strike
capability is enough to deter a Soviet attack. Charles
Douglas-Home, on the other hand, contends that a Soviet attack
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which "concentrated on inflicting heavy damage on military
and industrial targets" in China "could not be counter-
balanced in any limited contest by the steady progress of
143China's long-range missile program."
The Soviet solution to the problem of a possible
Chinese retaliatory nuclear strike, as is clear from Soviet
military writings in general and their statements on the
Chinese nuclear threat in particular, would be to launch
a preventive (pre-emptive, the Soviets would prefer it be
called) first strike on China's nuclear force. The New York
Times has reported that a 1979 Department of Defense study
of the vulnerability of the Chinese nuclear force concluded
a successful first strike by the Soviets "probably could not
144be achieved. " It is doubtful that Soviet military planners
would agree with this assessment, and even more doubtful that
they would abandon their fear of a Chinese nuclear strike and
their doctrine of protecting the homeland because of it. It
is reasonable to expect, therefore, that the Soviet Union will
attempt to destroy the Chinese nuclear force before it can be
used, and that the overall Soviet offensive would be capable
of inflicting decisive damage on the Chinese armed forces.
The second Soviet objective in a war with China would
be the seizure of strategic areas: Manchuria (consisting of
the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning) , Xinjiang
(Sinkiang province, formally an 'Autonomous Region' for the
Muslim Uighur peoples), and possibly Inner Mongolia ('Nei
Monggol ' in the current Chinese spelling, also an Autonomous
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Region, the Chinese portion of the Mongol homeland) . Joseph
Schiebel has explained the Soviet motives for a seizure of
these areas in the event of a war with China:
...no Chinese leadership, no matter how pro-Soviet
it professes to be, can long be relied upon to
resist the temptations and indeed the compulsion
to pursue the independent course that China's geo-
strategic size justifies. One necessary step in
any Soviet program to reassert its claim to
strategic mastery over China will be to reduce the
country in size....
Manchuria is what the Soviets must have to be
able to project their power directly into East Asia.
Its loss, combined with the loss of Sinkiang,
might be sufficient to lessen the strategic weight
and significance of China so that whose side she
is on might matter a good deal less than it does
today. 14 5
This perceptive analysis reveals the broad range of Soviet
fears that would be relieved and objectives that would be
achieved by such a dismemberment of China. The Soviet Union
would gain the buffers and strategic access it believes are
essential to the defense of its Eastern flank. The Chinese
threat, either alone or in alliance with the West, would be
reduced to manageable proportions. An ideological rival would
be humiliated, leaving the Soviet Union as the uncontested
leader of the socialist camp and the national liberation move-
ment. Such gains would be a windfall to rival that of the
Soviet conquest and occupation of Eastern Europe during World
War II.
Even though the Chinese border regions would be lucra-
tive targets for the Soviets to seize, there remain questions
as to the Soviet ability to seize them and as to possible
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undesirable consequences if they were seized. The Soviet
Union does appear to have the military forces necessary to
seize at least significant portions of the Chinese border
regions. Uri Ra'anan believes the Soviets could occupy these
regions without becoming bogged down in an "unending war of
attrition" with China, and possibly even without the use of
nuclear weapons, or with the use of only tactical and medium-
range weapons. Lucian Pye agrees that the Soviets could avoid
the danger of a 'People's War' with China, but cautions that
Chinese defenses in Xinjiang and Manchuria would still present
146formidable obstacles to an invading army.
A Soviet attack during a period of political turmoil
in China could greatly ease the difficulty of seizing the
Chinese border regions on the Soviet border. The Chinese
Communists have been faced with military and political leaders
in Manchuria from within their own ranks striking out on an
autonomous path—with strong indications of Soviet involvement.
The Uighurs of Xinjiang and the Mongols have both been targets
for promises of national liberation, and have to some degree
147been receptive to offers of external support. Dmitri Simes
claims that, even though the Soviets could seize these regions,
they have no desire to do so, at least in the case of Xinjiang,
because they already have enough problems with the Muslim popu-
148lation they currently rule. The objective of the Soviet
'liberation' of these regions would not, however, be annexa-
tion into the Soviet Union. The creation of relatively small,
militarily weak, and virulently anti-Chinese states would suffice
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The third Soviet 'condition of victory' described by
Douglas and Hoeber is the occupation and control of the enemy
country. This objective probably could not be realized by
the Soviet Union in an invasion of China except at exorbitant
149
cost. There is a firm consensus on this point. There is
also no evidence to indicate a Soviet interest in attempting
such a Herculean feat. The Russian fear of the brutal nature
of the Chinese, as they see it, would probably be as much of
a deterrent as the logistical problems and the prospects of a
prolonged 'people's war' on Chinese terms. The most important
of the Soviet objectives in attacking China in the first place
could be achieved, however, by the seizure of the border regions
of China without having to occupy the entire country. As long
as China's warfighting capability had been destroyed, the Soviet
Union could leave the remnants of the Chinese state to care for
its ravaged masses
.
Ideological conversion is said to be the fourth and
ultimate objective of a Soviet war. In the case of China,
this objective presents the Soviet Union with unique, and per-
haps insurmountable, problems. If they could occupy China,
the Soviets would undoubtedly pursue the ideological conver-
sion of the Chinese from the Maoist (or post-Maoist) version
of Marxism-Leninism to the Soviet 'true gospel. 1 This objec-
tive is most decidedly not, however, sufficient in itself to
tempt the Soviets to occupy all of China. Only if Soviet
strategic objectives, those deemed to be vital to the defense
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of the homeland, demanded the occupation of all of China
would the Soviets consider such a campaign.
There is a less demanding political goal which could
probably be achieved without the occupation of the entire
country and which would have almost the same value as direct
ideological conversion under Soviet tutelage. That goal is
to force a change in the political leadership of China. Hal
Piper has noted that the Soviets perceive more of a fluid
situation in the current state of Chinese politics than do
most western observers:
Soviet Asia specialists say they still think
China is in a period of "transitional" leadership.
Shake-ups of political cadres appear to be con-
tinuing, they point out, and the wallposter cam-
paigns in Peking turn up conflicting sentiments,
including even a pro-Soviet slogan or two.
"In principle anything is possible," a Soviet
analyst said. He means anything from restoration
of capitalism to a return to the Soviet-Chinese
friendship of the 1950's. 150
This Soviet analysis may well strike Western observers as
merely wishful thinking, or as a cynical attempt to deter the
growth of Sino-American ties by creating doubts as to the relia-
bility of the Chinese, but if it is indeed the Soviet view, as
it appears to be, then it could provide the basis for Soviet
planning of its political objectives in a war with China.
The ideal time for the Soviet Union to strike at China
would be during a period of domestic political turmoil in
China, as has already been pointed out. In such a situation
in China it would be reasonable to expect that a faction with
political leanings or policy objectives favorable toward Soviet
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interests would emerge, and might even turn to the Soviet Union
for support. The motives of such a faction in turning to the
Soviets could well be altruistic: a desire to restore order
from chaos so that the suffering of the masses could be alle-
viated. And if the PLA had collapsed as an effective political
force or was unable to restore order, then Soviet power could
well become attractive to ambitious and desperate men.
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 may well be thought
by the Soviets to be a possible prototype for a political
solution in China: Lenin was spirited into Russia by Germany,
which was at war with, and had invaded, his homeland. After
he had carried out his revolution, with 'peace' as one of its
rallying points, Lenin then submitted to the German-dictated
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which forced Russia to cede large
areas of its soil to its enemy Germany. The Soviets might
plan on a similar political turnover to complement their in-
vasion of China. Even if a Soviet puppet could not be installed
in Beijing, a Chinese leader willing to for sue for peace at
the cost of Manchuria and Xinjiang in order to save what was
left of his country would serve Soviet purposes.
This review of the nature of the Soviet military threat
to China has shown that, while most of the commonly proposed
scenarios for a Soviet attack are unlikely to occur, there is
a particular combination of circumstances which would be pro-
pitious for a Soviet attack. That combination of circumstances
involves political isolation of China from effective support
from the West and internal political turmoil in China that had
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disrupted the capability of the Chinese to resist a Soviet
attack. If such a combination of circumstances were to occur
at a time when Soviet resources were not previously committed
to other objectives, and if the state of Sino-Soviet relations
at the time indicated to Soviet leaders that crucial state
interests were directly threatened by Chinese behavior, then
the Soviet Union would not hesitate to seek a military solu-
tion to its China problem. Specific military and political
objectives can be identified in China that would fit the condi-
tions for victory known to guide Soviet military strategy.
Thus, while a simple prediction as to the likelihood
of a Sino-Soviet war cannot be made, as its possibility is not
inherent in the nature of the relationship but rather is de-
rived from contingencies that cannot themselves be predicted,
it is possible to predict the circumstances under which the
Soviets would probably decide to launch a war on China. The
sudden or imminent occurrence of various of those circumstances
should provide warning to the analyst that a Soviet attack is
forthcoming before evidence of military deployments to launch
the attack are even begun
.
In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union is not passively
waiting for the appropriate circumstances to strike while its
position vis-a-vis China deteriorates before its eyes. The
Soviet Union is carrying out an active foreign policy designed
to achieve its fundamental national goals, if possible, with-
out resorting to the use of force. The Soviet strategy toward
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China is a dual one of containment and coexistence. It has
not been an overwhelming success for the Soviets, but is un-
likely to be abandoned except for one other option: war with
China on Soviet terms.
C. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE SECURITY OF CHINA
Thus far, it would seem, little has been said in this
paper about United States security interests in China. The
previous two sections have focused on conceptual frameworks
and on Soviet policy toward China, rather than on American
interests per se. The diversions were vitally necessary,
however, because American perceptions of its security inter-
ests in China have been clouded by uncritical acceptance of a
flawed conception of the international system— the strategic
triangle—and by oversimplified views of the Soviet threat
to China. In other words, it is in the national interest
that United States policy toward China be formulated within
a conceptual framework that allows clear perceptions of inter-
ests, and that security policies reflect a realistic appraisal
of the Soviet threat to China.
In the process of defining the concept of national inter-
est, mention was made of the "clusters of interests" devised
by Ralph N. Clough for sorting out American interests in
another country (see page fifteen) . Clough proposed four cate-
gories of interests: general, intrinsic, derived, and created
This section will be concerned with 'intrinsic 1 American se-
curity interests in China, interests that are "inherent in
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its direct relationship with a particular country at a particu-
lar time." Such intrinsic interests include, in the Clough
formulation, "the ability of that country to help protect U.S.
general interests," such as deterrence, avoidance of war, and
creation of a stable world order. That particular subset of
intrinsic interests will be discussed in succeeding sections,
leaving for this section those American security interests
that are intrinsic but generally within the geographic con-
fines of China itself.
United States interests in the security of China will be
defined by determining, first of all, if there are threats
to the security of China that would also threaten American
national interests, and, second, what the consequences for
American interests would be should China succumb to any of
those threats.
1 . Threats to the Security of China
Sources of threats to the security of China can be
grouped into two broad categories: internal and external.
This taxonomy is not meant to be formal in the sense that the
two categories are mutually exclusive. The pattern of Chinese
history has been that internal and external threats to Chinese
security almost always either arise simultaneously or one be-
gets the other. It is no coincidence that the Western powers
(including Russia) made their greatest imperial penetration
into the Middle Kingdom at a time when its Manchu rulers were
besieged by major rebellions. Nor is it a coincidence that the
most serious border clashs the People's Republic has had with
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its communist neighbor— those with the Soviet Union on the
Ussuri River in March 1969-—occurred in the wake of the Cul-
tural Revolution in China. It is with this historical tendency
for the two to be linked in mind that threats to Chinese se-
curity will be categorized as internal or external.
Three internal sources of threats to the security of
China can be postulated: (1) a power struggle for leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) erupting into violence
among armed factions, (2) rebellions of various segments of
the Chinese population against CCP rule in general or against
specific CCP policies, and (3) acts of terrorism, urban or
rural, by individuals or groups lacking the popular appeal or
political power to resist the regime by either of the first
two me an s .
There is evidence, one is tempted to assert abundant
evidence, that each of these three internal threats to Chinese
security has occurred more than once since the Communist Party
came to power in China. The Cultural Revolution, which was,
in essence, a power struggle between the Maoist radicals and
the previously-ascendant 'moderate' mor 'pragmatic' wing of
the CCP (led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, both purged),
degenerated into violence—even pitched battles. The purge of
the "Gang of Four"— the leaders of the 'radical' wing of the
CCP—after the death of their patron Mao Zedong was accompanied
by numerous reports of violence in China during 1976-1977--
including outright civil war in Fujian and Sichuan Provinces.
Lin Biao and the Gang of Four have both been accused of plotting
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military coups, charges that are not so far-fetched as to be
dismissed without consideration. As recently as 1980 there
were reports of several bombings of public places, such as
railway stations, and other acts of sabotage in China that
could be classified as acts of terrorism—if not rebellion.
Tibet, it should also be noted, has risen in rebellion twice
since being forcefully incorporated into China: in 1959 and
1965. 151
Do all of these past examples of internal security
threats indicate that similar problems must be expected in
the future? Not necessarily, but it is still too early to
conclude that the apparently successful consolidation of power
in China by Deng Xiaoping and his proteges, Hu Yaobang (Party
Chairman) and Zhao Ziyang (Premier) , heralds a new era of
Party unity and political tranquility. There remain numerous
sources of tension which could generate renewed internecine
Party conflict or popular dissatisfaction with the regime.
The rank and file of the CCP are not fully united behind Deng
and his modernization program, nor are workers and peasants
everywhere satisfied with the gains they have made. Inflation,
unemployment and youth dissatisfied with the opportunities open
to them are all problems which cannot be solved in the short-
term. There are reports of the leadership of the armed forces
in China being upset with the decline in their prestige and
priority, particularly because of two successive reductions
in the defense budget, as well as reports that morale among
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the troops is suffering. China's 'national minorities'
(Tibetans, Uighurs, Mongols, and others) are also not overly
happy with their lot, despite having made substantial economic
progress in some areas and having been granted, of late, an
increasing degree of political and cultural autonomy, raising
the possibility of unrest in the key provinces of Inner Mon-
152golia, Xinjiang, and Tibet.
In short, then, the possibility of there again arising
internal threats to Chinese security must be taken seriously.
The occasional optimistic assessment of the future course of
153Chinese politics should be tempered by hard-nosed realism
about the magnitude of the problems China will face merely
providing for the basic human needs of a billion people, much
154less satisfying their aspirations for a better life.
The external threat to the security of China has two
basic forms, though they may well occur together: interven-
tion in Chinese politics or outright military attack. An
intervention in Chinese politics could consist of supporting
a faction involved in a power struggle, subverting minority
groups in the provinces on China's frontiers--which could go
as far as the creation of a national liberation movement—or
attempting to stir up popular dissatisfaction with government
policies in the hopes of fomenting a rebellion or terrorist
resistance. As was pointed out, China has had problems with
all of these in the form of 'internal' security threats. They
are also potential targets for external intervention.
105

The most immediate and dangerous potential external
threat to the security of China, both in terms of capabili-
ties and in terms of having motives to threaten China, has
already been discussed in detail: the Soviet Union. There
are other nations with motives for threatening China, but in
each case they lack the capability to take effective action
unless China were first defeated by the Soviet Union. India
has territorial claims against China in the Aksai Chin, would
like to have Tibet as an independent state--if not a client
—
to be a buffer against China, and probably would not be above
seeking to avenge its national honor for its 1962 defeat by
the Chinese. Vietnam likewise has a score to settle with the
Chinese, the 1979 Chinese invasion certainly has not been for-
gotten, and disputes the ownership of the Paracel and Spratley
island groups in the South China Sea with China. Both India
and Vietnam have signed friendship treaties with the Soviet
Union, both are armed primarily by the Soviets, and both have
received diplomatic and military support from the Soviets
against China. On their own, Vietnam and India can dc little
more than harass China: India by stirring up anti-Chinese
sentiment in Tibet or putting pressure on Pakistan, and Vietnam
by means of low-level military operations along its border with
China. In the context of a Sino-Soviet war, however, such
actions could well take on major proportions.
The existence, at least in theory, of potential ex-
ternal threats to China from the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan
or from Japan should be mentioned in passing. Both threats
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are, under present and almost any future circumstances, remote.
Neither Taiwan or Japan could hope to gain more than they would
lose by attempting to subvert or attack China. Only if China
lay prostrate from internal upheaval or Soviet attack would
Taiwan or Japan be capable of taking effective action, and
even then Japan would still lack the motive.
2 . Potential Consequences for American Interests
Western and American interest in the security of China
has historical roots well over a century old, even though the
interest itself died out after the Communist revolution.
Prior to the coming to power of the Communist Party,
the West, including the United States, had taken a degree of
interest in the internal security of China because of their
own interests there. Intervention by the Western powers in
the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Uprising are probably the
two best examples of such interest. The Western powers inter-
vened in these cases to protect their citizens, notably mis-
sionaries, property and investments, to restore tranquility
for the growth of commerce, and to ensure a regime favorable
to their interests remained in power. Indeed, it can reason-
ably be argued that the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, which
was already in decline by the mid-nineteenth century, was
forestalled by the 'support' it received from the Western
powers.
The Communist victory, of course, ended this Western
interest in China's internal security (except to the extent
that the Soviets appeared to be involved) . But now that China
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has begun orienting its economy toward the West, using trade
and investment to speed its development, there is somewhat of
a revival of interest in the stability of the Chinese govern-
ment. No single country, not even Japan, has a crucial
stake in its trade with, or investments in, China. However,
as China's trade grows, as its markets open up to foreign
manufactured goods, as it becomes a supplier of resources such
as oil and coal, and as it absorbs more foreign direct invest-
ment, so will the Western economic stake in China grow. At
the same time the number of foreign citizens in China has been
growing as China has developed its tourist industry and as
businessmen, technicians, educators, and other professionals
have flocked to China. If these economic and travel trends
continue, and at this point it is reasonable to assume that
they will, then the Western interest in the internal security
of China can be expected to grow apace.
The direct American stake in China itself is still
insignificant. In 1980, American exports to China were only
1.5% of total American exports and imports from China were
only 0.35% of American imports; American direct investment in
China is negligible; and China is not a significant source of
any crucial energy or mineral resources. Appendix B examines
the United States economic interest in China. The U.S. human
presence in China, bodies which might be threatened in a dis-
turbance, is likewise small. In 1980, about 70,000 Americans
visited China, an average of about 172 per day, and there were
perhaps 600 American educators, students, and technicians
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residing in China. Probably the most significant American
interest physically in China, at least from a security view-
point, would be the U.S. intelligence equipment being utilized
by the Chinese in a cooperative effort to monitor Soviet mis-
sile tests. Even in this case, however, it is doubtful that
U.S. national security hinges on the safety of that equipment
or the functioning of the stations.
In comparison with American interests in other coun-
tries or areas of the globe, such as Japan, the Middle East,
or Western Europe, the U.S. economic stake and human presence
in China are relatively insignificant and cannot be counted
as among the major determinants of the American security inter-
est in China. Nevertheless, these direct U.S. interests in
China would be threatened by either internal or external threats
to China's security. Political upheavals and rebellions in
China have commonly taken on xenophobic overtones, as in the
Boxer Uprising and the Cultural Revolution, and it would be a
serious mistake to presume that China's opening to the West has
laid to rest the deeply-rooted emotions from which such anti-
foreign outbursts arose. Internal upheavals have also tended
to disrupt transportation, communications, production, and
normal commerce—even when efforts were made to protect these
from the turmoil. And a major war with the Soviet Union would,
of course, result in immeasurable damage to the Chinese economy




Another aspect of the American interest in China's
security which must be brought up is the potential problem of
refugees should China suffer political collapse or military
defeat. The destructiveness of modern warfare, whether civil
or among nations, can clearly be seen in the great number of
refugees that result from violent conflicts— even a relatively
small-scale conflict like the Soviet conquest of Afghanistan
can generate hundreds of thousands of refugees. China's own
Cultural Revolution produced a steady stream of what were, in
effect, refugees into Hong Kong. A refugee problem affects
both ideological and economic interests: humanitarian princi-
ples urge that they be aided, but economic constraints (the
cynic would say selfish economic self-interest) can made that
aid slow in coming. Depending on the scale of destruction
suffered in an internal upheaval or from a Soviet attack, the
refugee problem could be enormous.
The United States does have an interest in the security
of China. Though the direct American involvement in China,
in terms of economic stake, the presence of U.S. citizens,
and military facilities, is still small both relative to Ameri-
can interests elsewhere and in absolute terms, it can be expected
to grow in the years ahead. The growth of American involvement
and interests in China will be paralleled by growth in the in-
volvement of America's allies in China, resulting in what must
be viewed as an overall Western interest in China's security.
The capability of the Chinese government to maintain internal
security and to defend itself against external aggression are,
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therefore, of concern to the West, including the United
States
.
This conclusion that the United States has an inter-
est in the security of China cannot be accepted at face value.
The United States also has global and Asian security inter-
ests and commitments that far outweigh its direct stake in
China. For example, were China to sign a nonaggression pact
with the Soviet Union on the eve of a war between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact, American lives and economic interests in China
would be saved from the possibility of destruction; but in
this situation the overriding American stake in Europe would
make the sacrifice of those interests in China a reasonable
cost for China's entry into the war on the side of NATO.
Stating that the United States has reason to be con-
cerned with Chinese security also has ideological ramifications
Does the American interest in the security of China imply a
corresponding interest in ensuring that the government . of China
can maintain internal security as well as defend against ex-
ternal aggression? Do American interests in China require an
overt commitment to the continued viability of the present re-
gime? The simple answer, that internal security is China's
business but external security does involve the United States
(because the primary threat, from the Soviet Union, also
threatens the U.S.), is not sufficient. These questions have
plagued America in its relations with Third World countries,




Unless China is now entering an era of progress and
domestic tranquility unlike any it has seen in well over a
century, the United States must expect that it will at some
point be forced to reconcile its security interests in China
with its ideological interests, or to explicitly--through
foreign policy decisions— select one as being of higher pri-
ority than the other. When the time comes for American inter-
est in China's security to be put to the test there are not
going to be any clear-cut choices. As was pointed out in dis-
cussing the Soviet threat to China, the Chinese are most vul-
nerable when they are isolated from the international community
and weakened by internal political turmoil. Under such cir-
cumstances, when China, through its own actions—perhaps by
military action against a smaller neighbor accused of fomenting
revolt in China and violent suppression of the revolt itself--
has offended American and Western values, it would be very
difficult for America's leaders to commit themselves to the
security of China. The conclusion that America does have
an interest in the security of China must be tempered by the
realization that in the 'real world' such interests may never
be clear-cut and the amount that should be spent in their de-
fense may not be apparent.
D. CHINA IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
China's role in the strategic relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union is the aspect of American
security interests in China which has received the greatest
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attention and generated the most controversy. The contro-
versy over China's strategic role arises out of contention
among three views as to the role the United States should
assign to China in its strategy for dealing with the Soviet
Union. One view is that, because China is so firmly anti-
Soviet and has opened to the West to drive its modernization,
the Chinese should receive the full support of the West, in-
cluding arras sales and joint strategic military planning.
Another view is that China cannot be relied upon as allies
against the Soviets because of potential political instability,
doubt in China as to the resolve of the West, and the latent
temptation for the Chinese to strike a strategic bargain with
the Soviets at the expense of Western interests. The third
view is that adopting a 'balanced' approach to relations with
China and the Soviet Union will result in an equilateral tri-
angular relationship pleasing to the aesthetics of all three
powers
.
These views share a common fault: all three place far too
much emphasis on the ability of American policy to shape China's
strategic role. Soviet policies toward China and the United
States, as well as China's own foreign policy, are determinants
of China's role at least as significant as American policies.
It is for this reason that Soviet policy toward China was
examined in detail and that Chinese views and objectives must
also be considered. Even the policies of third parties, such




This section will examine the influence China has on the
bilateral interactions involved in the Soviet-American strate-
gic relationship. Five such Soviet-American relationships
will be discussed: their geopolitical positions, the strate-
gic balance of power, Soviet expansionism and the American
effort to contain it, arms limitations efforts, and detente.
1 . China's Geopolitical Importance
We return for a moment to the subject of the security
of China itself. The geographic position of China, sharing
a 4,000 mile border with the Soviet Union as well as dominating
the central position of all of Asia, cannot be ignored as a
factor affecting the Soviet-American strategic relationship.
The American interest in the security of China that is based
on China's strategic geographic location is the 'intrinsic'
security interest that was postponed in the last section. The
geopolitical aspect of the intrinsic American security inter-
est is being discussed in this section because the most signi-
ficant external threat to China's security comes from the
Soviet Union—directly linking Chinese security to the Soviet-
American strategic relationship.
The fundamental objectives the Soviet Union seeks to
achieve in its foreign and defense policies tend to focus Soviet
attention primarily on the Eurasian landmass. Eurasia is the
target of Soviet efforts to secure objectives such as Soviet-
dominated or at least passively compliant neighbors around
the Soviet periphery as buffers for the defense of the Soviet
homeland. Having to share the continent with the Chinese--openly
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defiant and perceived to be a military threat to the Soviet
Union--is one of the two most signficant barriers to the full
achievement of Soviet goals in the region. The other major
barrier is the continued American insistence that it has vital
interests on the Eurasian landmass and its military presence
on and near the continent for the protection of those interests
Soviet strategy for dealing with China--containment
and coexistence--has already been described. To understand
the overall thrust of the Soviet effort to counter the Ameri-
can presence on the Eurasian landmass, Colin S. Gray has up-
dated the geopolitical approach formulated by Sir Halford
MacKinder and Nicholas Spykman, concluding that Soviet policy
can best be described as an attempt to achieve "hemispheric
exclusion" of the United States. According to this theory
of geopolitics, the "heartland" power— the Soviet Union—will
attempt to dominate the "rimlands" around its peripher on
the Eurasian continent (Africa also is included in some formu-
lations)
, an effort that the "insular" powers--led today by
the United States--must resist in order to prevent the heart-
land power from gaining, in effect, world domination. Gray
summarized the value of the theory as follows:
In short, as Sir Halford MacKinder and
Nicholas Spykman explained in theory, and as
American politicians thus far have acknowledged
by their deeds, denial of Soviet hegemony over
the Eurasian Rimlands is a vital security in-
terest of the United States. There is nothing
crassly mechanistic about this proposition. It
is not suggested here that every Rimland position
is of vital importance. But the unifying concept
of a long-term Soviet ambition for hemispheric
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denial does serve usefully to undermine the basis of
some of the arguments advanced by those who prefer
to examine every clash of Soviet and American
interests as being solely of local significance (if
of any significance at all). 157
To suggest that Soviet strategy may be usefully con-
ceptualized as one of "hemispheric denial" is not to imply
that Soviet leaders actually use the term itself, or the
phraseology of the geopolitical theory underlying it, in
their internal discussions on their strategy. The "hemisper-
ic denial" idea does, however, provide a useful conceptualiza-
tion of Soviet strategy; it provides a unifying framework for
what would otherwise seem to be disparate Soviet initiatives
and objectives. The Soviet attempt to drive a wedge between
the United States and the Western European nations, Soviet
efforts to counter and diminish American influence in the Mid-
dle East, Soviet pressure on Pakistan and wooing of India,
Soviet attempts to improve its relations in ASEAN and to ensure
its hegemony in Indochina, Soviet attempts to forestall the
improvement in Sino-American relations, and Soviet use of
political and military pressure on Japan in conjunction with
economic inducements; all are motivated by the objective of
"hemispheric denial" of the United States (the Soviet actions
in Asia also nearly dovetail with the Soviet strategy of con-
tainment of China)
.
China is, of course, one of the most crucial of the
"rimlands" from which the Soviets must attempt to exclude any
external influence or presence, particularly that of the
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United States. To be an effective buffer for the defense of
the Soviet homeland, China must also be forced to adopt a
foreign policy posture complementary to Soviet strategic in-
terests: that is, a posture that is not hostile to the Soviet
Union, but which also is not so hostile to the West that it
might drag the Soviet Union into a war (the problem that led
to the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the late 1950s
and early 1960s) . The potential military threat from China
must also be kept within acceptable bounds. If the Soviet
strategy of containment and coexistence continues to fail to
achieve these objectives, if the apparent military threat from
China continues to mount, then, should the opportunity arise
at a time when the Soviets have the resources available, the
Soviet Union would not hesitate to pacify the Chinese "rimland"
by military action.
Successful Soviet domination of China, a goal the Sovi-
ets have never—even at the height of the Sino-Soviet alliance
in the early 1950s—been able to achieve, would have serious
consequences for the American geopolitical position vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union. Loss of the largest and most strategically
important "rimland" in Asia is only one, and perhaps not even
the greatest, of the consequences. Henry Kissinger has pointed
out that a Soviet defeat of China would reverberate throughout
the countries around the periphery of the Eurasian continent:
If Moscow succeeded in humiliating Peking and
reducing it to impotence, the whole weight of
the Soviet military effort could be thrown a-
gainst the West. Such a demonstration of Soviet
117

ruthlessness and American impotence (or indiffer-
ence--the result would be the same) would en-
courage accommodation to other Soviet demands
from Japan to Western Europe, not to speak of
the many smaller countries on the Soviet
periphery . 1^8
In the previous discussion of the Soviet military
threat to China it was pointed out that the Soviet Union would
probably attempt to dismember China, to separate Manchuria
and Xinjiang as independent 'people's republics' similar to
Mongolia, in order to ensure a permanent solution to the
'Chinese threat' and to gain strategic buffers. Charles
Douglas-Home has observed that Soviet success in this endeavor,
at least in Manchuria, would have profound condequences for
East Asia and for America's Asian power position, as well as
for the Chinese:
Apart from crippling China, it would enhance
Soviet domination of Korea and Japan. It would
strike at the very foundation of America's de-
fence guarantees to those countries, particular-
ly in circumstances where the United States
stood idly by and watched such a partial dis-
memberment take place with the same impotent
huffing and puffing displayed by Washington fol-
lowing the invasion of Afghanistan. 159
The critic of geopolitics would probably argue that
these views expressed by Kissinger and Douglas-Home sound
suspiciously like a reincarnation of the 'domino theory' being
used to justify the American involvement in China. Though
this argument has much more emotional impact (due to the "no
more Vietnams" syndrome) than it has logical merit, it must
nevertheless be given serious attention. No analyst has yet
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directly applied the domino theory as an explanation for
the strategic impotence of China, but when used in the past
to justify American intervention in other countries there was
an unfortunate tendency for the theory to be grossly over-
simplified. The domino theory is not unique in that respect:
most theories or strategies in international relations become
grossly oversimplified in the arena of American politics—wit-
ness the fate of 'containment, ' 'detente, ' or 'deterrence.
'
It will be important, therefore, for future decisions on
American policy toward China to be based on analyses of China's
geopolitical significance that reflect the complex political
dynamics of the international arena. International politics
and global power relationships are not adequately described
by a simple 'strategic triangle, ' as was discussed in the
first section of this chapter.
The United States government has already publicly
ackowledged that it has an interest in the security of China
for what are, in effect, strategic reasons (though the sticky
term 'geopolitics' has not come up). Richard Holbrooke, As-
sistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
during the Carter Administration, stated in a June 4, 1980
speech that: "A China confident in its ability to defend its
borders against foreign aggression enhances stability in the
Pacific and on the Eurasian landmass and therefore contributes
to our own security and that of our allies." Though at the
time one of the more- explicit statements of the American strategic
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interest in China, Holbrooke's speech was hardly the first
public commitment made by the United States. Vice President
Walter Mondale had stated in Beijing on August 27, 1979,
"any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate you in world af-
fairs assumes a stance counter to American interests," an
expression of interest that was firmed up in Harold Brown's
January 1980 budget report, which stated that: "A strong,
secure, and modernizing China is in the interest of the United
States .
"
2 . China in the Soviet-American Strategic Balance
China's strategic importance is based on more than
just its geographic location. With approximately 3.6 million
men in the People's Liberation Army and a relatively small
but growing nuclear capability, including now ICBMs, China is
also a significant factor in the Soviet-American military
balance. That China is a 'significant factor' is not neces-
sarily an indication that the Chinese desire, or have the
capacity, to play an active role in Soviet-American military
competition. Nor is it likely that .the Soviet Union perceives
China's significance in the same light that the United States
does, or will react as Americans feel a superpower should.
The conventional view among Western observers has
been that the Sino-Soviet dispute and China's opening to the
West have shifted the global balance of power against the
Soviet Union, forced the Soviets to divert their military
forces from other objectives to defend the Soviet border with
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China, and caused a moderation in Soviet behavior lest China
and the West step up their anti-Soviet cooperation. Leslie
H. Brown has summed up these views:
...so long as the Soviet Union and the United
States remain political and military adversaries
on a global scale it is very much in American
interest to see this dual threat to the Soviet
Union maintained. It is an efficient and effec-
tive way to inhibit the exercise of Soviet mili-
tary power in both hemispheres. It forces the
dispersion of Soviet military resources, and
the dedication of a significant share of them to
the protection of one of the most isolated and,
for the US, strategically unimportant areas on
earth—the Sino-Soviet border. Soviet political
freedom of action is limited as well, since
Soviet decision-makers must also worry about
other forms of Sino-American collaboration, short
of the rather improbable extreme of collusive
military attack. They must surely be conscious
of the encouragement their own actions might give
to a military supply arrangement from the United
States to China, to the export of advanced West-
ern technology and development assistance and,
above all, to the organization of Asia under
American, Chinese and Japanese auspices into an
anti-Soviet bloc. 162
There is certainly some merit in the points made by
Brown--Soviet fear of the 'Chinese threat* and the linkage
of that threat with the capitalist threat to socialism has
already been described--but Soviet behavior has not conformed
to Western expectations. The influence that the improvement
in China's relations with the West would have on Soviet de-
cision-makers has been greatly exaggerated. The points made
by Brown can be broken down into two aspects of the Chinese
role in the strategic balance: (1) the 'two-front war' threat
as a deterrent to a Soviet attack on NATO, and (2) the actual,
or potential, deterrent effect Sino-Western military coopera-
tion has on Soviet expansionism or 'adventurism' in the Third
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World. This section will focus on the first aspect, the next
section will look at the second.
There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has made a
major commitment of military resources to the 'China front. '
The two phases of the Soviet buildup of forces along the
Chinese border and in the Far East, and the factors that led
the Soviets to decide the buildups were necessary, have al-
ready been described (see notes 108 and 122) . The result,
as Charles Douglas-Home observed, is that:
The Far Eastern front absorbs more than one
third of the Soviet military effort; and is no
military side-show for Moscow. Although it costs
three times as much to maintain a division there
than it does in East Europe, the Asian units re-
ceive the latest equipment, often before it reaches
the Warsaw Pact area. 163
It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Sino-Soviet
hostility, China's strategic alignment with the West, and
potential increases in China's military capabilities (due
to access to advanced Western technology) have forced the
Soviets to 'tie down' a substantial portion of their forces
along the Chinese border, and that this development is in the
164interest of the United States and NATO.
This line of reasoning must not, however, be carried
too far: it is easy to overstate the strategic benefits
gained by the West from its strategic alignment with China.
First of all, it is not safe to assume that the mere exist-
ence of the threat of a two-front war against NATO and China
is sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from launching an
attack against either one of them. Richard Burt, for example,
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concluded in 1979 that "the likelihood of any large-scale
Soviet military action against the West has been reduced by
Moscow's worry about a war on its eastern front." This
observation is valid, but only when viewed in the context of
Soviet military strategy and doctrine.
The Soviet response to the threat of a two-front war
has been to prepare to fight a two-front war, as is evident
in the pattern of Soviet force deployments and in changes in
Soviet military doctrine. The deterrent value of the two-
front threat is not a universal or immutable feature of the
international strategic environment: its effect on Soviet
decision-making must be estimated on a case-by-case basis,
keeping in mind that Soviet perceptions of the "correlation
of forces" are not the same as American perceptions of 'sys-
temic* determinants of behavior. The Soviets fear defeat in
war more than they fear war itself. In a society and politi-
cal culture which have deeply-rooted fears of invasion and
which are strongly oriented toward risk-avoidance, as is the
case in the Soviet Union, victory in a war launched under
conditions of one's own choosing is preferable to the risk
of suffering a devastating surprise attack while trying to
. , 166
avoid war.
Caution must also be exercised in linking the Soviet
build-up on the China border with Soviet force levels in the
European theater. Allen S. Whiting, an observer of great




The Sino-Soviet confrontation drew off nearly
thirty Soviet divisions that otherwise might
have been deployed against NATO or objectives
elsewhere. To be sure, there is no evidence to
suggest that Moscow would have attacked West
Europe had it not confronted a hostile China.
Nevertheless, the NATO defense posture was im-
proved because one fourth of Soviet military
power was tied down on the China front. 167
Whiting's qualification that there is no evidence Moscow
would have attacked NATO were it not for China is valid, but
he misses the more important pont: the Sino-Soviet dispute
did not draw off any Soviet forces from the European front,
new divisions were mobilized and equipped to deal with the
additional threat. From the mid-1960s to 1980, about 33
divisions have been added to the Soviet ground forces (up from
140 to 173) . All of this increase can be attributed to the
Soviet build-up against China (at least 31, and possibly as
many as 39, divisions have been added to Soviet forces around
China's periphery, including divisions transferred from the
central and southern USSR) , but at the same time the number
of divisions directed against NATO also increased (by six,
I (TO
one in Poland and the five in Czechoslovakia)
.
The qualification Whiting should have made is that
there is no evidence that the overall build-up in the number
of Soviet ground force divisions would have been made had it
not been for the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split. Western
observers are not, of course, privy to the policy discussions
of the Soviet Politburo, but the available evidence indicates
that force level decisions in the European and Far Eastern
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theaters have been based primarily upon the perceived defense
needs and perceived threat in each region. Soviet force ex-
pansion and modernization in each theater has had its own
dynamics, vice deployments to the China front having "drawn
off" forces intended for expansion of capabilities against
NATO. The Soviets do not have an inexhaustible supply of re-
sources and manpower to devote to defense, but their capacity
169for expanding their forces apparently has not been overtaxed.
Although the Sino-Soviet dispute and China's later
shift to strategic alignment with the West did not divert Soviet
forces from the European theater, now that the Soviet Union
has assembled a massive military force on China's border it
is essential to American security interests that those Soviet
divisions (and aircraft and nuclear weapons) stay right where
they are. If for some reason the Soviet perception of a mili-
tary threat from China should cease to be a factor in Soviet
strategic planning, at least 4 6 ground force divisions (though
not all of them at full strength) and thousands of armored
vehicles and aircraft would be freed for deployment to Europe
or to Soviet military districts near the Middle East (Trans-
Caucasian and Turkestan) . The United States cannot, and there-
fore must not, rely on the potential Chinese threat to the
Soviet Union to deter the Soviets from attacking NATO. Nor
can the United States hope that Chinese pressure will divert
Soviet forces from Eastern Europe or from the western Soviet
military districts. The United States does, however, have a
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crucial interest in keeping the Soviet forces deployed
against China tied down.
There are three possible ways in which the Soviet
perception of the 'Chinese threat 1 might be dispelled. The
most reliable way of eliminating the potential threat from
China, at least from the Soviet point of view, would be to
destroy China's military capability and dismember the coun-
try. This potential Soviet threat to China was discussed at
length in Section B of this chapter. The second possibility
would be a decision by China that, although the Soviets are
still an enemy and a threat to China, there is nothing to be
gained by becoming directly involved in the Soviet-American
strategic balance on the side of the West. The third possi-
bility would be a Chinese decision to reduce the threat from
the Soviet Union by opting for a rapprochement with the Soviets,
the extreme form of which would be a new Sino-Soviet alliance
against the West. If it is in the national interest that
Soviet forces stay tied down on the Chinese border, which it
is, then Chinese attitudes toward the second two possible op-
tions must be understood.
China has openly and emphatically identified the Soviet
Union as its number one enemy. Although the Soviet Union is
a political as well as a military threat to China, the Chinese
being highly sensitive to the Soviet effort to isolate them
from the international community, it is as a military threat
that the Soviets are perceived to be most dangerous to China.
The Chinese strategy for coping with the Soviet threat has been,
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and can be expected to continue to be, the formation of a
'united front 1 against Soviet "social-imperialism." This
Chinese strategy and the American need for a means of influ-
encing Soviet behavior led to the realpolitic strategic align-
ment of the United States and China against the Soviet Union.
As was pointed out earlier, this parallel interest in opposing
Soviet assertiveness is still the foundation upon which Sino-
American relations are being built.
The Chinese Government emphasizes the strategic impor-
tance of Sino-American relations in its public statements
and it is on the international strategic situation, particu-
larly the Soviet threat, that talks between Chinese and Ameri-
can leaders are usually described as "productive." In its
January 1981 criticism of Ray Cline, Bei j ing Review asserted
that: "Men of insight and vision the world over, including
many Republicans and Democrats in the United States, are fully
aware of China's role and weight on the global chessboard.
Failing this, one can hardly claim to have a sound grasp of
170global strategy. " Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua
similarly emphasized the "strategic significance" of Sino-
American relations in a March 22, 1981, statement on the sub-
ject, though also emphasizing that relations must develop on
the basis of the joint communique on normalization—a thinly
veiled reference to American policy toward Taiwan, which
171irritates the Chinese Government.
Analyses of Soviet strategy and of the Soviet-American
strategic relationship published in the official PRC media,
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as well as statements on strategic issues made by Government
officials, bear a remarkable resemblance to analyses made by
various Western observers (particularly those whom could be
considered 'hawkish' in their views) . In a November 29, 1977,
speech before the United Nations General Assembly, the Vice
Chairman of the Chinese delegation, Chen Chu, warned that the
"strategic point" of Soviet expansionism is Europe, a view of
Soviet priorities that most western observers would agree with,
and further warned that: "At present, the Soviet Union is try-
ing by every conceivable means to gain overall military superi-
172
ority over the United States. " Other commentaries and
analyses have presented the views that the Soviet Union is
attempting to undermine the alliance between Western Europe
and the United States by means of its detente policy and eco-
nomic inducements, and that: "In the 1970s, the balance of
forces between the United States and the Soviet Union changed
in favour of the latter, and Moscow shifted from the defensive
to the offensive, from avoiding direct confrontation to press-
173ing very steadily and hard against the United States."
Although the cynic might argue that such statements
are too good to be true, that China must make them for some
ulterior motive--perhaps to induce American concessions on
the Taiwan issue--there is no doubt that the anti-Russian
sentiments and fear of the Soviet threat that underlie them
are, indeed, real. The Chinese Government can be forgiven
for adopting Western ideas and phraseology in its strategic
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analyses: U.S. officials have, after all, been known to
speak of Soviet "hegemonism" and the threat from the "Polar
Bear." More to the point, Michael Pillsbury has concluded
that "the version of the world the Chinese describe in publi-
cations for foreign consumption and the way they talk to
foreign visitors about strategic affairs bear a strong resem-
174blence to the way they talk among themselves."
The Communist Chinese media have on occasion addressed
the specific issue of China's role in the Soviet-American
strategic balance. A January 11, 1980, commentary on Renmin
Ribao (People ' s Daily , the official Party paper) noted that
the strategic alignment of China and the West exacerbated the
Soviet 'two-front' problem:
For political, geographical and other reasons,
the Soviet Union has strategically always had to
face the problem of fighting on two fronts--in the
east and the west. This has been highlighted due
to changes in the international situation in the
past decade or so. 175
It is tempting to read more into that statement than its
apparently-deliberate vagueness will allow, but it at least
shows an official awareness of an issue that is critically
important to Western defense planners (and to Soviet defense
planners, for that matter). A similarly enticing comment
was made in the Beijing Review a year later, this time hinting
at the threat of a Western military response to a Soviet at-
tack on China:
Moreover, launching a war against China will not
be an isolated matter. If the Soviet Union were
to demolish our strategic weapons bases, it will
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run the risk of being the first to launch a war,
and if it were to attack China's Xinjiang or
northeast, that would mean its launching of a
world war in China. 176
Such veiled Chinese comments have led some observers
to conclude that reliance on Western nuclear forces ia a
part of the Chinese strategy of deterrence. William V.
Garner, for example, has stated: "Chinese strategists also
seem to calculate that Soviet nuclear and conventional force
requirements against both the US and NATO provide important
177
restraints on Soviet military options towards China."
Garner's view is certainly reasonable, it is supported by the
vague comments quoted above and by the well-known Chinese
strategy of the 'united front' with lesser enemies against
the most threatening enemy. As has been the case before,
however, it is dangerous to push such a line of reasoning too
far. Unless there exists a secret alliance between the United
States and China specifying that an attack on one shall be an
attack on the other, and committing both to some form of
retaliation, it is unreasonable to expect that defense planners
in either country intend to rely upon the anti-Soviet senti-
ments of the other to guarantee their own nation's security.
There is no evidence whatsoever that such a secret pact exists.
In contrast to the ethereal Chinese remarks on the
Soviet two-front war problem and the likelihood of a "world
war" should China be attacked by the Soviets, the official
press has also printed statements explicitly denying any
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dependence on the West for the defense of China. The 1981
Beij ing Review New Year's editorial on world affairs warned:
"China has always sought to build its security on the basis
of an independent and self-reliant defense policy and it will
never resort to sheltering under an external protective um-
178brella." This raises what has been one of the more vola-
tile issues of Chinese domestic politics: the question of
'self-reliance' versus external support or dependence. This
issue has generally been concerned with economic planning
and modernization programs (whether or not to seek foreign
technology, capital, and assistance), but it has undoubtedly
become a point of debate in discussion on China's foreign
policy and defense strategy. Despite the consolidation of
power in China by the 'pragmatists * in the CCP , who have been
identified with a willingness to seek external support,
there remains a strong impetus for a 'self-reliant' posture.
Indications of a Chinese belief that they are capable
of deterring a Soviet attack, whether conventional or nuclear,
would cast doubt on the assumption that the Chinese must re-
main aligned with the West for strategic purposes and would
also raise the possibility of China deciding to remain neutral
in a Soviet-American conflict. The Beijing Review statement
quoted in the previous paragraph on China's "independent and
self-reliant defense policy" is one possible indicator of such
a Chinese belief. In a January 1981 article on Sino-Soviet
relations, Beijing Review carried warnings that China could
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sacrifice all of its territory north of the Huanghe (Yellow)
River and still fight on, and that the Soviets "must be pre-
pared to fight at least 2 years" should they decide to in-
17 9 18
vade China. As for the nuclear threat, Su Yu expressed
in an August 6, 1977 Renmin Ribao article the following
attitudes:
We do not deny that nuclear weapons have great
destructive power and inflict heavy casualties,
but they cannot be counted on to decide the out-
come of a war. The aggressors can use them to
destroy a city or town, but they cannot occupy
them, still less win the people's hearts; on the
contrary, they will only arouse indignation from
the people of the country invaded and the world's
people at large.
China's economic construction takes agriculture
as the foundation and industry as the leading fac-
tor and adopts the principle of combining indus-
try with agriculture, the cities with the countryside,
large and medium-sized projects with small ones,
and production in peacetime with preparedness
against war. Thus it cannot be destroyed by
any modern weapons. 181
Statements like these, along with the relatively low
priority assigned to modernization of China's armed forces
(fourth of the 'four modernizations' and suffering budget
cutbacks for the last two years) , has led some observers to
conclude that the Chinese do indeed believe they can deter a
Soviet attack. Jonathan Pollack has observed:
Most statements have further asserted that a Soviet
attack against China, whether nuclear or conven-
tional, has already been deterred. While 'prepara-
tions against war' must continue, the likelihood of
a sudden, surprise attack has diminished greatly.
Soviet military capabilities, though extremely
imposing and still intended in part to subjugate
China, are deemed by most pronouncements as
simply inadequate for the task. 182
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The pronouncements to which Pollack refers, and which were
quoted above, cannot, however, be taken at face value. An
oft-noted feature of the deterrence strategy of the People's
Republic is that public statements out of China consistently
show "an image of toughness and willingness to fight" designed
to sway the "feelings the aggressor has about the potential
18 3
victim" away from a willingness to attack. The United
States used to be the potential 'aggressor' such statements
were directed at, today the Soviet Union is the power to be
deterred. China also intends to maintain a certain degree
of maneuverability in its relations with the United States,
useful for coaxing concessions out of both Washington and
Moscow, and such statements asserting China's strategic in-
dependence undoubtedly serve that purpose also.
The only firm conclusion one can draw from all this
is that the evidence if sketchy and contradictory. The
Chinese clearly attach great importance to their strategic
alignment with the West, which is crucial for political as
well as for strictly military reasons (to prevent the Soviet
isolation of China, which could cause a severe deterioration
in China's military position vis-a-vis the Soviets). At the
same time, however, China has no intention of becoming depen-
dent upon the West for the preservation of its security.
Chinese cultural and national pride, as well as ideological
principles and realistic strategic assessments, dictate against
political or military dependence. Establishing the precise
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balance the Chinese intend to maintain in their strategic
relationship with the West is difficult because public state-
ments on the subject almost always are made for their 'psycho-
logical deterrence' impact on the Russians. It is in China's
strategic interest that the Soviets believe that an attack on
China would result in war with the West also, but if the
West were to stay out of the war China could defeat an invader
on its own.
Aside from the question of China's strategic inten-
tions, the mutual fear and mistrust between the Chinese and
the Russians makes the prospect of Chinese neutrality in a
Soviet-American conflict unlikely. The Soviet side of this
issue has already been discussed (see p. 11) . The Soviets
have a deeply-rooted suspicion of the Chinese, reinforced by
hostile Chinese propaganda and the growth of China's relations
with the Western powers, and have a distinct dislike for hav-
ing to tolerate neutrals when engaged in a major conflict.
The Russians, for their part, would demand more than just a
declaration of neutrality from the Chinese--a non-aggression
pact, for example.
Does the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941
provide a precedent for a Sino-Soviet pact today? There
are several parallels between the international situation
that led to the 1941 pact and the situation today. Japan had
shifted into strategic alignment with ideological adversaries
of the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy, by signing the
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Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, 1936 and the Tripartite
Pact on September 27, 1940. Japan had also fought two serious
border incidents with the Soviets in Manchuria in 1938 and
1939. Yet, in order to pursue Japanese interests in the
Pacific, Japan was willing to sign the Neutrality Pact with
the Soviet Union—as it turned out, just two months before
Germany invaded Russia.
"Anti-hegemony" is one of the key points of China's
foreign policy today, and the United States and Japan have
both agreed to its inclusion in treaties and communiques
with China. Though very low-key, the anti-Soviet implications
of the "anti-hegemony" front China is attempting to build are
not entirely unlike those of the "anti-Comintern" alignment.
There is not, as of yet, a contemporary equivalent to the
Tripartite Pact, but the United States has openly expressed
its strategic interest in China's security and the Chinese
media do carry veiled comments on strategic alignemnt with
the West (see p. 129-130). China has also fought ' serious bor-
der incidents with the Russians, though not on the scale of
the Japanese-Soviet clashes. China has much less of a common
ideological cause with its Western partners than Japan had
with Germany and Italy, so it is not unreasonable to expect
that China would be willing—as was Japan--to pursue its own
national interest by remaining neutral while its de_ facto
allies went to war with the Soviets.
Historical precedent may suggest possibilities, but
it cannot predict probabilities. In this case, the postulated
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scenario of a sudden Chinese decision to sign a non-aggression
pact with the Soviets, the probability of such an eventuality
must be assessed as very low. The Chinese do not appear to
trust the Russians enough to be willing to enter into such a
risky pact from a position of marked military inferiority.
Statements in the official media regularly attack Soviet
treaties as being "nothing less than shackles for the third
world countries, which serve to aid Soviet intervention and
conquest as the occasion arises," and warn that "no agreement
or negotiation can stop the Soviet hegemonists from pursuing
184their policies of aggression and expansion." Though such
statements are obviously intended to disrupt the Soviet effort
to isolate China by means of detente and 'friendship treaties'
with countries around China's periphery, they also reflect
underlying Chinese attitudes, as Kenneth Lieberthal has pointed
out:
This perspective explains why the Chinese will
continue to refuse Soviet offers for a treaty on
nonaggression and the nonuse of force, for Peking
believes that Moscow will inevitably try to use
the treaty to undermine China's sovereignty . 185
The example of the 1941 Soviet-Japanese pact adds credence
to these Chinese fears: as soon as the Soviets had defeated
the Germans and redeployed their forces, they attacked the
Japanese in Manchuria. The Russians did not attack Japan
only, or even primarily, out of loyalty to their Western
allies: they had old scores to settle with the Japanese, as
well as the lucrative territorial gains awaiting their con-
quest. The same motives would apply to China today.
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It is highly unlikely that the Chinese would abandon
their strategy of the 'united front' (alignment with lesser
rivals against the primary threat) to enter into a dangerous
nonaggression pact with their 'number one enemy': the Soviet
Union. This possibility can be discounted as a potential
threat to the American interest in keeping the Soviet divi-
sions on the Chinese border tied down where they are. There
is a third possibility, as was mentioned earlier, that must
be examined. That is the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rap-
prochement, an actual shift by the Chinese to strategic align-
ment with the Soviets against the West.
Motives for China to seek a rapprochement with the
Soviet Union are not difficult to postulate. China's security
would be enhanced by the relaxation of tensions with the coun-
try most threatening to China, China would gain flexibility
and leverage in the international political arena, and China's
economic development would benefit from both of the first two
benefits, due to less need for defense allocations and less
inhibitions on the part of the West to develop economic rela-
tions with China (and more incentives to do so) . For these
reasons, most Western observers do not rule out the possibility
of China seeking 'detente' (in the strict sense of a relaxation
of tensions) or a 'limited accommodation' with the Soviet
1 ft fi
Union. It is pertinent to note, in this regard, that the
Chinese and the Soviets have been able to conclude a number
of agreements covering trade, river navigation, and railway
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transportation over the past two decades, despite the per-
sistence of their dispute.
A limited detente would not necessarily threaten the
United States strategic interest in keeping Soviet forces
tied down on the Sino-Soviet border. Such a detente certainly
would not be able to resolve the fundamental differences be-
tween China and the Soviet Union that led to their split in
the first place. A relaxation of Sino-Soviet tensions would
not erase the fact, as the Chinese well know, of massive Soviet
military forces along the Chinese border or the existence of
Soviet-armed clients around the southern periphery of China.
China has been highly critical of Soviet motives in seeking
detente with the West, and certainly would not expect the
Soviets to change their style of diplomacy just to improve
relations with China, a much weaker power. As for the Soviets,
unless China were to drop its strategic alignment with the West
and take some sort of overt action to indicate alignment with
the Soviet Union— for example, a mutual defense or military
cooperation clause in a friendship treaty with Russia, as
the Soviet treaties with India and Afghanistan have--the Soviet
forces along China's borders would have to stay in place (to
maintain pressure on China, in accordance with the 'dual
strategy' described earlier, as well as for defense).
Although a Chinese decision to seek a lessening of
tensions with the Soviet Union is a real possibility, it is
not likely that there will be a return to a Sino-Soviet alli-
ance as existed in the 1950s. Resurrection of the Sino-Soviet
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alliance would require a drastic revision of the foreign
policy and defense strategies of the Soviet Union, China, or
both. A prerequisite for major shifts in Chinese or Soviet
strategy would be a substantial change in the perceptions
of security threats and the strategic balance (the 'correla-
tion of forces') held by Chinese and Soviet leaders,. There
are, of course, numerous other factors contributing to the
tensions between China and Russia, and these could also pre-
clude a far-reaching rapprochement, but resolution of the
military-strategic aspect of the dispute is the one irreduci-
18 7ble requirement for a renewed alliance.
There are several possible scenarios for the shift
in Chinese and Soviet threat perceptions and defense stra-
tegies that would be necessary for China to become aligned
with the Soviet Union against the West. The Soviet Union
would -like to be able to force a change in China's policies,
by means of its 'dual strategy' of containment and coexist-
ence, in order to gain a rapprochement on Soviet terms. This
is unlikely to occur, as demonstrated by China's stiffening
resistence to increasing Soviet pressure over the past two
decades. The Soviets have also left open the option to force
a "rapproachement" through military intervention in China,
probably to exploit political collapse—revolution or a power
struggle—and put in place a 'pro-Soviet' regime. A military
solution to the 'China problem' by the Soviets, while a real
possibility, would only take place under the unique combination
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of propitious circumstances described earlier—circumstances
which are, admittedly, unlikely to occur.
There are two other possible changes in the Chinese
perception of China's vulnerability and strategic position
which could lead to a decision for a rapproachement with the
Soviet Union. These are 'non-coercive' scenarios, in that
the change in China's strategy is not forced upon China by
Soviet power. The first of these would be for China to suc-
ceed in building up its own military forces to the point that
it no longer considered the Soviet Union to be a threat to
its security. This is certainly the scenario that China's
leaders have in mind. Soviet terms for a rapprochement have
been too onerous and the Soviet application of crude military
pressure on China has been too reminiscent of the humiliations
China suffered in the past for the Chinese to be willing to
submit to an 'unequal rapprochement.' Donald Zagoria has
observed that "the Chinese know the Russians too well to think
that they can deal with the Soviet Union from a position of
weakness, and the Chinese are now almost completely encircled
by the Soviets." 188
Chinese statements on the inability of the Soivet Union
to conquer China and the relative invulnerability of China's
economy to destruction by nuclear weapons notwithstanding,
China's leaders do not yet have enough confidence in the
ability of their armed forces to deter Soviet attack to be
willing to abandon strategic alignment with the West for an
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alliance with the Soviet Union. Should China somehow be able
to equalize the Sino-Soviet strategic balance, at least to
the extent that the Soviets cannot hope to intimidate China,
the strategic value of ties with the West would be greatly
18 9diminished. Thomas W. Robinson has concluded that this is
precisely the strategy being pursued by Beijing: "to use
the Americans to fend off the Russians and then help build
up China's economy and then, when the time is right, to
190
strike a bargain with the Kremlin."
The problem with this scenario is that, barring a
collapse of the Soviet economy or internal political dis-
order on a scale the Soviet Union has not seen in almost
fifty years, the Russians will not allow China to upset their
present preponderance of power. Soviet policy toward China
is not based solely on expansionist motives: the Soviets per-
ceive China to be a military threat to their homeland--a
threat they believe is growing both in terms of might and in
terms of the intensity of hostility to the Soviet Union. Twice
within the last twenty years the Soviets have reacted to a
perceived increase in the threat from China by building up
their forces along the Sino-Soviet border. Each time the
margin of Soviet superiority over China widened. From the
Soviet point of view, to allow China to achieve nuclear or
conventional parity is not just to forsake an opportunity
for expansion, it is also to expose the Russian motherland
to devastation by a foe of unrelenting hostility. Add to
141

this the threat from the capitalist camp, waiting for the
opportunity to destroy socialism, and the remoteness of
the possibility of the Soviets consenting to a rapproche-
ment with China as strategic equals becomes apparent.
The second 'non-coercive' scenario for a Chinese de-
cision to shift alignment from the West to the Soviet Union
is the possibility that China's perception of the 'number one
enemy' might shift from Russia to one of the Western powers,
presumably the United States, or to the West as a whole.
Should such a shift in China's threat perceptions occur, the
principles of the 'united front 1 doctrine would dictate a
shift to strategic alignment with the lesser enemy--the Soviet
Union. This is the position China was in when Mao Zedong
journeyed to Moscow in December 1949 to negotiate an alliance
with the Soviet Union. It is highly unlikely that China would
decide to stand alone; against two enemies other than to "watch
two tigers fights" (that is, to stay neutral in a Soviet-
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American war, a possibility already discounted) . A. Doak
Barnett has concluded that a shift in China's threat percep-
tions would be the only likely cause of a Sino-Soviet alliance
against the West:
Such a rapprochement would probably only be-
come a serious danger if, at some point, China
concluded that the United States--or a rearmed
Japan
—
posed a greater and more immediate poten-
tial military threat to China than the Soviet
Union does. US policy can and should try to
insure that this will not occur. 192
Although it is unlikely that the Chinese perception
of the Soviet Union as their 'number one enemy' will change
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in the near future, over the longer-terra this cannot be stated
with such assurance. There are serious constraints on the
ability of the United States to directly influence China's
threat perceptions, as Barnett recommended. Disagreements
between the United States and China on a number of inter-
national questions, not the least of which is the status and
future of Taiwan, and potential disputes between China and
American allies in Asia cannot lie dormant indefinitely. Cir-
cumstances in which the United States believes military action
must be taken to defend its national interest despite the
vehement objections of Beijing are not difficult to imagine:
in 1950 the United States failed to appreciate the serious-
ness of China's warning that it could not tolerate the approach
of United Nations forces to its frontier, with severe conse-
quences for American troops when the Chinese 'volunteers'
struck. There are too many conflicts simmering among and
within China's neighbors for it to be safe to assume that in
every potential conflict the United States and China will al-
ways perceive a common need to oppose the Soviet Union as a
higher priority than their own direct interests in the con-
flicts. Adroit Soviet diplomacy during such a test of wills
between the United States and China could well result in a
shift in China's perception of its 'number one enemy.
'
To sum up the points made in this sub-section: The
United States does have a security interest in China derived
from China's role in the Soviet-American strategic balance.
It is in America's interest for the Soviet forces deployed
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on the Sino-Soviet border to stay tied down there. On the
other hand, the United States should not expect that the
threat of a two-front war will deter the Soviet Union from
attacking NATO should the circumstances in Europe convince
the Soviets such an attack would succeed. Neither can the
United States expect that fighting between Russian and China
would divert Soviet forces from the European front. Both
the United States and China must understand that it is the
Soviet intention to fight and win a two-front war if such
a conflict cannot be avoided except at the scarifice of vital
Soviet interests.
Although it is in the interest of the United States
for the Soviet forces on the Chinese border to remain there,
the United States must not assume those forces have been
cemented in place as a Maginot Line against the Chinese.
There are circumstances, -admittedly remote but nonetheless
demanding consideration, in which the Soviet Union would per-
ceive enough of a diminution of the potential threat from
China that it could safely redeploy its forces from the Sino-
Soviet border to other theaters. Such circumstances could
well arise out of a local conflict in which the United States
had intervened to protect its interests against a threat not
even emanating from either Russia or China.
The Sino-Soviet dispute will probably remain irrecon-
cilable, though a slight relaxation of tensions is a distinct
possibility. While it is reasonable to expect that a
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Sino-Soviet rapprochement would not result in an anti-American
alliance, this should not be relied upon as a basis for United
States defense planning— for the reason given in the previous
paragraph. The strategic alignment of China with the West
has complicated Moscow's defense planning and forced the
Soviet Union to devote substantial resources to the defense
of all of its frontiers, but the fact that the Soviet Union
has been able to make such large commitments of its resources
to defense—and apparently will continue to be able to do so
—
demands that the United States not base its own force level
decisions on the calculation that China's armed forces can be
added into the Soviet-American strategic balance as substi-
193tutes or surrogates for American forces.
3 . China and Containment of Soviet Expansionism
Secretary of State Alexander Haig has made it clear
that containment of Soviet expansionism is to be a high
priority objective of the Reagan Administration:
A major focus of American policy must be the
Soviet Union, not because of ideological preoccu-
pation but simply because Moscow is the greatest
source of international insecurity today. Let
us be plain about it: Soviet promotion of vio-
lence as the instrument of change constitutes
the greatest danger to world peace....
Our objective must be to restore the pros-
pects for peaceful resolution of conflict. We
can do this by demonstrating to the Soviet
Union that aggressive and violent behavior will
threaten Moscow's own interests....
Only the United States has the pivotal
strength to convince the Soviets--and their
proxies—that violence will not advance their
cause. Only the United States has the power to
persuade the Soviet leaders that improved
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relations with us serve Soviet as well as Ameri-
can interests. We have a right, indeed a duty,
to insist that the Soviets support a peaceful in-
ternational order, that they abide by treaties,
and that they respect reciprocity. A more con-
structive Soviet behavior in these areas will
surely provide the basis for a more productive
East-West dialogue. 194
Although the April 24, 1981 speech in which Secretary Haig
made these statements was titled "A New Direction in U.S.
Foreign Policy," the 'new direction 1 is more in the realm of
tactics and priorities than in strategy or fundamental objec-
tives. Every American administration since the end of the
Second World War has committed itself in some manner to the
195policy of containment of Soviet expansionism.
China has been proposed as a partner for the United
States in the containment of Soviet expansionism. Ross
Terrill, for example, has observed that: "China is much
closer to the West than six months ago... and in some ways
China promises to be a staunch partner in the containment of
a USSR whose intentions it has perhaps read more accurately
196than the West has." Such sentiments are reflected in
policy statements by Reagan Administration officials (as in
statements by the previous three administrations) . Walter
J. Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs stated on April 24, 1981, concerning the foreign
policies of China and the United States, that: "Our policies
toward Soviet expansion and hegemonism run on parallel
19 7tracks." The United States has, in effect, gone on record
as having a security interest in China based on the broader
American interest in the containment of Soviet expansionism.
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This American security interest in China has two
aspects. The first is the deterrent effect China's strategic
alignment with the West has on Soviet behavior as a result
of the shift in the Soviet-American balance of power. China's
role in the Soviet-American strategic balance was discussed
at length in the previous sub-section. As was noted, the
Soviet response to China's alignment with the West has been
to expand its military forces as much as Soviet leaders felt
was necessary to prevent a diminution of the Soviet prepon-
derence of power over China. The mere fact of a Sino-Western
alignment does not deter the Soviets from taking action, as
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates.
The second aspect of the American interest in China
as a partner in containment is the possibility of Sino-
American consultations, perhaps even coordinated policies,
on how best to deter Soviet intervention in specific in-
stances. Two questions must be asked regarding such a co-
ordinated containment policy: Would China be an effective
partner, from the point of view of American interests, in
the containment of Russia? If a Sino-American collaboration
were possible, would it be effective in deterring the Soviets
from further aggression?
China's foreign policy strategy, based as it is on
the 'united front' doctrine, at least makes China a de facto
partner in the containment of the Soviet Union whether or not
there is an explicit Sino-American agreement on such a
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partnership. Commentaries in the Communist Chinese media on
the Soviet threat identify the same targets and strategies
as many Western analyses of Soviet expansionism, perhaps for
the purpose of reinforcing the Western perception of shared
strategic interests with China, but also certainly reflecting
19 8
the perceptions of China's leadership.
Since the mid-1960s, an editorial in Renmin Ribao
asserted, "a dominant feature of Soviet foreign policy has
been the pursuance of an offensive strategy for global ex-
199pansion." Although there is disagreement among Western
observers as to whether "global expansion" is indeed the
Soviet goal, there is considerable agreement that the Third
World has been the principal target of Soviet efforts since
control over Eastern Europe was consolidated in the late
1940s. The Chinese view of Soviet global strategy supports
this Western perception:
The Soviet plan for the areas flanking Europe,
that is the Middle Wast and North Africa, has been
to make use of the existing political unrest to
expand its influence, to prop up pro-Soviet re-
gimes, to seize military bases and to conclude
treaties of a military nature so as to outflank
Europe . 200
The Soviet tactic of exploiting "existing political unrest"
for its own strategic purposes is what has been labeled
"opportunism" in the West, and the Chinese press has shown
an awareness of the specific cases of such Soviet behavior
which aroused concern in the West:
...during a number of local conflicts in the past
few years, including the 1975 Angola war and the
1977 Ogaden war, the Soviet Union demonstrated
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time and again its ability to support a proxy war
in a third world country by a massive sealift and
airlift, delivering huge quantities of arms and
ammunition within a very short time. 201
It is in Asia, of course, that Soviet behavior arouses
the greatest concern among China's leaders. The Chinese
assessment of current Soviet foreign policy priorities is
similar to that of the Western observers quoted earlier
(see page 57 ) , that because of the stalemate in Europe and
Soviet concern for the Chinese challenge the Russians have
directed their attention to Asia as a target for expansion.
Warns the Beijing Review :
It is far from adequate today to repeat that
the emphasis of Soviet strategy lies in Europe.
Given the stalemated confrontation in Europe, the
Kremlin, emobldened by the enervated reactions of
the West to its advances, has turned away to ?02
strengthen its strategic dispositions in the East.
Outflanking Europe is, however, only one of the Soviet goals
in pursuing expansion in Asia. The other Soviet goal, the
one that most worries Beijing, is to "encircle and isolate"
China. The Chinese media regularly complain that:
...the Soviet Union has adopted a policy of en-
circling and isolating China. It has massed
large numbers of troops along the Sino-Soviet
borders and in Mongolia and has occupied the
Wakhan region of Afghanistan bordering on China.
The Soviet Union has also made use of Vietnam
to harass China's southern borders, thus
attempting to encircle China with a two-pronged
pincer movement to create an atmosphere of un-
easiness and to undermine her modernization
drive. In addition, it has tried to sow dis-
cord between China on the one hand and Japan,
the United States and the Southeast Asian coun-




Thus, Chinese perceptions of Soviet strategy suggest
the possibility of a broad commonality of purpose with the
West, and the United States in particular, in containment of
Soviet expansionism. This commonality of purpose has, in
fact, been expressed in the public descriptions of private
conversations between American and Chinese leaders on global
strategic issues. Common purpose has not, however, resulted
in common policies for containing the Soviet threat. China
has, at least in statements in the press, indicated an aware-
ness of the need for greater coordination of effort in coun-
tering the Soviets:
...in order to check and defeat Soviet expansion,
it is necessary to further strengthen the con-
certed efforts of the countries of the Asian and
Pacific region and for this it is very important
that the people and governments of the countries
concerned have a maximum consensus on problems
related to the destiny of their own region. 204
Identification of common purpose and China's recognition that
"concerted efforts" and a "consensus on problems" are needed
to contain the Soviets allow the conclusion that it is in
the national interest for the United States to engage in
consultation with China's leaders for the purpose of develop-
ing a common policy for deterring or countering Soviet
aggression.
Which brings up the second question: could Sino-
American collaboration produce a policy which would effec-
tively deter the Soviet Union from expansionist behavior?
There are several reasons to believe that it cannot do so.
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As was pointed out before, it is unlikely that China will
divert Soviet military forces from other important missions,
a point which Allen Whiting has specifically linked to China's
205
role in containment of Russia. Domestic political insta-
bility in China has in the past, and may well again in the
9 a c.
future, limit China's role as a regional or global power.
As was also noted earlier, the United States and China have
much different tactics for dealing with the Soviet Union:
the Americans preferring to induce the Soviets into behaving
themselves by reassuring Russian paranoia and with promises of
the 'good life' of Western prosperity through trade, while
the Chinese believe that only a tough, even belligerent, and
uncompromising stance will convince the Russians of one's
resolve to resist their expansionist aspirations. Common
purpose and common strategy could founder on divergent tactics,
or even on different styles in implementing the same basic
tactics. China's united front may not be able to speak with
one voice (a problem the Chinese Communist Party experienced
in trying to form united fronts against the Japanese)
.
The apparent assumption that the Soviet response to
a Sino-Western common policy will be one of moderation and
conciliation must also be questioned. Jiri Valenta has con-
cluded that Soviet decision-makers probably did consider
China's likely reaction (and how it would affect Soviet in-
207terests) prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
but the consequences the Politburo may have feared at the
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time have all come to pass in the years since then. A Sino-
American common containment policy would have to be fairly
explicit in defining the adverse consequences the Soviets
would suffer as the price for aggression. Richard Pipes has
warned: "In principle, it does not pay to be too clever with
Russian politicians: they are inclined to interpret ambi-
guity as equivocation, equivocation as weakness, and weakness
2 8
as a signal to act." Writing in 1972, Pipes could well
have been describing the circumstances at the time of the
209Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. government's
reaction to events in Poland over the last year and the poli-
cies adopted by both the Carter and Reagan Administrations
have been much more appropriate in this regard.
The point is that the structure of the international
system does not in itself deter the Soviet Union from taking
action. Soviet decision-makers, like national leaders every-
where, evaluate their opportunities and risks on a case-by-case
basis. Long-range consequences and the possibility of retali-
ation or sanctions from the West and China are, of course,
considered in each case, but not as factors that arise inevita-
bly from the structure of relationships in the international
system. A persuasive argument can in fact be made that, if
anything, the structure of the international system, particu-
larly the strategic alignment of China with the West, will
impel the Soviet Union to take action to prevent the status




Sino-American cooperation on the containment of
Soviet expansionism, to be effective, must be willing, and
must state explicitly that it is willing, to directly confront
the Soviet Union whenever and wherever the Soviets attempt
to exploit local conflicts to expand their own influence or
control by military means. Such a conclusion inevitably
raises the criticism of being "brinksmanship" and advocacy
of abandonment of detente in favor of a return to the cold
war. These are points frequently brought up in the Soviet
press whenever a Western leader or observer has the temerity
to suggest that detente must entail a moderation of Soviet
as well as of Western behavior.
The brinksmanship and return to the cold war argu-
ments are based on a view of the world that is either hope-
lessly oversimplified or else naive to the point of being
foolhardy. Though the expression itself fell out of favor,
the phenomenon described by brinksmanship remains a feature
of international politics. The threat of a crisis reaching
the brink of war can be avoided by any of three means: by
the Soviet Union of its own accord abandoning the ideology
of its rulers and the lessons it has learned through its his-
tory just to become friends with the West, by the West backing
down whenever the Soviet Union makes a thrust, or by the West
and China firmly resisting every Soviet probe for opportuni-
ties for expansion. The first possibility is unlikely to
occur, the second requires abandonment of the national interest,
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only the third approach would appear to offer the prospect
of containment without threat of war.
Not all features of detente and the cold war are
mutually exclusive. This is the myth that led to the dis-
illusionment with detente in the United States. The Soviet
Union has made its point of view clear, as was pointed out
earlier: detente is limited to the reduction of superpower
tensions and cannot, indeed must not, be construed as in any
way limiting Soviet intervention in Third World conflicts
(the conflicts and Soviet intervention in them being pre-
ordained by history) . On the other hand, from the Soviet point
of view, Western activities in the Third World must be linked
with detente. Thus, to assume that detente or a renewed cold
war are the only two policy choices we face is to ignore the
complexity of the international political environment—many
local conflicts are beyond the power of the superpowers to
control, or even anticipate—and is also tacit acceptance of
the Soviet version of the ground rules for detente.
The essence of the Soviet version of detente is that
east-west tensions are reduced by a reduction in the linkages
drawn by the West, not by a moderation in Soviet behavior.
Herein lies the key to a policy for containment of Soviet ex-
pansionism which can be carried out within the context of a
continuing search for detente. Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko's January 19 81 analysis of foreign policy and world
affairs shows the Soviet sensitivity to the 'linkages' issue:
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In the United States, or to be more precise,
among those who determine U.S. foreign policy, a
thesis has circulated as of late to the effect
that in examining a particular issue it is necessary
to take into account its link with other problems
or events in international life, in particular
those actions by the Soviet Union.... But if you
disengage yourself from universal scales and
take a sober look at the development of inter-
national events over a long term, it becomes
obvious that with this 'linkage' it is essentially
impossible to resolve a single international
problem. ... If this concept were permitted to be
introduced into international political practice
to the advantage of someone's narrow interests
—
and we, but not we alone, have frequently had
occasion to achieve this— a vicious circle would
then inevitably develop around the process to
solve urgent international problems and the
overall state of affairs in the world would be
deadlocked, with all the ensuing consequences.
Conversely, the opposite concept— specific-
ally, that the solution of any specific problem,
particularly if it is an important one, can
facilitate the solution of other questions--is
perfectly justified. 211
The tone of Gromyko ' s analysis is moderate, perhaps even
conciliatory, but that cannot be mistaken for a change in
the Soviet attitude toward the West or for a change in the
Soviet approach to detente. The warning of the "ensuing
consequences" should the linkages apporach be adopted is a
thinly-veiled reference to the Soviet assertion that the West
has but two choices: detente, as defined by the Soviets, or
a renewed cold war. Gromyko 's remarks are an attempt to pre-
serve the previous pattern of detente, in which the Soviet
Union, not the West, draws the linkages.
As if to confirm Gromyko 's fears, the Reagan Adminis-
tration has adopted a 'linkages' approach to relations with
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the Soviet Union. Specifically, Secretary of State Haig has
publicly remarked that the "Basic Principles of U.S. -Soviet
Relations" signed May 29, 1972 must be observed by the Soviet
Union before further progress can be made on a number of is-
sues of interest to the Soviet Union. Secretary Haig is re-
ported by the Washington Post to have stated that a Soviet
demonstration of restraint in the Third World and a new
understanding on the limits of Soviet activities would be
212
essential conditions for future negotiations. Although
the record of the West, including the United States, in hold-
ing to such a linkage policy is not encouraging— the West has
as much interest in compartmentalizing the various aspects of
east-west relations as does the Soviet Union--it is clear that
from the Soviet point of view a Western 'linkages' approach
undercuts many of the advantages to be gained from detente.
The Soviet Union also confronts the 'linkages* problem
in its relations with China. The Chinese are adamant that
an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations depends upon Soviet
abandonment of its policy of containment and isolation of
China. China broke off discussions on the normalization of
relations with the Soviets after the invasion of Afghanistan,
talks which supposedly opened as a result of a moderation in
213China's preconditions for negotiations. The Chinese almost
certainly felt they had been the victims of the same Soviet
strategy they had been warning the West against:
In plain words, it wants others to stick to
'detente' while it single-mindedly pursues ex-
pansionism. It alone reserves the freedom to
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engage in flagrant aggression and expansion when-
ever and wherever it chooses, in the name of
"supporting the national-liberation movement" or
"supporting social change" in other countries.
Whoever objects to such acts is labelled "the
enemy of detente. "214
Although the People's Republic has made overtures to the
Soviet Union to resume the talks, the Chinese have not, as
far as is known, again dropped the troop withdrawal precondi-
215
tion, nor have they stopped insisting that Soviet troops
must be withdrawn from Afghanistan.
The 'linkage' concept may offer a basis for a Sino-
American strategy for deterring Soviet aggression, but it is
not clear such a policy would succeed in moderating Soviet
behavior. Historical precedent would suggest that, rather
than adapting their behavior to the Sino-American linkage
policy, the Soviets would make every effort to destroy the
policy. The classic pattern of Soviet diplomacy--brute power
and exaggerated inducements—would undoubtedly be the Soviet
response: brute power in the form of psychological pressure
on Western leaders and their constituencies, pressure applied
by dire warnings of the consequences of a new cold war backed
by typical Russian sabre-rattling made visible by increased
force deployments; inducements in the form of trade and in-
vestment offers, arms limitations proposals, and the promise
of a glorious new world free of tensions. The Soviet Union
is using such tactics right now in an attempt to thwart the
modernization of NATO's nuclear weapon force and preserve the
Soviet preponderance in theater nuclear weapons.
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The various difficulties which have been discussed
above forewarn that Sino-American collaboration will not be
a panacea for the problem of Soviet expansionism. This is
not to say, however, that the United States and China should
not attempt cooperative efforts at deterring Soviet interven-
tion in local conflicts. It is in the national interest for
the United States to pursue with China common policies for
the containment of Soviet expansionism. Otherwise, there
is a risk of China and America inadvertently working at cross
purposes, sending the wrong signals to Moscow, thereby in-
viting Soviet intervention in conflicts. More important
than collaboration with China, though, is clarity of purpose
and resolve on the part of the United States. Whether or not
the United States works with China on this issue, the Soviet
Union can be expected to apply pressure on American leaders,
directly and through the American public--to which the Soviets
have enviable access—raising the spectre of a return to the
cold war as the only alternative to detente on Soviet terms.
The temptation will be to blame the Soviet pressure on Ameri-
can ties with China, a theme the Soviet Union must be expected
to play upon. To yield to that temptation would be a grave
error, just as it would be a grave error for Western Europe
to abandon ties with the United States for Soviet inducements.




4 . China and Soviet-American Arms Limitations
The relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union is highly complex: the two superpowers are at
once adversaries, competing for power and influence, and
partners, attempting to solve, or at least manage, a panoply
of global problems—not the least of which is the prevention
of thermonuclear war. The preceding two sections focused on
the adversary side of Soviet-American relations: the stra-
tegic balance and Soviet expansionism. This section and the
next will look at the mutual interests America and the Soviet
Union share in arms control and the reduction of tensions.
Whether or not Soviet or American leaders make a conscious
decision to include China in their calculations of mutual
interests, it is evident that each of the superpowers in-
cludes the 'China factor' in its own perception of interests.
Arms control and disarmament are, of course, issues
that affect every nation on earth—not just the two super-
powers. But because of their tremendous nuclear arsenals, the
United States and the Soviet Union do have specific bilateral
interests, and responsibilities, in the limitation of strate-
gic weapons. China has a role, even if only one of non-
participation, in both the global and bilateral Soviet-American
aspects of the arms control problem due to its possession of
nuclear weapons. This section will examine China's role in
Soviet-American arms limitation efforts, broad global efforts
will be discussed in part E.
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Although the Reagan Administration has taken a 'hard-
line' approach to relations with the Soviet Union, there has
not been an abandonment of arms control as a fundamental in-
terest shared by the superpowers. The new administration has
expressed a willingness to resume negotiations with the Soviet
Union in two areas of arms limitations—strategic arms limi-
tations (SALT) and European theater nuclear forces (TNF)
limitations—both of which have previously been the subject
of Soviet-American talks. Because the two areas are closely
related, and because China's nuclear force has an impact on
both talks, they will be examined herein. Additionally, a
third area which has been negotiated before, but is currently
a dormant issue, will be mentioned for the same reasons:
mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in the European
theater.
The first priority of the Reagan Administration has
been to ensure that its negotiating position in any future
SALT talks is not burdened by implied commitment to Carter
Administration policies with which it disagrees. During the
election campaign, in an interview on September 30, 1980,
Ronald Reagan emphasized his view that the SALT II treaty
was "fatally flawed" and that he would, if elected, scrap it
and negotiate a new one. Now that he is in office, President
Reagan has indeed scrapped the SALT II treaty and the State
Department has issued a statement that the United States is
not legally bound by its provisions, though the Administra-
tion has not formally renounced it (the treaty was 'scrapped'
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by not sending it to the new Congress for 'advise and consent'
prior to ratification) and has thus far left open the possi-
bility of using SALT II provisions as starting points for
talks on a new treaty. The administration has also decided
to take its time in opening the next round of SALT talks,
primarily so that it can carefully prepare its negotiating
strategy, but also because the American bargaining position
should be much stronger after the Regan defense budget has
passed (including decisions on new ICBMs , bombers, and related
systems) and because the U.S. will not appear overly eager to
reach an agreement
.
As for the Soviet Union, it also appears interested
in resuming the SALT talks, despite earlier warnings that the
SALT II treaty must be ratified before new talks could begin.
Soviet leaders have on several occasions pressed the Reagan
Administration to enter into new talks quickly, which is
probably a tactical and propaganda ploy to manipulate Ameri-
can and European public opinion, but which also reflects an
earnest desire to hold the talks (though, it should be pointed
out, the talks themselves could well be a ploy to erode the
American consensus for a defense build-up) . Despite the ap-
parent Soviet interest in talks, the initial contact the
Reagan Administration had with the Russians--at the Standing
Consultative Commission (which monitors SALT compliance)
meeting in May 19 81—did not go well due to Soviet intransi-
gence on a number of long-standing issues. Thus, while it is
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almost certain that the SALT talks will be reopened, it is
equally certain that they will be at least as difficult
217
and protracted as any of the previous SALT rounds
.
There was not a delegation from the People's Republic
of China present at the SALT I negotiations, but China, in
particular the superpowers' relations with China, weighed
heavily on the course and outcome of the talks. John Newhouse
has credited the Nixon Administration's opening to China as
having been a decisive factor in the conclusion of the SALT
I accords. Describing the impact of Henry Kissinger's secrete
trip to Beining in 1971, Newhouse observes:
Triangular politics had started. Indeed, the
United States was playing at old-fashioned Real -
politik , hitherto an alien style. The SALT
agreement reached on May 26, 1972 was the prod-
uct of multiple purposes and forces of which none
may have been more critical than Washington's
revival of nineteenth-century power politics . 21°
Earlier in the SALT I negotiations, Newhouse has also ob-
served, the Soviet Union had felt constrained from engaging in
serious talks with the United States until a Sino-Soviet dia-
logue had been opened on the border issue—which had erupted
219into armed clashes in 1969. Throughout his memoirs of his
years as National Security Advisor to President Nixon, Henry
Kissinger remarks on the relationship between the American
opening to China and the Soviet-American SALT talks, though
he denies having opened relations with China for the purpose
of playing the 'China card' against the Russians. Neverthe-
less, it is clear from his description of the policy decisions
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made during those years that the wording and timing of pub-
lic statements of American policy, and the scheduling of
various visits and talks, were all carefully designed so as
220
to have maximum impact on Soviet leaders.
This could be termed the 'positive' aspect of China's
role in Soviet-American arms limitations efforts. Due to its
geopolitical importance, China provided somewhat of an incen-
tive for the two superpowers to conclude a SALT agreement.
But there has also been a 'negative' aspect to China's in-
fluence on Soviet-American arms cooperation. As was described
earlier, the Soviet perception of an increasingly dangerous
threat from China has twice led to large-scale build-ups of
Soviet forces directed against China. Undoubtedly a portion
of the build-up in Soviet strategic arms, perhaps even a
significant proportion of it, has been directed against China.
The problem is that, except in the case of relatively short-
range delivery systems in place near the China frontier, it
is exceedingly difficult to draw a firm distinction between
weapons aimed at China and weapons aimed at the West. The
result, as Jeremy J. Stone astutely foresaw in 1967, is that
China contributes to the Soviet-American arms race:
China will therefore probably trigger a new round
of expenditures on active defenses that might
—
but only might--have been avoided had the Chinese
detonation never occurred. Thus its impact on
the superpowers ' arms competition is likely to be
a catalytic one: one that encourages expenditures
disproportionate to its threat. These expendi-
tures will be produced through exaggerated re-
sponses and through the reciprocal perception in
each superpower of the other's reactions and of
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the political and strategic threats that these
pose. 221
China has been a factor in Soviet arms control policy
since the late 1950s when disagreements between the two al-
lies on relations with the West and on military and revolu-
tionary strategy spilled over from the realm of ideological
debate into matters of national policy. Policy disputes over
Soviet arms control policy and the development of nuclear
weapons by China appears, in fact, to have been a major (if
222
not the major) cause of the Sino-Soviet split. The role
that China played in Soviet arms control policy through the
mid-1960s has been summarized well by Helmut Sonnenfeldt:
...it would be overdrawing the case to say that
the Chinese challenge has driven the Soviet
Union 'westward' in its orientation. The most
that seems warranted is that in several instances
the Soviets have been prepared to conclude an
agreement or arrangement that they judged to be
in their national interest even though they knew
it to be objectionable to the Chinese and real-
ized that they would come under attack from
Peking. 223
After the split with China had become open and irreconcilable
over the near-term, the Soviet Union did use the arms control
issue as an element of its 'dual strategy' toward China, as
Sonnenfeldt also noted: "As a very general proposition, it
seems safe to conclude that disarmament proposals have at
various times played a role in Moscow's tactical conduct of
the dispute with the Chinese, sometimes as a stick, sometimes
as a carrot.
"
Once China had exploded an atomic device of its own
(October 1964) , the potential nuclear threat from China became
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an element in Soviet arms control policy as well as in Soviet
defense policy. The escalation in Sino-Soviet tensions in
the late 1960s, which culminated in the March 19 69 border
clashes, led to. a Soviet attempt to use the SALT negotia-
tions as the basis for a Soviet-American alliance against
China. The Soviets made this attempt in a July 10, 1970 pro-
posal to the United States, according to John Newhouse:
A stunning glimpse of Moscow's China phobia
was provided; on learning of plans for some
'provocative' action or attack, the two sides--
the United States and the Soviet Union—would
take joint steps to prevent it or, if too late,
joint retaliatory action to punish the guilty
party. The Soviets, in effect, were proposing
no less than a superpower alliance against other
nuclear powers. Although clearly aimed at
China, the proposal risked arousing NATO, whose
membership includes two other nuclear powers,
Britain and France. The Soviets never would
explain what might constitute provocative actions.
Washington rejected the idea immediately ... 225
Washington not only rejected this Soviet proposal, it re-
assured China that the United States would not collude with
•j n c.
the Soviet Union against the Chinese. Nevertheless, as
this incident illustrates, and as Thomas W. Wolfe concludes
in his study of the SALT negotiations, one of the Soviet objec-
tives in SALT was to forestall a Sino-American rapprochement
227in order to "keep China politically and militarily isolated."
The Soviet Union failed in its attempt to prevent a
Sino-American rapprochement, but continues in its attempt to
link American policy toward China with Soviet willingness to
negotiate arms limitations. On June 17, 1979, Pravda warned
that: "Alignment with China on an anti-Soviet basis would
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rule out the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union
in the matter of reducing the danger of a nuclear war and,
2 2 8
of course, of limiting armaments." The next day President
Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signed the Salt II treaty in
Vienna. A similar warning would be made in December 1979,
however, after Vice President Mondale made his remarks in
Beijing in August on American interest in China's security:
However, will it want to do so, at the risk of
arousing the displeasure of its 'Beijing friends?'
Which will prove the stronger: sensitivity to
pressure from Beijing which has characterized the
present administration, or concern for the really ,,-,,
important aspects of mankind's present and future?
These rhetorical questions on American interest in arms limi-
tations with the Soviet Union attempt to establish the mutually
exclusive 'SALT or China' policy linkage the Soviets still de-
sire. Such 'SALT or China' warnings have been accompanied
by a campaign of vituperative criticism of China's opposition
to various arms control efforts, especially those proposed
230by the Soviet Union.
In contrast to Soviet concerns, China has played a
small role in the formulation of American strategic arms
limitation policy. The most important reason for this is
that until May 1980, when China tested its first ICBMs, the
Chinese lacked a delivery system that could threaten the
United States; whereas the Soviet Union had been threatened
by the small Chinese nuclear force since 1964. Closely re-
lated to this point is the fact that since the end of the
Korean War it has not been Americans and Chinese, but rather
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Russians and Chinese, shooting at each other. In 1967,
Jeremy Stone's assessment of China's impact on American arms
control policy concluded that "for the most part, her impact
231
on arms control is what we let it be, what we make it."
In retrospect it is apparent that, for the most part, as he
hedged, Stone has been correct in that assessment.
For a short while during the mid-1960s China did, at
least in public policy debates, play a role in American stra-
tegic arms policy. The issue at the time was whether or not
the United States should deploy an anti-ballistic missile
system, given the widely-held belief that the Soviet Union
had already tested and deployed a first-generation system of
its own. Because of the cost and dubious reliability of a
full-scale system, and because of pressure to negotiate an
ABM treaty with Moscow (as was done later) , it was proposed
that a "thin" ABM system be deployed initially to defend the
United States against possible ICBM attack by China. John
Newhouse has observed, however, that: "Even in Washington,
most people think that McNamera saw an anti-China ABM simply
as a hedge against the thick coverage he feared." Newhouse
also quotes Dean Rusk as having stated that the "China issue
was dragged in by the heels and became a makeweight for the
23 2decision." Thus, China may have been in the thick of the
American political fray, but as an actual concern for defense
or arms control policy-makers the 'China issue' was at best
peripheral, perhaps even spurious.
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Beginning with Kissinger's reassurances to Beijing
that the United States would not enter into collusion with
the Soviet Union against China, first made in January 1970,
China began to play a role in American arms control policy.
China's role was not as a potential threat-, nor as a poten-
tial party to negotiations (Kissinger reports that initial
233probes of this possibility were quickly and firmly rebuffed )
,
but rather as a means of spurring Soviet interest in reaching
an agreement
—
playing upon the evident Soviet interest to pre-
clude a Washington-Beijing detente. Thus far the United
States has been remarkably successful in achieving both of
its objectives—arms limitation agreements with Russia and
improved relations with China--despite pressure from both
Moscow and Peking to make the two objectives mutually
exclusive.
As the United States enters the 198 0s, however, the
propitious circumstances that made possible the dual successes
of the 1970s (counting the signing of the SALT II treaty as
a success for diplomacy, if not for arms control) are rapidly
being overtaken by a much more complex international politi-
cal and strategic environment. The United States no longer has
the 'China card' to play as an inducement for the Soviets to
reach further SALT agreements—unless American leaders are
willing to contemplate such drastic measures as participation
in China's nuclear weapons program or the signing of a Sino-
American military alliance. It is becoming increasingly
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difficult to keep SALT separated from negotiations on theater
nuclear forces and conventional force reductions in Europe
due to a great deal of overlap in the capabilities of various
weapons systems (particularly American "forward based sys-
tems" that can threaten the Soviet homeland even though their
assigned missions may be elsewhere) . It is also becoming
increasingly difficult to keep China separate from Soviet-
American arms talks because of Soviet concerns, China's grow-
ing nuclear delivery system capabilities, and because, as
William Garner points out, "China itself is pressing the US
2 34
to consider its interests in US-Soviet negotiations."
If, as Garner observed, China is pressing the United
States to consider Chinese interests in SALT, then the na-
ture of those interests should be understood—whether or not
they are allowed to influence American arms control policy.
The Chinese concern which has been most widely recognized
among Western observers is a fear that the SALT negotiations
could lead to a Soviet-American 'condominium* against China.
In 1965 Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins noted that
Soviet-American negotiations on arms control agreements "are
235
viewed by the Chinese as detrimental to their interest."
Their conclusion was not particularly novel, as China had
been quite open in its opposition to Soviet participation in
various arms control talks. At the time they wrote, however,
the United States and the Soviet Union were beginning to make
progress in discussions that would later result in the
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Non-Proliferation Treaty and the SALT negotiations—both of
which could have had serious implications for the Chinese
(though, as it turned out, they did not) . Two years after
Halperin and Perkins made their observation on China's fears,
Jeremy Stone warned of what the implications of successful
Soviet-American arms talks would be:
For the Soviets, and the Chinese, arms control
agreements will be political indications sig-
nalling a coordinated opposition of Western and
Soviet governments to China. From China's
point of view, a US-Soviet arms control agree-
ment is a primitive but still significant form
of military alliance against her... 236
The United States had several important reasons for
desiring to improve relations with the People's Republic of
China in the early 1970s, but not the least among them, as
is evident in Henry Kissinger's description of the events of
the period, was to make it clear to both the Soviet Union
and China that Soviet-American arms negotiations most defi-
nitely were not the foundation for a superpower alliance
against China. Nevertheless, China still harbors apprehen-
sions about the potential consequences of SALT for Chinese
security interests. Warnings from China against American
'appeasement' of the Soviet Union are more than just propa-
ganda: they reflect underlying concerns about American
reliability as a 'united front 1 partner and fears that the
United States might be tempted to let the Soviets vent their
237
expansionist cravings upon China. Commentary in the
Communist Chinese media on SALT repeatedly make the points
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that the arms limitation negotiations have not--and cannot
—
halt the strategic arms race and that the Soviet Union is
using the SALT talks to divert attention from its own arms
build-up so that it can achieve strategic superiority over
238
the United States. Although these views have obvious
political purposes— if the United States should come to accept
the Soviet 'SALT or China' position, then the Chinese want
America to opt for China— they also reflect China's security
concerns. Even the Chinese fear of Soviet-American collusion
against China has persisted, according to Michael Pillsbury,
239despite Kissinger's reassurances during the Salt I negotiations.
These are the interests that William Garner stated
China was pressing the United States to consider in the nego-
tiation of arms limitations. This is one side of the double
jeopardy China's nuclear force creates: it is as of yet, and
for the foreseeable future, too small to effectively deter a
Soviet strike against China. China must, therefore, seek at
least a tacit alignment of Western and Chinese strategic
interests, an imperative which could be disrupted by SALT.
The other aspect of the double jeopardy is that by its very
existence the Chinese nuclear force complicates SALT, and as
that force expands and is modernized it will complicate SALT
even more. Samuel S. Kim warned in 197 9 that "The onset of
a Sino-Soviet arms race is bound to complicate further the
chronic problem of comparing apples and oranges in bilateral
SALT negotiations between the United States and the Soviet
Union." Whether or not their actions are labeled an 'arms
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race, ' both the Soviet Union and China have been building up
their nuclear forces and the Soviets have specifically been
increasing the deployment of medium-range weapons clearly
directed against China. Tensions over the Sino-Soviet mili-
tary balance could be exacerbated by general political ten-
sions, such as arose over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
241further complicating Soviet-American arms negotiations.
Now that China possesses a demonstrated ICBM capa-
bility, both superpowers must consider China's nuclear force
in their planning for SALT. As long as China is in alignment
with the West, the Chinese nuclear force complicates SALT by
generating Soviet demands that the terms of any treaty ac-
knowledge the Soviet need to defend against the Chinese nuc-
lear threat. William Garner has warned that: "The Soviet
uproar over the Carter Administration's March 1977 proposals
for substantial reductions may well indicate that the Soviet
concept of 'equal security' against China requires SALT III
242levels well above what the Congress may seek." The demise
of SALT II and the hostility shown by the Senate against it
notwithstanding, Garner's view of the Soviet position is still
valid. The prospects for substantial reductions in strategic
arms is further diminished by China's ICBM capability regard-
less of whose side China should swing to at some time in the
future. In this respect the two superpowers probably do have
a common interest against China, in that neither would want
to be in the position of having to rely on the allegiance of
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a 'swing power' who could decisively alter the strategic
nuclear balance—a possibility only if SALT were to result
243
in deep cuts in force levels.
Helmut Sonnenfeldt predicted in 19 67 that for the
"foreseeable future" it would be likely that "only arms con-
trol arrangements that the powers involved consider useful
without Chinese participation, or in which Chinese partici-
244pation is not relevant .. .will be agreed upon." He has
been proven correct, and his conclusion is of even greater
importance today than it was at the time he made it. For
the reasons given above, China's impact on arms control will
no longer be "what we let it be" or "what we make it, " as
was the case, for the most part, over the past two decades.
Today, the United States must face the imminent danger that,
as William Garner warned, "the failure of U.S. arms control
policy to deal innovatively with the 'China factor* may soon
result in the unravelling of the entire US-Soviet arms control
245process." The United States will not be able to straddle
for much longer the 'SALT or China' dilemma being forced upon
it by both the Soviet Union and China.
The United States is thus confronted with a funda-
mental decision regarding the future course of its arms con-
trol policy: either accept the premise that it must choose
between SALT or China, then abandon one in favor of the
other on the terms being demanded by Russia or China; or re-
ject the 'SALT or China 1 framework, as has been the implicit
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American policy all along, and pursue an arms control policy
which attempts to resolve the complications created by the
Chinese nuclear force and Sino-Soviet hostility. Barring
some highly unlikely change in Soviet foreign policy--such as
total rejection of 'peaceful coexistence' in favor of con-
frontation or the opposite extreme of abandoning all support
of national liberation movements in favor of closer ties with
the West--the first policy option, accepting the 'SALT or
China 1 framework and opting for one or the other, cannot be
reconciled to the national interest. The United States has
vital interests in both further progress in arms control and
the continued development of Sino-American relations. To sacri-
fice one for the other, whichever interest were lost, would be
a substantial setback for American national interests.
The United States must, therefore, seek some means
of implementing the second policy option— rejection of the
'SALT or China' framework. This will require that the Chinese
nuclear force, and the intentions of the Chinese Government
for the use and development of that force, be brought into
the SALT process. There are several means by which this could
be achieved. As long as the Soviet and American nuclear forces
remain far superior to that of the Chinese, it could be suffi-
cient to rely on an 'equal security 1 formulation of some sort-
as has been the approach, at least by the Soviets, thus far.
This technique precludes, however, the possibility of more




earlier. And as the Chinese nuclear force grows it will
be difficult to maintain any particular agreed-upon limitation
of Soviet and American strategic arms, unless the ceilings
are raised to the point that they are meaningless anyway.
A second approach which has been suggested in the con-
text of multilateral arms control efforts, such as the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Limited Test Ban Treaty, would
be to induce China to lend "tacit support" for arms agreements
247
that benefit Chinese interests. Applied to SALT, this ap-
proach would
|
demand concessions from both China and Russia
which are not likely to be granted. First, China would have
to agree to abide by the terms of the Soviet-American treaty,
possibly in writing in a separate treaty with the United States
using the same language as the SALT treaty. The problem here
is that unless such an arrangement were kept absolutely secret,
it would appear that China was allowing the United States to
speak for the Chinese in arms control matters— a position the
Chinese would vehemently reject. In January 19 60 the Chinese
rebuked the Soviets for daxing to infringe upon China's sover-
eignty in such matters:
China will unhesitatingly commit itself to the
international obligations to which it has agreed.
However, it must be pointed out that any inter-
national disarmament agreement which is arrived
at without the full participation of the
Chinese People's Republic and the signature of
its delegate cannot, of course, have any
binding force on China. 24 8
This is a warning the United States must not take lightly.
To gain indirect Chinese participation in a Soviet-American
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SALT treaty by means of a Sino-American treaty would demand,
in effect, full Chinese participation— through the United
States— in the negotiation of the SALT treaty itself. Even
with that concession the Chinese would probably refuse to
agree to such a scheme— for reasons of national pride if for
no other reason.
The concession which would be needed from the Soviet
Union is to rely upon the United States as a guarantor of
Chinese compliance with the terms of the SALT agreement
that apply to the Chinese nuclear force. As has been noted
earlier in another context, the Soviets are not particularly
impressed with the American record of reliability. Nor do
Soviet ideology or Russian history dispose the leadership
of the Soviet Union to trust in such inherently dangerous
arrangements. To protect Chinese dignity and to preclude a
Soviet propaganda coup against the Chinese, it would probably
be necessary to phrase the sections of the SALT treaty which
applied to China in such a manner as not to mention China by
name. This, and the fact that there would not be a Chinese
signature on the SALT treaty itself, only upon a parallel
treaty with the United States, would leave the Soviet Union in
a precarious position, dependent upon the United States to
control Chinese behavior. The Soviets know from their own
bitter experience as allies of China that no nation can claim
to control China's behavior. The Soviets are left to rely,
then, upon Chinese goodwill towards the United States and the
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Soviet Union—and the Russians refuse to believe that the
Chinese are capable of such an emotion.
Although the 'parallel treaties* or 'tacit support'
approach appears to be infeasible, history may not be an
accurate guide for the prediction of the Soviet and Chinese
reactions to such a proposal. A 'parallel treaties' scheme
would have to be proposed very carefully—with utmost sec-
recy and slowly, in a step-by-step manner--but this is true
of most arms limitation proposals. Both the Soviet Union and
China, as well as the United States, would be able to achieve
significant security objectives that are otherwise unattain-
able, therefore it may well be worth the effort to explore
at least the concept with Russia and China individually.
A third approach, one which has been urged upon the
United States Government on occasion by well-intentioned
but poorly-informed Western observers, would be to accede
to some form of total nuclear disarmament proposal. The
Soviet Union and China have both advocated such proposals
over the years, therefore this approach could, in theory,
offer a means of including the two nations in the arms con-
trol process. The theory is, however, fatally flawed.
There is no evidence that either the Soviets or the
Chinese take their own nuclear disarmament proposals seriously,
other than perhaps as a vague, altruistic goal achievable
only when socialism has vanquished the true source of war:
capitalist imperialism (and, now, social-imperialism, at least
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from the Chinese point of view) . There is abundant evidence
that both the Soviets and the Chinese have used disarmament
proposals overwhelmingly for political and propaganda pur-
poses. China has since 1963 been advocating "the complete
prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons,"
but at the same time has adamantly opposed Soviet proposals
for essentially the same goal--a stance which Western observers
have consistently identified as being motivated by political
249
considerations. As was pointed out earlier, the Soviets
have used similar tactics against the Chinese (see pages 165-
166) , and the two continue to wage a propaganda war over
each others disarmament policy.
The second fallacy of the total nuclear disarmament
approach is the unstated assumption that, once the three
powers had agreed in principle to the objective, the con-
clusion of a disarmament treaty would be much simpler than
the SALT negotiations have been. There is absolutely no
evidence to support this assumption. Indeed, the record
shows that the greater the propaganda stake in an issue, the
more difficult the negotiations. Certainly no other disarma-
ment issue has been as deeply entangled in the Sino-Soviet
propaganda war, as well as in Soviet and Chinese political
attacks on the West, as the total nuclear disarmament pro-
posals of Russia and China. Whether the objective is to halt
the expansion of nuclear forces, to reduce them by some per-
centage, or to abolish them completely, it will not be possible
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to circumvent the inevitable long and difficult negotia-
tions that are required for the success of any arms control
effort. Pending a significant shift in the political and
propaganda motives of the Soviet Union and China, the total
nuclear disarmament approach will continue to be implausible
as an alternative to SALT.
A fourth possible approach would be 'to include China
as a direct participant in the present SALT framework. As
in the case of the two previous approaches, this idea does
have some merits which warrant its consideration, but it
likewise is fraught with possibly debilitating difficulties.
In the mid-1960s, Morton Halperin and Dwight Perkins recom-
mended that China be kept out of Soviet-American arms talks
and that whatever arms talks the United States may hold with
China be kept separate from the Soviet-American talks. Their
recommendations were based on China's overwhelmingly political
251
and propaganda motivations for interest in arms control.
By the end of the 1970s, however, most observers were con-
cluding that, difficult as it may be, the United States will
soon have no choice but to bring China directly into the SALT
252
negotiations. To bring China directly into the SALT pro-
cess will require that the United States somehow convince
the Soviets and the Chinese that their interests are better
served by substantive talks than by their continuing propa-
ganda battle over arms control and their efforts to enlist
the United States as a partner against the other power.
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Realistically, there are severe limits to the capa-
bility of the United States to induce change in Soviet and
Chinese attitudes toward each other. Unless the two commun-
ist powers have motives of their own for mitigating their
polemical battle, it is unlikely that they would do so at the
bidding of the United States. The Soviet Union and China do
have incentives for reducing tensions between themselves, so
it is possible that propaganda motives could be set aside
to pursue arms talks at the same table—and the United States
may well be able to provide the formula which would allow both
to consent to such talks without the fear of an unacceptable
propaganda coup by the other side.
Although this approach is a possibility, and were it
to succeed it would certainly have tremendous payoffs for the
further progress of the arms control process, the difficulties
that would be encountered in any attempt to implement it must
not be understated. The suspicions, fears, and animosities
between Russia and China are deep, and their history written
in blood. The Sino-Soviet polemical dispute that makes their
mutual participation in arms control so difficult cannot be
dismissed as peripheral to the fundamental national interests
of the two nations. The ideological and political disputes
are inseparable from the national security and foreign policy
goals of which they are a manifestation. The United States
may indeed have no choice but to attempt to bring China directly
into the SALT process, but the effort will undoubtedly be
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the most difficult initiative ever undertaken in the realm
of arms control.
China's impact on Soviet-American arms limitation
efforts goes beyond the complications created by the Chinese
nuclear force for further progress in SALT. The strategic
arms negotiations have already become linked to talks on the
limitation of 'theater nuclear forces' due to the deep in-
volvement of the superpowers in the military balance in
Europe. The United States, for its part, committed itself to
the "two-track" policy in December 1979 by agreeing to pursue
the limitation of "long-range theater nuclear forces" (TNF)
in talks with the Soviet Union while NATO modernized its
nuclear weapons with the Pershing II ballistic missile and the
ground launched cruise missile. The Soviets have been lobby-
ing intensively for the TNF talks to start as soon as possible,
an apparent attempt at manipulating European public opinion
against the new NATO arms. Although the Reagan Administra-
tion has been proceeding slowly on the issue to emphasize that
the talks must be matched by a clear Western commitment to
modernize their forces, preliminary talks on the TNF negotia-
tions have begun and the administration has stated the formal
254talks will open before the end of the year.
The TNF talks complicate SALT because some of the long-
range theater weapons are capable of striking at the Soviet
homeland. The Soviet Union has, consequently, made efforts
to include American "forward based systems" in the totals
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being discussed in SALT, while at the same time exempting
their own theater weapons. Although the Soivet point of
view may have some merit, the way it has been exploited shows
that the primary Soviet purpose has been to emasculate NATO.
The result has been an American refusal to discuss 'forward
based system' limitations in the context of SALT and to agree
to the opening of TNF talks. The two talks, SALT and TNF,
may be separate, but they are inextricably linked.
China complicates the TNF talks because the Soviets
have been deploying medium-range nuclear systems against
China to maintain an overwhelming superiority over the Chinese
nuclear force. The advantage of this strategy for the Soviets
is that the theater forces they deploy against China are not
limited by the SALT agreements. The Soviet Union is free,
therefore, to deploy whatever level of forces it may desire
to use in its attempt to intimidate the Chinese. Additionally,
any concessions the Soviets can cajole the United States into
making on the basis of providing 'equal security' against China
only serve to turn the SALT process to the unilateral advantage
of the Soviet Union.
Depending on the form they take, the TNF talks could
be a serious setback for Chinese security. If the American
objective is to merely limit the deployment of such weapons
in the European theater— the goal that the European allies of
the United States have in mind— then the Soviet Union would be
free to redeploy those weapons against China. From the Chinese
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point of view it would be preferable that the total number of
such weapons, wherever they may be located, be limited.
William Garner has pointed out that seeking an overall limi-
tation of this sort is preferable for Western security inter-
ests as well. Limitations confined to the European theater
would have to ignore the obvious fact that such weapons are
by their very design mobile. Soviet theater weapons deployed
against China also have the range to strike at American friends
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and allies in East Asia. Thus, while China's security inter-
ests do complicate the American interests in TNF limitations,
to a large degree Chinese and American concern over Soviet
medium-range systems are parallel. It is Chinese and European
interests that conflict.
China's military capabilities, and the obvious Soviet
concern for those capabilities, can also be expected to com-
plicate the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks
in Vienna. The MBFR negotiations opened in November 1973 and
have been essentially deadlocked ever since due to Soviet at-
tempts to exploit the talks to gain unilateral advantage over
NATO in central Europe. The central issue dividing east and
west is the Soviet insistence that NATO and Warsaw Pact forces
are already approximately equal, whereas the United States and
its allies insist the Warsaw Pact has a superiority of at
least 100,000 men and thousands of tanks and tactical aircraft.
This numbers game is of critical importance because the Soviets
have insisted upon equal reductions (roughly 17 percent was
their initial proposal), while the West has proposed equal
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force levels (which would require larger reductions by the
Warsaw Pact than by NATO) . Although there has been minor
progress on technical issues, there has been none at all
on the fundamental issues impeding the MBFR talks. Neverthe-
less, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs, has testified in Congress that the
Reagan Administration will continue to participate in the
4. 11 256Vienna talks.
MBFR becomes intertwined with the TNF talks and SALT
because some of the tactical nuclear weapon delivery systems
which NATO relies upon to offset the overwhelming Warsaw
Pact superiority—systems such as attack aircraft and the
Pershing I missile—have become issues in all three talks.
The Soviet 'forward based systems' proposal in the SALT nego-
tiations attempted to limit American systems which the United
States considers to be tactical, rather than strategic or
theater in their scope, and which the Carter Administration
had used as concessions for withdrawal in the MBFR talks. From
the Soviet point of view, the more American nuclear delivery
systems that can be shifted to the higher-level talks (SALT
and TNF) , the greater will be the Soivet advantage in the
lower-level talks (MBFR) and the greater will be the overall
Soviet superiority if it achieves its goals in all three talks.
The United States has, of course, been aware of this danger
and has attempted to coordinate its position in all three talks




China becomes involved in the MBFR talks because the
Chinese believe that a strong NATO supports China's security
interests and that arms control agreements with the Soviet
Union will only weaken the resolve of the West to resist
Soviet hegemonism and the Soviet drive for strategic super-
iority. The danger that a successful MBFR agreement would free
large numbers of Soviet troops for redeployment against China
is real, but is secondary to the political consequences such
a pact would have: stabilization of the European front could
generate an even greater commonality of Soviet and Western
European interests. This would almost inevitably work to the
disadvantage of China because the strategic interests of the
European nations are, for the most part, narrowly focused within
their own theater. China would be left, then, with only the
United States— a United States being pressured by its NATO
allies to give first priority to their interests—as a Western
partner in the Chinese 'united front' against the Soviet Union.
William Garner has suggested that China has been a
factor in the Soviet interest in the MBFR negotiations. He
postulates that the increased Soviet increase in conventional
warfare, without immediate escalation to a strategic nuclear
exchange, has prompted a Soviet desire to use the MBFR talks
to free forces for deployment alcng the Sino-Soviet border in
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order to ensure conventional Soviet superiority over China.
Although it is clear that the Soviet Union has not had to make
any sort of a trade-off between its European and Far Eastern
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forces, but rather has increased its overall force levels so
that both areas could be strengthened, it is still possible
that this could be a Soviet motive in the MBFR talks. Garner
has proposed that the United States take advantage of the
China factor in Soviet MBFR interests by adopting "a dual
policy of negotiating the redeployment of Soviet forces to
Asia, while bolstering Chinese conventional forces with sales
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of western military technology. " Unfortunately, there is
no way that this proposal could possibly succeed. The Soviet
Union, even without MBFR, has the capacity to expand its forces
faster than the United States could arm China, whether the
U.S. sold the arms or provided them free of charge.
China is far from being the most significant factor
complicating the MBFR talks. The fundamental difference in
the Soviet and NATO approaches to making the reductions is
the most significant problem. Second only to this is the geo-
graphical asymmetry between the positions of the two super-
powers relative to their European allies—with the Soviet Union
at the edge of the theater and the United States separated
from it by the Atlantic Ocean. Nevertheless, if, as has been
proposed herein, the United States does have an interest in
the security of China, then China's security interests will
impinge upon the overall American interests in the MBFR nego-
tiations. As was also true in the case of SALT, there is no
simple means of reconciling the American interests in China
with American interests in MBFR. The first step is to be con-
stantly aware, in the formulation of American policy, that the
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:wo sets of interests are linked, just as MBFR, TNF and SALT
ire all linked.
The preceding discussion of China's role in Soviet-
unerican arms limitations efforts has raised many more prob-
.ems than it has solutions. That may, in itself, be progress
)f a sort, but it certainly highlights the increasing diffi-
:ulties the United States must expect to face as it pursues
.ts interests in arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. It
loes seem clear that within the next few years the United
>tates must be prepared to make sweeping revisions in its arms
:ontrol policy. Likewise, the United States will be forced to
reassess the basis of its relationship with China. As long
is the United States could straddle the 'SALT or China 1 dilemma,
leither American arms control policy nor American China policy
required such revision or reassessment. Unfortunately, the
iortuitous circumstances which made that American policy possi-
)le are rapidly being eroded--and a much more difficult politi-
:al and strategic environment is replacing them. If the United
itates is to pursue its interests in China as well as its
nterests in Soviet-American arms limitations, then American
iolicy must be adapted to the changing international circum-
tances within which it is executed.
5. China and Soviet-American Detente
Much has already been said, indirectly, herein on the
ubject of detente. In examining the effect that one's concep-
ual framework has on perceptions of national interests it was
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noted that 'detente' is one of the convenient ideas which has
come to take on a theoretical life of its own. The idea it-
self, a relaxation of tensions, is elegantly simple, but the
term for that idea, 'detente, ' is overburdened with intellec-
tual and political baggage. It seems, at times, as if 'detente'
is uttered with reverence, as if it were a divine or mystical
state of international nirvana, the only worthy goal toward
which leaders could possibly aspire to lead their nations.
For the purposes of this study the term 'detente' will
be used, precisely because it is a convenient shorthand for 'a
reduction of tensions, ' but it will not be treated with
theoretical reverence. That is, detente is not a system of
interaction between two countries, nor is it necessarily even
a goal in and of itself. Detente describes a short-term trend
in the relations between two countries. A nation can, indeed,
set detente with another country as an objective of its foreign
policy, but detente as an objective and detente as an accurate
description of a bilateral relationship are not one and the
same. A reduction in the level of tension between two coun-
tries can only be the product of the overall foreign policies
of both of those nations. An era of inviolate or irreversible
detente cannot simply be proclaimed as existing—every policy
decision and every action taken day after day either adds to
or reduces the level of tensions.
This description of detente is heresy to the Soviet
Union. The Soviets are invariably precise in their language,
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abhorring in their own councils the vagueness upon which
Western diplomacy survives, and detente has evolved a strict
definition—and even its own historical niche in the dialectic
of history. In the Soviet view, detente is a specific form of
peaceful coexistence; one made possible only by the shift in
the balance of forces in favor of the socialist camp. Once
that shift had occurred, the irresistible trend in human history
made detente inevitable. The result has been the opening of
an era of detente, founded upon Soviet power, that can be im-
peded only by the subversive actions of the 'enemeies of de-
tente' lurking within the capitalist camp. Rational men recog-
nize the preponderance of Soviet power and embrace detente.
They likewise accept the inexorable march of history, which
dictates that the national liberation movement shall every-
where overthrow the bonds of capitalist imperialism—with Soviet
assistance, naturally. Detente only prevents the threat of
luclear war by reducing the possibility that the capitalists
vould embark upon such an irrational course, and in so doing




Despite its 'hard-line* approach to relations with the
Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration has not foresworn de-
:ente. Administration spokesmen have made it clear, however,
:hat the terms for detente set by the Brezhnev regime are un-
acceptable, and that detente cannot be a substitute for mili-
tary power as guarantor of the nation's security. Secretary
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Haig's speech on April 24, 1981, quoted above (page 145), set
the tone of the Administration's Soviet policy. Emphasis
would be upon deterring Soviet promotion of violence, on the
peaceful resolution of conflicts, and on reciprocity on the
part of the Soviet Union as "the basis for a more productive
East-West dialogue." It is also clear that the Administration
has adoped a 'linkages' strategy as the basis for relations with
the Soviet Union, despite Gromyko's tirades against the con-
cept. Lawrence S. Eagleburger testified in Congress in June
1981 that the American relationship with the Soviet Union would
be based upon the principles of "restraint and reciprocity."
His explanation of these principles neatly sums up administra-
tion policy:
Demonstrating to the Soviets, by expanding our
own capabilities, that there is no alternative to
restraint i.s_ a sine qua non to the success of
our approach. But, we recognize as well the
value and long-term necessity of giving the
Soviets incentives to act with greater restraint.
The Reagan Administration does not view
cooperation with the Soviet Union as an end in
itself. Nor does it believe that the prospect
of cooperative activities will necessarily
induce the Soviet Union to moderate its policies.
Linkage will be an operative principle. The
leaders of the Soviet Union cannot expect to
enjoy the benefits of joint activities in areas
of interest to them, even as they seek to un-
dercut our interests.
But, in the context of adequate and cred-
ible U.S. defense and regional capabilities and
on a basis of strict reciprocity of benefits,
the United States is open to an expansion of
mutually beneficial activities, if justified
by Soviet behavior. The United States is pre-
pared to respond positively to constructive in-
itiatives by the Soviet Union. However, given
the lessons of recent history, it is clear that
we cannot be satisfied with words alone. 2 60
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Thus, while it appears that the United States will be
in for a period of 'luke-warm cold war 1 or 'tense detente,
'
the possibility of a significant lessening of Soviet-American
tensions cannot be ruled out. If detente is a possibility,
then China's interests in that possibility, and the likely
Chinese reaction should it come about, must be considered.
The Chinese view of detente with the Soviet Union, at least
when it is the West seeking the relaxation of tensions, is
quite hostile. Commentary in the Communist Chinese media
constantly warn against "appeasement" of the Soviet Union,
attribute the desire for detente to an "appeasement mentality,
"
and assert that "any accommodation or concession to Soviet
social-imperialism is dangerous." China accuses the Soviet
Union of using detente to "lull" Western Europe to the danger
from Soviet military expansion, to mask Soviet arms expansion
from the American public, and to "cover up its crimes of aggres-
2 fi ?
sion" in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Of late, Brezhnev's
speech at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in February 19 81 has been denounced as merely
another Soviet "peace offensive" embodying all of the vile
purposes described above:
The Soviet Union's new peace offensive is aimed at
sapping the fighting will of the people of the
world against Soviet hegemonism, driving a wedge
between Western Europe and the United States,
covering up its wild amibitions of aggression and
expansion, and extricating itself from its pre-
dicament in Afghanistan and Kampuchea . 26 3
Statements out of China such as these have obvious
propaganda purposes, but they also reflect the underlying
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importance China attaches to the maintenance of its 'united
front' against the Soviet Union. Western observers do not
seem to be sure, however, just how much Western detente with
the Soviet Union can be tolerated by the Chinese. Leslie H.
Brown leans toward the pessimistic view of China's attitude:
...the excesses of Chinese ideological fervour
are not to be underestimated; detente with the
Soviet Union is anathema to China, and the United
States has been her major Western protagonist.
If detente, by whatever name, continues as a
policy objective of the United States, it will
continue also as a.source of tension in American-
Chinese relations
.
Michael Pillsbury--waxing optimistic on China--perceives the
Chinese as being not all that hostile to Soviet-American de-
tente as long as the Americans "give 'tit for tat' in response
to Soviet challenges" in order to "tame the polar bear rather
than appease it":
Yet the Chinese have not encouraged the United
States to downgrade its relations with the Soviet
Union, but instead have urged Washington to re-
ply to specific Soviet challenges in a more as-
sertive fashion . . . .The Chinese do not suggest
that the United States should break diplomatic
relations, reduce trade, or otherwise provoke the
Soviet Union in the absence of any specific
challenge, and they deny any desire to exacerbate
U.S. -Soviet tensions. 265
There is merit to both views. China does indeed op-
pose detente, but it primarily opposes the Soviet version
of detente. If the Reagan Administration sticks to its early
pronouncements on its Soviet policy, then it is likely that
a future detente with the Soviet Union would avoid the worst
of the errors of which the Chinese statements warned. At
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this point there is no reason to believe that the new ad-
ministration will reverse itself on its Soviet policy, there-
fore Pillsbury's caveats will probably be met and his view
of China's attitude may well turn out to be reasonable.
Those caveats--the Chinese expectation that the United States
respond 'tit for tat' to the Soviets--are crucial, however,
for they lie at the heart of China's 'united front' strategy.
Should the United States back off from its current 'hard-line'
approach to the Soviet Union in favor of a conciliatory stance,
the tensions in Sino-American relations of which Leslie Brown
warned would surely arise.
The danger of Sino-American relations becoming strained
due to a Soviet-American detente is but one side of the impact
China has on detente. The other side is the possibility that
Chinese behavior could, through guilt by association in the
eyes of the Soviets, disrupt progress toward Soviet-American
detente or even preclude it altogether. The extreme case
would be the threat of China dragging the United States into
a war with the Soviet Union.
Just as the Soviet Union attempted to force upon the
United States a 'SALT or China' decision, so too have the
Soviets attempted to force a 'detente or China' decision in
5 c. c
America. Much to the credit of American foreign policy
during the last four administrations, these two Soviet efforts
came to naught. SALT and detente did eventually founder, but
it was due to Soviet behavior and the American reaction there-




Although Soviet efforts to exploit detente as an
inducement for the United States to forestall the improve-
ment of relations with China have failed thus far, it must
be expected that similar efforts will continue in the fu-
2 fi 7
ture . Considering first conflict situations short of
armed clashes, it is not likely that the Soviets would take
other than propaganda action against the United States in
retaliation for Chinese actions considered by the Kremlin
to be hostile to Soviet interests. Even in the case of
the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, which was an armed clash
(though with a proxy of the Soviets) , the Soviets denounced
9 £ Q
the United States for complicity in the assault, but did
not take more active symbolic moves as they did against the
Chinese (stepping up border force readiness and deploying
naval units off the coast of China)
.
If, on the other hand, the Soviets should have some
reason to be upset with the United States in the first place,
then it would be to their advantage to retaliate against the
Americans for a Chinese transgression (still talking of situa-
tions short of war) . Because of their free access to the
American public through the news media, such a maneuver could
build enough pressure on an administration to back off from
a 'hard-line' stance on some issue the two superpowers had
Deen deadlocked over. The American sense of justice and fair
^lay would be vulnerable to skillful propaganda by the Soviets
designed to portray the administration as condoning, by its
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actions if not by its words, belligerent actions by China
against a Soviet Union which was all the while striving to
improve relations with the United States. In short, it is
much more likely that China would be a pretext for a worsen-
ing in Soviet-American relations, rather than the actual cause
of the tensions. Under such circumstances it would be of
crucial importance for American leaders to seek out the
issue in Soviet-American relations which was the actual point
of key interest to Soviet leaders before taking action to de-
fuse, the "crisis."
As was mentioned, the extreme case of concern over
Chinese behavior is the fear that China could drag the
United States into a war with the Soviet Union . Soviet leaders
could probably sympathize with such fears, as it appears they
became highly uncomfortable with the actions of their Chinese
allies during the Taiwan Straits Crises and the two episodes
of Sino-Indian border tensions. Propaganda in the Soviet media
also appears to play upon such fears of Chinese militarism,




The precepts of Soviet strategy and of Soviet military
doctrine make it unlikely that the scenario of a Soviet attack
on the United States in retaliation for a Chinese provocation
vould ever occur. As was discussed at length in Section B of
:his chapter, the Soviets would not seek a military solution
to their 'China problem' unless assured of a definitive politi-
cal and military victory. An essential prerequisite for
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victory over China would be to isolate China from the West,
so that the Chinese could not expect military or political
support from the United States. In a crisis with China the
Soviet Union would be much more likely to hold off from strik-
ing the decisive blow until the international position of
the Chinese could be eroded--due primarily to the actions of
the Chinese themselves, but also by intense propaganda and
political activity by the Soviets. If they could prevent it,
and they almost certainly could, the Soviets would not let
China drag them into a war with the West. The Soviets would
only attack the West if they thought they could also win a
decisive political and military victory over the West—a much
more formidable task than defeating China. The reverse sce-
nario—the West dragging China into a war with the Soviets---
would be more plausible.
Concerns that China could drag the United States into
war arise largely from the differences in the styles preferred
by Beijing and Washington in their dealings with Moscow. As
has been pointed out before, the Chinese prefer a belligerent
tone for deterring Soviet aggressiveness, whereas the Ameri-
cans prefer to avoid provoking Soviet 'paranoia' and mix in-
ducements with warnings. Even the 'hard-line' approach of the
Reagan Administration has not veered too far from the histori-
cal American pattern. But the belligerence of Chinese
propaganda does not indicate a similar belligerence in Chinese
conflict behavior. The Chinese have been willing to use force
196

to support their foreign policy (as have the Americans and
the Russians) , but when they have done so their actions have
been measured to retain control over the momentum of events
—
and as soon as the Chinese felt they had made their point, or
reduced the threat to a tolerable level, their forces were
pulled back. This pattern in Chinese conflict behavior has
been described by Steve Chan, and that the pattern was main-
tained in the Chinese incursion into Vietnam has been demon-
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strated by Edward Ross. Because of this caution in the use
of force shown by the Chinese, and because the Soviet Union
is not likely to be provoked by such Chinese behavior into a
costly attack on the United States without some clear objec-
tive in (or unacceptable threat from) the West, fears that
China might drag the United States into war are largely
unfounded.
China's impact on Soviet-American detente is clear,
but not clear-cut. Differences in the political styles of
the Chinese and the Americans seem to generate at least as
much tension over their relations with the Soviet Union as
do differences of substance. The United States has an inter-
est in improving relations with both the Soviet Union and
China. Pursuing better relations with both is made difficult,
however, with the Chinese and the Russians pulling from oppo-
site directions for the United States to make a 'detente or
China' decision in their favor. Despite this pressure the
two objectives are not mutually exclusive by definition:
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through careful diplomacy the United States can, to a degree,
achieve better relations with both countries. Careful diplo-
macy does not mean the 'balance' or 'equilibrium' approaches
formerly urged on American leaders—such formulas were a
dismal failure because they did not account for the asymmetry
in Soviet and Chinese motives and behavior.
As long as the United States does not assent to de-
tente on Soviet terms, a reduction in Soviet-American tensions
will not result in strained Sino-American relations. In fact,
Soviet-American detente on "American terms "--that is, restraint
and reciprocity enforced by a strong commitment to military
defense and by the 'linkages' strategy—could well create con-
ditions conducive to a Sino-Soviet detente that would also bene-
fit American interests. For the time being, however, it does
not seem likely that the Soviet Union will easily agree to
"detente American style." Nevertheless it is more to the
national interest to let detente be a slow process than to
rush into a Soviet-dictated detente. Rushing into a detente
relationship on Soviet terms would also be the American action
vis-a-vis the Soviets most likely to strain Sino-American
relations—ultimately for no good reason.
Ironic as it may seem, the only sure means of achiev-
ing a reduction in Soviet-American tensions that will prove
effective over the long-term is to take many of the actions
against which the Soviets have warned over the near-term.
This means demonstrating that the United States has the capacity
and determination to maintain—and even upset, should we so
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desire--the strategic balance. It means concerted efforts
at the containment of Soviet expansionism, insisting on
Soviet restraint in the use of force and insisting upon the
peaceful resolution of conflicts. And it means ensuring that
the Soviets understand that American foreign policy will not
be driven by the needs of maintaining detente with the Soviets
to the exclusion of all other American interests, ensuring
that the Soviets understand that detente demands reciprocity.
At the same time, the United States must not mistake
means for ends. The United States does not increase its de-
fenses to overwhelm the Soviet Union, but to make it clear
to the Soviets that they cannot overwhelm the West. The
United States does not contain Soviet expansionism in order
to isolate the Soviet Union from the world and leave it weak
and vulnerable, but to leave the Soviets with no other means
of reaching out to the world and securing the benefits of
global social and economic intercourse than by doing so in
peace, without the threat of force of arms. And the United
States does not spurn the Soviet version of detente for the
purpose of escalating tensions and subjugating diplomacy to
military solutions, but rather to achieve a reduction of
tension in which both sides must pursue their interests by
peaceful means
.
China has an important, and in many respects growing,
role in all aspects of the Soviet-American strategic rela-
tionship. In geopolitics, in the strategic balance, in the
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containment of expansionism, in arms control, and in detente,
American foreign policy will be affected in its consequences
by China—whether or not China affected its formulation. The
role China plays is complex and to a large extent beyond the
capacity of American policy to shape, but vital nonetheless.
In many cases United States policy toward the Soviet Union
and United States policy toward China can be to some degree
coordinated—though at times the best that such coordina-
tion can hope to achieve is to reduce the adverse consequences
of a decision. China and the United States do have a great
many parallel interests in their relations with the Soviet
Union, interests which are the foundation upon which Sino-
American relations have been built, but interests the United
States must be willing to look beyond if it is to pursue the
full scope of American interests without sacrificing its
interests in China.
E. CHINA AND AMERICAN WORLD ORDER INTERESTS
United States national security is affected by much more
than just the strategic relationship with the Soviet Union,
even though that one aspect does indeed encompass the most
potentially destructive sources of tensions. The United
States has a major, if not vital, interest in the establish-
ment and maintenance of a world order in which the nations
of the earth can effectively join together in cooperative
efforts to manage the many problems that transcend national
boundaries, as well as in cooperative efforts at the local,
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regional, and global level aimed at the peaceful resolution
of conflicts. It is in the management of global problems and
the peaceful resolution of conflicts that American diplomacy
and economic policy contribute at least as much as American
defense policy to the security of the nation.
This section will examine China's role in international
cooperation on global problems and local conflicts, and how
that role affects American interests in these issues. Because
China and the United States were able to set aside their dif-
ferences on many of these issues in order to pursue their com-
mon interest in opposing the Soviet Union, discussion of the
American interest in China as regards global problems and
local conflicts has largely been overshadowed by discussion of
the strategic implications of the Sino-American relationship.
For this reason, the possibilities for Sino-American coopera-
tion on global issues and local conflicts, and the potential
for conflict over them, will also be addressed. Each section
will conclude with a summarization relating United States inter'
ests in these issues with the overall American security inter-
est in China and with the prospects for Sino-American relations
1 . China and the Management of Global Problems
The United States has a world order interest in inter-
national cooperation because the world is beset with a host
of problems that are global in scope and growing in severity.
Many of these global economic, environmental, social, and arms
control issues affect, directly or indirectly, United States
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national security. To the extent that such problems are the
root cause of local conflicts, north-south tensions, and
revolutionary causes, United States participation in inter-
national action on those problems contributes to national
security, broadly defined.
Global problems requiring international cooperation
cannot properly be understood, nor can effective policy on
those issues be formulated, if they are viewed narrowly within
the context of the bipolar model of east-west competition.
Even worse is to attempt to understand China's role in the
management of global problems strictly in terms of the stra-
tegic triangle. On the other hand, it is equally misleading
to analyze the politics of global problems only within the
context of the north-south dispute: bipolar superpower com-
petition is ever present beneath the surface of the inter-
national alignments on such issues, China does interject its
own rivalry with the Soviets into its policies on global
problems, and on different issues the 'north' and 'south' camps
are deeply divided within their own ranks
.
The de facto polycentric, multiple issue-based sys-
tems conceptualization of the international system recognizes
the actual complexity of the continually shifting patterns of
alignments within the international community. On some issues
the United States and China may find themselves in opposition,
despite their common cause against the Soviet Union. On other
issues, the United States may find it has common interests
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with the Soviet Union that China opposes due to the Sino-Soviet
dispute (the best example being arms control) . Because of its
commitment to capitalism and Western democratic freedoms, the
United States has in the past found itself --singly or as
leader of the 'West' —standing alone against both China and
Russia in opposing socialist and Marxist solutions to inter-
national problems. On top of all this one must overlay the
innumerable conflicts among the Third World nations themselves,
conflicts which complicate or even frustrate effective cooper-
ation on many issues (such as non-proliferation and resources
management) .
The impact that global issues have on United States
security interests is also complex. International problems
affect security interests indirectly as well as directly in
some cases. To the extent that it contributes to the level
of international tensions, almost every global problem has an
indirect effect on national security. Most problems of eco-
nomic development and food supplies fall in this category.
Certain international issues, such as sources of energy and
crucial minerals, arms sales and nuclear proliferation, and
the law of the sea negotiations, have a more direct impact.
Decisions on the allocation of foreign aid are also influ-
enced by the perceived relative importance of indirect and
direct security benefits from economic development. A percep-
tion that the indirect security benefits are the more signi-
ficant argues for priority being given to support of multi-
lateral assistance institutions that aid the Third World in
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general without recipient obligations to the donors. On the
other hand, a perception that the direct security benefits of
aid are the more important argues for bilateral assistance
to specific countries whose resources or geographic location
make them important to American strategy. There is no con-
clusive evidence that either view has more merit than the
other— a decision in favor of one approach over the other is
likely to be motivated more by the political predispositions
of the particular administration than by the evidence sup-
porting the efficiency of the approach.
The security aspect of global problems is complex for
a second reason as well. An international issue may affect
power relationships in general by its contribution to the
level of international tension, or it may affect a particular
set of power relationships, such as the east-west rivalry or
the north-south dispute. Many issues, moreover, affect more
than one set of power relationships, but there is not neces-
sarily a correlation of interests among the various parties.
Thus, for example, problems of resources management and commodity
price stabilization are primarily north-south issues, but
also have an element of east-west ideological competition;
whereas arms control issues have primarily been viewed within
the context of the east-west rivalry, but have been the topic
of north-south disagreements as well (in terms of charges
that the nuclear powers are attempting to establish a monopoly
over such weapons so as to be able to subjugate the developing
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countries—a charge China has made in the past) . Not every
nation with an interest in a particular issue will perceive
it as affecting the same set of power relationships, if any
at all. Though the United States may focus its foreign policy
on its competition with the 'Soviet Union, the non-aligned na-
tions of the Third World are still going to perceive the pri-
mary division within the international system as being between
rich nations and poor.
The Reagan Administration has not completely over-
looked or disregarded the American security interest in global
problems despite its clear shift in emphasis to east-west re-
lations. In his testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee in March 1981, M. Peter McPherson, Administrator of
the Agency for International Development, reviewed the many
global problems the international community must deal with
and pointed out the security aspect of one of those issues:
Failure to make acceptable progress in ameliorating
conditions of poverty can only lead to domestic
instability and increasing frustration on the
part of Third World governments over the workings
of the international system and the distribution
of economic and institutional power in that
system as it is now constituted. Such instabili-
ties, as we know all too well, can quickly spill
over into regional disequilibrium and create op-
portunities for interventions that are to the
interest neither of the countries directly involved
nor to ourselves . 271
Secretary Haig has observed that one of the fundamental prob-
lems that American foreign policy must take into account is
that "Limited resources and political disturbance impede the
eradication of hunger, poverty, disease, and other important
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272humanitarian goals." Haig has also linked global problems
with national security, including the major themes of the
foreign policy of the Reagan Administration:
Restraint of the Soviets, the reinvigoration of
our alliances, and the strengthening of our friends
are crucial aspects of the Reagan foreign policy.
But the underlying tensions of international af-
fairs go beyond the themes of allies and adver-
saries. A fresh American approach to the developing
countries is essential if we are to treat the
roots of international disorder. 273
The "fresh approach" that the Reagan Administration
has taken toward developing countries, and international
problems in general, is probably not what the Third World
has in mind as a desirable American policy. Thus far, the
major initiatives of the administration have been to withdraw
from the proposed United Nations conference on north-south
issues, to block completion of the Law of the Sea Treaty,
and to be the only nation to vote against the 'baby formula'
resolution. The first two actions were explained as being
necessary while the new administration reviewed the issues and
American interests in them. President Reagan has made it
clear, however, that his attendance at the conference on
cooperation and development to be held in October 1981 at
Cancun, Mexico, does not represent a shift in United States
policy on the proposed United Nations conference (the Carter
Administration had opposed both the United Nations conference
and participation in the Cancun meeting) . It has also been
reported that the administration is considering major revi-
sions to the proposed Law of the Sea Treaty to protect the
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commercial interests of American corporations involved in
274
sea-bed mining.
Although these initial policy actions may presage a
major shift in American policy toward global problems, it is
more likely that the shift will be more of emphasis than of
goals. The third of the three objectives that Secretary
Haig has set forth for United States foreign policy is "to
offer hope and aid to the developing countries in their as-
275pirations for a peaceful and prosperous future." The
shift in emphasis appears to be a greater consideration of
the direct and indirect security implications of global prob-
lems, especially the direct American security interests in
them. Myer Rashish, the Under Secretary of State for Eco-
nomic Affairs, has stated to the Joint Economic Committee of
Congress that:
Ultimately, our responsibility is to craft and
implement a U.S. foreign policy which takes into
account all our interests--our security needs, our
resource requirements, our trade and investment
concerns, our need for good working relations with
the many countries a world power must deal with
in today's interdependent world. 27
6
Secretary Haig has explicitly drawn the linkage between United
States economic policies and security interests in his state-
ment that "in the formulation of economic policy, in the
allocation of our resources, in decisions on international
economic issues, a major determinant will be the need to
277protect and advance our security." Haig refers here to
direct security interests--allocating aid to those countries
that play the most important role in American strategy.
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There is a two-way relationship between the American
security interest in global problems and the American security
interest in China: China has a role to play in the inter-
national efforts at managing the problems--be it disruptive,
indifferent, or cooperative—which will affect American inter-
ests in those problems; and the status of Sino-American rela-
tions will be affected by the policies each nation has toward
global problems, which in turn affects the American security
interest in China. Each of these two aspects will be examined
individually.
The importance of the "positive participation and
contribution" of China to international cooperation on global
problems has been pointed out by former Assistant Secretary
of State Richard Holbrooke, presumably indicating an awareness
within the Carter Administration of the linkage between China's
2 7 8
world role and American interests in global problems. In
more general terms, Under Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel,
Jr., remarked, speaking for the Reagan Administration, that:
"We recognize that the one billion people of China play a
very important role in the maintenance of global peace and
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security." Thus, there is a basis for proposing that it
would be in the national interest to encourage the participa-
tion of China in the various forums and agencies for dealing
28
with global problems, as well as to maintain a Sino-American
dialogue at all levels of government on these issues. For the
United States to do otherwise, that is, to define its interests
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in China in strictly bilateral terms (What can China offer
the U.S.?) rather than in broad international terms (What
can China contribute to the international community?) , would
be a failure to consider that the manner in which China
develops its world role will directly affect American security
interests .
If the United States does have a security interest
in China's participation in international efforts to manage
global problems, then the Chinese attitude toward world order
and the role of China in that order needs to be understood.
The attitude that the People's Republic has displayed since
its founding has not been conducive to Chinese participation
in forums for international cooperation other than for propa-
ganda purposes. In 1968 Walter C. Clemens, Jr., concluded
that China "has little cause to be satisfied with the basic
structure of world politics, the state of her internal develop-
2 81
ment, or the apparent thrust of economic and social change."
During the 1970s there was a significant reorientation of
China's foreign policy from revolutionary goals toward what
Western observers have labeled more "pragmatic" goals, but
as recently as 1979 Samuel Kim concluded that, to a large de-
gree, the 'traditional' Chinese Communist view described by
Clemens still persists:
The Chinese image of world order that is pro-
jected throughout the United Nations system defines
the international system as a Manichean struggle
between the status quo defenders and the revolu-
tionary challengers. It is an image deeply imbued
with 'justice' rather than with order, with change
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rather than with stability. The moral and strategic
imperative of the Chinese image is that the old
and unjust order had to be destroyed first, before
a new and just world order could be established. 282
The change in Chinese policy toward global problems
and world order issues has not been so much a change in
ideology as a change in means and a reaction to perceived
changes in the external threat to China. China's earlier
efforts to unite the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America in a "people's war" against the developed
nations, and China's present attempts to unite with the West
and the Third World against Soviet "hegemonism" are both mani-
festations of the same ideological principle: the united
28 3front strategy. The earlier revolutionary attitude toward
world order was at least partially a result of China's leaders
not perceiving their nation as possessing a more effective
means of pursuing its goals. iMorton Halperin and Dwight
Perkins concluded in 1965 that: "To some degree, of course,
the Chinese Communist posture of seeking more active support
of world revolution from the Soviet Union results from the
lack of alternative means for exercising influence on the
284international scene." Today, although China still does not
28 5have the resources or capabilities to be a truly global power,
it has largely overcome its diplomatic isolation and has greatly
improved its relations with the West, thereby gaining, on
balance, much more influence than it had previously.
The consequence of this change has been that: "anti-
hegemonism" has replaced revolutionary themes as the primary
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political interest China has in global problems. In his
study of China's role in the United Nations, Samuel Kim noted
that: "At the operational level, even New International Eco-
nomic Order politics has been transformed into an anti-hegemonic
2 8 fi
model." This shift from revolutionary politics to anti-
Soviet politics is hardly a gain for the American interest in
cooperative efforts at managing global problems, but it does
reflect an underlying reorientation of China's objectives that
is encouraging and apparently has been the first step in an
on-going evolution in Chinese attitudes.
The Third World, of which China claims leadership, has
not reacted favorably to China's efforts at infusing serious
international efforts at coping with global problems with the
spirit of "anti-hegemonism, " and, according to Thomas W.
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Robinson, "Beijing seems now to have learned its lesson."
Though he- probably would not go so far as Robinson, who has
described China's attitude toward global issues as "promising,"
Samuel Kim does perceive somewhat of a symbiotic relationship
between China and the United Nations, despite the negative
political attitudes he descrbies the Chinese as having:
When all is said and done, the reciprocal
interactions and impacts between China and the
United Nations system have on the whole been posi-
tive. The relationship between the two during
the first half of the 1970s may be characterized
as a mutual adjustment, mutual legitimization,
and mutual enhancement of each other's symbolic
capability. 288
Not only has China not been able to enlist Third World
support for using the United Nations as a forum for its
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anti-Soviet policies, China has also had to take the same
'pragmatic' approach toward developing nations that Western
observers have credited China with taking toward the developed
nations of the West. T.B. Millar has observed of China's
foreign policy that:
The new diplomacy and the new links are not only
with the developed states. A much more pragmatic
set of relationships has developed between China
and the non-communist states in Africa, Asia and
South America. China has become a far more repre-
sentative member of the world community with its
forms and norms.^"
These are the very countries that China had previously viewed
as prime targets and potential allies in its revolutionary
strategy. The 'pragmatic' adaptations China has been willing
to make in its policies toward the Third World countries, both
to improve relations with them and to oppose Soviet initiatives,
have been so great so as to lead one to wonder whether China
is leading or being led by the Third World. Samuel Kim
observed:
More specifically, the United Nations—or, more
accurately, its most dominant group, the Group of
77
—exerts a subtle but substantial influence on
Chinese behavior. It may be appropriate to say
that China, instead of manipulating the Third
World, is actually being manipulated by it. 290
The change that has taken place in the apparent Chinese
attitude toward the sale of conventional arms to developing
countries is illustrative of the type of shift in China's
perception of global issues that may be termed encouraging.
In 1977, China was adamantly opposed to the exploratory talks
between the United States and the Soviet Union on restraint in
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the transfer of arms to Third World nations. The justifica-
tion for this opposition was that:
Confronted by the fierce contention between the
two superpowers, and, in particular, by the rabid
expansion of Soviet social-imperialism, the third
world countries cannot do otherwise than strengthen
their own defense capabilities. In fact, their
weapons, far from numerous, are not nearly enough.
This is one of the reasons why so many developing
countries are being bullied by imperialism and
social-imperialism. ^91
By March 1981, commentary in the Beijing Review had almost
completely reversed itself in its attitude toward this issue:
The booming trade in arms has brought serious
consequences to third world countries. In the
first place, their money is not being spent to
develop their economies. In the second place, buy-
ing armaments fuels an arms race between antago-
nistic neighbours, which further destabilizes the
region and further exacerbates relations. And
lastly, it affords the big powers chances to inter-
vene and control them, endangering their indepen-
dence and sovereignty . 292
Western analysts of the arms transfers phenomenon might dis-
pute the details of some of the contentions in this second
statement, but it is. nevertheless clear that China is now
demonstrating a much more sophisticated understanding of the
issue than v/as shown in the first of the two statements. This
in itself is encouraging, even though there is no indication
that the second statement represents the final word on Chinese
policy toward arms sales to the Third World.
As important as China's interests in international
issues may be from the point of view of United States security
interests, for the Chinese global problems have been, and
remain, secondary to domestic issues. The two most important
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objectives that must be supported by China's foreign policy
are national defense and domestic economic development.
The defense aspects of Chinese foreign policy are discussed
throughout this paper. The relationship between China's
development program and Chinese foreign policy is discussed
in Appendix B, and will be summarized here to understand how
it shapes China's role in the world.
In 1968, near the end of the violent phase of the
Cultural Revolution in China, Morton Halperin pointed out that
"It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that the major
preoccupation of the Chinese leaders--both Mao and the opposi-
tion— is with internal events within China and with the future
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shape of the Chinese revolution." Today, although the
"opposition" has triumphed and the Chinese revolution has
turned away from the more radical policies of Mao and the
Cultural Revolution in favor of 'pragmatic' policies based
on Western models of management, Halperin 's observation is
still correct.
Deng Xiaoping has identified economic development as
the fundamental task to which China must devote itself during
this decade. The program guiding this task, the "four moderni-
zations," largely orients China's economic development toward
the West as a source of technical and management expertise,
capital, and trade to drive China's growth. China has also




This departure from self-reliance in economic devel-
opment and entry into the free-market Western economic sys- "
tern has given China a stake in the stability of the international
environment. Deng stated in January 1980 that: "Our strategy
in foreign affairs, as far as our country is concerned, is
to seek a peaceful environment for carrying out the four
modernizations." He went on to emphasize that "the size of
the role we play in international affairs depends on the speed
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and range of our economic development." Because Deng's re-
marks were made before a closed party work conference, vice
in the media, they are probably an accurate reflection of the
official Party attitude toward China's world role. Thus, al-
though domestic concerns are predominant over interest in global
problems, the current thrust of China's development program
and the manner in which Deng has linked it with China's world
role make it reasonable to expect that Chinese participation
in international forums on global issues will not be disrup-
tive, and may even be supportive of American security inter-
ests in managing global problems.
An overall assessment of the impact of the Chinese
attitude must balance the encouraging changes discussed above
against the persistence of views and policies that are not
necessarily parallel with American interests in global issues.
Ross Terrill has warned that China's outlook on international
issues is still highly nationalistic and lacking in what he
9 fidescribes as "internationalist values." Chinese and American
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perceptions as to what policies are in the best interest of
the international community can be expected to differ, and
at times conflict. Samuel Kim's description of the Chinese
view of world order, which emphasizes justice and change
rather than order and stability, should also be kept in mind.
As a developing nation, China stands to gain from progress
toward the creation of a 'new international economic order'
that emphasizes Third World interests at the expense of pro-
tection for the inordinate wealth of the developed countries.
As long as such a new order could be achieved within the
"peaceful environment" Deng identified as being necessary for
China's modernization, China would probably pursue both
objectives
.
This caution that China and the United States may
well disagree on how to handle global problems leads to the
second aspect of the relationship between American interests
in global issues and American interests in China: the poli-
cies each nation adopts toward global issues will affect the
status of Sino-American relations to some degree, which in
turn affects the American security interest in China. For
this reason it was proposed that the United States has an
interest not only in encouraging China's participation in
international efforts at managing global problems, but also
in maintaining a bilateral Sino-American dialogue at all
levels of government on those issues.
A Sino-American dialogue on global issues would be a
primary means for broadening the scope and basis of the
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bilateral relationship. As was pointed out in discussing the
effect of conceptual frameworks on perceptions of interests,
there exist numerous latent sources of Sino-American tension
that have been set aside in the interest of cooperation in
dealing with a common threat— the Soviet Union. As a means
of initiating the process of normalization and growth in Sino-
American relations, this 'agreement to disagree' on many issues
was a master stroke of diplomacy. The long-term development
of Sino-American relations will require, however, a founda-
tion greater than mutual opposition to the Russians.
The United States cannot expect that such a dialogue
would fundamentally change China's views of its interests in
world order and international problems. The lessons of
Soviet-American detente are instructive in this regard. It
had been hoped by some that efforts to increase Soviet con-
tact with the West, vice keeping the Soviets politically con-
tained, would allow Soviet leaders to perceive the common
interests they actually had with the West, and that this in
turn would result in a moderation in Soviet behavior. Such
hopes have largely proved groundless. The actual Soviet
response was to exploit the common interest it had with the
West to neutralize opposition to Soviet policies while pre-
serving as much freedom of action as possible. The Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan was the epitome of this strategy.
China would not necessarily adopt the Soviet approach, but
would certainly refuse to sacrifice what it perceived to be
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vital national interests to pursue harmonious relations with
the United States.
Nevertheless, if the United States does not make an
effort to broaden the scope of the relationship, ties with
China will remain dependent upon the sole significant mutual
interest in opposing the Soviets. This would not be a prob-
lem were it not for the fact that both the United States and
China have incentives for improving relations with the Soviet
Union, and the Soviets have been attempting to exploit those
incentives to hinder the development of Sino-American rela-
tions. Beyond the direct benefits for American security-
interests resulting from maintaining good Sino-American rela-
tions, efforts at broadening the scope of the relationship
would probably also aid in the improvement of China's relation-
ship with the West in general. At least part of the barrier
between China and the West in the past has been a lack of
mutual understanding, and the United States can help to alle-
viate this problem. Then, should the Sino-American relation-
ship become strained, China's ties with the West as a whole
and with other Western nations should prevent a drastic re-
orientation of China's strategic alignment back to the Soviet
Union
.
2. China and the Peaceful Resolution of Local Conflicts
The second category of American world order interests
that affect national security is the peaceful resolution of
local conflicts. For the purposes of this paper che term
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'local conflicts' includes both disputes among nations
(other than the United States, the Soviet Union, and China)
and external interventions in internal strife in a single
nation (such as support for a guerrilla movement or for one
side in a civil war)
.
The United States interest in the peaceful resolution
of local conflicts is long-standing and has been a fundamen-
tal tenet of American foreign policy. In recent history, the
Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt and the peaceful
transition to black majority rule in Zimbabwe represent suc-
cessful efforts at the peaceful resolution of both of the
types of local conflicts described in the previous paragraph.
Because of the Soviet-American ideological and politi-
cal rivalry, the American interest in the peaceful resolution
of local conflicts has often become intertwined with the east-
west dispute. In many cases this occurs because of Soviet
support for a revolutionary or "national liberation" movement
that seeks to overthrow a pro-Western government. In most of
the rest of the cases opportunistic Soviet intervention on be-
half of one party in a local dispute, such as on behalf of
India against Pakistan or on behalf of Ethiopia against Somalia
(even though the Somalis had been Soviet clients), has exacer-
bated or escalated the level of violence of a dispute that
could otherwise have been addressed at the negotiating table.
The Reagan Administration has chosen to emphasize the
sast-west aspect of the American interest in the peaceful
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resolution of conflicts. Although Secretary Haig has stated
that "Our objective must be to restore the prospects for
peaceful resolution of conflict," that objective was clearly
linked with constraining Soviet use of violence in the pur-
297
suit of its national goals. This emphasis on the Soviet-
American rivalry, and its application in American policy toward
El Salvador, has led to criticism of the Reagan foreign policy
for ignoring the sources of local conflicts that cannot be
traced to the Soviet Union. While the presupposition upon
which this argument is based--that not all local conflicts are
instigated by the Soviet Union--is valid, the argument itself
is overstated. Administration spokesmen, including Secretary
Haig, have acknowledged that the "underlying tensions" that
lead to local conflicts go deeper than east-west competition
and require United States concern for the problems of the
Third World (see page 206)
.
The Chinese attitude toward the peaceful resolution of
local conflicts remains somewhat of an unknown factor. Al-
though there have been reports that China has pressured revo-
lutionary groups receiving its aid to participate in negotiations'
the Vietminh in 19 54, North Vietnam in 197 2, and Mozambique
(which was supporting guerrilla operations against white-ruled
Rhodesia) in 1978-9--there are other cases in which China's
role led to an escalation of, or at least hindered a solution
to, a local conflict--the development of the Vietnamese-
Kampuchean conflict during 197 6-9 being the most recent example.
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There does not appear to be one preeminent ideologi-
cal imperative that guides China's policy toward local dis-
putes. China does, however, still espouse ideological
objectives for its foreign policy that should be taken into
account. In his 1979 "Report on the Work of the Government,"
former Premier and Party Chairman Hua Guofeng summarized
China's overall policy toward the Third World as follows:
We uphold proletarian internationalism and sup-
port all the oppressed nations and peoples in
their struggle against imperialism, colonialism
and hegemonism and for liberation and social
progress. Adhering to Comrade Mao Zedong's
theory of the three worlds, we will strengthen
our unity with the proletariat and the progres-
sive forces of the world, with the socialist
countries and third world countries and unite
with all the forces in the world that can be
united in a joint effort to oppose the hegemon-
ist policies of aggression and war. 298
Fortunately for the American interest in the peaceful resolu-
tion of local conflicts, this statement by Hua appears to have
been primarily a counter to Soviet criticism of China's foreign
policy. Hua included all of the revolutionary ideological
phraseology used by the Soviet Union to describe its own
Third World policies, then drew the distinction that China
desires the Third World to perceive between Chinese and Soviet
(hegemonist) foreign policies .
At the operational level, ideological goals have been
ie-emphasized, in some cases reformulated, and in general
implemented in such a manner as to be supportive of the de-
fense and development goals guiding China's foreign policy.
The causes of local conflicts, however, are still explained
221

in terms of the ideological concept of "contradictions."
Originally developed by Mao Zedong to explain the persistence
of political conflicts and non-Marxist ideas within the
Chinese masses, the concept of "contradictions" has since
been applied to the analysis of conflict in the international
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arena. The result has been a flexible scheme for defining
a variety of causal factors for local conflicts, which allows
a broad spectrum of policy options from which to choose in
dealing with them. This is a significant departure from strict
Marxist-Leninist ideology, which defines all conflict in terms
of class struggle or the struggle between capitalist imperial-
ism and revolutionary national liberation movements.
This flexibility in Chinese foreign policy raises the
possibility of Sino-American consultation, and perhaps even
cooperation, on a number of potential and actual local con-
flicts. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak have reported that
such consultation has already taken place. During his May
1978 visit to Beijing, Zbigniew Brzezinski is said to have
asked the Chinese to support the Anglo-American settlement
in Zimbabwe. Michel Oksenberg perceives that, even with-
out actual talks, Chinese and American policies have become
increasingly complementary: "Strategically, particularly in
the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, each nation
now appears to be genuinely taking into account the views of




Although these developments are encouraging, the
extent to which Chinese and American interests in local con-
flicts are complementary or parallel is limited. The tacit
mutual accommodation described by Oksenberg in particular has
its limits. Ralph Clough has warned that "The ability of
the United States and the PRC to act in mutually beneficial
ways when dealing with problems involving other countries
rests on their success in promoting their bilateral rela-
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tions." But even improving bilateral relations will not
guarantee that China and the United States can cooperate
effectively on local conflicts. The flexibility of China's
approach to such problems could lead to disagreement with
the United States when Chinese and American national inter-
ests diverge.
Revolutionary ideological goals have been de-emphasized
in China's foreign policy because this is an expedient means
of pursuing other goals that currently have higher priority,
and which cannot effectively be achieved by revolutionary
policies. The ideology from which those revolutionary goals
are derived has not been abandoned, the 're-assessment' of
Mao Zedong notwithstanding. In describing the Chinese attitude
toward the 'contradictions' present in the international
scene, Clough et al
.
, observed that: "They seek to take
advantage of these tensions by a variety of means, ranging
from diplomatic moves through people-to-people activities to
3 03
support for communist insurgents." The encouraging devel-
opments discussed above are just one of the means—diplomatic
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moves—available to China for dealing with local conflicts.
There is no ideological barrier precluding the possibility
of a renewed emphasis on revolutionary policies, including
support for communist insurgents, in China's approach to
local conflicts should the leadership of Chinea perceive this
to be in their nation's interest.
The priority that China gives to opposition to the
Soviet Union has been the underlying interest determining
the direction in Chinese policy toward 'contradictions ' and
local conflicts. China's leaders are well aware of the vastly
superior Soviet capability for supporting revolutionary move-
ments and clients in local disputes. They are also aware of
the increased Soviet willingness to intervene directly in
such conflicts, including with Soviet troops as in Afghanis-
tan— a willingness backed up by the powerful Soviet airlift
and sealift capability. Because China cannot hope to match
these Soviet capabilities for a long time to come, and because
the Soviet Union has been using its support for national
liberation movements and client states as an element in its
strategy of containment and isolation of China, the Chinese
have been willing to support the peaceful resolution of local
conflicts whenever this would preclude an opportunity for
Soviet intervention.
The mutual interest that China and the United States
share in opposing Soviet expansionism has been the basis for
the tacit coordination and overt cooperation that has occurred
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thus far in dealing with local conflicts. But this will not
be an adquate long-term basis for Sino-American consultation
on such issues. The latent tensions that threaten the de-
velopment of Sino-American cooperation in other areas also
could interfere with cooperation on local conflicts. China
and the United States could easily end up being adversaries
in a local conflict, despite their mutual opposition to Soviet
expansionism. The Soviets are not the sole source of tensions
in the Third World, nor do they always intervene in local
conflicts. Without the threat of Soviet intervention to
motivate Sino-American cooperation, whether tacit or through
consultations, the divergent interests that were set aside
to allow the initial improvement in Sino-American relations
could emerge to generate tensions between China and the United
States. This would be detrimental to the United States security
interest in the peaceful resolution of local conflicts as well
as to American security interests in China.
It would be best, therefore, for the United States to
take a broader view of China's role in the peaceful resolution
of local conflicts. On-going discussion of this issue would
be helpful for building mutual understanding of the interests
that each nation has in potential trouble spots and of the
overall attitude each takes toward the means by which local
disputes should be resolved. More important than this, how-
ever, will be the growth of China's relations with the West
as a whole. China must perceive that it is assuming a position
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in the international community commensurate with the world
role to which it feels entitled. China's view of its world
role is evolving as China's interactions with the West and the
Third World evolve--it is not an immutable demand made of the
community of nations. The Chinese definition of their
nation's role in the world will to some degree be shaped by
traditional outlooks and Party ideology, but to a much larger
degree it will be shaped by Chinese perceptions of their
national interest.
That national interests will play a large part in the
evolution of the world role that China seeks also argues for
a broader American view of its interests in China. To the
extent that China's leaders perceive their nation as having
a wide range of mutual interests with the West,, they will be
less inclined to jeopardize relations with the West to pursue
revolutionary ideological goals that directly threaten Western
interests. This could serve to moderate Chinese foreign
policy in situations wherein the United States and China dis-
agree on the cause of and solution to a local conflict. United
States security interests, global as well as in China, might
well be served better by an American policy toward China that
is founded upon interest in the contribution that China can
make to the international community than by a policy founded
upon interest in China's role in the strategic triangle.
F. CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN ASIAN SECURITY
United States security interests in China are most com-
plex and difficult to reconcile with the broad range of
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American security interests when examined in the regional
setting of Asia. Major power rivalries, instability and
tensions within the region, and the continuing American com-
mitment to the security of Taiwan generate numerous potential
security problems that cannot easily be integrated into a
single strategic framework for regional security. American
security interests in Asia are in some cases incompatible—a
few verge on being mutually exclusive— requiring the United
States to set priorities among its interests and to accept
trade-offs among them.
This section will examine four aspects of the role China
plays in the Asian security interests of the United States:
China's effect on American security commitments in Asia,,
China's interests in the potential and actual trouble spots
of Asia, China and the American commitment to Taiwan, and the
role of China in American naval strategy in the Western Pacific
As background for the discussion of these issues, an overview
of the security problems of Asia and the American security
interests and objectives in the region will be presented.
Diversity is the characteristic of Asia that has the great-
est influence in shaping American security interests in the
region. Leslie H. Brown has described the impact this has
on the formulation of American policy:
In developing a statement of American inter-
ests in the Pacific around which to build a stra-
tegic policy, the United States cannot treat Asia,
as she might Europe, as a coherent political, geo-
graphic or military entity; quite the reverse.
Asia is geographic shorthand for a diverse collec-
tion of cultures, societies and politico-economic
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systems that cannot be combined logically into one
unit. As a consequence, American Asian interests
virtually have to be developed in terms of
country interests and bilateral relationships the
sum of which are taken as interests for the region
as a whole. From these are derived an 'Asian'
set of objectives and a policy. 304
Recognition of the diversity of Asia forewarns that it is a
risky procedure to apply American global strategy and interests
to the Asian setting other than in general terms. The failure
of the American strategy of containment--a policy originally
applied in Europe and the Middle East--in the Asian setting
is the best example of this risk.
The conceptual error made by the United States was the
assumption that the ideological dimension—the conflict be-
tween communism and democracy--rather than diverse political
and social causes was the root of conflict in Asia. The pri-
mary sin committed by the American 'China hands ' purged during
the McCarthy years had been their refusal to ascribe to this
erroneous presupposition. Domestic instability in the devel-
oping nations of Asia most often arises from the problems of
political and economic development that strain their societies
.
Morton Kalperin warned in 19 68 that:
Violence also emanates, of course, from many
non-Communist sources. Internal violence has marked
political development in many Asian countries, and
the U.S. can expect such violence to continue. 305
His observation is as valid for the decade of the 1980s, and
probably beyond, as it was in the 1960s. Donald Zagoria has
reached a similar conclusion about the political problems of
the Asian nations today:
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...all over the developing countries of Aisa, one
could question whether political stability is likely
to last. Political development and modern institu-
tions of government have not taken deep root. In
most of these countries the military is ruling,
either directly or indirectly. In many of them,
the whole political system rests on one man, or
on an oligarchy . 306
It would be an error, therefore, for the United Staates to
view every revolutionary movement or terrorist group in Asia
as existing only because of the efforts of the Soviet Union
(and to a lesser degree China) to spread its ideology through-
out Asia.
Disputes among the nations of Asia often have as their
root cause local circumstances—historical , religious and
ethnic animosities; territorial claims; and dreams of regional
or local pre-eminence--rather than external provocation.
Richard Solomon observed that "National interest has replaced
ideology as the orienting force of international relationships
in Asia, " and concluded that this and the frictions of devel-
opment may lead to local conflicts:
While military factors will, of course, continue
to be a major element in regional security affairs,
one aspect of the "transitional" quality of current
developments in Asia is that emerging social,
political, and economic factors will produce new
tensions and international alignments which ulti-
mately may lead to regional conflicts . 307
Just as the Iran-Iraq war (before it stagnated) was a poten-
tial threat to the American interest in the oil shipping routes
in the Persian Gulf, so too should American policy in Asia be
cognizant that local conflicts unrelated to Soviet-American





Does, or should, the United States have a role in these
internal and local conflicts? William W. Whitson argues that
the nations of Asia are becoming increasingly capable of
handling their own disputes:
The thirty years between 194 5 and 197 5 witnessed a
steady movement toward management of Asian affairs
by Asians. By the late 197 0s, the accumulation of
power and newly won confidence by leaders within the
subregions of Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia
had provided the foundation for a uniquely Asian
system of interests, values, and techniques of
crisis management that was decreasingly dependent
upon the involvement of the superpowers .308
Whitson 's description of the trend in Asian politics is essen-
tially correct, but recent conflicts in Indochina and South
Asia tend to indicate that not much has been built on the
foundation for a "uniquely Asian" system of crisis manage-
ment he perceives. This is due not so much to any inherent
weakness in Asia as to the continuing presence of both super-
powers in the region, and especially to the growing assertive-
ness of the Soviet Union. There can be no hope for an effective
regional crisis management system as long as the Soviet Union
pursues the encirclement of China through its 'selective se-
curity system' of proxies hostile to the Chinese.
Under these circumstances the assessment of Guy J. Pauker
seems a better basis for defining an American role in Asian
security:
The international mechanisms by which regional sta-
bility had been maintained in East Asia are no longer
effective. Unless the United States regains a posi-
tion of major influence in the region, the next
decades could become a period of political chaos. 309
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Pauker's view probably overstates the direction in Asian af-
fairs (in the opposite direction as Whitson) , but the point
that the United States does have a role in regional security
is well taken. Even if the United States does regain a "posi-
tion of major influence in the region, " as Pauker deems
necessary, the American role will be constrained by the politi-
cal trends Whitson believes to be predominant.
The constraint imposed by political circumstances in Asia
on the role of the United States in regional security was
described by Selig S. Harrison in his 1978 study of Asian
nationalism and American policy:
In attempting to suggest new guidelines for
American military and economic policy in Asia, this
analysis proceeds from the pivotal assumption that
nationalism sharply circumscribes the role. American
policy options are defined, in this approach, by
the limits inherent in the situation rather than by
an a priori definition of American interests as
viewed in a global perspective from the vantage
point of Washington. Thus, the United States must
differentiate between a variety of distinctive
regional and national environments, each struggling
for its own place in the sun, each with its unique
world view, and each with an identity worthy of
American recognition in its own right. 310
Harrison's view of the context of American security policy in
Asia brings the discussion back to the point with which it
opened: the diversity of Asia. Nationalism and the pursuit
of national interests (the factors identified by Harrison and
Solomon, respectively) build upon the diversity of Asia to
preclude the use of the east-west ideological rivalry as a
common denominator for the conflicts in Asia.
Thus, while the United States has an important role in
the security of ASia due to the aggressive Soviet policy of
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exploiting the tensions of the region to improve its position
against China (as well as to supplant American influence in
the region) , the American definition of that role must be
careful to distinguish between policies whose purpose is to
pursue global American security interests (containment of
Soviet expansionism) in the Asian setting, and policies which
inadvertently or by design attempt to redefine, or even overtly
shape, that Asian setting to conform with American notions as
to what is best for Asia. The first purpose is important to
American security interests and can be pursued; the second is
unattainable and to pursue it would be disastrous for American
interests .
The fundamental United States security objective in Asia
has been described by Morton Halperin as maintenance of a
oalance of power in the region:
First and most important, the U.S. has been and con-
tinues to be concerned with maintaining a balance
of power in Asia so that no single nation can gain
sufficient control of the area to directly threaten
the American homeland. 311
although this is an accurate description of the single most
Important American security interest in Asia, it. is not the
Dnly, nor has it always been the foremost, security interest
juiding American policy. In the closing years of the nine-
:eenth century, for example, American leaders, often quoting
:he influential naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, were
inabashedly espousing imperialist goals for the United States
.n Asia, and the Philippine Islands were kept after being
seized from Spain (though with some reluctance) for avowedly
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imperialist reasons as well as to preserve the balance of
312
power in Asia. During the 1950s and 1960s the American
cold war goal of containment of communism likewise was pre-
eminent over what would have been a less demanding 'pure'
balance of power strategy.
There are compelling reasons for considering maintenance
of a balance of power in Asia as the basis for American
security interests in the region. Raymon H. Myers has pointed
out that:
...an American commitment to maintain a stable balance
of power among states in East Asia and elsewhere,
arises from the perception that checks and balances
are required to deter aggressive acts by other
states in a world where order is constantly threatened
by competition between diverse power groups. 313
"Checks and balances" are required in Asia because of the ag-
gressive policies of the Soviet Union in the region, and be-
cause Soviet clients in Asia have an unsavory reputation for
hostilities against their neighbors (North Korea against South
Korea, India against Pakistan, and Vietnam against Kampuchea
—
in each case solid Soviet backing was a major factor in the
sscalation of local tensions to the level of armed conflict)
.
Although the United States has an interest in the mainte-
lance of a balance of power in Asia, American policy in the
region should not be focused exclusively upon this one objec-
:ive
. As was noted earlier, the diversity of the political
-ircumstances of Asia argue against an American policy based
solely on a single global objective. Selig S. Harrison
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perceives that the political circumstances of Asia require
that great care be taken in using the balance of power concept:
The diffusion of power accompanying the spread of
nationalist consciousness greatly reduces the danger
of one-nation dominance that has provided the ration-
ale for the past application of balance of power
logic to Asia. In a geopolitical landscape that be-
comes more and more kaleidoscopic, the enduring
American interest does not lie in any particular
transitory balance of power but rather in compatible
relationships with countries big and small cutting
across the multipolar spectrum. . .
.
The task of defining an appropriate American mili-
tary policy in Asia is facilitated by making a clear
distinction between two separable objectives that
have been consistently merged in cold war perspec-
tives. One is the maintenance of a global American
military capability, encompassing Asia, designed
primarily to assure a stable bilateral power equation
with the Soviet Union. The other is the promotion
of regional power balances within Asia, buttressed
by the continuing interposition of American forces
and American military aid. The first objective can
be pursued in ways that avoid a direct collision
with nationalism in Asia; the second, by its nature,
places the United States on a collision course with
nationalism and can only be self-defeating . 314
Harrison makes important points in these paragraphs that
should be considered in the formulation of American security
policy in Asia, but his analysis has one major weakness: the
Soviet Union does not respect his distinction between global
and regional balances. The capacity and willingness of the
Soviet Union to project its military power into Asia, directly
and through client states, have grown enormously over the last
decade and are still expanding today. As part of its 'selec-
tive security' policy in Asia, aimed at the military encircle-
ment of China, the Soviet Union has been vigorously interposing
its forces and military aid to buttress its clients in
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Asia—particularly Vietnam and Afghanistan, and to a lesser
degree India. The United States interest in Asian security
requires, therefore, close attention to regional power ba-
lances as well as to the global power balance.
Because the Soviet Union is the pre-eminent threat to
American security interests in Asia, those interests have be-
•come directly linked with America's global security inter-
ests. In 1977 Leslie H. Brown observed:
With the decline of China as a major US security con-
cern and her replacement by the Soviet Union, the
'threat' becomes global in character and has as its
focus interests lying for the most part outside
Asia, not within it. As a consequence, American
security policy in Asia, particularly with respect
to China but to other Asian countries as well, is
increasingly a function of Soviet-American interests
and rivalries external to the region and subordinate
to them. 315
Although it is argued elsewhere in this paper that the United
States has security interests in China that are not merely a
function of Soviet-American relations, when one looks at the
overall priorities of American global security interests
Brown's assessment is essentially correct. Even the April
1980 United States policy announcement that American forces in
the Pacific would no longer automatically be committed to the
defense of NATO in the event of a Soviet attack (the "swing
strategy") was not based primarily on America's Asian security
interests. The primary American concern in this policy shift
was the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf, which had required
a heavy commitment of American forces to the Indian Ocean--
forces for the most part drawn from those committed also to
the defense of American interests in East Asia and the Pacific.
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The Reagan Administration has reaffirmed this linkage
between American security interests in Asia and American
global security interests. Under Secretary Stoessel stated
in April 1981 that:
In recent years, we have recognized that our
Asian security policy is related to our larger task
of coping with the challenge posed by our principal
adversary, the Soviet Union, and by the aggressive
actions of nations which receive its backing and
act as its proxies, such as Vietnam. The challenge
is global in character, and what we do in Asia will
be consistent with our efforts elsewhere . 317
The Reagan Administration has also been reported to have
adopted a "two war" strategy—actually somewhat of a mis-
nomer in that both wars would likely be one war against the
Soviet Union fought in two theaters— but, as was the case
in the earlier de-emphasis of the "swing strategy, " the
Middle East appears to have been the region primarily re-
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sponsible for the shift in American policy. Although the
overall increase in the level of American forces that is
implied by upgrading the strategy from, "one-and-one-half wars"
to "two wars" will indirectly benefit the commitment of the
United States to the security of Asia (mainly by reducing the
possibility of a diversion of forces from Asia) , it does not
appear that the priority of the Asian region itself has in-
creased as a result of the strategy shift.
With this overview of the security problems of Asia and
of the United States interest in Asian security as a back-
ground, the discussion now turns to the role of China in
American security interests in Asia.
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1 . China and American Security Commitments in Asia
The United States is heavily committed to the security
of its interests, and to the security of its allies and
friends, in Asia. The foundation of this commitment is the
series of treaties the United States has signed with several
of the nations of the region. Under Secretary Stoessel re-
affirmed the American commitment to those treaties in April
1981:
Our security arrangements are spelled out in bi-
lateral treaties with Japan, South Korea, and the
Philippines; our trilateral treaty with Australia
and New Zealand (ANZUS); and the Manila Pact, under
which we have a commitment to the security of
Thailand. In a broad sense, then, we are committed
to peace and stability throughout the region. 319
The United States also has interests, commitments,
and obligations arising from other sources. The Taiwan Rela-
tions Act expresses American interest in the security of
Taiwan, but this is a special case and will be examined in a
separate section. The United States has clearly stated its
interest in the security of Pakistan, and in the wake of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has reaffirmed the American
commitment to Pakistan's defense. The exact nature of the
American commitment to Pakistan, however, is unclear because
the tempestuous history of the relationship has obscured to
what extent treaty commitments made in the 19 50s are still
operative. The United States has also clearly expressed an
interest in the security of the ASEAN nations, though no
treaty binds the United States to the organization itself.
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The Reagan Administration reaffirmed this interest during
Secretary Haig's June 1981 visit to Manila, and it has been
expressed by John H. Holdridge, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in his July 15, 1981
statement before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Rela-
320tions Committee.
The commitments, both formal and informal, that the
United States has made to the security of allies and friendly
nations in Asia imposes two requirements on American policy
in the region. First, the United States must maintain
forces—either in the region or which can quickly be deployed
there—that can effectively fulfill these American commitments
For this purpose the United States maintains a military pre-
sence in Asia consisting of naval, ground and air forces
supported by forward bases and facilities, engages in joint
military training and planning with its allies in Asia, and
supports the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of
its allies and friends by means of arms sales, the military
assistance program, and technical assistance and training.
In the background, but an essential contribution to Asian se-
curity nevertheless, is the American strategic nuclear deter-
rence force—some of which is deployed in the Pacific region.
The second requirement imposed upon American security
policy in Asia is that if the United States hopes to deter
aggression, then its commitment to the security of its allies
and friends must be credible—credible both to potential ag-
gressors and to the nations relying on American support as
238

well. Morton Halperin has warned that "the United States
must be concerned not only with threats to particular pieces
of territory, which if dominated by hostile forces could
threaten her security, but also with threats to the credi-
bility of American commitments and to the principles of
321peaceful change to which it is dedicated." There have
indeed been threats to the credibility of the American commit-
ment to Asian security, and the United States has not been
entirely successful in maintaining its credibility in the face
of those challenges. As a consequence of the "Nixon doctrine"
reduction of American forces in Asia, the Vietnam debacle, and
the irresolute United States response to Soviet adventurism in
Africa, the Vietnamese conquest of Kampuchea, and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, United States credibility has suffered
Richard H. Solomon reports "there is a widespread concern that
the United States cannot be depended upon to meet its regional
3 22
security commitments . " ' The Reagan Administration has ex-
pressed an awareness of this problem and a commitment to re-
323
storing American credibility, but it is a problem that is
not readily susceptible to one-time 'quick-fixes ' --constant
and unflagging attention to the viability of America's rela-
tions with its allies and friends is required.
The relationship between American security interests
in China and America's Asian security interests has two major
aspects: China's attitude toward the American commitments in
Asia, and the attitudes of America's Asian allies and friends
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toward American commitments to the security of China. It is
possible that only fortuitous circumstances have thus far
prevented these two sets of American security interests from
being mutually exclusive.
China's attitude toward American security commitments
in Asia has been shaped since the early 1970s by the percep-
tion of a growing Soviet threat to China. China's leaders
believe that the Soviet Union is attempting to encircle their
country militarily, both with Soviet forces and with the
forces of nations hostile to China that are enlisted as Soviet
proxies. In the realm of politics and diplomacy, China has
attempted to forge a 'united front' against Soviet ' hegemonism.
'
In the military realm, China dropped its opposition to the
American military presence in Asia and in public statements
acknowledged that the American presence was crucial as a
counterweight to Soviet power. In an equally dramatic policy
reversal, China now calls on Japan to strengthen its defense
forces to resist Soviet efforts at military intimidation of
the Japanese. Likewise, in Southeast Asia, because of Soviet
backing of Vietnam, and in South Asia, because of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet ties with India,
China has been supportive of American commitments to allies
and friendly nations. In Thailand and Pakistan, in particu-
lar, Chinese and American security interests are closely
parallel due to aggressive Soviet policies in those regions of
Asia. Only in the case of South Korea does China publicly
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oppose an American commitment, but this appears to be due
largely to Chinese competition with the Soviets for influence
in North Korea. There is evidence that the Chinese have no
interest in a new war on the Korean Peninsula, both because
it would disrupt China's development program and because the
Soviets would be better able to exploit the conflict for
their own ends (which are anti-Chinese) , and therefore are
willing to lend tacit support for preserving the status quo
324
on the peninsula.
Another element in the Chinese attitude toward United
States commitments in Asia is the differing approaches the
Americans and the Chinese prefer to take in their policies
toward the Soviet Union. As was described earlier, China
prefers a more resolute opposition to Soviet belligerency,
whereas the United States is more comfortable with a mix of
inducements and warnings. The more moderate American approach
is in part due to the web of alliances the United States has
around the world. Leslie H. Brown has described this linkage:
Moreover, the United States is operating, as China
is not, through a system of alliances and other
international arrangements. United States ability
to deal successfully with the Soviet Union, pol-
itically and militarily, is critically dependent on
maintaining her alliances in good order. She must
take into account in her Soviet policies the vievvs
and interests of the partners, most of whom, for
domestic political reasons, are strongly inclined
towards negotiation rather than confrontation
tactics . 325
China could well come to the conclusion that what it perceives
as a lack of American resolve against the Soviet Union is in
fact symptomatic of a subordination of China's interests to
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the interests of America's allies and non -communist friends
in Asia. A perception in China that the United States lacks
resolve in dealing with the Soviets could also lead to a
weakening of American credibility in the eyes of the Chinese.
Earl C. Raven al has pointed out:
The more painful irony is that somehow we have
to be even stronger in Asia than we were when we
were in a posture of confrontation with China, in
order to demonstrate our resolve as a worthy
alignment partner and discourage China from think-
ing of accommodating the Soviets; and somehow we
must now have a larger defense budget and a more
active global posture than we had before the
Sino-Soviet split. 326
Ravenal overstates the actual state of affairs in Sino-American
relations, but the point that the United States may face
credibility problems with China--problems similar to those
experienced with other countries in Asia--must be kept in
mind when defining security interests in China.
The attitudes of America's Asian allies, and those -of
Asian countries commonly labeled as "friends" of the United
States (a convenient but potentially misleading label)
,
toward American commitments to the security of China and
Sino-American security cooperation are a second potential
source of conflicts between America's security interests in
Asia and America's security interests in China. Richard H.
Solomon observed in 197 9 that: "More recently, a concern has
arisen that the development of US-PRC security cooperation
on the theme of anti-hegemony will either provoke the Soviet




relationships in Asia." To a certain degree such concerns
are to be expected whenever United States foreign policy in
a region changes significantly. The concerns of America's
Asian allies do not require that the United States choose once
and for all between China and its allies, but; American policy
should be formulated so as not to needlessly exacerbate those
concerns
.
Underlying concern that the United States will give
China priority over its allies in Asia is a fear that, in
its eagerness to buttress China militarily against the Soviet
Union, the United States will fail to consider the possibility
that China could become a threat to its neighbors. This issue
comes up most frequently in discussions of arms sales to
China. Because there is this concern that the United States
might be creating a "Frankenstein's monster" in Asia, the
possibility of China becoming a military threat to its neigh-
bors needs to be examined.
China, naturally, is adamant that it is not and will
not become a threat to any of its neighbors:
Another point is that when it becomes stronger, it
will not place the Soviet Union or any other coun-
try in jeopardy. The Chinese don't want to threaten
anyone; they want to be strong because they know
weakness would bring humiliations and injuries which
they had suffered from the big powers for more than
a century. 3 28
Statements like this one in the Communist Chinese media are
more than just propaganda, but the Chinese perception as to
what constitutes a threat is not necessarily the same as the
perceptions of the West or China's neighbors (especially the
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Soviet Union) . Chinese history, particularly the memory of
humiliations suffered at the hands of the West, weighs heavily
on China's view of its role in Asia and the world. This leads,
in some instances, to the perception that because the status
quo threatens Chinese security or sovereignty, actions to
force a change in the status quo (such as seizure of the
Paracel Islands in 1974) cannot be considered a Chinese threat
to its Asian neighbors. This is reinforced by the Marxist-
Leninist concept of "just" wars—those which defend the prole-
tariat from capitalism or which are waged for national
liberation from imperialism. Thus, although China's leaders
may well firmly believe that they have no intention of
threatening anyone, their definition of a 'threat' may exclude
a broad range of actions that are, in fact, threatening.
• Western perceptions of the potential threat from China
have- tended to take wide swings, at various times either
greatly overstating or understating the Chinese threat. The
common practice of contrasting the Chinese threat with the
Soviet threat is probably cause for such swings. In the late
1950s and early 1960s when the United States and the Soviet
Union moved toward "peaceful coexistence, " and again in the
late 1960s and early 1970s when Soviet-American detente began
to arise, the American view of the threat from China took a
swing toward exaggerating Chinese intentions and capabilities.
In 1968, for example, Walter C. Clemens wrote that "While
Moscow tends on the whole to prefer the preservation of exist-
ing frontiers, Peking wants to change them, to move again
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toward a grand design of a iMiddle Kingdom, and is calling for
3 29
the overthrow of existing governments all over the world."
Such comparative descriptions of Soviet and Chinese foreign
policy almost invariably result in far too sharp a contrast
between the two nations. Although Chinese foreign policy did
shift toward 'radical' goals and confrontation tactics in both
of the periods mentioned above, the shifts were more of empha-
^u * 4.- i 330sis than of national purpose.
A more reasonable view of the nature of the Chinese
threat would take as its starting point the observation of
Alice Langley Hsieh (stated in 1963) that: "In sum, there is
little in Chinese military doctrine, policy, or behavior to
support the thesis that the Chinese are militarily reckless
331
or adventurist. " This is the essential counterpoint that
should be kept in mind when evaluating -the hostility often
seen in Chinese polemics against its adversaries (formerly the
United States, now the Soviet Union) . Western observers have
tended to emphasize the military dimension over the political
dimension in their assessments of Chinese policy—which is a
reversal of the Chinese view of the importance of these factors
The potential threat from China lies primarily in the
political dimension rather than in the military dimension,
though--as the Chinese are well aware—military forces are an
essential foundation for the exercise of political power. A.
Doak Barnett has concluded that "the bulk of the evidence
indicates that the Chinese leadership does not think in broad
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territorial expansionist terms, although it is determined
332
to increase its political influence." Barnett's observation
is not only applicable to the policy of the People's Republic,
it identifies a continuity in the Chinese attitude toward
their neighbors that originated in dynastic times. The Middle
Kingdom, for the most part, saw no need to conquer and annex
the lands of its "barbarian" neighbors as long as they ac-
knowledged Chinese influence by accepting tributary state
status (in many cases little more than a pro forma ritual)
.
Joachim Glaubitz has described this political dimension of
the Chinese threat:
We can presume that China is committed to its
anti-hegemony formulas. But it must also be taken
into consideration that China--as we can learn
from its past--is very skillful in exercising
political influence and economic control in neigh-
boring countries without overt interference.
The possibility cannot be excluded that China,
while openly and emphatically opposing hegemony,
will continue to use subtle means of indirect
influence and subversion with the aim of dominat-
ing the other countries in the region in its
own peculiar fashion. 333
It would probably not serve American security inter-
ests for the Asian allies of the United States to become the
modern equivalent of tributary states to China. Such a situa-
tion would be a significant challenge to the balance of power
that best serves America's Asian security interests. On the
other hand, the Chinese have not shown themselves to be as
"skillful in exercising political influence and economic con-
trol" as Glaubitz credits them. In the economic sphere in
particular China's influence over its neighbors is severely
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limited. Indeed, to the extent that China's development is
financed by profitable trade relations with its neighbors, and
by their investments in China's economy, the "control" will
operate in the opposite direction than Glaubitz postulated.
Appendix B takes a closer look at China's economic interactions
with the countries of Asia—which are going to directly af-
fect, whether positively or negatively, American security
interests in China and Asia. In the political sphere as well,
as is evidenced by the moderating effect that the Third World
has had on Chinese policy, the ability of China to exercise
sufficient influence to dominate its Asian neighbors is limited
Only China's relationship with Burma comes close to being an
example of such influence, and even here the extent of Chinese
dominance is arguable.
The conclusions of Hsieh and Barnett that China is
neither "adventurist" nor "expansionist" and the observation
that the political threat from China is political more so than
military do not fully describe that potential threat. As
Leslie H. Brown has warned, China has interests that could
(and have in the past) lead to policy decisions which are
threatening:
The arguments that can be marshalled to support
the non-imperialist view of China are persuasive.
But there remains a nagging doubt. There are
large Chinese populations in a number of Asian
countries (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia) that
Communist China has in the past manipulated for
political ends (notably in Indonesia in the mid-
1960s) and could do so again. There are also
irridentist claims outstanding not only on the
Soviet Union but also on India, Hong Kong, Macao
and a variety of small islands in the East and
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South China seas. Any or all of these claims
could one day be pressed. 334
Two additional issues, then, need to be addressed: China's
support for subversive groups in neighboring countries and
Chinese territorial claims.
China's support for subversive groups in neighboring
countries takes two forms: manipulation of the overseas
Chinese, as mentioned by Brown, and support of revolutionary
and national liberation movements. The two forms of support
tend to be somewhat indistinguishable in Southeast Asia, where
the overseas Chinese have been prominent in the communist
movements of some nations (Indonesia being the best example)
.
Chinese support for both forms of subversion has been greatly
de-emphasized in favor of developing closer state-to-state
relations with the nations of Asia. This is one aspect of
the overall adjustment in China's foreign policy--away from
revolutionary goals to support the domestic development pro-
gram—that was described in Section E.
Other than during the period of the Cultural Revolution,
China has since the Bandung Conference (1955) generally been
conciliatory toward the Southeast Asian nations on the sub-
33 5iect of the overseas Chinese. A January 1978 editorial in
Renmin Ribao on overseas Chinese affairs reaffirmed the Chinese
Government's declared policy on this issue:
We should continue to implement the policy set
forth by Chairman Mao for settling the question of
dual nationality among overseas Chinese and en-
courage them to acquire the nationality of the
country of residence on a voluntary basis. Upon
acquiring such a nationality, they are no longer
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citizens of China, but they are still our kinsfolk
and friends. The policies concerning overseas
Chinese affairs at home also fully apply to their
relatives in China. As to those overseas Chinese
who wish to retain their Chinese nationality, we
should welcome their choice, and the state has
the duty to protect their legitimate rights and
interests. It is our hope that overseas Chinese
abide by the laws and decrees of the countries
in which they reside, live in harmony with the
local people and make contributions to the de-
velopment of the economy and culture of these
countries. We also hope that the governments
of these countries will protect the legitimate
rights and interests of overseas Chinese and
respect their national traditions, customs and
habits. 336
Overall, this policy is respectful of the interests of the
Southeast Asian countries. The duty of the state to protect
the legitimate rights and interests of those overseas Chinese
electing to retain Chinese nationality is somewhat ambiguous,
and could be a cause for concern. The bulk of the editorial,
however, was concerned with Chinese Government policy toward
the overseas Chinese in China itself, and with policy toward
the relatives in China of the overseas Chinese. The ambiguous
passage probably refers to such policies, and therefore does
not contradict the overall conciliatory tone of the statement.
Chinese Communist Party policy toward the support of
revolutionary groups has also been constrained so as not to
impede the government policy of forming a 'united front' against
the Soviet Union. Donald Zagoria has pointed out how this fits
into the overall scheme of China's Asian policy:
Because of its fear of the Russians, China also
is now building up relations with many governments
in Asia to which it had formerly been hostile.
Many of these regimes--in the Philippines, Malaysia,
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Thailand, Indonesia, and particularly in Japan-
have long been supported by the United States.
The switch in Chinese policy is motivated by
Peking's desire to counter Soviet diplomatic
efforts to line up an Asian collective security
pact directed against China. This switch means
that Chinese support of revolutionary movements
throughout Asia is played down. 337
Keeping in mind that Japan, the Philippines and Thailand are
allies of the United States, and that there are American
bases and facilities in Japan and the Philippines, the con-
nection between China's Asia policy and American security
interests in the region is clear.
Although China has played down its support for the
revolutionary movements in Asia, it continues to provide a
low level of material aid and other assistance to them. The
Chinese Government has not been responsive to requests from
its Asian neighbors that it cease such support, citing his-
torical ties with the groups and the threat of the Soviet
3 38
Union supplanting China as their patron as its motives.
Although there is a certain degree of merit in the second
excuse, it is likely that the persistence of Chinese support
for revolutionary groups in Asia reflects a continuing com-
mitment to the ideology that brought the Chinese Communist
Party into power. "It would be naive to expect Peking to
abandon the Utopian goal of world revolution, " warned Shao-
chuan Leng, even though China has focused on state-to-state
339
relations and "playing the balance of power game. " Deng
Xiaoping' s January 198 statement that China seeks "a peaceful
environment for carrying out the four modernizations" should
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be interpreted narrowly, as a statement of current foreign
policy priorities, rather than broadly, as being indicative
of a fundamental shift in Party ideology.
Chinese leaders appear to be aware that support for
subversive groups in neighboring countries is a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, support for such groups can be a
convenient tool for harassing or pressuring a government, and
a successful revolutionary movement might replace a regime
hostile to Chinese interests. On the other hand, when China
desires to improve relations with a neighbor support for a
subversive group in that country becomes a liability—but to
abandon the group could cause it to turn to the Soviet Union
for support. A victory for a revolutionary movement is also
not necessarily in China's interest. As the Vietnam example
has shown, nationalism and historical animosities are stronger
factors than a common ideology in determining the state of
relations between China and a communist neighbor. This creates
opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence
around China's periphery by offering its diplomatic and mili-
tary support as a counterweight to the Chinese. Thus, China
faces somewhat of a dilemma: whether it abandons support of
revolutionary groups or backs them in a victorious struggle
there is a risk of the Soviets capitalizing on the situation
at China's expense, but to maintain a level of support in
between those two extremes is to risk alienating the estab-
lished regime—which could also benefit the Soviet Union.
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China's territorial claims in the East and South
China Seas and border disputes with India and Vietnam are
a second potential source of conflict between China and its
neighbors. The disputes with India and Vietnam will be dis-
cussed in the next section, on China's interests in the trouble
spots of Asia. Because Chinese claims in the East and South
China Seas are a source of tension between China and allies
and friends of the United States in Asia, those claims could
adversely affect American security interests in China and
the rest of Asia.
China's claim of "inviolable sovereign rights over the
continental shelf in the East China Sea" has been the basis
of Chinese condemnation of an agreement between Japan and the
Republic of Korea on joint development of a portion of that
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shelf. Closely related to the continental shelf dispute
is a disagreement between China and Japan over possession of
the Senkaku (T.iao Yu Tai) Islands north of Taiwan, which led
to tension in April 1978 when a number of Chinese fishing boats
intruded into waters claimed by Japan. China also asserts
sovereignty over most of the South China Sea and the various
island groups and banks in it. The Paracel (Xisha) and Spratley
(Nansha) island groups have been the focus of the disputes in
the area--China and Vietnam claim both groups and the Phili-
ppines claims the Spratleys . Because China claims almost all
of the South China Sea, however, the Chinese contest several
claims with the Philippines and are also involved in disputes
with Malaysia and Indonesia. The potential for oil under the
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South China Sea, in particular, and fishing rights are the
341
reasons for such great interest in the region.
The possibility cannot be dismissed that these or
other potential disputes could lead China to take military
action against its Asian neighbors. China has clearly demon-
strated a willingness to use its military forces outside its
own borders, as the seizure of the Paracel Islands from South
Vietnam in January 1974 illustrates. Chinese military doc-
trine and forces provide a limited capacity to conduct offen-
sive operations—but it needs to be stressed that this Chinese
capability is extremely limited. In assessing the possibility
of China seizing the Spratleys as it did the Paracels, for
example, Jonathan Pollack observed that: "The scale of allo-
cation and preparation which would be required to assert these
claims--not to mention the even larger objective of Taiwan--
vastly exceeds any operations that have yet been undertaken
342by China's naval and air forces." China appears to be mak-
ing an effort to expand its ability to project naval power
beyond its coastal waters, but as an indication of future
Chinese intentions this must be balanced against the record
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of caution China has shown in the use of its military forces.
As long as opposition to the Soviet Union remains China's top
foreign policy and security objective, it is unlikely that China
would take military action against America's allies and friends
in Asia.
Unites States security interests in China and Ameri-
can commitments to Asian security are inextricably linked.
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Because China and the United States share a mutual interest
in the containment of Soviet expansionism those two sets of
American security interests have been mutually supportive
over the past decade. Although it appears that these for-
tuitous circumstances will continue to shape the security en-
vironment of Asia for the next several years as well, there
are far too many latent sources of tension in the region for
this to be the basis of American security policy indefinitely.
Over the long-term, the range of interests China shares with
its Asian neighbors, and the importance China attaches to those
interests, will be the decisive factor in the evolution of
American security interests in Asia. Recent trends have been
encouraging in this regard, but there remain significant po-
tential conflicts which could erupt in violence and force the
United States to choose between its interests in China and its
commitments to its allies in Asia.
2 . China's Interests in the Trouble Spots of Asia
There are three places in Asia where long-standing
disputes have in the past broken out in fighting: the Korean
Peninsula, Indochina, and the Indian Subcontinent. In all
three areas the basic conflicts remain unresolved and in Indo-
china there is still fighting today. The United States has
security interests and commitments in all three areas: South
Korea and Thailand are allies and Pakistan is a former ally
and of strategic importance to American interests in the
South Asian-Indian Ocean region.
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China's security interests in these loci of conflict
are even greater than those of the United States. North Korea,
Kampuchea (the Pol Pot regime) , and Pakistan are allies of
China. The Soviet Union, China's prime adversary, is com-
peting for influence with China in North Korea, and has signed
friendship and cooperation treaties with India and Vietnam
that are clearly directed against the Chinese: China fought
a border war with India in 1962 and launched a punitive attack
on Vietnam in 1979. Thus, it would appear that the stage is
set for renewed violence in Asia—violence which could embroil
China and the superpowers in a much wider conflict. This sec-
tion will examine China's interests and roles in these three
trouble spots of Asia.
Although China is firmly committed to North Korea,
this does not mean that the Chinese would back a second
attempt by Pyongyang to reunify the peninsula by attacking
the South. The Sino-Soviet dispute is the primary reason for
such Chinese reticence. An attack by the North on the South
would strain China's relations with the United States and
Japan—the two most important partners in China's 'united front'
against the Soviets. A North Korean victory in a new war
would be desirable only if the Communist regime remained on
good terms with China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but there
is no assurance that this would be the case. The greater
Soviet ability to provide military aid might induce a Pyongyang
tilt towards Moscow. On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet compe-
tition in the North constrains the Chinese from overt
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cooperation with the United States on the Korean problem and
inhibits the development of relations with the South. Re-
ports of Chinese trade and contacts with the South are vehe-
mently denied by Beijing lest the Soviets capitalize on them.
While China would probably agree to cross-recogniztion of the
South once Pyongyang had accepted the idea (not a likely
prospect) , it is unrealistic to expect China to take the
initiative on such a proposal without a concurrent Soviet com-
mitment. Thus, while China can be epxected to restrain the
North from future aggression, China will not risk alienating
344the North Koreans by backing proposals opposed by Pyongyang.
The political-military situation in Indochina is much
more volatile than the situation on the Korean Peninsula. China
and the Soviet Union are squared off in a clearly adversary
relationship, which has polarized a number of disputes in and
around the region. War-torn, poverty-stricken Kampuchea stands
at the center of the tensions and disputes in Indochina--and
has been the primary battleground on which those disputes have
been fought. China lost the first round of the Kampuchean
conflict when the Soviet-backed Vietnamese ousted the Pol Pot
regime, which was allied with China, and installed the Heng
Samrin government. China continues to support the Khmer Rouge
and the non-communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front
in their guerrilla war against the Vietnamese in Kampuchea,
and also backs the efforts to form a united front of the
various anti-Vietnamese Khmer groups (an effort being led by
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Norodom Sihanouk, among others) . The Soviet Union and Vietnam
34 5
oppose all of these Chinese actions.
The Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea is just one of
the sources of tension between China and Vietnam. Others in-
clude a dispute over the Sino-Vietnamese border, conflicting
claims to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratley islands
and large areas of the South China Sea, and Chinese displeas-
ure over Vietnam's treatment of the overseas Chinese (the
Vietnamese counter that China seeks to subvert the overseas
Chinese in Vietnam) . The Soviet Union has exploited, and
thereby exacerbated, these Sino-Vietnamese tensions by forming
an alliance with the Vietnamese and seeking the use of air-
fields and ports in Vietnam for Soviet Pacific Fleet naval
and air deployments. To counter the Soviet-Vietnamese align-
ment, China has sought to improve its relations with the
~XAf.
members of ASEAN, particularly Thailand.
The situation in Indochina is almost hopelessly polarized
and deadlocked at the present time. Unlike the situation on
the Korean Peninsula, however, it has not yet had time to set
into a rigid pattern of relationships nor is there an armis-
tice agreement among the feuding parties to formalize the dead-
lock. On the negative side, this unstable situation could
erupt in renewed fighting (beyond the continuing guerrilla
activity in Kampuchea) at any time. The next round in the
Indochina War could involve Thailand and the Soviet Union as
well as China and Vietnam. On the positive side, there is
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still a possibility of a breakthrough on any one of a number
of fronts which could lead to a partial settlement of some of
the more dangerous disputes. If the Soviet Union continues
to consolidate its direct control over Kampuchean affairs,
347
as it now appears to be doing, the most likely prospects
will be for a stalemate in Indochina marked by continuing
tensions and fighting in Kampuchea.
China's two primary objectives in South Asia are to
contain the expansion of Soviet influence and power in the
region and to resolve the long-standing border dispute with
India. To a certain degree these two objectives are incom-
patible. China's alliance with Pakistan is the cornerstone
of Chinese efforts to counter the Soviet presence in South
Asia, but Pakistan is embroiled in a deeply-rooted conflict
with India. Resolving the border dispute with India is im-
portant to China because it directly affects China's control
over its unruly Tibetan autonomous region. Tibet has been a
source of animosity between China and India: India would
prefer an independent Tibet, and harbors the Dalai Lama in
exile; China is determined that Tibet is an inseparable part
of China and resents Indian interference in its "internal
affairs." The border issue is also tied to questions of
national pride and Sino-Indian competition for status and
influence in Asia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a
setback for Chinese efforts at containing the Soviets in the




Although India has lent partial (perhaps even reluc-
tant) diplomatic support to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, China has con-
tinued to pursue the improvement of relations with India--a
process begun in 1976 with the exchange of ambassadors. The
Chinese interest has been expressed in public statements by
top Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Huang Hua,
Premier Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping; in conciliatory ges-
tures such as assurances that China would cease its support
of rebels in the Indian provinces of Mizoram and Nagaland and
would not disturb the "existing tranquility" on the Sino-Indian
frontier; and in annual exchange visits by the foreign minis-
ters of China and India over the last three years. India has
also been expressing an interest in improving relations with
China, though this has at least partially been an Indian tac-
tic for pressuring the Soviet Union into greater concessions
in talks with India (a ploy which payed off handsomely for
India in a large arms agreement on easy financial terms in
1980). Nevertheless, India and China did agree to open talks
on their border dispute during Huang Hua's June 1981 visit to
New Delhi. China has also been encouraging Pakistan to improve
its relations with India, and Pakistan has expressed just
349
such an interest.
There are several additional potential sources of
tension in South Asia: the nuclear proliferation question,
separatist sentiments in Pakistan's provinces of Baluchistan
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and Pushtunistan and in parts of India as well, and unresolved
disputes and historical animosities between India and its
neighbors Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Soviet-American naval
competition in the Indian Ocean, a region India and other
nations would like to have recognized as a "zone of peace,
"
is another source of tensions. These problems, and those
described above between China, India and Pakistan, add up
to an unstable international environment in which violence
could arise for a number of reasons. But the outlook for South
Asia is not completely bleak. India and China both perceive
benefits to be gained from an improvement in their relations,
and this could improve the chances for an Indian-Pakistani
detente. Such initiatives would not eliminate the many po-
tential sources of conflict in the region, but they would
reduce the likelihood of violence—thereby reducing the
opportunities the Soviet Union has for expanding its influence
and military presence in South Asia.
The only pattern to the Chinese interests in the three
trouble spots of Asia is that in each case opposition to the
expansion of Soviet influence and presence in the region is
one of the most important Chinese objectives. Although this
Chinese objective generates a number of parallel interests
with American security objectives in Asia, the ability of
China to pursue policies that would be of benefit to American
as well as to Chinese interests varies greatly in each trouble
spot. In Korea, for example, China cannot risk alienating
Pyongyang to improve relations with Seoul. In South Asia,
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on the other hand, an improvement in Sino-Indian relations
would probably be to the benefit of Pakistan. The United
States should keep in mind this variation in the role that
China can play in managing the potential conflicts in the
trouble spots of Asia. The United States and China should
also engage in close consultations on these areas of con-
flict so that each will understand the constraints which
limit the freedom of action of the other. Without such an
understanding Sino-American relations could become strained
over an issue in which the two countries share substantial
mutual interests.
3 . China and the American Commitment to Taiwan
The relationship between the United States and the
Kuomintang (Nationalist) regime on Taiwan creates special
problems for the defining of American security interests in
China and Asia. The problems arise as much from American
domestic politics as from the hostility between the Kuomintang
and the Chinese Communist Party. The perception in the United
States of the relationship between People's Republic of China
and the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan has become somewhat dis-
torted through a process of 'selective' memory and the drawing
of inaccurate analogies to other countries. Observers in the
United States remember the historical ties between America and
the Republic of China, but forget that the Kuomintang lost the
Chinese civil war' in every province of China except Taiwan--
and is still insistent that it will reconquer the mainland.
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The Nationalist regime on Taiwan was not created in the way
that the state of Israel was created, and it is a false and
misleading analogy to compare the American commitment to
Taiwan with the American commitment to Israel. Israel is an
independent nation. Taiwan is a province of China ruled by
the remnants of a regime defeated in a contest for the
control of the nation.
The official policy of the United States toward the
status of Taiwan is derived from three sources: the Shanghai
Communique, the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplo-
matic Relations, and the Taiwan Relations Act. The Shanghai
Communique was issued by the United States and China on Feb-
ruary 27, 1972 during the visit of President Nixon to China.
It stated:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is
but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.
The United States Government does not challenge
that position. 350
This statement governed American policy until the Joint Com-
munique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations was issued
on December 15, 1978. This communique made essentially the
same point: "The Government of the United States of America
acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China
351
and Taiwan is part of China." When the People's Republic
of China criticizes American poxLicy toward Taiwan, this is
the position to which it insists the United States must adhere.
The Taiwan Relations Act was passed by the Congress on
March 29, 1979 and signed into law by President Carter on April
262

10, 1979. This act declares that "peace and stability in
the area are in the political, security, and economic in-
terests of the United States, and are matters of international
concern," and that it is the policy of the United States:
...to consider any effort to determine the fu-
ture of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, includ-
ing by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the
peace and security of the Western Pacific area and
of grave concern to the United States;
. . .to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive
character; and
...to maintain the capacity of the United States
to resist any resort to force or other forms of
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the
social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. 352
This act, of course, greatly upsets the government of the
People's Republic, which reacts with vigorous indignation
whenever an American spokesman reaffirms the intention of
an administration to comply with it. Under Secretary Stoessel
issued just such a reaffirmation for the Reagan Administration
in April 1981:
Regarding Taiwan, this Administration intends
to implement faithfully the Taiwan Relations Act,
the law passed by Congress which sets the parame-
ters for our nonofficial ties on the basis of a
longstanding and warm friendship with the people
of Taiwan. Our conduct of this relationship with
Taiwan will be responsible, respectful, realistic,
and consistent with our international obligations . 353
The "international obligations" of which he speaks presumably
would include the position of the United States, as stated in
the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Rela-
tions, on the status of Taiwan as a part of China.
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Although the Taiwan Relations Act states that the
United States has an interest in the security of Taiwan due
to concern for the "peace and security of the Western Pacific,"
it does not formally commit the United States to the defense
of Taiwan. The President is obliged to "maintain the capacity
of the United States to resist any resort to force or other
forms of coercion, " but is not obliged to employ that capac-
ity to comply with the provisions of the Act itself. The
causal linkage between an effort to determine the future of
Taiwan by other than peaceful means and the peace and security
of the Western Pacific is not explicitly defined by the Act,
giving the President leeway in deciding the circumstances un-
der which the "grave concern" of the United States should be
backed by American military force. Thus, the United States
is not formally committed to the defense of Taiwan and while
an informal commitment may well derive from historical ties
with the Republic of China, the exact nature of that informal
commitment is not defined by the Taiwan Relations Act--American
domestic politics will be the ultimate arbiter.
The United States relationship with Taiwan raises five
issues concerning American security interests: (1) American
credibility as an alliance partner, (2) the effect of Taiwan-
American relations on Sino-American relations, (3) the possi-
bility of China using force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland
under one government, (4) the possibility of a desperation
move by Taiwan to defend itself should it lose the American
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commitment, and (5) the possibility of Kuomintang interven-
tion in political turmoil on the mainland.
It has been argued that the United States must main-
tain its commitment to the defense of Taiwan in order to
preserve American credibility as an alliance partner. Ray
S. Cline, for example, has warned: "While geopolitical
realities sometimes require us to deviate a little from
principle, nothing that China is likely to do for the United
States against the Soviet Union could compensate for the shock
that our allies and friends would feel if Washington did not
354honor its commitment to defend Taiwan." Although it is
true, as was discussed earlier, that the United States must
be concerned with its credibility, Cline 's statement greatly
oversimplifies the many ways in which other countries perceive
American foreign policy as affecting their own national
interests
.
The effect that "abandoning" Taiwan would have on
American credibility has to be assessed on a case-by-case
basis. The primary interest of the nations of ASEAN is that
Sino-American relations continue to improve so that Chinese
behavior will continue to be moderated in a manner favorable
to their political and economic interests—and if United States
ties with Taiwan would prevent this, then the commitment to
355Taiwan should be scaled down. South Korea and Japan would
be much more concerned with the credibility of American com-
mitments in East Asia, but there are a number of actions the
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United States could take to reassure them of its commitment.
Outside of East Asia, concern over such an American move would
be much less intense. In almost every case direct American
action toward its allies has a far greater effect on American
credibility than the symbolic importance of American actions
outside of their immediate geographic area,
The circumstances in which the United States ter-
minated its informal commitment to the defense of Taiwan
would largely determine the effect of such a move on Ameri-
can credibility. The repercussions would be much more severe
if the United States were to abandon Taiwan in the face of
an assault from the mainland than if the defense commitment
were ended in the context of the opening of talks between
China and Taiwan. In the latter case such an American move
would probably be welcomed by most nations. Thus, the credi-
bility argument is not so much an independent variable shaping
American interests as it is a dependent variable which can,
to a degree, be controlled through the careful implementation
of American foreign policy.
The continuing American relationship with Taiwan has
been somewhat of a hindrance to the development of Sino-
American relations. China is adamantly opposed to the Taiwan
Relations Act and reacts strongly to any indication that the
United States might upgrade the status of its relations with
Taiwan. China maintains that the United States is interfer-
ing in the internal affairs of China, in violation of the
197 8 Joint Communique position, by implying any form of an
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American commitment to the defense of Taiwan. The sale of
American arms to Taiwan draws the most vehement Chinese con-
demnations of the United States. In January 1981 a commen-
tary in the Beijing Review stated:
The continued supply of weapons by the United States
will only make the Taiwan authorities mere arrogant
and obstruct the peaceful reunification of Taiwan
with the motherland. This is really detrimental
to 'the peace and security of the western Pacific
area. '356
It is highly likely that China's downgrading of its relations
with the Netherlands (from ambassadorial to chanrge d'affaires
level) in retaliation for the Dutch decision to sell two sub-
marines to Taiwan was intended primarily to be a warning
signal to the Reagan Administration.
United States relations with Taiwan may slov; the de-
velopment of Sino-American relations, but almost certainly
will not preclude such further development. The mutual in-
terests China shares with the United States--above all,
opposition to the Soviet Union, but also the desire for Ameri-
can trade and investment--limit the actions China is willing
to take to pressure the United States to abandon Taiwan.
American leaders will have to expect a great deal of verbal
abuse from China over relations with Taiwan, but, as long as
the principle that there is but one China and Taiwan is a
part of China is not violated, China will not take more
than symbolic actions to express its displeasure.
The United States must also be aware that the Nation-
alist regime on Taiwan is not above manipulating its relations
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with America for its own purposes—which may not serve
American interests. The current controversy over Taiwan's
request to purchase the F-16 jet fighter is a case in
point. Although Secretary Haig has stated that there is
"no urgency" to the sale and that the administration's
decision will be based solely on Taiwan's genuine defense
needs—vice on political grounds to balance the decision to
sell arms to China—it is hardly likely that all of the admin-
istration officials who will be involved in the decision will
agree v/ith his views. Indeed, there have been press reports
that the sale is regarded by some officials as important for
3 5 8
maintaining American "friendship" with Taiwan.
The debate on Taiwan's request has thus far focused
on whether the air threat (now and in the future) justifies
the advanced aircraft and on what the consequences will be
for Sino-American relations (the economic health of certain
defense contractors has also entered into the picture, as it
always does in such decisions) . What has been missing is
a questioning of Taiwan's motives in making the request.
Defense needs and a reaffirmation of the American commitment
to Taiwan are the obvious, but not the only, motives. The
timing of the request strongly suggests additional motives.
The Kuomintang regime clearly intended to catch the Reagan
Administration as soon as it was in office, before the first
formal contacts between the new administration and the People's
Republic of China. In this way, it was hoped, the pro-Taiwan
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rhetoric of the campaign could be capitalized upon before
the pressures of the "real world" caused the inevitable
moderation in outlook that occurs in every new administration.
In addition to scoring a political coup in the Reagan
Administration, Taiwan would also be spared from much of the
growing pressure to negotiate with the mainland. China could
reasonably be expected to harden its position against both
Taiwan and the United States as a result of approval of the
request. A hard-line position against Taiwan would probably
emphasize that China had not renounced the option of using
force to reunify the country, and the many lucrative induce-
ments China has offered Taiwan would at least be de-emphasized
and perhaps even rescinded. Thus, for Taiwan, the political
benefits of the sale would far outweigh the defense benefits-
no matter what the basis for the American decision had been.
The United States should remain constantly aware that it is,
by the nature of its commitment to Taiwan, highly vulnerable
to political manipulation by the Kuomintang regime.
China has not renounced the option of using force to
reunify Taiwan with the mainland. The Beijing Review warned
in January 19 81:
It is our hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace
of the motherland peacefully. But if we are driven
by the Taiwan authorities ' adamant refusal to
resort to non-peaceful means to solve the issue,
that is entirely China's internal affair which
the United States has no right to meddle in, let
alone claim that it poses 'a threat to the _ 5 qpeace and security of the western Facific area. '
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There is nc reason to expect that China would renounce its
military option other than in the context of progress in
negotiations with Taiwan on a political solution. The Kuo-
mintang regime, however, is adamant that it will never agree
to talks with the mainland and that the only ultimate solu-
tion is the destruction of the communist regime ruling China.
This standoff between China and Taiwan is not as
dangerous as it seems. Deng Xiaoping has been quoted on
more than one occasion as having stated that China would not
use force against Taiwan unless the Kuomintang regime indef-
initely refused to enter into negotiations or unless there
were an attempt by the Soviet Union to interfere in the
affairs of Taiwan. There does not appear to be a time
limit on the "indefinite" refusal to negotiate, even though
Deng Xiaoping has identified "the return of Taiwan to the
motherland" as one of the "three major tasks" that China must
accomplish in the 1980s. J Only a declaration of an inde-
pendent state of Taiwan would permanently foreclose talks,
but the Kuomintang regime is adamantly opposed to the 'Taiwan
? fi 3independence movement' and is firmly in power.
Turning to the second situation in which Deng said
China would use force, although Henry Kissinger has reported
Soviet contacts with Taiwan and China has in the past made
similar accusations against the Russians, the Soviet Union
appears to be cautious in its approach to Taiwan—knowing
that a severe deterioration in already tense Sino-Soviet
relations could be provoked with little to show for the
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efforts. Additionally, Kuomintang officials have stated on
more than one occasion that Taiwan has no intention of turn-
ing to the Soviet Union for support against China, and
364for this reason will not even trade with the Soviets.
Thus, the political circumstances which would pro-
voke an attack by China on Taiwan are not likely to occur.
Nor would an attack on Taiwan be an attractive option for
China. Stuart E. Johnson examined four military options
China might consider: a nuclear attack on Taiwan, a con-
ventional attack on Taiwan, an attack on one of the off-
shore islands (probably Quemoy) , or a blockade (probably
partial) of Taiwan. Each of these options has its own
serious drawbacks. Any military action against Taiwan could
entail heavy losses and high political and economic costs
for China, particularly if the United States came to the
•3 C C
aid of Taiwan. Tying together these two factors--the
political circumstances which would provoke a Chinese attack
and the costs China would suffer if it did attack—should be
the key to American policy toward Taiwan according to Ralph
N. Clough:
The key to living with the Taiwan problem lies in
three propositions: keeping high the potential
loss to the PRC in men and equipment if it resorts
to military force against Taiwan; expanding rela-
tions between the United States and the PRC so
that the potential gains to the PRC from continua-
tion of this process and the potential losses
from its interruption will be high; and keeping
open the possibility of an eventual reunifica-
tion of the PRC and Taiwan. 366
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Clough's observation is probably correct, but it is
not an easy policy to implement. Clough himself admits that
the three propositions are contradictory, and the government
of China would certainly agree with him. Moreover, the
Kuomingtang regime on Taiwan has found China's refusal to
renounce the use of force to be a convenient form of lever-
age over American policy. Taiwan officials, including
President Chiang Ching-kuo, have cited the threat from China
as justification for their requests to purchase American
weapons. As was noted above, Taiwan's arms requests may
have ulterior motives: the frustration of efforts to induce
Taiwan to negotaiate with China. China, on the other hand,
expects a more active and positive American role in "keeping
open the eventual reunification of the PRC and Taiwan."
Vice Premier Wan Li has been reported to have suggested that
the United States should help get discussions started between
~) (Z ~7
China and Taiwan. The United States has thus far rejected
any such role and the American experience as mediator in the
Chinese civil war argues against assuming that role again.
But the conflicting roles that Taiwan and China envision for
the United States could unravel the delicate policy outlined
by Clough, forcing American to seek a new approach to the
entire issue.
The fourth security issue that arises from the Ameri-
can relationship with Taiwan is the possibility of a despera-
tion move by Taiwan to ensure its own defense without reliance
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upon the informal American commitment. Such a desperation
move could result from a deliberate American decision to
"abandon" Taiwan or from a loss of confidence in the infor-
mal American commitment to Taiwan's defense. Two despera-
tion moves Taiwan might take have been suggested: alignment
with the Soviet Union against China or acquisition of a
nuclear weapons force. The first "desperation option" was
discussed above--it is a course of action Taiwan is not
likely to take. The Kuomintang regime trusts the Russians
even less than it does the Chinese Communists. The only
Soviet interest in such an arrangement would be to exploit
Taiwan for all it was worth against China. It would be much
more likely, if it can be assumed that there is such a thing
as a "Chinese" style of politics, for Taiwan to make low-
level overtures to the Soviets in order to manipulate the
Chinese fear of the Soviet Union. This would greatly in-
crease the maneuvering room and bargaining power Taiwan would
have against China, but would not expose Taiwan to exploita-
tion by the Russians.
The second "desperation option" open to Taiwan would
be the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This is a much more
serious threat than a Taiwan-Soviet alliance. In tenns of
scientific and technological capabilities Taiwan is fully
capable of building nuclear warheads. The eleventh of the
"ten great projects" Taiwan pursued in its development pro-
gram of the 1970s was a surreptitious uranium reprocessing
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facility—but Taiwan was caught red-handed and was pressured
into closing down its operations. It would be premature,
however, to cite that incident as a victory for non-prolifera-
tion. If Taiwan were to lose, or lose confidence in, the
informal American commitment to its defense, the nuclear
option would become very attractive. The possibility of
losing the informal American security guarantee might deter
Taiwan from "going nuclear" for a while, but over the long-
term the threat of such a loss is an incentive to acquire
nuclear arms. An American policy toward Taiwan based upon
this approach would ultimately be self-defeating. The pro-
liferation issue has become a tool for Taiwan to exercise
leverage over American policy: if the United States balks at
selling Taiwan the conventional arms it requests, Taiwan can
threaten to go nuclear. The only other disincentive which
might deter Taiwan from acquiring nuclear weapons is the
threat of a pre-emptive strike by China before Taiwan could
3 6 8develop a credible nuclear deterrent force.
The fifth security issue related to the American re-
lationship with Taiwan is the possibility of Kuomintang inter-
vention in political turmoil on the mainland. Given the
insistence of the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan that it will,
someday, return to the mainland and free the Chinese people
from their "subjugation" by the communists, the possibility
of such a move cannot be dismissed. There would probably
be nothing the United States could do to prevent Taiwan from
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intervening in a collapse of authority on the mainland--
sentiment in the United States could be expected to favor
the Kuomintang in any case—but this does not mean that
Kuomintang intervention would be in the best interests of
either the United States or China. As was discussed in an
earlier chapter, China is most vulnerable to external ag-
gression when weakened by internal political disruption.
This is precisely the type of situation which the Soviet
Union would prefer as the context for an attack on China to
guarantee a final solution to its China problem. Kuomintang
intervention in a rebellion or power struggle en the main-
land could well be the factor which would prompt the Soviets
to strike: the only situation worse than a China united under
the Communist Party would be a China united under the Nation-
alist Party. The Kuomintang might even emerge victorious in
the political struggle (though this is doubtful) but its prize
would likely be a China that had been dismembered and devas-
tated by the Soviet Union.
The five security issues discussed above suggest that
the United States should reconsider the manner in which it
pursues its commitment to the security of Taiwan. In par-
ticular, the United States should reverse the tables on Taiwan:
instead of the Kuomintang regime being able to exploit its
historical ties and (supposed) ideological affinity with the
United States to manipulate American policy and resist any
movement toward negotiations with the People's Republic, the
United States should emphasize those same factors as the basis
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for encouraging (a polite word for pressuring) Taiwan to
enter into talks on reunification. In its public declara-
tions of friendship with and support for the regime on Taiwan,
the United States should emphasize that the proven economic
viability and political cohesion of Taiwan are a solid founda-
tion for Kuomintang negotiations with the mainland. The
United States should also point out that it expects Taiwan,
as a free country dedicated to peaceful progress, to seek a
negotiated settlement to its dispute with the mainland—and
that arms cannot be provided under any other conditions. The
quid pro quo for American arms should be a Kuomintang policy
line that does not absolutely rule out any talks with the
Chinese Communists. It would not be overly difficult to
formulate a statement which would allow the regime on Taiwan
to save face while opening the possibility of talks--thereby
reducing the threat that China would resort to force to re-
cover Taiwan.
Once the regime on Taiwan had revised its policy line
to allow the possibility of some form of discussions, the
next objective of American policy toward Taiwan should be to
ensure that a dialogue, no matter how modest, was begun. This
is a formidable, but not entirely hopeless, objective. The
-onciliatory stance that China has been willing to take toward
Taiwan (probably a tactical ploy, but there may well be sub-
stance to some of the offers) and the reports of unofficial
contacts between the two rivals suggest that there may well
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be subjects—-economic, educational, and humanitarian—which
369
could be used for a trial effort to open talks. The
United States should not mediate or host such talks, but
could provide a confidential channel for arranging them.
4 . China and American Naval Strategy in the Western
Pacific
The Asian security interests of the United States can-
not be defined only in terms of the interests America has
in the security of its allies and friends in the region.
The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union,
as has already been noted, is global in scope, requiring the
United States to view its security interests in any given
region in the context of the overall Soviet-American power
equation. Local conflicts, and the Soviet involvement in
them, need to be understood not only in terms of the indige-
nous origins of the dispute but also in terms of the poten-
tial effect they could have on the geopolitical positions
of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Naval power is a significant element in the Soviet-
American strategic balance. The capacity to utilize the
oceans of the world for the projection of national power,
for the support of allies and friends abroad, for the trans-
port of commerce, and for the exploitation of the wealth of
resources in and under their waters is the sine qua non of
global power. The possession of nuclear weapons made the
Soviet Union a superpower, but it has been the growth of its
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naval and maritime power which has made the Soviet Union a
global power
.
Possession of naval forces is only one of the elements
of naval power. A strategy for the employment of the navy in
support of national goals and the unity of purpose behind the
pursuit of those national goals are two other important
elements—but are beyond the scope of this discussion. A
fourth element of naval power is geography. Because geography
cannot be changed (with few exceptions, such as the digging
of canals) , it is a fundamental determinant of naval strategy.
The effect of geography on the exercise of naval power, how-
ever, can to a degree be controlled. This can be done by
purely military means (such as by mining a strategic strait)
or by a combination of political and military means (for
example, by forming an alliance with a state whose naval forces
can control a strategic body of water in place of one's own
forces) . Thus, geopolitics becomes a vital element in the
formulation and implementation of naval strategy.
The fundamental missions of the United States Navy,
broadly defined, are nuclear deterrence, sea control, and
power projection. Ballistic missile submarines are assigned
the strategic nuclear deterrence mission, as one element of
the "strategic triad" (along with intercontinental ballistic
missiles and strategic bombers). Although there are bal-
listic missile submarines deployed in the Pacific, the nuclear
deterrence mission will not be discussed herein because the
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operations of those submarines are, for the most part,
unaffected by geopolitical considerations.
The sea control and power projection missions are
the fundamental tasks of the United States Navy in the
Western Pacific. Sea control requires that the United States
be capable of defeating any force which seeks to deny it
free access to and transit of the international waters of
the Western Pacific. Power projection is the deployment
of ground, air, and naval forces to locations abroad in order
to influence the course of events in a crisis ashore or, if
necessary, to defeat the military forces of countries threat-
ening American interests. The United States maintains the
Seventh Fleet, supported by forward bases in Japan and the
Philippines, for carrying out these missions in the Western
Pacific. Elements of the United States Air Force and the
navies of America's allies in the region also participate
—
to varying degrees—in planning and training for these mis-
sions. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is the primary potential
threat to the maritime interests and security of the United
States and its allies in the Western Pacific.
Geography preordains that China must be primarily a
continental rather than a maritime power. Because China
shares a lengthy frontier with its number one adversary--
the Soviet Union
—
ground forces are the most important of
the Chinese armed forces and national strategy gives primary
attention to the threat of a land invasion. China nonethe-
less has significant maritime interests: the defense of
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its long coastline against seaborne attack, a large and
vital fishing industry, offshore oil and gas deposits on
the verge of extensive development, and a rapidly expanding
merchant shipping fleet that is important for domestic as
370
well as international commerce.
"The defense of Chinese territorial waters and mari-
time interests" has been identified by Jonathan Pollack as
one of the four principal objectives of China's military
planning (the other three being defense against a Soviet
ground and air assault, acquisition of an independent nuclear
371deterrent, and people's war) . China's capacity to pursue
its maritime interests outside its territorial waters re-
mained extremely limited through the 197 0s (for political and
economic reasons as well as technological constraints) with
the result that the mission of the Chinese navy was essen-
tially coastal defense. The mainstay of the Chinese navy
is forces suitable for the coastal defense mission that can
be built in large numbers at low cost: small fast attack
craft armed with guided missiles and torpedoes, medium and
light coastal patrol vessels, and diesel-electric submarines
armed with torpedoes. Although the Chinese navy is techno-
logically at least a generation behind the Soviet and Ameri-
can navies, because of its large numbers and its limited
mission it is a formidable force to be reckoned with by any
372
adversary seeking to threaten the mainland of China.
Coastal defense—that is, sea control within the
operational radius of China's combat vessels and land-based
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air cover—is the primary, but not the only, mission of the
Chinese navy. Power projection has also been a mission of
the Chinese navy. Jonathan Pollack concludes that the con-
duct of offensive air and naval operations has been an ele-
ment of China's military doctrine since the 1950s, due
originally to the presence of Nationalist Chinese forces on
373
several of the offshore islands. This mission was initial-
ly limited to China's coastal provinces and territorial waters,
but, as was demonstrated by the 1974 seizure of the Paracel
Islands, has since expanded in scope as China's capabilities
and interests have grown. Most observers (outside of Taiwan)
do not believe, however, that the Chinese navy has the power
projection capability that would be required to launch a
successful amphibious assault on Taiwan. "The Republic of
China stands a good chance of holding off a PRC seaborne
invasion, " conclude the Japanese naval experts Hideo Sekino
and Sadao Seno, because China's naval forces are inappropriate
374for such an attack and are dispersed along the coast.
The range of the sea control mission has also been
expanding. China laready possesses naval forces— its sub-
marines and some of its larger surface combatants--which are
capable of operating at distances well beyond China's coastal
waters. This was dramatically illustrated by the May 198
deployment of a ten ship squadron to the South Pacific in
order to recover the re-entry vehicles from China's first
ICBM tests. With the support of three relatively small but
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surprisingly modern underway replenishment vessels (at least
one was rigged for alongside underway refueling and cargo
transfer—a technology that is essential for effective long-
range naval operations in time of war) , the Chinese ships
operated at least 4,000 miles from Shanghai. The most cri-
tical weakness of the Chinese navy, however, is its lack of
effective air defenses on its surface ships, which limits
the range of combat operations to the range of land-based
37 5
air cover (about 500 miles)
.
China will probably continue to expand the range of
operations of its surface forces, particularly in the South
China Sea. The Chinese navy has been increasing its presence
and range of deployments in the South China Sea since the
mid-1970s, and this effort received additional impetus in
recent years as the Soviet navy began using facilities in
Vietnam on a routine basis to maintain a standing presence
37 6
in the region. The basic reason for an expansion of the
Chinese naval presence in the seas off its coasts will be
the growth of China's capacity to pursue its maritime inter-
ests outside Chinese coastal waters. According to Pollack:
Increased Chinese claims to 2 00-mile economic zones
and the right of states to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over such territories will ultimately
be matched by military capacities to uphold and
enforce such claims. The prospect of a signifi-
cant offshore oil drilling capacity reinforces
this conclusion . 377
The indications that China will continue to expand
the range of operations of its navy have led to a misleading
iebate over whether the Chinese navy will remain essentially
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a coastal defense force or become a "blue water" navy. This
distinction cannot be drawn as sharply as adherents of one
view or the other would assert. In the case of China, and
in the case of other navies as well, there is an intermediate
possibility: an 'expanded coastal defense' or 'limited blue
water' naval capability. Although China will probably con-
tinue to deploy its navy far beyond its coastal waters in
peacetime (practicing naval diplomacy, or to accomplish
specific tasks as in the case of the ICBM test) , the capacity
to exercise sea control and to project power within the seas
contiguous to China— the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and
the South China Sea—appears to be the objective of China's
current modernization efforts. China is already putting forth
an effort to maintain surveillance of all Soviet surface
combatants in these seas (though the southern South China
Sea is difficult for China to cover) . For the most part
this has been accomplished with lightly armed fishing vessels
manned by the 'people's militia' (which probably report to
the local fleet headquarters rather than to the militia) , but
larger and more capable vessels have also been assigned this
task.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet is much more technologically
advanced than the Chinese navy, packs more firepower (includ-
ing sea-based jet aircraft on the carrier Minsk ) , and can
operate at longer ranges for longer periods of time. The
Soviet naval threat to China is nevertheless limited. The
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primary missions of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are related to
countering the United States Navy and ensuring command of
3 78
the waters contiguous to the Soviet Union. Unless the
Soviets were convinced that the United States and NATO would
not intervene against them in a Sino-Soviet war, or unless
the U.S. Pacific Fleet had been eliminated as an offensive
threat (through Soviet attacks or by being diverted from the
Pacific) , there is little likelihood that major offensive
naval operations would be conducted against China. Even
without the threat of American intervention, however, the
defensive capabilities of the Chinese navy when operating in
its own waters are great enough that the Soviet Union would
not attempt an amphibious assault on China. The primary
theaters of a Sino-Soviet war would be Manchuria and Xinjiang,
where Soviet ground and air superiority are decisive and
379
where limited but strategic objectives could be seized.
A more likely Soviet naval threat to China would be
interdiction of shipping to China in attacks outside the
operating radius of the Chinese navy. There would be little
that China could do to break such a blockade other than at-
tacks by Chinese submarines on Soviet surface combatants or
shipping—neither of which would be an unmanageable threat
38for the Soviets. If the United States were to intervene
militarily in support of China, however, the Soviet Union
would have great difficulty in maintaining its blockade other




The 197 9 study of the Soviet naval threat made by the Atlantic
Council Working Group on Securing the Seas concluded:
In short, the Soviet threat to the sealanes across the
Pacific is probably no greater than it is in the
Mediterranean and probably half as great as it might
be in the North Atlantic. While such a threat is by
no means negligible, neither is it a cause for seri-
ous speculation that the Pacific sealanes could be
severed for any extended period by Soviet naval
actions . 381
This reinforces the observation made earlier that the serious-
ness of the Soviet naval threat to China is critically de-
pendent upon the likelihood of the United States intervening
on behalf of the Chinese. This option for American policy
toward China will be examined in the next chapter.
Overall, there is little reason for the security of
China to be a central concern of American naval strategy
in the Western Pacific. The Chinese navy is a potent force
within its restricted operating areas in the East China
and South China Seas, but once outside the range of its
land-based air cover it is highly vulnerable. Although the
range of operations of Chinese surface combatants is growing,
the scope of wartime naval operations—other than submarine
operations—will probably remain limited to the seas con-
tiguous to China. China's power projection capability also
seems likely to grow, but without a large and modern amphibi-
ous force supported by fighter and attack aircraft China
will only be a threat to lightly defended objectives.
G. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA
The expression 'military relationship 1 is used in this
paper to describe a category of bilateral ties whose purpose
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is enhancement of the military security of each of the two
nations. Previous chapters have used a broad definition of
national security which considered economic policy and
diplomacy as well as military matters. This discussion will
be more narrowly focused on the military dimension of national
security
.
A wide range of bilateral ties can be described as being
a military relationship. Examples include arms sales, train-
ing assistance, declarations of a commitment to the defense
of another country, mutual defense agreements, multilateral
security organizations (such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact)
,
and joint military commands and operations. Although some
observers implicitly define a military relationship as being
synonymous with a military alliance, and treat any bilateral
military ties as indicators of a tacit alliance, there is no
apparent analytical justification for such a sweeping gener-
alization. The level of commitment underlying ar particular
military relationship cannot be deduced by simply assuming
that the existence of the relationship proves the existence
of an alliance. Rather, the level of commitment is a function
of the perceived importance of the national interests being
served by the particular military relationship. Thus, a
nation may well enter into a military relationship with no
•intention of forming an alliance—tacit or otherwise.
Two questions concerning American interests in a mili-
tary relationship with China will be addressed: First, is
it in the security interests of the United States to enter
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into a military relationship with China? Second, if it is
in the American interest to enter into such a relationship,
then what form of a military relationship, which types of
bilateral military ties, would best serve America's security
interests?
Because China affects nearly every aspect of American
security interests—the strategic relationship with the
Soviet Union, world order issues such as management of glo-
bal problems and peaceful resolution of conflicts, and Asian
security—and because the United States has a growing inter-
est in the security of China itself, it is in the national
interest for the United States to enter into some form of
a military relationship with China. Five types of bilateral
military ties will be assessed as possibilities, either alone
or in combination, for the form that this Sino-American mili-
tary relationship should take: (1) security consultations,
(2) arms sales and technology transfers, (3) intelligence
cooperation, (4) mutual defense, and (5) naval operations.
1. Security Consultations
Of all the initiatives the United States could take
to form a military relationship with China, security consul-
tations are the most important. Continuing consultations
between the United States and China at all levels of govern-
ment were identified as being necessary in virtually every
area of American security interests. Although the United
States and China agree that they must join in opposing Soviet
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expansionism, they do not necessarily agree as to the strate-
gy and tactics for pursuing this common interest. Addition-
ally, each of these two nations has goals and perceptions of
the world not shared by the other. Thus, there are numer-
ous latent sources of tension—not the least of which is the
status of Taiwan—which cannot be expected to fade away of
their own accord.
Security consultations have already been initiated
between the United States and China, a process that began
with Henry Kissinger's secret 1971 visit to Beijing. These
talks have already generated a much improved mutual under-
standing of the security interests shared by China and the
United States. It is likely that normalization of Sino-
American relations could not have been achieved without the
mutual understanding that grew out of these talks. It is
also likely that security consultations will continue to be
a central element in the Sino-American relationship, even as
a broader range of mutual interests develops. Under Secretary
Stoessel has stated the attitude of the present administra-
tion toward such consultations:
Equally important, our two governments have estab-
lished a pattern of frequent and extremely useful
consultations between our highest leaders and
diplomats. We will continue the serious dialogue on
international security matters which now takes place
in an atmosphere of friendship and candor. 382
The value placed on these talks with China is evident in the
July 16, 1981 testimony of Assistant Secretary Holdridge
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee: "An active consul-
tative relationship has taken shape, through which our two
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countries seek to discuss and, when appropriate, coordinate
our remarkably convergent policies over practically the
3 8 3
entire spectrum of global and regional issues."
The primary importance of security consultations lies
in the building of mutual understanding, which is crucial
for the formulation of mutually supportive policies against
Soviet expansionism, for broadening the scope of the Sino-
American relationship to encompass cooperation on security
problems not directly a product of the Soviet threat (vari-
ous world order issues), and for exploring means of accommo-
dation on the many potentially divisive issues which were
set aside to deal with the Soviet threat. The fact of con-
sultations does not determine the level of commitment in the
relationship--that is a product of the substance of the talks
Therein lies a potential problem. The "atmosphere of friend-
ship" described by Stoess.el may well be conducive to Sino-
American consultations, but the candor he also mentions must
not be compromised just to improve that atmosphere. Michel
Oksenberg has warned:
To repeat, Sine-American relations cannot be nur-
tured through rhetoric that engenders temporary
good feeling but which we do not intend to live
up to. The Chinese have a tendency either to allow
their expectations to soar or, more likely, to
feign high expectations in order to force greater
performance from their partner. With some excep-
tions from 1971 on, the American record has been
good, but as we extend the relationship to the
military sphere, it may prove tempting to suggest
that the relationship will extend to areas we sub-
sequently may not reach. 384
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With this warning in mind, it is in the American national
interest to pursue security consultations with China as the
central element of a Sino-American military relationship.
2 . Arms Sales and Technology Transfers
'China's leaders are aware that most of the equipment
of the Chinese armed forces is technologically out-dated, and
are determined to modernize their military. Modernization
of national defense is one of the four modernizations, and,
as in the case of the other three modernizations, China has
turned to the West as a source of the modern technology it
needs. The top ten types of military weapons, equipment and
technology China has expressed an interest in since 1977 in-
cludes whole aircraft and spare parts for them, anti-tank
weapons, technology for shelter and defense against nuclear
attack, anti-submarine warfare equipment, computers with
military applications, reconnaissance and communications
satellites, anti-aircraft weapons, tanks and armored per-
sonnel carriers, nuclear weapons and missiles, and naval
38 5
engines. In some of these categories Chinese interest
is not an indication of an intention to purchase related
equipment or technology, but this list does reveal the areas
of technology in which China believes it must exert the
greatest effort to modernize its forces. The broad scope
of the list is an indication of the magnitude of the task
Chinese leaders face.
Although China is intent on modernizing its military
and is interested in acquiring Western technology to
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accelerate that modernization, there are significant limita-
tions on China's ability to purchase and effectively utilize
modern Western weapons technology. Modernization of
national defense has the lowest priority of the four modern-
izations, consistent with a long-standing Chinase policy of
giving economic development priority over modernization of
the armed forces. The economic problems China is suffering
at the present time, including large budget deficits, has
led to reductions in the military budget two years in a row
(1980 and 1981) and will severely restrict China's ability
to purchase weapons from abroad. This financial constraint
has led to priority being given to the acquisition of
advanced technology for the domestic development and pro-
duction of weapons, and secondarily to the acquisition of
components and equipment for the modernization of existing
Chinese weapons systems and platforms (for example, China
has sought bids from Western shipbuilding firms for up-
grading the command and control facilities in its present
destroyers) . This approach also serves the purpose of
preserving China's "self-reliance" by minimizing dependence
on the West for parts and technical assistance (a lesson
China learned the hard way in 19 60 when the Soviet Union
withdrew its technicians from China), but China's ability
to absorb advanced technology is limited by a lack of
trained personnel, outdated industrial technology, and a
to/:
poorly developed economic and industrial infrastructure.
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Arms sales and defense technology transfers to the
People's Republic of China have become a major point of con-
troversy in the United States. The debate opened in earnest
in 1975 when Michel Pillsbury suggested that the policy of
"balanced" exports to the Soviet Union and China be scrapped
and that restrictions on exports to China be relaxed due to
China's military vulnerability. The Carter Administration
held to the "evenhanded" approach favored by Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance until January 24, 1980, when, in retalia-
tion for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it was announced
that the United States would sell "dual use technology and
military support equipment" to China. The Carter Adminis-
tration also appeared to tacitly condone the sale of weapons
by America's NATO allies to China. The Carter policies were
abandoned by the Reagan Administration on June 16, 1981 when
Secretary Haig announced while on a visit to China that the
administration had decided "in principle" to sell defensive
weapons to China on a case-by-case basis. This policy was
further elaborated by Assistant Secretary Holdridge in July
1981. Thus far it has entailed liberalization of export con-
trols over dual-use technology and revision of arms export
regulations to permit the licensing of commercial sales to
China on a case-by-case basis. Holdridge stated the admins-
tration is considering legislative amendments to various
trade and assistance acts which impose restrictions on China
as well as the Soviet bloc, but denied that it would seek
authorization for government foreign military sales (FMS) to
292

China (FMS is not limited to the $100 million ceiling that
is imposed on commercial sales) or that FMS credits or loans
are being sought. He added, however, that the Administration
would be prepared to address these additional measures should
^u a 387the need arise.
Valid arguments can be offered in support of the sale
of weapons and defense technology to China, but it is easy
to press those arguments too far. It is clear, for example,
that China's armed forces are greatly outclassed by those of
the Soviet Union and that the gap between them has widened
as the Soviets built up their forces against China (a quan-
titative expansion during the 19 60s and early 1970s, followed
by a qualitative upgrading of those forces from 1977 onward) .
This is of concern to the United States because it would not
be in the American interest for China to be so weak that it
could be militarily intimidated or defeated by the Soviet
Union. The limitations on China's ability to pay for modern
Western weapons or to absorb advanced Western technology,
however, cast doubt on the impact that Chinese purchases from
the West could have on the Sino-Soviet military balance (other
than over the long run, and even then the Soviets will proba-
bly be able to maintain--if not increase--their lead) . It
is even less tenable to argue, as a 1979 Department of Defense
study is reported to have done, that arms sales to China would
increase the Chinese threat to the Soviet Union, thereby forc-
ing the Soviets to divert forces from the NATO front. The
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Soviet perception of the Chinese threat would be likely to
grow, but the actual capability of China to project power
into Russia could not be expected to expand faster than the
Soviet forces countering that threat. The Soviets cannot ex-
pand their forces forever, but the limit to their expansion
3is far greater than the limits that already hinder the Chinese.
Most observers agree that the political and symbolic
significance of the willingness to sell arms to China is of
far greater importance than the actual military capabilities
gained by transfer of the weapons. The American decision to
sell arms to China and President Reagan's description of that
decision as a "normal part" of improved relations emphasize
the progress that has been made in Sino-American relations
and underscore the common interest of the two countries in
opposing Soviet belligerence. Unlike consultations, the fact
of an arms sales relationship in many cases implies an Ameri-
can commitment to the defense of another country because the
United States most often decides to sell arms on the basis
of its strategic and security interests. The political
significance of arms sales probably does not, however, extend
to influence or leverage over Chinese foreign policy. China
seeks to avoid dependence on any foreign country and has ex-
plicitly warned the United States against assuming that China
would sacrifice its interests because it needs American arms
or power to counter the Soviets. Ross Terrill has warned
that the Chinese are "highly sensitive to being patronized by
3 89friends more powerful and wealthy than themselves." The
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example of the Sino-Soviet split should forewarn the United
States that a close military relationship with China will not
guarantee an American capacity to influence Chinese behavior.
Mutual interests, not gratitude or dependence, are the only
viable basis for the development of Sino-American relations.
Another benefit that has been claimed for an arms
sales relationship is that by linking American decisions to
sell arms to China with Soviet foreign policy behavior the
United States would be able to exploit the Russian fear of
390the Chinese and moderate Soviet assertiveness . This is
the 'China card' approach to relations with China. The Reagan
Administration may have considered this strategy at one
point—Defense Secretary Weinberger stated in April 1981 that
the United States would sell arms to China if the Soviet
391Union intervened in Poland --but the announcement of the
change in American policy on arms sales to China was not
visibly linked with any particular Soviet transgression.
Former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance denounced the Reagan
Administration's shift on arms sales to China, claiming it
had "substantially diminished" American influence over the
Soviet Union. According to Vance: "We played the China card
392in no-trump, and there is not much left." This view has
been countered by Ross Terrill, who argues that the Reagan
policy shift actually reinforced American influence over the
Soviets. Because the policy announced in June 1981 was essen-
tially that the United States is willing to sell arms to China
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and was not linked with any particular sales agreement, Terrill
asserts, decisions on individual sales can still be linked
393
with Soviet behavior. It remains to be seen whether
Vance or Terrill is correct.
The 'China card' approach to the sale of American
arms to China is subject to the same criticism leveled against
this approach earlier: China's security is, in effect, made
subservient to Soviet-American relations. It is a short-
term power maximizing rather than a long-term problem solving
approach to Sino-American relations. Not only does it essen-
tially preclude progress on the many latent sources of tension
between China and the United States, it also cuts away at
the foundation of the relationship— a common opposition to
the Soviet Union. China's leaders have clearly warned the
United States against manipulating its relationship with China
as if China were a pawn whose interests could be sacrificed
to suit American purposes. China affects far too many Ameri-
can security interests for the 'China card 1 strategy to be a
viable approach in any aspect of Sino-American relations.
A panoply of arguments can be mustered in opposition
to the sale of arms to China. Many of the potential problems
cited as reasons for not selling arms to the Chinese are not
unique to this particular aspect of Sino-American relations,
and it oftentimes seems such arguments are merely embellish-
ments for a preconceived attitude toward China or arms sales
in general. There are, however, some serious drawbacks to
selling arms to China which need to be considered.
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One of the two most common arguments made against
selling arms to China is that it would harm Soviet-American
detente, leading to a deterioration in their relations which
394
could result in a new cold war. A related theme is that
arms sales to China would be provocative: Vance criticized
the Reagan policy shift on arms sales as being "needlessly
provocative" and asserted that it "smacked of bear-baiting
395
rather than well-thought-out policy." Both themes are
played upon by Soviet leaders and the Soviet press. Brezhnev
warned in 198 that selling arms to China would mean "erod-
ing the pillars of confidence erected among states in the
process of detente, " and Tass labeled the Reagan deci-
396
sion to sell arms to China a "provocative" action. Such
Soviet statements are a part of the overall Soviet effort
at forcing a 'detente or China' decision upon the United
States, with a decision for China being equated with a new
cold war and an unending arms race. It even seems at times
that the Soviets go so far as to promote the American belief
that Russians are "paranoid" about the Chinese threat. An
American fear that the Soviets might take some irrational
move to destroy China and any country aligned with the Chinese
would be of definite value to Soviet efforts to deter the
development of Sino-American relations.
In addition to being convenient for Soviet foreign
397policy, the "don't feed the bear's paranoia" argument is
faulty on historical grounds. Soviet foreign policy behavior
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is not noted for paranoid reactions to provocation, it is
noted for cautious and carefully-calculated initiatives to
exploit propitious international circumstances. Ross Terrill
has offered a perceptive critique of this argument against
arms sales to China:
Vance is right to say that Moscow cares very
much about China-US relations. But at no point has
the growing China-US tie "provoked" Russian to
reckless action. Moscow went into Afghanistan, as
previously into Hungary and Czechoslovakia, to ar-
rest what it saw as a deteriorating situation within
that country, in the. absence of much likelihood
that the US or anyone else would interfere.
Indeed, since World War II the Soviet Union has
never reacted as a "cornered beast, " committing
aggression out of desperation at being ganged up
upon, but many times has expanded its sphere out
of a sense of opportunity, starting in Eastern
Europe at the end of the war, through Hungary, the
missiles into Cuba, Czechoslovakia, to the advances
in Africa during the Carter Administration. Much
of the Kremlin's fury with China stems from
Soviet inability, now that China has friendly ties
with the US, Japan, West Europe, and most of -,
q o
Asia, to do anything about its "loss of China.
"
Soviet opposition to the sale of arms to China is a factor
which must be considered in every decision by the United States
to make such a sale, but it is not the only—nor even the
most important--factor entering into that decision.
The second of the two most common arguments made
against selling arms to China is that those arms could be
used by China to threaten neighbors other than the Soviet
Union: the "ultimate end use question," as Donald C. Daniel
3 99has called it. Although to a degree modernization of
China's armed forces will increase the capacity of China to
threaten Asia whether or not the United States sells arms to
2 98
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China, this observation does not ameliorate the ultimate end
use problem. At the least, this problem argues for close
American consultation with its allies and friends in Asia
(including countries we would like to be our friends, such
as India) . The reaction in Asia to the Reagan policy shift
on arms sales to China has been mixed, but clearly there is
concern and apprehension in several countries whose friendship
the United States values. It would not be in the interest
of the United States if arms sales to China were to result
in an expanded Soviet military presence in Asia as countries
not on good terms with the Chinese turned to the Russians
for support. Soviet propaganda is already playing up the
threat of Chinese "hegemonism" in Asia, citing China's terri-
torial claims, the overseas Chinese, and "Great Han chauvin-
ism" as grounds for the threat. Tass commentary on the
Reagan Administration decision to sell arms to China explicitly
linked that policy shift with a growing Chinese threat to
a • 401Asia.
Another aspect of the ultimate end use question is
that there is no clear technical means of differentiating
between offensive and defensive weapons--a point driven home
by the recent Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor
using American-made F-16 fighters sold to Israel for defen-
sive purposes only. The definition of "defensive" is almost
entirely political: American domestic politics more than
technical attributes determine whether a particular weapon
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system is defensive or offensive at the time the decision
whether or not it may be sold is being debated. In actual-
ity, however, the military strategy and tactics of the na-
tion that purchases the weapon will determine in almost every
case whether that weapon serves offensive or defensive pur-
poses. In the case of China, military doctrine and the
equipment of the armed forces both support the view that
China's strategy is defensively oriented, but China has also
sent its troops into battle outside its borders in operations
which were offensive tactically even if the strategy behind
them was defensive. Nevertheless, some form of "defensive"
criteria for the approval of arms sales to China will be re-
quired by American domestic politics, and this can be expected
to generate tensions at home, with China (when a sale is dis-
approved) , and with those Asian allies of the United States
wary of arms sales to China (when a sale is approved)
.
The complexity of the arms sale and technology trans-
fer issue does not permit the identification of a specific
national interest. The United States does have an interest
in China's security, but it also has security interests
in several of the countries neighboring China—some of whom
fear China second only to the Soviet Union. China's long-
term debt management problem (described in Appendix B) , al-
though primarily affecting economic development plans, will
clearly have a direct impact on Chinese arms purchases and
the level of goodwill engendered by American sales. Given
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these problems and the magnitude of the effort that will be
required to modernize China's armed forces, it appears that
the most important contributions that the United States can
make to reduce China's immediate vulnerability are in areas
other than arms sales. Thus, arms sales and technology
transfers should not be the central form of bilateral tie
in the Sino-American military relationship. There is no
compelling reason to prohibit arms sales or technology
transfers altogether, but there is also little to be gained
—
and potentially much to be lost--by making them the foundation
on which a Sino-American military relationship is built.
3 . Intelligence Cooperation
The premise for the contention that the United States
has an interest in a military relationship with China is the
conclusion, drawn earlier, that the United States has an
interest in the security of China. It is in the American
national interest that China be able to defeat Soviet aggres-
sion and have enough confidence in that ability that the
Soviet Union cannot intimidate China into submission. These
interests would still be relevant even if Sino-American rela-
tions were to become strained over the latent sources of ten-
sion between the United States and China, such as the status
of Taiwan. The damage to American interests would be much
worse under these circumstances if China felt compelled by
Soviet military might to seek an accommodation with the
Russians
.
The United States could, in theory, ensure China's
defense by arming the Chinese to the teeth with the latest
TOT
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in American weapons. As was seen in the previous section,
however, this is neither feasible nor desirable. This
American interest in China's security might also be secured
with American forces fighting on behalf of the Chinese. As
will be seen in the next section, however, this also has
serious drawbacks. Thus, the United States is in need of
a form of bilateral military relationship with China to
supplement security consultations and ensure that China can
repel Soviet aggression.
Intelligence cooperation is the one type of bilateral
military relationship that can make an immediate contribu-
tion to the defense of China without the many side-effects
and implications that detract from other alternative ties.
Michael Pillsbury suggested intelligence sharing as a policy
option for the development of Sino-American military ties
402in 1975, but the issue for the most part faded from the
on-going debate over the security implications of Sino-American
relations for the next six years.
The Carter Administration, however, resurrected the
possibility of an intelligence cooperation arrangement with
China in 1978. As the political situation in Iran continued
to deteriorate and the prospect of losing the American elec-
tronic intelligence facilities used to monitor Soviet missile
tests for SALT verification became an imminent threat, the
Carter Administration is reported to have proposed the estab-
lishment of similar stations in China. After the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations with China in January 1979,
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which coincided with the fall of the Shah of Iran, China agreed
to one station in Xinjiang manned by Chinese technicians and
with the intelligence collected by the facility being shared
by the United States and China. The facility is reported to
have begun surveillance operations in 19 80 and its existence
was reported in the press for the first time in June 1981
403(though previous reports had alluded to it)
.
Thus, the United States and China have already entered
into a limited inteligence cooperation arrangement. This
particular facility, however, does not make an immediate con-
tribution to the security of China—if press descriptions
of its capabilities are accurate. Intelligence information
on the characteristics of new Soviet strategic missiles is
of no doubt valuable to China, but does not address the
pressing defense problems which China faces today.
Military intelligence can be divided into three cate-
gories of information: scientific and technical , order of
battle, and surveillance and threat warning. Scientific
and technical intelligence includes information on weapons
characteristics and the doctrines for their employment
—
information critical for procurement decisions and training
programs. The missile test monitoring facility generates this
type of information. Order of battle information covers num-
bers and locations of hostile forces—information valuable
for decisions on the deployment of one's own forces. Sar-
veillance and threat warning is the continuous monitoring
of potentially threatening forces and weapons launch sites
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(or the territory that they must transit to attack one's own
forces or homeland) , an intelligence function essential for
preventing a surprise attack.
The United States and China would both benefit from
cooperation and sharing of information in all three areas of
military intelligence, even if the sharing were little more
than a one-way flow from the United States to China. The one
caveat on this observation is that the sharing of intelligence
should be limited to information on the Soviet Union. The
United States would gain little from sharing information with
China on the military forces of China's neighbors in Asia,
while such information would exacerbate the "ultimate end
use" problem encountered in arms sales to China. Unlike arms
sales, however, the United States would have a certain degree
of control over the scope of the arrangement and it is likely
that China would be willing to limit that scope to Soviet
forces
.
The immediate objective of an intelligence sharing
arrangement with China would be to deter a Soviet conventional
or nuclear attack by enabling the Chinese to deny the Soviets
the circumstances which would ensure a Soviet victory. This
is achieved by taking advantage of what is known about Soviet
military doctrine. In the case of an attack by ground forces,
Soviet military doctrine is based on the combined arms offen-
sive. The three most important principles of such an offen-
sive are (1) mass, a clear superiority in all types of forces,
(2) surprise and (3) speed, rapid advance to seize key
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objectives and keep enemy forces off balance. Deny the Soviet
Union the ability to launch an attack using these three prin-
ciples and the Soviets would be faced with a protracted war
of attrition with China. It is highly unlikely, therefore,
that the Soviets would attack China if denied the circumstances
404they believe are necessary to achieve a military victory.
The weakness in the Soviet combined arms offensive
strategy is that to a degree the principles of mass and sur-
prise are contradictory. Thomas W. Wolfe has pointed this
out in the example of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968, when "despite the tactical surprise achieved by the
invasion forces, their build-up and positioning had required
several weeks of preinvasion maneuvering, which gave NATO
strategic warning and thus provided at least an opportunity
405
to put Western defenses on the alert."" The Soviets have
had the same problem in Poland today: the West closely moni-
tors Soviet forces around Poland, thus denying the Soviet
Union the possibility of launching a surprise attack. The
mass versus surprise problem would be an order of magnitude
greater on the Sino-Soviet border, where the Soviets would
have to mobilize and deploy a huge army in order to attack
China. Without surprise, however, that huge army could not
fight a blitzkrieg war--it would become mired in a prolonged
war of attrition.
Denying the Soviet Union surprise would also help to
deter a Soviet pre-emptive first strike on China's nuclear
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force, increasing the credibility of that force as a deter-
rent and thus stabilizing the Sino-Soviet strategic nuclear
balance. China is already taking measures to reduce the
vulnerability of its nuclear force to a surprise first
strike, and has been reported by Angus M. Fraser as having
a ballistic missile early warning system that covers about
407
ninety percent of the approach arc from the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, to the extent that an intelligence sharing ar-
rangement would further enhance the early warning China has
of a Soviet nuclear strike, it would contribute to the surviva-
bility of China's nuclear force and thereby deter a Soviet
first strike. This form of intelligence cooperation would
also help to ease Chinese anxiety over the implications of
the Soviet-American SALT agreements for Chinese security.
Michael Pillsbury suggested the establishing of a Sino-American
"hot line" for strategic warning purposes. While such a
link would certainly be of value, granting the Chinese direct
access to information from American early warning satellites
over the Soviet Union (using their own ground stations) would
be a more effective means of providing strategic warning.
There are other forms of cooperation which might also be of
value to both China and the United States and should not be
excluded from consideration.
There are drawbacks to intelligence cooperation with
China: the risk of compromise of American sources and methods
to the Soviet Union, the risk that intelligence collection
technology turned over to the Chinese could be turned against
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the United States, and the argument that such cooperation
would undoubtedly be viewed as "provocative" by the Soviets
(and by those Americans who worry about provoking the Soviets)
None of these drawbacks, however, outweighs the gains for
Chinese security and for American interest in China's se-
curity which would accrue from an intelligence cooperation
arrangement. Therefore, it is in the American national
interest to pursue intelligence cooperation with China.
4 . Mutual Defense
Efforts at mutual defense can take many forms. The
American refusal to condone a Soviet pre-emptive strike on
China's nuclear program in 1969 was a contribution to the
defense of China. China, in turn, by tying down a quarter
of the Soviet armed forces on the Sino-Soviet frontier con-
tributes to the security of NATO—which the United States
considers vital for its own security. Thus, without any hint
of a military alliance the United States and China contribute
to each other's security—a rudimentary form of mutual defense
Security consultations also contribute to mutual se-
curity, and could therefore be considered a form of mutual
defense entailing a low level of commitment. By improving
mutual understanding of security interests and threat percep-
tions, consultations allow individual national policies to
be formulated so as not to unnecessarily conflict with the
vital interests of the other party. This in itself contrib-
utes to mutual defense by reducing the opportunities the
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Soviet Union might have to play off China and the United
States against each other so as to neutralize their responses
to Soviet aggression.
Security consultations also allow the coordination of
policies to achieve common objectives, such as deterring
Soviet aggression, or to react in a coordinated manner to a
specific Soviet threat. Although the Carter Administration
409
adamantly denied having any interest in contingency planning,
as the scope and depth of mutual interests grows, such planning
becomes the logical follow-on to coordination efforts. Mili-
tary contingency planning has come to be equated with a mili-
tary alliance by opponents of any form of Sino-American
cooperation which might be suggestive of an alliance. This
is not necessarily always the case, but great care must in-
deed be taken when engaging in such talks lest the implied
commitments bind the parties to courses of action they could
not or would not take should the contingency being planned
for arise.
The primary value of contingency planning short of
alliance commitments is as a deterrent to Soviet aggression.
The political value of such planning exceeds its military
value in this sense, but there are also significant military
advantages to be gained from contingency planning. This view
is often disputed on the grounds that only an actual alli-
ance would allow for effective joint military planning.
Lucian Pye, for example, contends:
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The idea that there could be informal cooperation in
the military area ignores the fact that military
cooperation requires a very high level of speci-
ficity in arrangements and if these arrangements
do not exist there is not much in the way of an
alliance. 410
If one assumes that the only effective form of military coop-
eration between two nations is combined operations under
joint command structures a la the Western allies during
World War II, then Pye ' s view is correct. Department of
Defense studies of the possibility of Sino-American military
cooperation have been reported as concluding that there
would indeed be tremendous problems in attempting to conduct
411joint operations in China.
On the other hand, this type of combined Sino-American
military operation would not be the optimum strategy for
mutual defense---whether or not an alliance was signed. The
example of World War II is again relevant: the Western allies
and the Soviet Union did very little in the way of the speci-
fic military planning Pye describes, yet it cannot be denied
that the combined assault on Nazi Germany from both east and
west greatly accelerated the destruction of Hitler's empire.
The only genuine coordination was at the very top levels of
government, other than broad strategic coordination the Soviet
and Western assaults on Germany were almost two entirely
separate wars.
This is the approach that should be used in any form
of military coordination—consultations, contingency planning,
or alliance—between the United States and China. The
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strategic objective should be to force the Soviet Union to
disperse its massive armed forces in order to defend against
potential threats from a variety of directions. Committing
American forces in China would be contrary to this objective.
The United States does not have sufficient military capacity
of any type to be able to make a significant commitment of
forces to the defense of China and still be able to fulfill
American commitments elsewhere in the world. American mili-
tary forces would therefore be better utilized to force the
Soviet Union to avoid an all-out commitment of its forces
against China. The threat of an American assault on the
strategic Soviet base at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Penin-
sula would do more to defend Manchuria than placing the same
forces around Harbin (Shenyang) . It also would not require
the detailed joint military planning that Pye rightly said
tfould be needed, whereas the second option (American forces
in Manchuria) would demand close coordination.
Thus, there are forms of military coordination which
:ould be undertaken effectively without a formal alliance.
This does not address, however, the critical question of
whether the United States would want to make such commitments
without a formal alliance, and if not, then is an alliance
:ith China in the American interest? There are persuasive
irguments against making formal or, even worse, implied com-
"litments to take specific military actions other than within
•he framework of a formal alliance. There are too many things
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that could go wrong—including a deliberate Soviet effort
to divide the two partners and thus nullify the planning that
had been done. If it is believed to be necessary to make
explicit commitments to take military action in certain con-
tingencies, then those commitments should be made within an
alliance framework. This does not preclude lesser levels
of coordination, as discussed above, but it necessarily
restricts their scope.
The highest level of mutual defense cooperation be-
tween the United States and China would be a military alli-
ance. The form of a Sino-American alliance could range from
a simple mutual defense treaty to a combined headquarters
and planning for joint military operations. Whatever form
it would take, however, there are numerous arguments against
entering into an alliance with China unless Soviet behavior
takes a sharp turn for the worse. The most important argu-
ment against an alliance is that China does not want to form
one. There is an explicit and significant difference between
a "united front" and an alliance—the united front strategy
actually opposes the formation of alliances except when abso-
lutely necessary--and China has clearly built its foreign
policy on the united front approach. The United States also
nas to consider the security interests of its Allies and
friends in Asia, not all of whom would support a Sino-American
alliance. The status of the Soviet-American relationship is
another factor worthy of consideration. A military alliance
tfith China would not serve American interests unless Soviet
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behavior made it clear that the prospects for improved
Soviet-American relations had no moderating effect whatso-
• 4. u i i • 412ever on Soviet belligerence.
A Sino-American military alliance may not be in the
interest on the United States at the present time, but it
is not difficult to envision circumstances in which both the
United States and China would benefit from such an alliance.
The Soviet-American alliance against Nazi aggression during
World War II is a prime example of an alliance born of ne-
cessity. It is therefore in the American national interest
to leave open the option of a military alliance with China,
lest the United States prematurely foreclose a potentially
critical means of enhancing its security. The best way of
leaving this option open would be to issue a joint declara-
tion that neither the United States nor China seeks to form
an alliance, but that neither side has forsworn the possibility
of reversing their attitudes should the threat from a "hege-
monistic" power force them to do so. The possibility of an
anti-Soviet alliance would thus be a 'Sino-American card' for
both to use jointly as part of cooperative efforts at deterring
Soviet aggression. The credibility of this 'Sino-American
card' would be enhanced by visits and exchanges between the
military forces of the two countries timed and publicized so
as to have an impact on Soviet perceptions of the likely reac-
tion to an aggressive move en its part. Such visits and ex-
changes would also be of value for familiarization purposes
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should it ever become necessary to implement the alliance
option
.
Although the alliance option should be kept open,
the United States will have to weigh carefully and with
caution the decision to actually form a Sino-American
alliance. In addition to the problems discussed above,
an alliance with China is bound to be tempestuous. The
experience of the United States as an ally of the Republic
of China during World War II and the experience of the
Soviet Union as an ally of the People's Republic of China
413during the 1950s should not be overlooked. An alliance
with China does not guarantee influence over Chinese behavior:
China must be expected to pursue its own interests as it
best sees fit, with only the strength of the mutual interests
shared with the alliance partner as a moderating influence
on its policy decisions. It is not likely that China and
the United States will in the near future share sufficient
interests to prevent an alliance between them from being a
stormy and crisis-ridden affair.
5 . Naval Operations
The observations made above on the role of contingency
planning in mutual defense efforts also apply to the possibility
of Sino-American naval operations. The most important con-
tribution the United States Navy can make to the maritime
defense of China is to divert Soviet Pacific Fleet forces
to missions of higher priority than offensive operations
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against China. Maintaining a potential naval threat to the
Soviet homeland from the Pacific would be the best way of
diverting the Soviet navy from attacks on China or Chinese
shipping. The U.S. Pacific Fleet would also be better used
in operations against Soviet naval forces outside of the
seas contiguous to China than in joint Sino-American naval
415
operations off the coast of China. It would be difficult,
perhaps even dangerous, to integrate the battle group type
of naval operations favored by the United States Navy with
the widely dispersed and less centrally-controlled coastal
defense forces of the Chinese navy. The American and Chinese
navies are most supportive of each other if they do not
operate in the same waters, but rather force the Soviets to
expect an attack at any time in any location in the Pacific.
It must also be asked whether the United States
should even make a commitment to the maritime defense of
China. As was true of contingency planning, it is not wise
to make formal or implied commitments outside the framework
415
of a formal alliance. The United States Navy, particu-
larly its Pacific Fleet, would be hard pressed to take on an
addditional major commitment such as the defense of China--
it already has more commitments than it has forces to meet
416those commitments." On the other hand, it would be ques-
tionable for the United States to encourage the Chinese to
expand the scope of their naval operations to supplement
American naval capabilities in the Pacific. Again, the
United States should consider the security interests of its
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Asian allies, not all of whom would welcome an expanded
417Chinese naval presence off their shores. The same caution
that should govern the American attitude toward an alliance
with China should also govern the American attitude toward
naval cooperation with China.
Naval operations could make a substantial contribution
to the 'open option 1 alliance policy previously recommended.
The American naval presence in the Western Pacific is a
visible means of demonstrating the resolve and capability
of the United States to defend its security interests in the
418
region. Port visits in China and small-scale joint exer-
cises could also be used to remind the Soviets of the 'Sino-
American card' --an alliance--that remains to be played. Thus,
the political significance will far outweigh the actual
military significance of Sino-American naval operations.
For this reason the political ramifications of such naval
operations should be given priority over their military value
in the formulation of American naval strategy in the Western
Pacific. There is no compelling reason to prohibit Sino-
American naval cooperation, but it will have to be handled




This paper has examined United States security interests
in China from the level of the conceptual framework used to
define those interests down to the level of American inter-
ests in specific military policy options. In the process
a number of security interests have been identified, but,
equally important, a number of issues and potential problems
that affect those security interests have also been raised.
Both the issues and the potential problems need to be addressed.
A. UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA
The full scope of American security interests in China
cannot adequately be perceived if Sino-American relations
are viewed as a function of the power relationships of a
"strategic triangle." This conceptual framework greatly
oversimplifies the complexities of the international environ-
ment and the many ways in which it affects the security of
the United States. It also leads to the formulation of
American policy toward China being guided by the single
objective of short-term enhancement of the American power
position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Hence, the 'China
card . '
There is an alternative conceptual framework which allows
balance of power considerations to be addressed without losing
sight of the many security interests that do not derive
solely from Soviet-American rivalry: the latent bipolar,
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de facto polycentric, multiple issue-based systems frame-
work. Local conflicts and world order issues are addressed
on their own merits and on the basis of the broad scope of
American security interests, while keeping in mind that
superpower conflict is an ever-present possibility when
international tensions arise over such issues. This broader
view of the international environment and American security
interests leads to the conclusion that the United States
should seek to broaden the scope of the Sino-American rela-
tionship so that it is founded on a range of mutual inter-
ests that extend beyond common opposition to Soviet
expansionism. Over the long-term, by enabling China and
the United States to address the many latent sources of ten-
sion between them, this broadening of the Sino-American rela-
tionship will provide a more secure foundation for cooperative
efforts to counter the assertiveness of the Soviet Union.
Although the most important American security interests
in China derive from the state of Soviet-American relations,
the United States has a range of security interests in China
(or which China affects) that are not primarily related to
the Soviet threat. The United States has world order inter-
ests and security interests in Asia which are also affected
by China and by the state of Sino-American relations. The
formulation of American policy toward China should encompass
this broad range of interests
.
Even in the narrower context of China's role in the
Soviet-American relationship, however, United States policy
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should consider a wider range of issues than just the stra-
tegic balance and the containment of Soviet expansionism.
China is important for geopolitical reasons and does have an
important role to play in the strategic balance and in de-
terring Soviet aggression, but it is not in the American
interest to place too much stress on just these aspects of
American security interests in China. The role that China
can play in the Soviet-American relationship is significant,
but in many respects limited. Additionally, China affects
other aspects of Soviet-American relations, such as arms
limitation efforts and detente, and Chinese and American
interests often diverge in these areas. The actual complexity
of China's influence on Soviet-American relations also argues
for a broadening of the scope of Sino-American relations.
United States security interests in China are better served
by a long-range problem solving approach than by a short-term
power maximizing approach to security issues.
The broad range of American security interests which are
affected by Sino-American relations make it prudent for the
United States to be extremely cautious in developing a mili-
tary relationship with China. Because the United States
has an interest in the security of China it is in the national
interest for there to be a Sino-American military relationship,
but the form that relationship takes should reflect the broad
scope of American security interests. The United States has
an interest in security consultations and intelligence coop-
eration with China. Other forms of bilateral military ties,
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however, are not so clearly supportive of American interests
at the present time. Arms sales and technology transfers,
and joint naval operations, should be pursued with caution
and as part of an overall strategy for the development of
Sino-American military relations. Contingency planning like-
wise could be pursued, but close attention must be paid to
the commitments implied by such planning. A military alliance
is not in the national interest at the present time, but
should not be precluded as a future possibility if the Soviet
Union should for some reason embark upon a policy of hostility
and aggression that could not be moderated other than by
threat of force. The optimum policy toward the alliance
question would be to formalize the American attitude toward
it as an 'open option.' With a similar Chinese approach the
possibility of an alliance could be a 'Sino-American card 1
for influencing Soviet behavior without irreversibly polarizing
the tensions that already exist.
B. PROSPECTS FOR SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Despite the broad range of potential mutual interests
between China and the United States that have been identified
in this paper, a balanced assessment of the future prospects
for Sino-American relations would have to stress the diffi-
culties and potentially divisive issues at least as much as
the opportunities for broadening the scope of the relationship.
Divergent international interests will be exacerbated by
domestic politics in both countries, in some cases making it
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almost impossible to reach an accommodation or even a
mutual understanding of the interests each holds.
The existence of mutual interests does not signify an
underlying ideological compatibility. China and the United
States have widely different historical backgrounds and
political-economic systems. Chinese and American leaders
do not share a common view of the international environment,
the world order that should govern that environment, or the
role of their respective nations in that world order. These
differences do not preclude the long-term development of
cordial and mutually beneficial Sino-American ties, but they
do demand that the United States not inadvertently try to
shape China in its own image. The Chinese respect American
learning and many aspects of American culture, but they do
not want to be "Americanized." United States security inter-
ests in China make it in the national interest for America
to accept the cultural and political differences between
China and itself rather than try to mold an image of China




SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA
The American perception of the Soviet military threat to
China is a major factor in defining United States security
interests in China. For this reason Soviet policy toward
China was examined in detail prior to discussing American
security interests in China. In the course of that examina-
tion of Soviet policy it was noted that caution should be
exercised in using statements by Soviet leaders or commen-
taries in the Soviet press as indicators of Soviet inten-
tions, lest the propaganda element in such public statements
lead to misperceptions of the Soviet threat to China.
It should also be borne in mind that if the Soviet Union
should ever decide to attack China it would be at a time when
political authority has collapsed in China or when China has
become politically isolated from the international community
as a result of its own behavior. Under such circumstances,
the United States could well find itself torn between its
ideological values and its geopolitical security interests
.
This uncertainty and the openness of American society would
be a tempting target for the Soviet Union to exploit through
adroit propaganda so as to ensure the isolation of China from
the United States.
Soviet public statements and commentaries on China and
the United States are explicitly designed to take advantage
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of Western freedom of the press and the policy of nonalign-
ment prevalent among many Third World nations . In the politi-
cal and ideological polemics with the West and China, the
only distinctions between the Soviet Union and its adversaries
which can be tolerated by the Soviets are those drawn by the
Soviet themselves. This Soviet belief that they must con-
trol the framework of the political polemics with their ideo-
logical adversaries (or with errant friends who stray from
the true path of Soviet ideology) is one of the consequences
of the Soviets having appointed themselves leaders of the
evolution of human society. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
has asserted:
CPSU congresses are of lasting international
significance. This is because their decisions
quite naturally attract very close attention
throughout the world as they generalize experi-
ence and outline new targets in socialist devel-
opment and in the creation of the material and
technical base of communism--and the Land of the
Soviets created by Great October is the pioneer
on this path leading to new heights in the de-
velopment of human society.!
Distinctions between the Soviet Union and its adversaries
that are drawn by its adversaries are often obscured by
demonstrating that the adversary's real intention is to dis-
guise his own faults or hostile intentions by attributing them
to the Soviet Union. This particular tactic is evident in a
recurring pattern that occurs in Soviet statements on China
and the United States . The pattern is that phrases and
terminology used by China and the United States to level accu-
sations against the Soviet Union are often adopted by the
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Soviets in their own public statements and the charges turned
against their accusers.
Three examples of this tactic demonstrate the attempt
that is made to obscure accusations made against the Soviet
Union by China. Soviet 'hegemonism* is today a central theme
of Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda. Chinese public statements
blame these hegemonistic aspirations on Soviet 'social-
imperialism' and draw parallels to Russian imperialism under
the Tsars. The following excerpts from a 1977 Hongqi ( Red
Flag , the Communist Party journal) are illustrative of such
Chinese statements:
This arrogant and ambitious craving for world hege-
mony is setting Soviet social-imperialism on a
rampage all over the world like a wild beast run-
ning amok; and wherever it goes, it leaves a
trail of turmoil and unrest.
The new tsars dwarf the crusade of aggression and
expansion of the old tsars .. .Surpassing the old
tsars in aggressive ambitions, it now strives to -
build a great empire embracing all five continents.
The Soviet response to such accusations has been to label the
Chinese as hegemonistic and imperialists, and to attribute
these sins to 'Great Han chauvinism.' An editorial in the
March 1980 issue of the Soviet journal International Affairs
used all of these accusations against China:
Hegemonism, displayed by China's leaders in their
foreign policy, is the sum total of the traditions
of Great Han chauvinism and Sinocentrism that has
taken the shape of a concrete political doctrine.
It has grown into the specific ideology of Chinese
foreign policy, because the Peking leaders have
departed from the socialist principles of inter-
state relations and set themselves the aim of
building a great China on the basis of nationalism,
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territorial expansion and subjugation of neighbor-
ing peoples and countries.
3
A second theme of Chinese public statements against the
Soviets has been opposition to detente on the grounds that
the Soviets exploit it for military expansion. This Chinese
view was presented in an April 1981 Beij ing Review article
("It" being China)
:
It is not against detente or negotiations. What it
opposes is the Soviet hegemonists using them as a
smokescreen to cover up their arms expansion and
aggression against other countries.
^
The Soviet press, in turn, levels similar charges against
China, as did Pravda on February 11, 1981:
It is an open secret that under cover of peace
Peking-style is the old Maoist instigatory course
for sharpening international tensions and
preparation for war. This policy really consti-
tutes a serious danger to the cause of peace
all over the world.
5
A third Chinese theme that the Soviets reciprocate on
are comparisons between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. In
particular, the policy of detente with the Soviet Union is
frequently and explicitly compared with Neville Chamberlain
travelling to Munich in 1938 to seek peace with Adolf Hitler
—
an obvious accusation of Western appeasement. The Soviets
turn this comparison against the Chinese by warning the West
against using China as a tool of aggression against the
Soviet Union in the manner that Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy
were supposedly, at least in the Soviet view, supported as





Whoever in the West today may be thinking that one
can play the 'China card' in an anti-Soviet game
is being short-sighted, for the arms will be used
in more than one direction, as those who abetted
Hitler and Mussolini once dreamed.'
In each of these three cases the Soviet statements re-
flect underlying antagonistic perceptions of China and it
is likely that the Russians do indeed believe the accusations
they level against China. At the same time, however, the
pattern of Soviet statements indicates that a conscious ef-
fort is made to control the framework of the polemic by means
of obscuring the political or ideological position of adver-
saries. Although a similar pattern was not observed with such
clarity in Chinese statements on the Soviet Union, China has
made ideological initiatives (particularly toward the Third
World) which at least temporarily placed the Soviets on the
defensive in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is probable that
China does employ tactics similar to the Soviet tactics des-
cribed above
.
The Soviet Union also appears to make efforts to control
the context of its polemic with the United States. In his
first press conference as Secretary of State, Alexander Haig
launched a new campaign for American foreign policy—opposition
to international terrorism—and explicitly linked the Soviet
Union with the problem:
I would also suggest that an additional subject
related intimately to this, in the conduct of Soviet
activity and in terms of training, funding, and
equipping, is international terrorism. .. they today
are involved in conscious policies, in programs, if
you will, which foster, support, and expand this
activity, which is hemorrhaging in many respects





Such an American campaign cannot be tolerated by the Soviets.
Even if the Soviets were keenly interested in improving re-
lations with the United States, they could not let such an
explicit and significant distinction drawn by an ideologi-
cal adversary to stand unobscured. Denials of the American
accusation, which were made by the Soviets, are not a suffi-
cient response--they leave the Soviets on the defensive and
allow the distinction to persist.
On May 12, 1981, United States Customs delayed the take-
off of an Aeroflot airliner bound for Moscow for four hours
after receiving a tip that it carried "defense-related items"
illegally being taken out of the country. As it turned out,
the items seized were not defense-related but had simply been
mislabelled. In responding to the incident the Soviet govern-
ment, through Tass , labelled it "an act of international ter-
torism." The incident was given top play on page one for
two days in the Soviet press and a formal protest by the
Soviet government charged the United States with "terror and
9banditism.
"
Such a virulent Soviet response to what was actually a
minor incident— in particular the labelling of the American
action as "international terrorism"--would seem contrary to
Soviet interests, given that they were at the same time making
overtures to improve relations with the United States. The
Soviet reaction to the incident makes sense, however, when
viewed as a deliberate effort to counter the charges of the
United States in kind.
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The fact that the incident the Soviets chose to label as
"international terrorism" was of little consequence made no
difference to the Soviet leadership. It would have been
more convenient for the Soviets if it had been the CIA rather
than the Customs Service that could have been stigmatized
as terrorists and bandits, but the incident nonetheless
served a fundamental Soviet purpose. Should a leader of a
non-aligned nation question the Soviet assertion that it is
the Americans and not the Russians who are international
terrorists, all a Soviet diplomat has to do is point to this
incident and ask why the leader of a supposedly non-aligned
country is in fact siding with the Americans.
The examples given above show the roots of propaganda
conflicts between the Soviet Union and both the United States
and China--the two nations that are the greatest ideological
rivals of the Soviets. In the light of this evidence, Soviet
statements denouncing the United States or China should be
examined carefully before being taken as indicators of trends
or shifts in Soviet foreign policy, or as revelations of
underlying Soviet fears and intentions.
The Soviet propaganda tactic of obscuring distinctions
drawn by its adversaries is adapted to serve foreign policy
purposes beyond preserving Soviet control over the polemical
framework of its ideological rivalries. The Soviet skill in
using negotiations as a forum for propaganda is well known:
but the propaganda is also used by the Soviets in an attempt
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to improve their own bargaining position vis-a-vis their
adversary in the talks. Foy D. Kohler, in a 19 79 study
of Soviet negotiating style, pointed out the Soviet tactic
of obscuring distinctions drawn by adversaries:
In practice, the effect has been a systematic
attempt at what Fred Ikle, a former Director of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has
aptly called "semantic infiltration, " that is to
the Soviets ' taking over and exploiting for their
own purposes words and expressions basic to the
political heritage of the Western world. -'^
Even when an adversary has not attempted to draw a specific
distinction between itself and the Soviet Union, by appealing
to Western concepts of morality and justice the Soviets at-
tempt to force concessions before the negotiations begin, or
even attempt to make such concessions preconditions for
negotiations. Richard Pipes noted this in a 1972 study for
the Senate Committee on Government Operations: "An interest-
ing and often successful technique employed by Moscow is to
turn the tables on the opponent by confusing the real issue
at stake. u11
Given the intensity and bitterness of the polemical battle
that has been waged by the Soviets and Chinese since the late
1950s, it comes as no surprise that this Soviet propaganda
tactic should be used to support the Soviet position in
negotiations with the People's Republic. One observer, inti-
mately familiar with the Sino-Soviet dispute, has been able
to date the first Soviet use of the tactic of obscuring an
adversary's position against China. In a Rand Corporation
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study published in August 1970, Thomas W. Robinson, referr-
ing to an editorial that appeared in Pravda on September 2,
1964 concerning the territorial dispute between China and
Russia, observed that: "This editorial appears to be the
first instance of the Soviet tactic of fighting fire with
12fire." The Soviet tactic, says Robinson, was:
...if China claimed that certain areas of the
Soviet Union do not, because of "historical cir-
cumstances," "belong" to that state, the Russians
would then claim that certain areas of China were
historically non-Chinese and disputed by more
than one state and hence, Chinese title to those
areas is open to question. 13
The Chinese claims and Soviet counter-claims discussed by
Robinson were being made in the context of stalemated nego-
tiations on the border issue. The Chinese had attempted to
put the Soviets on the defensive by asserting that the Sino-
Soviet border had been fixed by "unequal treaties" forced
upon China at gunpoint by imperialist Russia. The Soviet
response was to obscure the Chinese position in order to
bolster the bargaining position of the Soviet Union.
Robinson's observation on the Soviet tactic of "fighting
fire with fire, " as he calls it, illustrates the risk of
taking Soviet statements at face value as indicators of
Soviet intentions. Soviet claims that large areas of China
are historically non-Chinese could well be interpreted as
laying the basis for Soviet occupation of those territories.
Such an interpretation, however, would greatly exaggerate
Soviet intentions as the statements were made to influence the
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course of on-going negotiations. Thus, the Soviet tactic of
obscuring the position of its adversary could be misinter-
preted as signifying a military threat--which would in turn
affect American perceptions of its security interests in
China.
The Soviet tactic of appealing to the values of its adver-
sary so as to disarm moral or ideological positions opposed
to Soviet interests would probaly be used to neutralize
American sentiment for China should the Soviets attack the
Chinese. The Soviet objective would be to exacerbate the
differences of opinion in the United States over American
interests in China, and the free access the Soviets have to
the American media would make this task relatively easy.
It would, in fact, be derelict on the part of the Soviets
not to appeal to American values if it would isolate China




SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SINO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
A broad definition of national security, as is being used
herein, must consider the impact of a nation's foreign policy
and foreign economic policy as well as its defense policies.
American national security is enhanced by the creation and
maintenance of an international order in which conflicting
interests are resolved by peaceful means and in which peoples
striving to improve their lives can realistically hope to do
so without having to overthrow the established order. The
economic interactions the United States has with the develop-
ing world, and the American economic policies that shape
those interactions, thus have a role in the security of the
nation.
Brief mention was made of the American economic interest
in China while examining the American interest in the security
of China. The complexity of those American economic inter-
ests, as well as their potential for growth, deserve further
study.
American economic interests in China have historical roots
as old as the United States itself. Economic opportunities
in China were already perceived at the time independence was
declared, and the first American trading ship visited China
in 1734. Preservation and furtherance of economic opportuni-
ties in China were objectives of America's China policy
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from the beginning of the treaty system in 184 2 through the
first round of Open Door notes in 1899. There were other
objectives, such as the dual missions of civilizing and
Christianizing the Chinese masses, but none found as concrete
an expression in official policies as did the economic
objective.
From 1900 to 1945 the objective of preserving the terri-
torial integrity of China—which was derived from and closely
linked to economic interests—became paramount as the European
powers sought to consolidate spheres of influence, and in
jarticular as Russia and later Japan attempted outright occu-
pation and rule of Chinese territory.
The 1949 victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the
civil war against the Kuomintang effectively ended America's
economic interest in China until 1971, when Richard Nixon
began the process of normalization of relations. Since diplo-
matic relations were established in 1979, U.S.-PRC trade has
grown rapidly—reaching an estimated $4.3 billion in 1980—
and direct investment in joint ventures is being explored by
both sides.
Three aspects of Sino-American economic relations will
be examined: China's development goals and program, trade
with and investment in China, and China's role in the inter-
national economic system.
1 . China's Development Goals and Program
The United States should not underestimate the magni-
tude of the task facing China's leaders as they strive to
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develop China's economy. The progress made by the People's
Republic over the past thirty-one years is generally recognized
to have been substantial, but China is still a developing
country: merely feeding its growing population and maintain-
ing their current standard of living—not to mention becoming
a modern and wealthy nation— are tremendous undertakings.
The United States should not expect the Chinese to
view America's history of economic development as a model for
China, and should not, by design or inadvertently, attempt to
impose it on them. This applies just as much to the attitudes
which American corporations take with them to China as to the
attitude of the United States government in formulating its
economic policies towards China.
China's economic development program is currently
focused on the "Four Modernizations:" the modernization of
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and
technology. This program is the second of two stages of
development proposed by Zhou Enlai in his "Report on the Work
of the Government" to the Fourth National People's Congress
in January, 1975:
. . .we might envisage the development of our national
economy in two stages beginning from the Third Five-
Year Plan: The first stage is to build a indepen-
dent and relatively comprehensive industrial and
economic system in 15 years, that is before 1980;
the second stage is to accomplish the comprehensive
modernization of agriculture, industry, and national
defense and science and technology before the end
of the century, so that our national economy will
be advancing in the front ranks of the world.
^
The requirements for accomplishing the first stage
were never made clear, although official statements claim
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that "a fairly complete industrial and national economic sys-
2
tern has been established" as of 19 80. In any event, com-
mencement of the second stage was announced by (then) Premier
and Party Chairman Hua Guofeng at the first session of the
Fifth National People's Congress in February, 1978.
The "Ten-Year Plan" announced by Hua, which was said
to have begun in 1976, contained the Four Modernizations and
highly ambitious goals for expansion of industrial and
3
agricultural output. To meet the goals, China in 19 78 em-
barked upon an overseas spending spree in an attempt to
4
achieve rapid modernization of industry.
By the end of 1978 it became obvious to China's
leaders that China simply was not earning sufficient foreign
5
exchange to pay for its imports and could not afford to use
the credits made available by foreign governments to pur-
chase imports. Further, China could not use all of the
equipment being purchased even if they could afford it due
to limitations in China's "ability to assimilate," "construc-
tion and capacity to provide the ancillary equipment, " and
in the "supply of raw and semi-processed materials, fuel and
7power .
"
Because of these and other problems, the Ten-Year Plan
was scrapped and Hua Guofeng announced at the second session
v
cf the Fifth National People's Congress in June 1979 that
"the country should devote the three years beginning from
1979 to readjusting, restructuring, consolidating and improv-




confirmed as a task for 1981 and will probably be extended
for at least two years, consists of ten points for achiev-
ing certain key objectives of the Four Modernizations without
attempting rapid expansion of the entire economy.
The current readjustment program is, in effect, a
return to stage one of Zhou Enlai's original program. Pub-
lic statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the experi-
ence of 1978 revealed that China did not in fact have the
"independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and
economic system" needed as a prerequisite for the Four
Modernizations. The underlying objective of the readjustment
program appears to be to make several relatively cheap quick-
fixes to the Chinese economy which will make possible a shift
back to the ambitious scale of development envisioned in the
Ten-Year Plan. In announcing this program, Hua stated:
"Further strengthening of the groundwork is an important
12precondition for smooth development later."
The quick-fixes, which may well end up taking 5-7
years instead of the three years originally planned, include:
(1) improving management efficiency and worker productivity,
(2) increasing the ability of the economy to assimilate ad-
vanced technology, (3) relieving energy supply and transpor-
tation bottlenecks constraining expansion of output, and
(4) improving China's foreign exchange position by rapidly




The interest of the United States in China's economic
development goes far beyond opportunities for trade and
investment, although these are certainly valid interests
in themselves. The success of China's development program
is directly linked to China's foreign policy and to domestic
political stability.
Vice Premier and Party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping
explicitly drew the link between domestic development and
foreign policy in a January 1980 speech on the three major
tasks China faces in the 1980s:
Modernization is the core of the three major
tasks. This is our main condition for solving
international and internal problems. Everything
depends on whether we make a success of running
our affairs, and the size of the role we play in
international affairs depends on the speed and
range of our economic development . 13
Most observers agree that United States trade with
China from 1972 to 1978 was inhibited by the lack of diplo-
matic relations between the two nations— for political con-
siderations as well as technical problems. The trade-politics
linkage is, however, broader than specific issues, as Paul
Balaran points out:
China's leaders have always viewed foreign trade
in the context of foreign relations. They have
shown that they are aware of the significance of
China becoming a full-fledged member of the inter-
national community subject to all the vagaries and
pressures of the economic and political front. 14
China's internal political stability is also of great
concern to the United States, especially as it affects China's
security. In this regard, Michel Oksenberg has observed:
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In this regard our concerns with respect to China
are similar to our interests in other developing
countries. Whether they meet the basic aspira-
tions of their people for an improved livelihood
and whether they are reliable trading partners
will decisively shape whether we live in a
stable world in the years ahead....
China contributes to the global equilibrium simply
by governing its huge mass and thereby removing
itself as a potential focal point of great power
competition. A weak or divided China would become
a source of international instability, as it was
from the 1860s to the 1940s. 15
There are three reasons why political instability could
possibly arise from China's modernization efforts: leader-
ship struggles, a xenophobic reaction to foreign influences,
and widespread discontent if expectations rise faster than
1 fi
the economy can grow. The Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution is a clear (though by no means the only) example
of the first two phenomena, and Premier Zhao Ziyang has ex-
pressed an awareness of the third—noting that "the government
can't expect the Chinese people to continue sacrificing."
The United States should not assume that the present
ascendancy of the "pragmatists " and demise of the "radicals"
represents a resolution of the ideological debate on moderni-
zation. Throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party
it has been standard practice for most major economic and
social issues to be translated into the "left-right" ter-
minology of party ideology. Such labels often have little
relevance to the actual decision-making process, the label
attached to a particular policy position can change with time,
and a particular individual may be "leftist" on one issue but
337

"rightist" on another. Only when personal or institutional
prestige and power are at stake do such "left-right" distinc-
tions become central to a decision.
This aspect of Chinese politics has two consequences
for China's economic and foreign policies. First, policies
which have been or are now discredited as "leftist, " "revi-
sionist," or whatever, can be reborn with a new label and
adopted on purely pragmatic grounds. Second, the continued
ascendency of the "pragmatic" (formerly labeled "capitalist
roader") wing of the Chinese Communist Party will depend upon
their handling of economic and social problems which we in
the West would not ordinarily perceive as ideological issues.
Problems such as wages and prices, educational opportunities,
promotion policies, technical errors in modernization, and
even natural disasters—all of which can reasonably be expected
to persist or recur in China—could crystalize as ideological
disputes, cause dramatic shifts in economic and foreign poli-
cies, and even lead to changes in government and party
leadership.
Thus, to the extent that American security interests
are served by domestic political stability and the continuity
of the present regime in China, the United States also has an
interest in the success of China's economic development efforts
2 . Trade and Investment Opportunities in China
The "China market" probably will never live up to
Western dreams of its potential. Nevertheless, there are
growing opportunities for mutually beneficial trade with and
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investment in China. Before discussing those opportunities,
however, it is important to understand why China's leaders
have decided to open their economy to the West.
There is ample evidence that the Chinese people them-
selves are, when given the opportunity, accomplished capi- .
talists. This entrepreneurial bent and recent trends in
Chinese economic policy should not, however, be interpreted
as being indicative of a government orientation toward "free
trade" in the Western sense. An ambivalent attitude toward
foreign trade is not unique to China: most developing nations
(and even some developed nations) do not trade for trade's
sake. Foreign trade is engaged in to meet specific develop-
ment goals which could not economically be met through a
policy of economic autarchy.
China's top leadership today is committed, as was
Zhou Enlai, to the trade philosophy attributed to. Mao Zedong:
"Rely mainly on our own efforts while making external assis-
1
8
tance subsidiary." In December 1980 Hu Yaobang stated:
Fundamentally, China is building socialism through
self-reliance. On this basis, however, we will
actively develop economic contacts with other
countries. One of our mistakes in the past was
to close the country to the outside world. 19
Japanese businessmen and trade officials have reported being
told outright by Chinese officials that China seeks foreign
investment to gain "technology, capital, export markets and






The United States and China have taken several bilateral
and unilateral actions to develop their economic relations
since establishing diplomatic relations, including the for-
mation of a Joint Economic Committee. The rapid growth in
two-way trade—which in 19 79 was 9 5% above 1978, and in 19 80
21
was 84% above 1979 —indicates that the efforts at trade
promotion have been successful. Figure 1 shows the trend
in Sino-American trade since 1971. It is worthy of note
that United States two-way trade with China surpassed Soviet-
American two-way trade in 1980, due largely to the trade
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Figure 1. SINO-AMERICAN TWO-WAY TRADE, 1971-1980
(In millions of dollars)
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What are the prospects for United States trade with
China? The outlook for the immediate future is rather bleak.
In September 1980 the Wall Street Journal reported:
Chinese Vice Premier Yao Yilin, in his report
to the Congress, said the value of overall trade
will rise only 7.5% next year. In view of world-





John R. Dewenter, Vice President of the National Council for
U.S. -China Trade, has pointed out the effect this will have
on American trade with China: "Our members realize that it's
going to be a slow two or three years ahead. Most firms
recognize that the long-term benefits in the relationship
2 5
will be 10, 15, 20 years down the line." This view is
supported by John Moore, President of the U.S. Export-Import
Bank, who said in November 1980, "I don't see an awful lot
2 fihappening in fiscal years '81 and '82."
Despite these gloomy prognoses, the National Council
for U.S. -China Trade has estimated that two-way trade with
27China could reach $6 billion in 1981, and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce projects that it will reach at least $10
28billion by 1985, a growth rate of 26.5% annually. The
validity of such projections will depend upon the length of
the present period of readjustment and on the ability of the
international economy to absorb China's exports of light in-
dustrial and textile products. Given the dour outlook of
China's leaders for their nation's economy and the weak
state of the international economy, the National Council
and Department of Commerce projections are probably too
optimistic
.
During the period of readjustment of China's economy,
growth in United States exports to China will largely be
limited to those items needed to meet China's immediate eco-
nomic objectives. The five categories of goods selected by
China for United States exporters to display at the trade
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exhibition in Beijing clearly illustrate current import
priorities: agricultural machinery, petroleum equipment,
transportation, power generation, and manufacturing machinery
29
for textiles and consumer goods.
After completing the readjustment of their economy,
China's leaders intend to return to a program of rapid eco-
nomic growth—to include a rapid growth in foreign trade.
A recent Wall Street Journal article noted that lucrative
future prospects are being held out to foreign companies
to keep them in the China market during the slow-growth
readjustment period:
Chinese officials, such as Vice Premier Bo Yibo, . .
.
have told foreign business executives that, if they
stay with China during its period of difficulty,
they won't be forgotten in four or five years when
the country is ready to take off economically.-^
Although it is reasonable to expect the China market
to expand over the long-term, it is unlikely that China's
leaders will ever completely abandon the philosophy of making
trade serve development goals. Bohdan and Maria Scuprowicz
observed in 1978 that during the 1970s the value of China's
imports was only 2.5% of China's GNP, and that: "On that
basis alone China can claim that its economy is more self-
31
sufficient than any other in the world." Despite rapid
growth in China's foreign trade since 1977, the ratio of the
value of imports to GNP has not risen much: in 1978 it was
3.3% and in 1979 it was still only 3.9%, even though the
32
value of imports had risen 40.7% over 1978.
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China's leaders have never articulated a limit on the
ratio of imports to GNP, but their development strategy is
33likely to keep it low. American businessmen must be aware
that successful development of China's economy will not mean
a rapid expansion of the China market. Conversely, because
of this de_ facto linking of import growth to GNP growth, it
is in the national interest that China's development efforts
succeed in order to allow at least some growth in the China
market. This observation completes a circular relationship
between trade and development: China trades to serve specific
development goals, and development of China's economy is re-
quired to expand trade. Such a relationship suggests
"mutually beneficial" as an objective to be sought in the
development of Sino-American trade.
Though growing much more slowly than trade, there are
also expanding opportunities for investment in China. The
numbers of various forms of investments and joint ventures
illustrate how far China has come in just the last few years:
China has entered into 3200 processing arrangements and 170
34
compensation trade arrangements with foreign firms, signed
over 300 joint venture agreements—including 17 joint equity
35
ventures—in 1980, and has allowed 490 industrial, commer-
cial and farming enterprises to be established in the Shumchun
3 6
special economic zone. Large-scale commercial lending to




China's policy towards foreign investment, like its
policy towards trade, is tailored to serve specific develop-
ment goals. Chinese leaders in no way believe in the free
flow of capital based strictly on market factors. This
attitude has meant that during the readjustment period foreign
investment in China is carefully regulated. Investment is
being limited for the same reason that imports are being
limited, as Xue Muqiao indicates: "At present, China doesn't
have enough energy supply, transport, managerial skills, and
other objective conditions for large-scale introduction of
3 8foreign investment."
Western financial analysts have noted an emphasis on
infrastructure development and rapid export growth in China's
investment priorities. Matthew Polsky, of Bear-Stearns
China Trade Advisors, has said: "I see more emphasis on two
types of projects--infrastructure and those that will gener-
39
ate export earnings relatively soon." Stanley Lubman,
another observer of the China market, emphasizes the second
of the two sectors: "The projects most likely to be attrac-
tive to the Chinese are those that will increase their foreign
exchange earnings, that will modernize their equipment to
40produce greater export earnings." There are also signs
that the limits on foreign investment are being relaxed to
include projects that will allow import substitution for the
41domestic market.
One consequence of the current readjustment program




and expensive projects. These cancellations have seriously
disturbed the foreign investors involved in the projects, and
have contributed to the prevailing mood of caution. As Cheng
Hang-sheng, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, put it: "the earlier euphoria about lending pros-
pects has passed; in its place is a more realistic appraisal
43
of China's financial needs and absorptive capability."
It is not possible at this time to make projections
as to future investment opportunities in China, other than
in very general terms. The current fluid situation is due
to China's continuing efforts to revise its financial laws
and restructure its economic system to attract the type and
levels of foreign investment its leaders believe will support
their development goals. Despite the initiatives already
taken by China to attract foreign investment, there remain
numerous uncertainties and outright barriers discouraging
44prospective investors.
One potential indicator of the future scale of China's
borrowing was revealed in September 19 8 in the Wall Street
Journal : "China will limit foreign borrowing so that repay-
ment of interest and principle in each year of the next
4 5decade doesn't exceed 15% to 20% of the country's exports."
Xue Muqiao has indicated that current restrictions on invest-
ment and borrowing may be relaxed upon completion of the
readjustment period:
By then, we shall be able to use more of the
funds loaned to us by foreign countries . In this
way, China will become not only the biggest

domestic market in the world, China will also Af.
become the most promising international market.
His assessment may be somewhat optimistic, but it is reason-
able to presume that investment opportunities in China will
grow (in terms of amounts) and broaden (in terms of the types
of investments) as China's economy strengthens.
As the preceding paragraphs have shown, there are
opportunities for trade and investment in China which serve
China's development goals as well as generate profits for
American business. Therefore, it is in the national interest
to develop mutually beneficial trade with, and investment
in, China.
"Mutual benefit" does not, however, arise as a natural
result of trade and investment: it requires attention by
47
each party to the needs and perceptions of its partner.
There are three potential sources of friction which must
be examined: the trade balance, technology transfers, and
China's debt structure.
China is not satisfied with its trade balance with
the United States. In December 1980 Vice Premier Bo Yibo
warned:
We want very much to buy things from the U.S., but
we are short of foreign currency. It won't do for
us to just keep buying from the U.S. We request 4g
that the U.S. buy from China and in greater volume.
A similar warning—linking Chinese cotton purchases
to American textile quotas—hdd been given during negotia-
tions leading to the three-year textile agreement signed
4 9September 17, 1980. Textile exports to the United States
346

are a significant source of foreign exchange for China,





This issue certainly is not dead, and there are
several other potential sources of friction caused by restric-
52
tive American import policies.
The record of Sino-American trade balances tends to
support the concerns of China's leaders. As is shown in Figure
2, China has run a deficit every year since trade was resumed
except in 1976 and 1977. In 1980 China's deficit with the
53United States is estimated to have been $2.53 billion, about
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Overall trade balance:
Balance of trade with U.S.
Figure 2. CHINA'S TRADE BALANCE, 1970-1980




When viewed in the context of China's overall balance
of payments, or even only in the context of China's overall
balance of trade, the persistent trade deficit with the
United States appears to have been manageable. China has
been able to cover a cumulative trade deficit with the United
States of $5.97 billion with its trade surplus from other
partners during the same period, and still be $436 million
in the black. In 1980 China was able to hold its overall
55trade deficit to about $526 million, down 31% from 1979 's
deficit, as a result of its efforts to boost export earnings.
The wide swings shown in Figure 2 seem to be due more to the
state of the international economy and the American economy
than to structural problems in the Sino-American trade
relationship
.
What is disturbing to China's leaders about their
negative balance of trade is its long-term effect on China's
foreign debt. China is attempting to hold down its total
debt, which requires that priority be given to long-term low-
interest loans for productive investments, rather than to
credits and loans for financing consumption. This policy
requires that trade be kept in balance as much as possible
so as not to disrupt the overall balance of payments.
There are also tensions and potential conflicts in
American exports to China, including fears that the trade
balance will permanently shift in China's favor. American
buinessmen experience numerous technical problems in trading
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with China, most of which are due to the legal and managerial
structure of the Chinese economy and government, but which
are compounded by America's lack of experience in economic
57
relations with the People's Republic. This situation has
improved somewhat as a result of the efforts at trade expan-
sion made in recent years, but difficulties still exist.
The U.S. Department of Commerce is seeking to open commercial
offices and conduct market research in China, as well as
pursuing bilateral agreements on specific problems such as
58
visas, to further alleviate technical problems.
Beyond the host of minor irritants just mentioned,
there is an underlying fear among some American businessmen
that in the long run China could turn out to be another Japan-
that as soon as China's economy is off and running it will
be the United States which suffers persistent trade deficits.
Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Robert
E. Herzstein has bluntly expressed these fears:
In the absence of specific efforts to do other-
wise, I could see how the enterprising Chinese
will learn how to do business with America but
somehow or other we won't find the way to sell
to the 'inscrutable orientals.' Japan has
benefited from our own very open market and
American know-how to operate in that market,
yet American companies continue to have a great
deal .of difficulty doing business with Japan....
I don't think the trade balance will be as
lopsided as it is now. My own feeling is that
China will sell us a lot within a short period
of time in the area of consumer products because
U.S. merchandisers will show them what to do. 59
There is evidence to support such fears. Xue Muqiao
has explicitly stated the narrow view China's leaders have
towards imports into China:
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To be precise, within the next three to five
years, we shall import mainly items which require
less investment, yield quicker results and turn
out products for export to increase foreign ex-
change earnings. 60
This attitude applies to investments in China also: they
must either generate increased export earnings or must allow
6
1
import substitution for domestic consumption. The new
"internal accounting" exchange rate applied by China to its
own trading organization is, semantics aside, a 4 7% devalua-
tion of China's currency— a classic maneuver for discouraging
imports and boosting exports.
China has also sent advertising officials to the
United States to study strategies for penetrating the American
consumer market. There are, therefore, observable grounds
for the concern expressed by Under Secretary Herzstein.
Importing advanced technology from abroad is a key
element in China's strategy for achieving the "Four Moderni-
zations," but weaknesses in China's economy have led China's
leaders to adopt technology acquisition policies that are
bound to generate conflict with the American business
community
.
Jeffrey Schultz has succinctly summarized the problems
which China's leaders face in managing their program of
technology acquisition:
Especially important for understanding current
Chinese attitudes are the lessons of the 19 50s:
(1) that technology imports can easily lead the
country into unconscionably high debt (a lesson
relearned in the early 19 70s) ; (2) that such
imports are often incompatible with Chinese factor
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proportions and needs; and, most importantly,
(3) they are capable of generating unexpected
technological imperatives, independent of the
desires of the political leadership . 64
China's system of economic management, its education system,
its political system, and its industrial infrastructure have
all acted to inhibit the assimilation and effective utiliza-
tion of advanced technology from abroad. The current re-
adjustment program is designed to focus China's scarce capi-
tal and trained personnel on alleviating these problems,
while at the same time continuing highly selective imports
of advanced technology.
The present emphasis in technology imports, in the
words of Vice Premier Bo Yibo, is the giving of "high pri-
ority to importing technology from Western nations, rather
6 6
than complete factories." The distinction he draws is be-
tween importing selected machinery or production processes,
as opposed to importing the entire factory in which they
would be used. Despite this economy measure, technology
intensive imports rose to 15% of the value of total imports




The Chinese technology import policy most likely to
raise hackles among American businessmen is "prototype pur-
chasing." To avoid having to expend large sums of foreign
exchange on imports or production licenses, the Chinese are
widely believed to purchase just a small number of a given
item, then through a "reverse engineering" process set up
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production on their own. A recent report alleges that
China has used this technique to reproduce its own version
69
of the Boeing 707 airliner. Under Secretary .Herzstein
has expressed the concern of the business community over this
issue: "We have to watch the way things are developing. If
we find a tendency to milk American companies of technology
and technical skills, we have to put our foot down."
The manner in which China structures its borrowing
and the foreign investment in its economy is also likely to
generate tensions with the United States--at least from the
point of view of China's leaders. Like any capital-scarce
developing country, China needs large amounts of long-term,
low-interest loans to invest in projects to upgrade its
infrastructure and human resources—projects which do not
offer an immediate return on the investment, but which are
vital for sustained and balanced growth. What China has been
offered (like any developing country) are mainly short-term
trade credits and commercial loans (at market rates) useful
only for those projects promising a near-term return on in-
vestment.
A rough comparison of the aid and credit available to
China will illustrate the magnitude of the problem. The
total amount of aid and concessionary loans currently avail-
able to China for economic development projects is on the
order of about $2.5 billion. In contrast, during 1980 alone
China was able to arrange about $26 billion in commercial
and foreign government trade credits. Although the amount
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of capital available on concessionary terms can be expected
72
to grow, it cannot supplant capital at commercial rates.
This is the type of imbalance that has radicalized the eco-
nomic policies of other developing countries, exacerbated
north-south tensions, and generated calls for a new inter-
national economic order.
China has been strictly limiting its use of short-
73term credits, and limiting its commercial borrowing to pro-
jects which will immediately improve its balance of payments
74position. The United States has already been in disagree-
ment with China over the terms of Ex-Im Bank trade credits,
due to China's pressing for larger financing at lower interst
75
rates than the United States is prepared to offer.
Japan has been much more sympathetic to China's finan-
cial needs than has the United States, and for this reason
has probably scored a major coup in the competition for the
China market. Japan has provided China with a $1.5 billion
loan for six development projects at 3% annual interest over
30 years after a ten-year grace period. The funds are largely
"untied, " allowing China to purchase equipment from any nation
7 6
it chooses. American quibbling over the terms of a $60
million export credit (China had dared to ask for the 7.75%
• . 77
minimum rate) probably did not enhance our image as a
trading partner in comparison with the Japanese.
Thus, although there are potentially lucrative oppor-
tunities for trade with and investment in China, there are
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also potentially serious sources of tension between the
United States and China. Whether they are harmonious and
growing or bitter and stagnated, Sino-American economic re-
lations will affect American security interests in China.
The debt management problem, for example, limits China's
ability to purchase Western arms and a lack of sympathy for
China's debt problems could lead to a Chinese perception that
the West is exploiting the Soviet threat to China for its
own economic gain. Additionally, to the extent that the
American economic stake in China--its direct investment,
exports, and imports of critical materials--expands , the
American interest in the security of China will also grow.
3 . China in the International Economic System
The United States should not lose sight of its global
and Asian economic interests while developing its economic
relations with China. The rapid growth of China's impact on
the international economic system is both a potential source
of conflicts and an opportunity for increased international
economic cooperation. The attitude that the United States
and other industrialized Western countries take toward their
economic relations with China will largely determine which
prevails. China's opening of its economy to the West will
probably result in intensified competition or increased ten-
sions in four key areas: international trade, aid and devel-




There are several dimensions to the impact China is
having on international trade. China is a competitor with
other developing countries for the markets in developed coun-
tries, and for the domestic markets in the developing coun-
tries themselves. China's current development strategy
places emphasis on the export of goods which compete with
7 8the exports of other developing countries. India in par-
ticular believes its exports have been hard hit by the grow-
79ing competition from China. China's competition with its
fellow developing nations is made all the worse by the rising
8protectionist sentiments of the developed countries.
The impact China has had in the markets in the devel-
oping countries themselves is revealed by the trade surplus
China has with the nations of Africa, Latin America, the
Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. As Figure 3
illustrates, the total surplus from trade with these regions
has grown from $630 million in 1970 to almost $3.9 billion
in 1979, an average annual growth rate of over 57%. The
cumulative surplus from this trade is about $19.2 5 billion
for the 1970-79 period. 81
China is competing with producers in the developed
countries for their domestic and export markets. This was
discussed previously as a problem in bilateral Sino-American
trade relations, with frictions over textile imports into the
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China's neighbors face competition in their export
markets as China strives to increase its foreign exchange
earnings. The countries of Southeast Asia are particularly
8 3
vulnerable to dislocations from Chinese competition, and
their own markets have provided China with the bulk of its
84trade surpluses over the last decade. Returning to the
example of textiles: China is the fifth largest supplier to
the United States, behind only its neighbors Hong Kong,
8 5Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. As China learns the ropes
of the American consumer market it will become an increasingly
strong competitor with its textile-exporting neighbors.
China's opening of its economy to the West has gen-
erated competition among the developed nations for a slice
of the China market. Japanese trade and investment delega-
tions openly ask for special consideration from the Chinese,
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and the large aid loan made by the government of Japan to
China should help ensure that Japanese business does indeed
q c
receive special consideration. H.B. Malmgren has pointed
out that much of. China's current allure is due to the slug-
8 7gishness of other markets, and therefore may fade when
the international economy strengthens. The possibility of
conflict will nevertheless remain a real possibility, and
8 8
will become more likely as China's economy expands.
Aid and development assistance is another sector of
the international economic system in which China is compet-
8 9ing with the other developing nations. China voluntarily
relinquished 10% of the $142 million in United Nations aid
offered to it for the 1982-86 period due to the needs of
90
other countries, but will nonetheless be seeking as much
91development aid as is available internationally. Competi-
tion with other developing countries for commercial loans
and trade credits is not yet a problem, as China eschews
such borrowing, but this could change if China's economy
takes off as is planned by China's leaders.
The potential for large reserves of oil and natural
gas under the continental shelves of the East China Sea and
the South China Sea has heightened concern over the many
conflicting territorial claims in these areas. China has
seabed territorial claims disputes with North and South





Observers disagree over the potential for conflict
to arise from these territorial disputes. While Selig
Harrison expects increased conflict, and has predicted that
China may seize the Spratley Islands by force or with politi-
cal pressure, Guy Pauker expects China to take a more con-
93
ciliatory approach. There is evidence to support both
views: although China seized the Paracel Islands by force
in 1974 and apparently tried to intimidate Japan over the
Senkaku (Tiaoyu Tai) Islands in 1978, the Chinese have avoided
94
conducting Seismic surveys in contested East China Sea areas,
95
and have shown similar discretion in the South China Sea.
At present China's grain imports do not compete
with the needs of other developing countries. Lurking in
the background, however, is the spectre of widespread famine
in Asia and Africa. Under those circumstances any grain
imports by China would be a threat to other countries.
China is not expected to be able to become fully
96independent of grain imports, but is relatively well off
in comparison with most developing countries. In 1980 the
total volume of China's grain imports was about 3.3% of total
97domestic production. Even though 1980 production was 10
to 15 million tons below the record 1979 harvest of 332
million tons, it was still the second largest crop of the
9 8past 30 years.
The global food and agriculture picture is grim. Des-
pite projections of bumper rice and wheat crops in 1980-81,
world stocks of these grains are expected to decline to
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dangerously low levels before the 1981 harvest can replenish
them—and a shortfall in the 1981 harvest would leave the
99
world on the brink of disaster. Meanwhile, population
continues to grow faster than grain production, so that up
to one billion people in Africa, Asia and Latin America
could starve after just one or two years of poor harvest.
Neither is the long-term picture for rice production in Asia
outside of China very rosy:
The ADB anticipates that these ten member coun-
tries, which collectively had a food grain deficit
of less than 8 million tons in 1972, will have a
shortfall of 46 million tons in 1985. The ADB
survey concluded that the "green revolution" will
not be able to raise agricultural output at a
faster rate than population growth. 101
Thus, it can be seen that there are numerous sectors
of the international economy in which China's growing presence
could exacerbate existing problems, rekindle smoldering con-
flicts, and even generate new tensions in currently placid
relationships. Such potential conflicts, which would directly
affect America's world order interests, are another dimension
of the overall American security interests in China.
The need for bilateral Sino-American consultation on
global issues and for greater Chinese participation in multi-
lateral efforts at managing global problems have already been
presented as being in the national interest (Chapter II, Section
E)
. Those global problems include the economic issues just




There are other international economic issues in
which China, as a major developing country, will play a signi-
ficant role—whether or not it chooses to do so actively.
These issues can be grouped under the heading of "evolution
of the international economic system, " and include the north-
south dispute, the demand of the developing nations for a
new international economic order, the future progress of
multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) after the Tokyo Round,
and readjustment of the international financial system to
cope with the recycling of petrodollars and the financing
of the energy bills of the non-oil-producing developing
nations
.
The United States has a vital interest in the peace-
ful evolution of the international economic system. If the
system as a whole or a major sector of it should collapse
—
due to an unbridled wave of protectionism or a series of
defaults by developing countries heavily in debt— the Ameri-
can economy would be threatened with the loss of its export
markets, its substantial overseas investments, and its
critical sources of minerals and energy resources.
It is therefore in the national interest that China
play a constructive role in international negotiations on
the evolution of the international economic system. Bilateral
consultations are vital for this interest. Even more impor-
tant, however, is for China's leaders to perceive that the
peaceful evolution and future strength of the international
economic system are in their national interest. The success
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of China's development efforts and the role that foreign
trade and investment have in that success are what will
give China's leaders a vested interest in an international
economic system compatible with American interests.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) have both recently taken actions to increase China's
role in those institutions, including the giving of an
executive directorship on the board of the World Bank to
102
,China. These actions should serve to develop a construc-
tive role for China in the international financial system.
China may also be considering entering into the General
Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) , a move which the
United States should encourage. The United States should
also, as Guy Pauker has recommended, work in close cooperation
with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) countries to manage the trade and financial problems
which will be generated by the rapid expansion of China's
impact on the international economy.
Another initiative the United States should support
that would aid in shaping a constructive role for China in
the international economic community, as well as being of
benefit for a host of other regional economic problems, is
the creation of an Organization for Pacific Trade and Devel-
opment (OPTD) . The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
1979 passed a resolution recommending that such an organiza-
tion be established, and there is wide support for the
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concept. ~ An OPTD would be able to address the many
thorny issues discussed above, and would fill a structural
gap in the economic relations among the nations of East
Asia and the Pacific.
4 . Conclusions
United States security interests in China extend far
beyond the purely military dimension of security. Likewise,
American economic interests in China extend far beyond just
trade and investment opportunities. Sino-American economic
relations are inseparably linked with American security in-
terests. Over the long-term, the importance of economic
issues will probably come to rival that of the Soviet threat
or the Taiwan issue as a determinant of the state of Sino-
American relations. The American interest in the security
of China and the development of the Sino-American security
relationship would be better served, for example, by a large
"no strings attached" economic development loan on highly
concessionary terms than by a willingness to sell to China
any sophisticated weapons it might request. American world
order interests—the management of global problems and the
peaceful resolution of local conflicts—will also be advanced
by concern for economic progress in China. China's economic
stake in the West is a deterrent to certain courses of action
which would alienate the United States--such as an attack
on TAiwan . Thus, the security implications of Sino-American
economic relations are extensive and affect a number of
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American security interests. American economic policy
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In late June, Soviet ambassadors made coordinated ef-
forts to "expose" Chinese policy to their host govern-
ments and to discourage various Western European
nations from recognizing Peking. The Soviet Union
sought to expand its contacts with non-Communist Asian
nations; feelers were even extended to Taiwan. In a
campaign to thwart any Chinese effort to break out of
its isolation, Soviet diplomats hinted that in order
better to isolate China the Soviet Union was prepared
to avoid complicating relations with the United States.
Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1979), p. 178.
For detailed discussions of the Soviet strategy of en-
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(New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 514.
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93Joseph E. Thach, Jr., "Modernization and Conflict:
Soviet Military Assistance to the PRC, 1950-60," Military
Review , v. 58, n. 1 (January 1978), p. 88.
94 Clubb, China and Russia: The "Great Game,
"
p. 514.
95On July 6, 1921, the Soviet Union launched its first
successful "war of national liberation" by sending the Red
Army into Outer Mongolia, occupying the country, and founding
a puppet Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government. Later,
in 1924, the Mongolian People's Republic was proclaimed.
96Gromyko, p. 130.
97The following quotes, both from the Soviet journal
International Affairs
, are illustrative of such Soviet
propaganda:
Proceeding from their selfish aims, they view the
developing countries and the national liberation
movement as a whole as an instrument for pursuing
their great-power, hegemonistic policy. There can
be no doubt that Peking's divisive actions are
detrimental to the cause of national liberation
and undermine the unity of the three most important
forces of our time—socialism, the international
communist and worker's movement, and the revolu-
tionary national liberation movement.
Y. Semyonov, "Peking and the National Liberation
Movement," International Affairs (Moscow, January 1980),
p. 29.
The most striking change has recently occurred
in Peking's policy with regard to developing coun-
tries. It is here that the renunciation of the
former 'ultra revolutionary' slogans and earlier
calls to uncompromising armed struggle against im-
perialism and colonialism was most apparent and
cynical. Instead, there is now a de facto alliance
with neo-colonialists and the most reactionary
regimes
.
A. Meliksetov, "Peking Threatens International Peace




99Donald Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement:
A Proposal for U.S. Foreign Policy," Pacific Community , v. 8,
n. 1 (October 1976), p. 129.
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Not only are there definite advantages to a rapproche-
ment with China, there are also no inherent ideological bar-
riers precluding it. Nathan Leites has deduced from Soviet
writings and political behavior that one of the precepts of
the 'operational code 1 guiding Politburo actions is that:
"The Party must not regard the existence of either 'close
relations* or of 'rupture of relations' with an outside
group as definitive for any length of time."
Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Folitburo
(Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, 1951), p. 35.
Charles Douglas-Home, "Why Two Giant Armies Face Each
Other in the East," Times of London, July 31, 1980, p. 14.
Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle/New
York Times Book Co., 1976), p. 449.
102 International Communications Agency, "Soviet Percep-
tions of the U.S.: Results of a Surrogate Interview Pro-
ject," USICA Research Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
International Communications Agency), June 27, 1980, Sections
I. A. and II. C.
The observation reported in this study on the Russian fear
of China was that:
Nothing unites the Soviets, particularly Russians,
more than a fear of China. Their attitude verges on
the irrational. It mixes real concern for border
integrity and' awareness of the vast number of Chinese
with a large dose of Russian racial intolerance. Only
a small group of Soviet Sinologists seem to share
any Sinophilism and even they are ambivalent.




103Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 108.
104The journal Studies in Comparative Communism has
published a collection of these Soviet reports:
"Documents: The Border Issue, China and the Soviet
Union, March -October 19 69," Studies in Comparative Communism
,
v. 2, n. 3/4 (July/October 1969), pp. 150-382.
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Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, The
Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Coral
Gables, Fla. : Center for Advanced International Studies,
University of Miami, 1974), p. 5.
There is evidence that Soviet fear of the "extremes
to which Peking might go" includes fear of a Chinese nuclear
strike on the Soviet Union. John Newhouse observed that:
Insiders remember SALT I for many reasons,
among them some palpable signs of Moscow's Sino-
phobia. At one point, the Russians began talking
somewhat vaguely about 'provocative attacks ' by
third nuclear powers.
Newhouse, p. 17 6.
1 fi
For detailed discussions of the economic and strate-
gic importance of Siberia, see:
Robert N. North, "The Soviet Far East: New Centre of
Attention in the USSR," Pacific Affairs , v. 51, n. 2 (Summer
1978)
, p. 195.
E. Stuart Kiby, "Considering Siberia," RUSI Journal
for Defense Studies , v. 118, n. 2 (June 1973), p. 42.
Hedrick Smith observed while in the Soviet Union that
Siberia has a symbolic importance for the Communist Party
that is at least as great as its immediate economic value.
Smith comments that "for a nation that has lost its revolu-
tionary elan without shedding its revolutionary pretensions,
Siberia is vitally important as a political symbol of the new
frontier." A Soviet economist is quoted by Smith as having
remarked that: "If Siberia did not exist for those projects,
the Party would have to invent it." (Smith, pp. 445-446).
107Doublas-Home, p. 14.
Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 101.
10 8A brief chronology of Soviet actions vis-a-vis China
since 197 6 will serve to sumarize the evidence of a growing
Soviet concern for what is perceived by Soviet leaders to be
a clear and present military threat emanating from China:
Feb 1976 CPSU 25th Congress, China declared "plainly
hostile" to Marxism-Leninism.
Oct 1976 Soviets announce, in wake of death of Mao,
willingness to normalize relations with China.
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Nov 1976 Soviet delegate to Sino-Soviet border talks
arrives in Beijing.
Feb 1977 China calls for a strong United States military
presence in the Western Pacific, raising the
possibility of Sino-American strategic coopera-
tion against the Soviet Union.
Feb 1977 Soviet delegate to border talks leaves Beijing.
May 1977 Brezhnev issues anti-Chinese statement, ending
the post-Mao honeymoon.
Sep 1977 Deng Xiaoping publicly states that 1950 Sino-
Soviet treaty has "virtually ceased to exist,
"
a gesture toward improved relations with Japan
at the expense of Sino-Soviet relations.
Feb 1978 China's 5th National People's Congress steps up
polemical feud wich the Soviet Union.
Mar 1978 Brezhnev and Defense Minister Ustinov make
highly-publicized inspection tour of the Soviet
Far East.
May 1978 U.S. presidential National Security Advisor
Brezinski visits Beijing, indicating American
interest in strategic cooperation with China.
Aug 1978 China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty, in-
cluded an "anti-hegemony" clause despite in-
tense Soviet pressure on Japan.
Nov 1978 Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship, Coop-
eration, and Mutual Assistance signed.
Dec 1978 Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendliness, Good
Neighborliness , and Cooperation signed.
Dec 1978 U.S. announces agreement with China on normali-
zation of relations
.
Jan 1979 U.S. and China establish diplomatic relations;
Deng Xiaoping warns of need to teach Vietnam
a lesson while in Japan.
Feb 1979 China attacks Vietnam.
Mar 1979 Soviet ships and aircraft begin using facili-





1979 Soviets establish joint command encompassing
the Far East, Siberian, and Trans-Baikal mili-
tary districts, headquarters at Chita; the
only unified command of its type in the USSR.
Jun 1979 Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk and amphibious
landing ship Ivan Rogov join Pacific Fleet.
1979 Mig-27 attack aircraft and SS-20 mobile IRBMs
deployed to Soviet Far East (SS-20 deployment
may have begun in 197 8)
.
These events highlight the changes in the strategic
balance in Asia over the past five years, illustrating that
as China moved into strategic alignment with the West, the
Soviet Union took diplomatic and military actions to counter
what was perceived to be a growing Chinese threat to the USSR.
Sources that address the Soviet military buildup or points
made above include:
Jacobsen, pp. 110-111 (Brezhnev-Ustinov tour and the
force buildup)
.
Solomon, p. 5 (Soviet force buildup).
Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia,
"
p. 78 (Soviet force buildup)
.
"Japan Confirms Location of USSR East Asian Hq,
"
Japan Times , August 10, 1980, p. 1.
Leo Y. Liu, "The Modernization of the Chinese Mili-
tary," Current History
, v. 79, n. 458 (September 1980), p. 38.
"The Power Game: Soviet Forces in the Far East," Asia
Yearbook 1981 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1981)
,
pp. 19-23.
Finally, it should be noted that Soviet actions, elo-
quent as they are, are matched by the appearance of some new
themes in Soviet statements on the 'Chinese threat.' The
primary purpose of such statements is undoubtedly tactical:
to counter Chinese claims of the existence of a Soviet threat
to China and to inhibit the United States from developing a
military relationship with China. Nevertheless, such tacti-
cal purposes could have been met with any one of a number of
propaganda lines, therefore statements such as this one
probably reflect a real underlying Soviet concern:
One of the most sinister changes in Pekings
'
foreign policy is a new approach to the military fac-
tor. One is struck by a certain change in the
theoretical foundations of the military policy:
today we see that the doctrine of the 'restric-
tion' of 'people's war' as a defensive war on home
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territory is being dropped and a concept of large-
scale military actions by a modernized professional





"Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and Alliance
with Imperialism, " International Affairs (Moscow, March
1980)
, p. 52.
110 cSemyonov, p. 30.
For discussions of the Soviet fear of the formation
of an anti-Soviet block, see:
Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia,
"
p. 66.
William R. Kintner, "A Strategic Triangle of 'Two and
a Half Powers," Orbis
, v. 23, n. 3 (Fall 1979), pp. 528-530.
112The purpose of this statement is not to establish a
definitive ordering of Soviet priorities: there is no con-
clusive evidence for the contention that Soviet foreign policy
is founded upon a fixed set of threat priorities. Rather,
the purpose is to emphasize why the Soviets perceive the im-
provement in Sino-American relations as a threat to their
foreign policy objectives and even as a threat to the Soviet
Union itself.
It was Uri Ra'anan who concluded that the United States
is still the "main antagonist" in the eyes of the Soviets.
He based that conclusion on the observation that:
Moscow feels this way apparently because of the
'subversive' attraction the West presents to the
Soviet intelligensia, because of America's tech-
nological and military potential , and because the
spectacle of America's apparent fatigue as a
world leader renders the West a more inviting
target for Soviet gains than China.
Ra'anan, p. 8 34.
Ra'anan is supported in his analysis by Leon Goure (et al)
,
who contend that it is, in fact, American might which makes
the threat posed by much weaker China seem so grave to the
Soviets:
No doubt the Soviet leaders are very conscious of
and concerned over the potential Chinese threat
and the possibility of having to wage a war on
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two fronts, as well as the advantages the US may
derive for its power position in the event of a
Sino-Soviet war. It is uncertain, however, to
what extent the requirement to deter and, if
necessary, to fight a China increasingly armed with
nuclear weapons and missiles affects the overall
Soviet drive for the further buildup of its mili-
tary capability and specifically, its strategic
missile force. Obviously, from the Soviet point
of view, it is still the US which potentially
poses the greatest military threat to the Soviet
Union, while China, even though it is becoming
militarily more powerful, would not pose the
same security problem for Moscow if US power could
be reduced or neutralized and China was once again
isolated.
Goure, p. 86.
The conclusion that the the United States is the number
one enemy of the Soviet Union, as is argued by Ra'anan and
Goure, is disputed by other observers on two grounds. First,
that Soviet foreign policy behavior has shown clear indica-
tions of being directed primarily against China. This is
the conclusion reached by Alfred Biegel, Joseph Schiebel,
Thomas Robinson, and Richard Pipes in their individual analy-
ses (See page 57 and footnote 84) . Second, observations
of Soviet threat perceptions have shown that fear of the
Chinese penetrates deep into the Russian psyche and is un-
equivocal, whereas the Russian view of the United States is
more ambivalent (See pp. 64-65 and footnote 102)
.
The lack of consensus among Western observers as to
whom the Soviets perceive to be their number one antagonist
is understandable: the Soviets simply have not established
a set of fundamental threat priorities which result in a
clear ranking of the United States and China. Nor do Russian
history or Soviet ideology necessarily impel them to do so.
Soviet priorities are flexible, established on the basis of
the fundamental objectives of Soviet foreign policy (See pp.
49-53) and the circumstances of the international milieu.
So long as different objectives are not perceived to be
mutually exclusive or competing for an insufficient supply
of some resource (arms, aid or attention), priorities may not
even be set at all, at least not in a formal manner. There
is more than one example of the Soviets having suffered
foreign policy setbacks—net deliberate retreats planned in
advance—because they resisted setting priorities among poli-
cies that turned out to be contradictory. The Soviet expul-
sion from Egypt in 197 2 and from Somalia in 1977, while
revealing after the fact what Soviet priorities were, did not
happen under circumstances of the Soviets' choosing. The
collapse of Khrushchev's 'grand design,* as postulated by
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Adam Ulam, can similarly be attributed to a Soviet failure
to set realistic priorities among a number of important
foreign policy objectives (Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence
,
Chapter XI, discusses the 'grand design' and its collapse).
It is when the United States and China begin working
together to thwart Soviet foreign policy ambitions that the
'circumstances of the international milieu' produce a clear
and overriding number one priority for the Soviet leadership:




"Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and Alliance
with Imperialism," p. 4 8.
A. Bobin, "Shortsighted Calculations," Izvestia
,
January 8, 1980, p. 5. Translation In: Soviet Press:
Selected Translations , n. 3-80 (March 1980), p. 77.
114Allen S. Whiting believes that the Soviets fear an
outright Chinese attack, and that the current trend in the
development of Sino-American relations is feeding this Soviet
fear. A Chinese attack in conjunction with a Soviet-American
strategic exchange, says Whiting:
...need not be openly specified by a formal Sino-
American agreement or even spelled out in a secret
protocol. As Beijing and Washington continue to
emphasize their 'common strategic interests, '
bolstered by high-level military consultation and
high-technology transfer, the implications for
Soviet defense analysts are sufficiently ambigu-
ous to require contingency plans that include
combined strikes against Chinese weapon systems
as well as against the panoply of American land,
sea, and airborne strategic systems.
Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 100.
Dmitri Simes has been quoted as having the view that the
Soviets only see a need to deter possible Chinese "diversion-
ary tactics" in support of NATO, a much less demanding task.
Eduardo Lachica, "Big Soviet Defense Buildup in
Siberia Stresses Region's Value, Holds Danger," Wall Street
Journal
, August 4, 1980, p. 16.
The Chinese factor in Soviet preparations for protracted war
has been described by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta
M. Hoeber. They note that the Soviets expect to have to
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defend against attacks by the Chinese "jackals" after a
strategic nuclear exchange with the West.
Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoeber,
Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War (Stanford, Ca. : Hoover
Institution Press, 1979), p. 12.
115Allen Whiting and Alfred Biegel have both noted such
Soviet concerns, which are evident in Soviet press commen-
tary on Sino-Japanese relations. "Right-wing, nationalistic
forces among Japan's ruling circles" are blamed for the
perceived anti-Soviet thrust of Japan's relationship with
China. See:
Whiting: "China and the Superpowers," p. 102.
Biegel, "Strategic Implications of Moscow's Concept
for Collective Security in Asia," p. 8.
Meliksetov, p. 47.
For example, see:
A. Kemov and V. Kozlov, "International Arms Trade,
"
International Affairs (Moscow), January 1980, p. 55.
117Unfortunately, Brezhnev's remarks were made in pri-
vate and cannot be confirmed. His warning to the United
States, if reported accurately, is very interesting in that
it is the most belligerent made by a Soviet leader in many
years:
Believe me, after the destruction of Chinese
nuclear sites by our missiles, there won't be
much time for the Americans to choose between
the defense of their Chinese allies and peace-
ful co-existence with us.
R.W. Apple, Jr., "Brezhnev Reported to Warn US on
Arming China," New York Times , January 30, 1980, p. A15.
118Arnold L. Horlick, "The Soviet Union's Asian Collec-
tive Security Proposal: A Club in Search of Members,"




p. 284. Henry Kissinger has observed the same
pattern of Soviet support for its clients and has concluded




What Singh had in mind became public on August
9 when India and the Soviet Union signed a Friend-
ship Treaty, which for all practical purposes
gave India a Soviet guarantee against Chinese
intervention if India went to war with Pakistan.
By this action the Soviet Union deliberately
opened the door to war on the subcontinent;
it was the first of a series of moves through-
out the Seventies whereby the Soviets fueled
conflicts by giving arms and assurances to
countries with high incentive to resort to force.
Kissinger, p. 767.
120The Chinese have shown similar restraint, though they
have demonstrated a greater willingness to throw their own
troops into the fray (possibly because they lack the proxies
available to the Soviets) . Even when China has committed its
troops, as in Korea in 1950, India in 1962, and Vietnam in
1979, Chinese foreign policy behavior has shown a reluctance
to use force except as a last resort, after warning the
potential adversary that his actions were becoming intolerable
For a description of Chinese conflict behavior, see:
Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1975).
Steve Chan, "Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior:
Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management,
"
World Politics
, v. 30, n. 3 (April 1978), p. 391.
Edward W. Ross, "Chinese Conflict Management,"
Military Review , v. 60, n. 1 (January 1980), p. 13.
12
1
Robinson has described the policy context and the
consequences of the 1969 border clashes:
Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute , pp. 41-71.
See Gelman, p. 13, for a current discussion of the border
issue.
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Thomas W. Wolfe reached this conclusion in his 1970
study of Soviet military strategy and Soviet policy in Europe.
Referring to the escalation of Sino-Soviet tensions in the
1966-1969 period, Wolfe states:
In view of these developments, one may assume
that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime found it prudent
to conduct a running reappraisal of its military
planning to take into account a potential "two-front"
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threat in Europe and in the Far East. While such
a reappraisal would have been likely to confirm
the wisdom of proceeding with the build-up of
Soviet strategic nuclear power as insurance
against China's developing atomic capability,
it no doubt would have raised also the question
whether Soviet theater forces in the regions
bordering China should be permanently strengthened,
and if so, whether this requirement might best be met by
shifting some forces from the European theater
to the Far East. The answer apparently was that
the Soviet Union should indeed bolster its mili-
tary garrisons in Asia, but not at the expense of
the general purpose forces deployed in Europe.
Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe
, p. 461.
Edward L. Warner confirmed Wolfe's observations in his 1977
study of the Soviet military establishment:
The total number of division within the ground
forces has. expanded from a stable 140 throughout
the mid-1960s to 168 reported in September 1976.
This buildup has been concentrated in the Far East,
which currently contains 43 divisions where only
15 were stationed in 1968. These additional divi-
sions have been newly formed or transferred from
the southern or central USSR. They have not come
either from Eastern Europe, where the deployed
Soviet forces increased with the stationing of
five divisions in Czechoslovakia since August 19 68,
or from the western USSR where 60 divisions con-
tinue to be identified.
Edward L. Warner III, The Military in Contemporary
Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis (New York:
Praeger, 1977), p. 154.
This thesis, that the Soviet build-up of forces
directed agc^inst China has been pursued for the purpose of
enabling the Soviet Union to fight a 'two-front' war, is not
accepted by all observers. A. Doak Barnett dismissed such
implications with the conclusion that: "The Soviet buildups
can probably best be explained as an overreacticn by Soviet
leaders in the late 1960s and early 1970s to what they saw
as a growing potential Chinese threat." Barnett attributes
this Soviet "overreaction " to 'worst case' planning by the
Soviet military, bureaucratic momentum, and a primary purpose
of deterring the Chinese from considering 'adventurist' moves




While the underlying factors that Barnett cites are
almost certainly operative, they do not justify the conclu-
sion that the Soviet buildup is attributable to simple
"overreaction . " From an American point of view the Soviet
build-up may appear to be an overreaction, but that does not
help to explain Soviet strategy or intentions.
Tying together three threads of the observations made
on Soviet behavior that have been presented thus far reveals
a more plausible explanation for the Soviet military build-up
First, as was noted above, the escalation in Sino-Soviet
tensions in the late 1960s caused the Soviets to reappraise
their defense strategy, with the result—confirmed by the
actual pattern of ground force deployments—that a decision
was made to build-up Soviet forces in the Far East. Second,
the Soviet leadership made a second reappraisal of the
'Chinese threat' in the 1977-1978 period when it became ap-
parent that the post-Mao leadership of China would not be
amenable to a reconciliation on Soviet terms and would, in
fact, turn to the West to buttress its strategic position
against Soviet pressure (See p. 67 and note 108) . The re-
sult of this Soviet reassessment was a second surge in the
build-up of Soviet forces deployed against China. Third, it
seems clear that the Soviets take seriously the threat they
perceive as arising from the Sino-American strategic align-
ment (See pp. 69-70 and notes 111-114) .
When the cumulative evidence of the Soviet military
build-up in the Far East, the pattern of Soviet diplomacy
and propaganda, and the revisions that have been made to
Soviet military doctrine are viewed together in the context
of world af fairs--notably the failure of the Soviet 'Asian
Collective Security System' gambit and the growth in Sino-
American ties—it is clear that the Soviets do indeed take
seriously the threat of a two-front war and are making
thorough and intensive preparations to fight, and win, such
a war.
123Douglass and Hoeber, p. 20. Their view, that the
Soviet Union would not respect the neutrality of third
parties, is supported by observations made by Nathan Leites
in his study of Bolshevik political behavior. Leites iden-
tified three elements in the Soviet 'operational code' that
opposed neutrality for third parties:
Any group not controlled by the Party, both at
home and abroad, is an enemy.
That is, there are no intermediate, neutral
groups
.





Is it valid to apply principles evolved during the revolu-
tionary struggle for power and the subsequent civil war to
the conduct of Soviet foreign policy today? There has been,
after all, a continuing evolution of the ideological prin-
ciples of the CPSU, such as the enshrinement of 'peaceful
coexistence' on the basis of justifications that do not
appear in Leites ' study. Separating, for the moment, the
questions of when the Soviets would choose to go to war and
what their behavior would be once a war had begun, the value
of looking into Bolshevik political precepts becomes more
readily apparent. It is true that the Soviets have, in their
statements and in their behavior, supported neutrality and
non-alignment (though in the latter case with the obvious
purpose of subverting the movement for their own purposes)
.
It is not reasonable, however, to assume that this pattern
of behavior would be maintained in wartime—particularly in
a struggle as potentially devastating as a war on two fronts,
against NATO and China. In such a struggle, as the Soviets
would call it, the principles derived during the revolution
and civil war are probably a better guide to Soviet behavior.
124
It is important to keep in mind the "never again" at-
titude that pervades Soviet military thought as a result of
the nearly catastrophic surprise attack by Nazi Germany on
the Soviet Union, launched June 22, 1941. For the Soviet
Union to turn its back on China during a war with NATO would
be to take a tremendous risk, and the Soviet military has
no intention of taking such a risk.
For example, see:
Kintner, p. 527.
Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia,
"
p. 78
126Allen S. Whiting is emphatic on this point:
Except for the period 1969-70, alarmist prognoS'
tications of a Sino-Soviet war have been grossly
exaggerated. Neither the issues nor the incidents
have been sufficiently serious or threatening to
prompt the two colossi into what could be a catas-
trophe for either or both. Each side has suffered
too much devastation from war within living memory
for the leadership to risk its reoccurrence over
anything less than national survival. No such
interest is at stake now or in the prospective
future.
Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 103.
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Whiting is correct in his observation that "Neither
the issues nor the incidents have been sufficiently serious
or threatening, " but his view of the role of memories of
"devastation of war" presents only half the story, at least
in the Soviet case. In fact, to believe that the only ef-
fect of memories of past wars is to inhibit the Soviet Union
from wanting to fight future wars is to project the American
point of view as being the Soviet point of view.
The rest of the picture is the concerted effort made
in the Soviet Union to keep memories of the 'Great Patriotic
War' alive as part of the nation-wide "military-patriotic
education campaign." The emotion may seem alien to Americans,
but the Russians take pride in the destruction they suffered
as proof of their unity and invincibility. If memories of
past wars has any direct impact on Soviet decision-making,
it is not that war must be avoided at any cost, but that
losing a war must be avoided at any cost. This attitude
would, of course, have an inhibitory effect on decisions to
go to war, but it would also, under some circumstances— as
in the case of the Chinese threat at Russia's back--be an
impetus for ensuring that an 'unavoidable' war be launched
under conditions of the Soviets' choosing.
For further discussions of the role of memories of
the second world war in Soviet society and polictics, see:
Warner, pp. 100-102.
Smith, pp. 418-434.
William E. Odom, "The Militarization of Soviet Soci-
ety," Problems of Communism (September-October 1976), p. 34.
127Aspaturian, Dallin and Valenta, p. 23.
128
p. 10.
Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization,"
129 Smith, p. 449. A recent description of the Chinese
in Soviet journal International Affairs , though made for
propaganda purposes, is probably representative of the
popularly-held view among Russians:
Militaristic sentiments are intensively being
cultivated in China; broad segments of the popula-
tion are being brought up in a spirit of chauvinism,
disregard for other peoples, and the thought that
war is fatally inevitable is being hammered into
the minds of the Chinese people. This is an
inalienable component of the aggressive and expan-
sionist course pursued by Mao's successors. As
for the moral and psychological conditioning of
broad sections of the Chinese population in the
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spirit of belligerent militarism, it is an impor-
tant aspect of Peking's policy of aggravating
international tension.
N. Kapchenko, "The Threat to Peace from Peking's
Hegemonistic Policy," International Affairs (Moscow,
February 1980)
, p. 69.




Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization,"
p. 7.
133This paragraph has attempted to reconcile, in the
particular case of Soviet policy toward China, one of the
long-standing debates on the nature of Soviet foreign policy
Is it expansionist and opportunistic, or is it defensive
and cautious? Answers that fall squarely on one side or the
other are probably determined more by the political leanings
of the observer than by the weight of the evidence. Inci-
dents in the history of Soviet foreign policy and passages
in Soviet public statements on world affairs can be cited to
'prove' either point of view.
The answer that best fits the available evidence, how-
ever, is- "both." Thomas W. Wolfe ascribes to that view:
"Historically speaking, it is perhaps more accurate to say
that Soviet foreign policy has reflected a combination of
caution and militance . . . " (Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe
,
p. 511) . That the Soviets strike a balance between seizing
opportunities and pursuing an orderly foreign policy is the
conclusion drawn by Richard Pipes, who also provides the cri-
terion used for striking that balance:
While pursuing the primary objective of the
moment, the Soviet Union does not neglect other
opportunities; but by and large, mindful of the
principle of "correlation of forces", its leaders
maintain a clear distinction between the primary
thrust and diversionary actions.
Committee on Government Operations, p. 17.
The ideological doctrines of the CPSU, which are sup-
posed to provide infallible guidance for the policy-maker,
dictate that Soviet foreign policy be both opportunistic
and cautious, depending on the circumstances at hand. Jux-
taposing two of the principles of the 'operational code'
guiding Soviet behavior, as deduced by Nathan Leites, shows
the dual nature of this guidance:
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There are rare occasions which offer unusual
possibilities for making great advances. The
Party must learn to seize them.
The Party must never show "adventurism" in its
attempts to advance; that is, it must never risk
already conquered major positions for the sake
of uncertain further gains
.
Leites, pp. 66, 68. Richard Pipes has noted that
the element of caution that tempers Soviet opportunism can
also be traced to roots in Russian culture:
Still, mindful of the Russian proverb: "If you
don't know the ford, don't step into the river,"
they do not plunge into contests blindly; they
rarely gamble, unless they feel the odds are
overwhelmingly in their favor.
Committee on Government Operations, p. 6.
134Peter W. Vigor and Christopher Donnelly, "The
Manchurian Campaign and Its Relevance to Modern Strategy,
"
Comparative Strategy , v. 2, n. 2 (1980), p. 162.
For further discussion of the fundamental concept of
the "primacy of the offensive" in Soviet doctrine, see:
Goure, p. 106.
Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe
, p. 4 57.
Warner, p. 154.
Alan J. Vick, "Soviet Military Forces and Strategy
Come of Age," Air University Review , v. 32, n. 2 (January-
February 1981)
, p. 19.
135Eugene D. Betit, "The Soviet Manchurian Campaign,
August 1945: Prototype for the Soviet Offensive," Military
Review
, v. 56, n. 5 (May 1976), p. 65.
13 6
John G. Stoessinger, for example, contends that "the
Soviets seem to have learned sufficienrly from history--
including recent American history--the possible calamitous
consequences of a major land war in Asia. " (Stoessinger,
P. 27.)
How Stoessinger arrived at that conclusion, other than
by projection of the American point of view onto Soviet leaders,
is somewhat mystifying. His is essentially the same argument
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as was used by Whiting to defend the view that a Sino-Soviet
war is highly unlikely (See p. 81 and note 126) . The same
critique applies in both cases: Russian history and Soviet
ideology do not produce the same world view as Americans
have. Russia has been fighting major land wars in Asia (or
against Asians on Russian soil, in the case of the Mongols)
for the last seven centuries. Considering the Russian record
of expansion—eastward to the Pacific and southward to the
Khyber Pass—it would seem that the Russians have, overall,
been well able to avoid the "calamitous consequences" of
which Americans are so sensitive.
If the Soviets have learned anything from history,
it is how a major land war in Asia should be fought, not that
a major land war in Asia should not be fought.
137 Ra'anan, p. 833.
Warner, p. 153.
139 Goure, pp. 20, 31. This study quotes a Radio Moscow
broadcast made on January 13, 1970 as having stated:
The defensive, as a means of military operation,
has lost its importance. In the face of an enemy
possessing nuclear weapons and pinning his hopes
on a first strike, a defensive strategy means to
voluntarily . subject a country and its armed forces
to nuclear strikes, which is contrary to the con-
cept of modern warfare.
Ibid
. , p. 107. This broadcast may well have had
propaganda purposes, but the threat it implies is certainly
consistent with what is known about Soviet military doctrine.
The Brezhnev warning against American participation in China's
nuclear weapon program (see note 117) also threatened a Soviet
first strike against China.
140Douglass and Hoeber, pp. 15-31.
141
Pye, "Dilsmmas for American in China's Modernization,"
p. 7. Other observers who agree with Pye's assessment include:
Kintner, p. 532.
Robinson, "China's Asia Policy," p. 2.
142Douglass and Hoeber, p. 18.
143




144Drew Middleton, "Pentagon Studies Prospects of Mili-




Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization,"
pp. 6-7
.
147Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 103.
Barnett, China and the Major Powers
, p. 79.
Schiebel, p. 93.
The incident in Manchuria refers to the case of Gao
Gang (Kao Kang) , a trusted ally of Mao Zedong, who was sent
to Manchuria in September 1945 and assumed the top military,
government, and party posts in the region when the People's
Republic was proclaimed in 1949. Gao is alleged to have
defied Party policies and to have colluded, openly and
secretly, with the Russians. He was briefly raised to a
key central government post but could not fend off the accu-
sations made against him and was purged on December 24, 19 53.
He is reported to have committed suicide not long after being
purged.
148Lachica, "Big Soviet Defense Buildup in Siberia, "
p. 16.
149 For example, see:
Gayler, p. 64.
Kintner, p. 532.
Hal Piper, "Soviet Sees Itself Along Against China,
"
Baltimore Sun , March 12, 1979, p. 1.
Steven I. Levine has noted the same phenomenon:
In political terms, Soviet leaders, unlike many Western
observers, expect additional major changes in a
Chinese political system that they believe has not
yet stabilized. Elite conflict and popular pres-
sures may yet force a change in Chinese policy toward




Steven I. Levine, "The Unending Sino-Soviet Conflict,"
Current History , v. 79, n. 459 (October 1980), p. 72.
A. Doak Barnett has chronicled the record of Soviet
attempts to manipulate Chinese domestic politics, which
would indicate that the Soviets have enough confidence in
their perception of the nature of Chinese politics that they
are willing to implement policies on the basis of that
perception. See:
Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia
,
p. 352, note 119.
151A detailed analysis of all of these events is beyond
the scope of this paper. For further information on them,
the following sources are recommended:
On unrest and revolt in Tibet:




" Asian Affairs , v. 6, n. 3 (London, October 1975),
p. 264.
George N. Patterson, "The Situation in Tibet," China
Quarterly , no. 6 (April-June 1961), p. 81.
On the Cultural Revolution:
Juliana P. Heaslet, "The Red Guards: Instruments of
Destruction in the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey , v. 12,
n. 12 (December 1972), p. 1032.
Thomas W. Robinson (ed.), The Cultural Revolution in
China (Berkeley, Ca. : University of California Press, 1971).
Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography (New York: Harper
and Row, 1980), Ch. 18, pp. 303-331.
On the Lin Biao purge:
Michael Y.M. Kau, The Lin Piao Affair: Power Politics
and Military Coup (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts
and Sciences Press, 1975)
.
Jaap van Ginneken, The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao (New
York: Avon Books, 1977).
On the Gang of Four purge:
Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China After Mao (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1981)
Asia Yearbook 1977 and 1978 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern
Economic Review, Ltd. ) . The sections on China and the "News
Roundup" chronologies in these two editions discuss the purge
of the radicals and the accompanying violence.
On recent unrest and bombings:
Fox Butterfield, "Peking Says Bomb Caused Fatal Blast,
"
New York Times , October 31, 1980, p. A3.
"Unexplained Blast Kills 9 in Peking, " Monterey
Peninsula Herald (Associated Press report), October 30, 1980,
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p. 31. Two reports on the same incident are included because
of their slightly different perspectives.
"China Attacks Unrest Sweeping Countryside," Washington
Post , February 1, 19 81, p. A6
.
152David Bonavia's reports for the Far Eastern Economic
Review provide a good picture of the underlying political
tensions in China that arise from dissent within the Party,
economic problems, and resentment within the military:
David Bonavia, "Will the Gang Rise Again?" Far Eastern
Economic Review , February 20, 1981, p. 36.
"The Jobless Generation, " Far Eastern Economic
Review , March 6, 1981, p. 30.
"The Heroes' Last Stand," Far Eastern Economic
Review , April 17, 1981, p. 17.
For recent reports on conditions in Xinjiang, Inner
Mongolia, and Tibet, see:
Fox Butterfield, "Muslims Prospering in Rugged Chinese
Border Area," New York Times
,
October 29, 1980, p. A2
.
Mike Chinoy, "An Outsider's View of Inner Mongolia,"
Christian Science Monitor , March 18, 1981, p. B18.
Donna M. Liu, "Lifting of Veil Reveals Trouble in




153 Roger Garside and David Bonavia, both of whom are
experienced and perceptive observers of the Chinese political
scene, have expressed views of China's political prospects
which can only be described as optimistic (perhaps excessively
so) when one considers the magnitude of the problems that
China's leaders are attempting to manage
—
problems that
Garside and Bonavia themselves have documented. For their
optimistic assessments, see:
Garside, Ch. 17, pp. 419-427.
David Bonavia, "More Hearts at Ease, " Far Eastern
Economic Review
,
July 10, 1981, p. 28.
For an overview of these problems and their political
ramifications, see:
Frank Ching, "In China, Party Rules but Confusion
Reigns," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly , January 5, 1981,
p. 10.
Earl Foell, "China: Can A Great Civilization Rise
Again after Decades of False Starts?" Christian Science
Monitor
, April 8, 1981, p. B2.
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Robert Keatley, "The Chinese Contend With an Uncer-
tain Future," Wall Street Journal , January 19, 1981, p. 19.
Kenneth Lieberthal, "China: The Politics Behind the
New Economics," Fortune , December 31, 1979, p. 44.
155Trade percentages calculated from data In :
John T. Norman, "U.S. Could Become ChinaTs Top Trade
Partner, Bo Says," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly
,
December 22, 1980, p. 6.
"US Trade Gap Hit $32.25 Billion in '80," Wall Street
Journal , January 29, 1981, p. 7.
For U.S. imports of minerals from China, see:
Ralph Shaffer, "Rare Metals for US from Cathay,
"
Christian Science Monitor , August 19, 1981, p. 10.
Figures on Americans -in China were drawn from:
U.S. Department of State, "U.S.-PRC Exchanges,"
Gist , March 1981.
For U.S. missile surveillance stations in China, see:
Philip Taubman, "US and Peking Jointly Monitor Russian
Missiles," New York Times
, June 18, 1981, p. 1.
15 6
It should be pointed out, in respect to the moral
dilemma that the United States is likely to face should it
have to make a decision to back China under these circum-
stances, that this is precisely the type of situation the
Soviets would prefer to have should they perceive the need
to strike at China in defense of Soviet interests. One of
the patterns observable in Soviet public statements and
press commentaries on China and the United States (see Appen-
dix 'A') is the tactic of appealing to the values of an
adversary— in this case to isolate the U.S. from China.
157 Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era:
Heartlands, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (New
York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1977), p. 17.
15 8Kissinger, p. 762. Harold C. Hinton has expressed a
similar view in a more limited setting: "Soviet humiliation
and browbeating, to say nothing of military defeat, of China
would be seriously detrimental to balance and stability in
the Far East." (Hinton, The Bear at the Gate
, p. 14.)
159Douglas-Home, p. 14.





Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report
,
Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, January 29, 1980), p. 52.
On January 4, 1980, the New York Times reported on a
classified 1979 Department of Defense study of Chinese secu-
rity which concluded: "Thus, it would be in NATO's interest
to deter (or help China defend against) either large-scale
conventional or nuclear attacks by the Soviets." (Middle-
ton, "Pentagon Studies Prospects of Military Links with China,
"
p. A2.)
This study may well have been leaked to Drew Middleton
deliberately as a warning to the Soviet Union in response to
the invasion of Afghanistan nine days earlier.
16 2
Leslie Brown, p. 18. Since the next several para-
graphs are going to critique this conventional Western view,
it should be noted that Brown is not alone in his opinion.
Steven I. Levine has asserted, "There is no doubt that Sino-
Soviet hostility short of war divides the attention of the
Soviet leadership, ties up Soviet political and military
resources, and weakens Soviet pressure on the West. " (Levine,
"The Soviet Factor," p. 253). Donald Zagoria has concluded
that for ideological, military, and political reasons,
changes in Chinese attitudes "have helped to hold back Soviet
power, " (Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement,
"
p. 124) . Michael Pillsbury has similarly observed that:
"Chinese strategic principles benefit the United States to
the extent that those principles enhance Chinese military
power and cause further Soviet apprehension and circumspec-
tion." (Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," p. 48).
16 3
Douglas-Home, p. 14. He does not, however, define what
"one third of the Soviet military effort" entails in terms
of numbers of units or economic costs. Simple calculations
based on numbers of personnel, vehicles, aircraft, etcetera,
result in proportions in the 20 to 30 percent range. Never-
theless, his main point--that the Soviets are deeply committed
on the China border-*-is well taken. The build-up of Soviet
forces on the Sino-Soviet frontier described earlier (notes
108 and 122) tends to substantiate Doublas-Homes ' view of the
nature of the Soviet commitment.
A point made by:
Barnett, "Military-Security Relations Between China
and the United States," p. 591.
Pillsbury, "U.S . -Chinese Military Ties?" p. 58.
Burt, "Washington Seeks 'Equidistance' in the Big-
Power Triangle," p. 1.
395

16 6Stalin's strategy for avoiding war with Nazi Germany
from 1939 to 1941 does not disprove this point. His blunder
reinforced the fundamental principle that invasion of Russian
soil must be prevented. This demands that deterrence and
diplomatic measures must be founded upon the capability to
pre-empt 'aggressors' and defeat them on their own territory.
Thus, the 'primacy of the offensive' in Soviet military
doctrine.
16 7
Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 106.
168Data taken from:
Warner, p. 154 (also see note 122) .
"The Power Game: Soviet Forces in the Far East,"
p. 19.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 1979-1980 (London: I.I.S.S., 1979), p. 9.
169Neville Brown, "The Myth of an Asian Diversion,"
R.U.S.I. Journal for Defence Studies , v. 118, n. 3 (September
1973) .
Hua Xiu, p. 11.
171Two excerpts from Hua ' s remarks quoted in the Bei j ing
Review well illustrate China's primary concerns in its rela-
tions with the United States:
Recently, American leaders have stated that the new
U.S. Government attaches importance to the strate-
gic significance of Sino-U.S. relations and that
it will develop these relations on the basis of
the principles set forth in the joint communique
on the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the two countries. We welcome these remarks.
We firmly believe that as long as our two sides
face up to the stark reality of the world situation,
earnestly handle our bilateral relations in the
context of overall strategy and abide by the princi-
ples laid down in the joint communique on the
establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations, there
is no reason why Sino-U.S. relations should not
develop still further.




Chen Chu, "What Do Moscow-Vaunted 'Detente' and
'Disarmament* Add Up to?" Peking Review , v. 20, n. 50
(December 9, 1977), p. 22.
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173Jiang Yuanchun, "Soviet Strategy for East Asia,
"
Beijing Review , v. 24, n. 12 (March 23, 1981), p. 19.
174Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," p. 50.
175
"Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," .
Beijing Review , v. 23, n. 4 (January 28, 1980), p. 16.
Reading this statement alongside the previously
quoted assertion that "to have a sound grasp of global
strategy" requires one be "fully aware of China's role and
weight on the global chessboard," (see page 127) gives the
impression that there is a consistency to such statements,
which may well reflect the actual Chinese Government view
of its role in the Soviet-American strategic balance.
17 6
Guo Ji, "Sino-Soviet Relations," Beijing Review
,
v. 24, n. 3 (January 19, 1981), p. 3.
This statement could also imply a threat of a conven-
tional forces counterattack by China after a Soviet nuclear
strike, or a Chinese nuclear retaliatory strike in response
to a Soviet conventional attack. This interpretation does
not, however, account for the warning that "a war with China
will not be an isolated matter, " or the threat that a Soviet
attack would be the "launching of a world war in China."
Twice making the same point for emphasis indicates the state-
ment probably was not carelessly worded: the implied threat
of Western involvement was deliberate.
177William V. Garner, "SALT II: China's Advice and Dis-
sent," Asian Survey , v. 19, n. 12 (December 1979), p. 1227.
17 8Chen Si, "1980 in Retrospect: The International Sit-
uation," Beijing Review , v. 24, n. 1 (January 5, 1981), p. 13
179Guo Ji, p. 3.
180Founding member of People's Liberation Army in 19 27,
commander of rear guard force at Kiangsi Soviet when CCP
departed on Long March in 1934. Formerly Chief of Staff of
the PLA General Staff. Currently a member of the Central
Committee of the CCP, a member of the Military Affairs Com-
mission, and a Vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress.
181Su Yu, "Great Victory for Chairman Mao's Guideline
on War," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 34 (August 19, 1977), p. 15
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These views expressed by Su Yu are almost an anachro-
nism—much closer to Chinese propaganda of the late 1950s
and early 1960s (prior to China's first atomic explosion)
than to contemporary discussions on military strategy in
China. Yet his remarks cannot be dismissed out of hand.
Since the 1960s China has been carrying on a civil defense
program that rallies around Mao Zedong's admonition to "dig
tunnels deep." Su Yu himself, though past the peak of his
power in the 19 50s, was a relatively young (by Chinese stan-
dards) 68 at the time he wrote, and has since been promoted
in the government.
182Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy,
"
p. 23. Michael Pillsbury has noted the same point: "Since
1974, however, the Chinese have claimed that Soviet forces
along the Chinese border are not enough even for defense let
alone aggression." (Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture,"
p. 59).
Robert C. North has postulated that while China's
leaders acknowledge their country's weakness, they nonethe-
less believe China has the power to deter an attack:
Chinese leaders must be fully aware that the Soviet
Union and the United States both possess over-
whelming superiority in tactical and strategic
capabilities. Moreover, even an all-out effort
by China would not be sufficient to redress the military
balance for some time to come. On the other hand,
the Peking regime may well have concluded that its
combined nuclear and conventional forces are now
sufficient to deter the USSR or any other country
from a major attack— a level of sufficiency that
Chinese leaders may be satisfied with for some
time to come
.
Robert C. North, p. 218.
183Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," pp. 52-55.
184
Yu Pang, "Moscow's Southward Thrust Menaces the Third
World," Beijing Review , v. 23, n. 19 (May 12, 1980), pp. 24-
25.
185
Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s , p. 155
18 6
Segal, p. 500, and Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking
Rapprochement," pp. 127-129, discuss motives for the PRC to
improve relations with the USSR. Zagoria concludes that "a
limited accommodation" is one of the two most likely future
scenarios for Sino-Soviet relations (the other being
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"continuation of the present cold war") . A. Doak Barnett
also believes a Sino-Soviet detente to be possible:
There is a real possibility, in my opinion, that
there could be a limited Sino-Soviet detente at
some point in the future—and here I use the term
'detente' in its literal and limited meaning,
namely *a relaxation of strained relations or
tension. '
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International
Relations, United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great
Power Triangle (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1977), p. 5.
187The intensity of the tensions and emotions that divide
China and Russia were summed up in one short paragraph by
Hal Piper:
The true sources of Soviet-Chinese friction
run deeper. "Zoological," one Soviet commentator
called the "anti-Sovietism" of China's senior
vice premier, Deng Xiaoping. The feelings are
mutual
.
Piper, p. 1. For more detailed analyses of the
Chinese perceptions and fears that act as barriers to a
rapprochement with the Soviet Union, see Lieberthal, Sino-
Soviet Conflict in the 1970s
, pp. 177-178, and Gelman, pp.
2-5. Among the many important points made by Lieberthal
and Gelman are that China perceives the Soviets as aggressive
and expansionist; China is apprehensive about the Soviet
record of invading its socialist allies and the growing
Soviet capability to project military power over great dis-
tances; China is wary of the Soviet habit of attempting to
exploit friends and allies to its own advantage; the
ideological dimension of the dispute, though no longer the
paramount issue, reflects a broader source of tension—the
Soviet refusal to treat its friends and allies as equals,
out only as junior partners; and the continuing Soviet effort
to encircle and isolate China militarily and politically.
When all of these factors are considered, almost all
observers agree that it is highly unlikely that there will
De more than a limited relaxation of tensions between the
Soviet Union and China. Lieberthal writes that there may
^ell be fluctuations in the level of tension between China
ind Russia, including gestures indicating the possibility
>f a significant improvement of relations, but he warns
:hat: "These 'flurries,' if they occur, will prove to be more
shadow than substance, as far-reaching rapprochement between
:hese two continental giants remains beyond the realm of the
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politically possible," (Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in
the 1970s , p. 145) . Richard E. Pipes has concluded that a
"complete change in government in either country" would have
to be a prerequisite for a "lasting rapprcchement , " (House
Committee on International Relations, p. 37) , but Ralph N.
Clough (et al) warn that even fulfilling this prerequisite
will not necessarily achieve such far-reaching results, at
least in the case of China:
A change in leadership in China might result
in some easing of the tension between China and
the Soviet Union, but the problems between them
are so basic and difficult to resolve that no
far-reaching rapprochement is likely in the
next few years
.
Ralph N. Clough, A. Doak Barnett, Morton H. Halperin,
and Jerome H. Kahan, The United States, China, and Arms Con -
trol (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975), p. 9.
Along these same lines, Donald Zagoria, citing Russian fears
of the "yellow peril" and the intensity of Chinese national-
ism, observed that: "The huge cultural and psychological
gap between China and Russia made it impossible for the two
countries to achieve any real degree of intimacy" during the
previous period of Sino-Soviet alliance that broke down
into the present dispute. (Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking
Rapprochement," p. 12 6).
There is also a consensus among Western observers
that a revival of the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s is
not likely to occur. Allen S. Whiting, for example, has
written:
The Sino-Soviet alliance cannot be revived. Too
much blood has been spilled, both figuratively
and literally, for either side to rely on the
other for national security. As for a division
of the world into spheres of interest, this
proved impossible even during the 19 50s, when
the alliance was in force. No such agreement on
who will prevail where is conceivable now that
Moscow has acquired clients in Latin America,
Africa, and the Middle East.
Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 105. For
similar views of the improbability of a renewed Sino-Soviet
alliance, see Levine, "The Soviet Factor in Sino-American
Relations," p. 254, and Barnett in House Committee on Inter-
national Relations, p. 5.
18 8




189Gerald Segal has postulated that "Once a more reason-
able defense is provided against possible pressure from
Moscow, Beijing may well feel able to negotiate from strength
and equalty with the USSR, and Sino-Soviet detente may be-
come more likely." (Segal, p. 508.) Kenneth Lieberthal
reached essentially the same conclusion after studying
China's policy of alignment with the West:
Barring any major unforseen setback, it is ex-
traordinarily unlikely that the Chinese will
change the anti-Soviet basis of their global
foreign policy... In all likelihood, only when
Peking feels the vitality of rapid industrial
growth combined with infusions of military hard-
ware and technology will the Chinese leaders
dare to contemplate pulling away from the policy
outlined above and risk offending important U.S.
policy interests across the board in the Pacific
region
.
Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s
,
p. 159.
190 Robinson, "China's Asia Policy," p. 46.
191
It appears that China may well have adopted a strategy
of standing alone against both superpowers for a few years
in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. In 19 6 8 the PRC
media began referring to both America and Russia as enemies,
and it was not until 1971 that the Soviets clearly stood
alone as "enemy number one" and the United States became a
candidate for membership in China's 'united front' against
Soviet hegemonism.
More than likely, if the Chinese did adopt a 'two
main enemies ' strategy—it is not clear that they actually
did so—it was because they, were unable to achieve a con-
sensus within the CCP leadership as to which superpower was
the greater threat. In other words, the strategy may have
been adopted by default, rather than because it was seen to
be superior to the 'united front* doctrine.
There is strong circumstantial evidence, and a few di-
rect indications , that China's relations with the two super-
powers was one of the crucial issues in the debate over
defense strategy and military policy that is known to have
been fought in China during the two-year period leading up
to Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing in July 1971.
A brief review of some of the key events of this period
illustrates the possibility of the linkage:
20 Feb 19 7 PRC accepts US proposal for high-level




1970 Throughout the remainder of the year there
appear in the PRC media reports and criti-
cism of continuing factional conflict with-
in the CCP over economic and military poli-
cy, and over "revisionist" lines.
30 May 1970 PRC accepts formal US proposal for Kissinger
to visit Beijing.
3 Jun 1971 Last public appearance of Lin Biao, the PRC
Defense Minister and officially-designated
heir to Mao Zedong as party chairman.
1 Jul 1971 Editorials on CCP anniversary carry numerous
indications of serious factional strife and
attack unnamed persons with "treasonable
foreign associations" (possibly Zhou Enlai's
communications with Washington, which Mao
approved, but more than likely Lin Biao's
links with Moscow, as alleged later)
.
9 Jul 1971 Secret Kissinger visit to Beijing (two days)
.
1 Aug 1971 Army Day editorials emphasize policies op-
posed to Lin Biao's line, indicating he is
no longer directing PLA.
12 Sep 1971 Lin Biao dies in plane crash in Outer
Mongolia, supposedly while fleeing to Moscow.
In White House Years Kissinger makes an interesting comment
on the fall of Lin Biao: "The upheaval was in all likelihood
induced by the sharp new turn in China's policy toward us:
so Mao told Nixon in February 1972." (Kissinger, p. 768.)
He adds to this observation later, in describing President
Nixon's first meeting with Chairman Mao:
Mao used the context of a generally teasing
conversation about Nixon's political prospects to
mention his own political opposition. There was
a "reactionary group which is opposed to our con-
tact with you," he said. "The result was that
they got on an airplane and fled abroad." The
plane crashed in Outer Mongolia, Mao and Chou
explained, in case we had missed the reference
to Lin Piao.
Kissinger, p. 1061.
192Committee on International Relations, p. 5.
193Essentially the same point has been made by Robert
Pfaltzgraff and Michel Obksenberg. Pfaltzgraff concluded
that:

Under such circumstances, the priorities of
the United States lie more in the strengthening of
its own capabilities for national security than
in the development of China as a surrogate for
American power—an alternative that lies beyond
the capacity of China, as its leaders have
reminded their American counterparts.
Pfaltzgraff, p. 48. Along the same lines, Oksenberg
observed:
The Chinese are unlikely to be able to contribute
more than they already do to the maintenance of
a global balance of power, though it is important
that they sustain their role. At best, therefore,
we should consider Chinese military capability a
.supplement to, and not a substitute for, the
American military presence in the Western Pacific.
The burden of maintaining stability in Northeast
Asia cannot be lifted from our shoulders.
Oksenberg, p. 316.
194Alexander Haig, "A New Direction in U.S. Foreign
Policy," Current Policy , no. 275 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, April 24, 1981), p. 2.
195A few choice quotations, all of which were made in the
context of Soviet actions perceived as threatening vital
Western interests (not just for general 'anti-communist'
motives)
, will illustrate that the policy transcends party
lines in American politics and, even more importantly, could
not be cast off in the transition from the 'cold war' to
the era of 'detente':
President Harry Truman, March 12, 1947 (the 'Truman
Doctrine'): "It must be the policy of the United States to
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation
by armed minorities or by outside pressures."
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 5, 1957 (the
'Eisenhower Doctrine'): "Now, under all the circumstances
I have laid before you, a greater responsibility now devolves
upon the United States. We have shown, this country has
shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the prin-
ciple that force shall not be used internationally for any
aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence
of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate."
President John F. Kennedy gave the principle its most
stirring and far-reaching expression: "Let every nation
know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay
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any price, bear any burden, meet any friend, oppose any foe,
to assure the survival and success of liberty." (Quoted,
of course, from Kennedy's inaugural address, January 20,
1961.)
Even Jimmy Carter, the president who has thus far
been the most emphatic in his desire to reorient American
foreign policy away from its focus on the East-West rivalry,
was forced to concede that the Soviets must be "persuaded"
to abandon their expansionist policies and that the United
States must play a central role in this effort:
Now, I believe in detente with the Soviet Union.
To me, it means progress toward peace. But the
effects of detente should not be limited to our
own two countries alone. We hope to persuade the
Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its
system of society upon another, either through
direct military intervention or through the use
of a client state's military force, as was the
case with Cuban intervention in Angola. (May 22,
1977.)
Ever since the end of the Second World War,
the United States has been the leader in moving
our world closer to stable peace and genuine
security. We have the world's strongest economy;
we have the world's strongest military forces;
and we share burdens of mutual defense with
friends abroad whose security and prosperity
are as vital to us as to themselves. (February
20, 1979.)
Let our position be absolutely clear: An at-
tempt by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault
on the vital interests of the United States of
America. And such an assault will be repelled by
any means necessary, including military force.
"
(The 'Carter Doctrine, ' quoted from his state of
the union address on January 23, 1980, barely one
month after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.)
The evolution in President Carter's policy toward the Soviet
Union—from persuasion in the context of detente, to recogni-
tion of the importance of American power, and finally to
the clear invocation of that power against the threat of
Soviet expansionism— is not surprising. He was dealing with
the same Soviet Union with which his predecessors quoted
above had to deal, changes in Soviet leadership and the
emergence of detente notwithstanding. Thus, the "new direc-
tion" in American foreign policy outlined by Secretary
of State Haig is to a large degree a firm reaffirmation of
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the same policy, first announced by President Truman, that
has been followed—with more or less vigor--by every adminis-
tration for the past 34 years.
Sources for the statements quoted above are as follows:
"Text of President Truman's Speech on New Foreign
Policy," New York Times , March 13, 1947, p. 2.
"Text of the Address by Eisenhower to Congress Out-
lining New Program for Mideast," New York Times
, January 6,
1957, p. 34.
"Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961, Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy,
1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1962), p. 1.
"Humane Purposes in Foreign Policy, " Department of
State News Release, May 22, 1977, p. 3. (Text of President
Carter's speech at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend,
Indiana, on that date.)
"America's Role in a Turbulent World," Current Policy
,
no. 57 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, March 1979),
p. 1.
"Transcript of President's State of the Union Address
to Joint Session of Congress," New York Times , January 24,
1980, p. A12.
196Ross Temll, "China Enters the 1980s," Foreign
Affairs , v. 58, n. 4 (Spring 1980), p. 935.
197Stoessel, p. 2.
198A January 1981 Beijing Review article reviewing inter-
national affairs over the previous year identified the fol-
lowing as targets of Soviet 'social-imperialism 1 : the oil
producing regions of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf,
the Indian Ocean, warm water ports for the Soviet navy, ASEAN,
the Strait of Malacca, the oil supply routes to the West and
Japan, Iran, Baluchistan, Pakistan, Thailand, and, of course,
Western Europe. (Chen Si, p. 11.)
The PRC press is sensitive to Western perceptions of
Soviet strategy and picks up on themes current in the Western
media. In 1981, for example, Beijing Review published a
commentary on the crucial issue of resource dependency:
Brezhnev has declared that the Soviet goal is
to control the two treasuries which the West re-
lies on: the oil-rich Persian Gulf and mineral-rich
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central and southern Africa. Moscow's strategy
is to seize control of the strategic resources
and passages leading to Europe . Once the Soviet
strategy succeeds, the West will be in a
dangerous position.
"The Battle for Resources," Beijing Review , v. 24,
n. 18 (May 4, 1981)
, p. 15.
This is not meant to imply that China's leaders do not
share those perceptions as a result of their own analysis of
Soviet behavior. Quite to the contrary, Chinese awareness
of Western security concerns implies a willingness to take
a stand supportive of Western interests even when China's own
security interests are not directly threatened. We in the
West must not, however, misjudge the source of Chinese
willingness to support, at least in its propaganda, Western
security interests. China is motivated not out of friend-
ship for or loyalty to the West, but out of enlightened
self-interest
.
Indeed, it is not really accurate to suggest that
China supports Western security interests. China's position
is one of opposition to the Soviet threat to those interests.
In the absence of a perceived Soviet threat--from China's,
not the West's, point of view--Western security interests
are of no interest to China except to the extent that they
might impinge upon China's own interests.
199
"Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination,
"
p. 16.
Jiang, p. 19. It should be noted that it has been
accusations such as this one that led to the Soviet counter-
attack, declaring China's actions to be "detrimental to the
cause of national liberation" and warning that Beijing would
"undermine the unity of the three most important forces of
our time—socialism, the international communist and workers
movement, and the revolutionary national liberation move-
ment. " (Semyonov, p. 29.) The Soviet Union remains highly
sensitive to challenges from China to the self-appointed
Soviet position as leader of the socialist camp and the
national liberation movement.
201
"Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," p. 16,
202
"Moscow's 'Dumb-Bell' Strategy," Beijing Review
,
v. 23, n. 8 (February 25, 1980), p. 9.
203Jiang, p. 20. Attempts by China to reassure the West
that the Chinese share Western concerns for the Soviet
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threat have, however, resulted in statements that contradict
this analysis of Soviet strategy:
China is not afraid of being encircled by the
Soviet Union. Our analysis of Soviet moves in
the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean
is based on an overall global strategy rather
than China's own interests.
Guo Ji, p. 3.
Once again, on another occasion, the same contradiction on
Soviet goals— in this case concerning Soviet motives in
Afghanistan and Vietnam:
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea with Soviet
backing are two major problems affecting the
whole world. They are not 'local' problems con-
cerning only the security of Asia. They are
global problems, for the Soviet Union's south-
ward thrust is a major step in its drive to at-
tain global hegemony.
Chen Si, p. 11. Only by viewing the Soviet encircle-
ment of China as part of the Soviet plan for global hegemony,
as these statements imply, is the apparent contradiction in
the Chinese perception of Soviet strategy resolved. While
this assumption may appear to resolve the contraction, it
seriously misinterprets the nature of Chinese fears of the
Soviet threat.
China's leaders are evidently faced with a dilemma
when presenting their case against the Soviets to the world.
On the one hand, China is deeply concerned with the Soviet
threat to its security and with the Soviet attempt to con-
tain and isolate China. If the Chinese counter to those
threats--the 'united front against Soviet hegemonism' --is to
succeed, the West, and the Third World as well, must believe
that China is indeed threatened by the Soviets (and not vice
versa, as the Russians contend)
.
On the other hand, the Chinese fear that should the
West perceive Soviet actions as being overwhelmingly directed
against China, Western leaders may be tempted to avoid a
strategic alignment with China so that the full brunt of the
Soviet expansionist drive would be borne by China alone. The
West would then be in the position of "watching two tigers
fight." China must, therefore, attempt to deter the West
from succumbing to that temptation by convincing its united
front partners that Soviet ambitions are global, that Soviet
aggression anywhere threatens all equally, and that, while
the isolation and emasculation of China may be the Russians
'
immediate objective, this is but one step in the Soviet plan
407

for the conquest of their ultimate objectives—Western
Europe and inevitably thereafter the world.
Hence, the apparent contradictions that are occasion-
ally seen in China *s assessments of Soviet strategy are but
two aspects of the same underlying concern for the Soviet
threat to China and of the 'united front' strategy for
countering that threat.
204_. --Jiang, p. 22.
205ttu ... . ,Whiting observed:
In addition, it is questionable how much
Beijing can or will contribute to halting Soviet
expansionism beyond the present diversion of
Soviet forces around China's periphery. These
forces are not likely to increase significantly,
given the rate and type of military moderniza-
tion that can be anticipated in the PLA over the
next decade.
Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 112.
2 6
In 1976, between the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao
Zedong, less than a week after Deng Xiaoping was purged (by
the same group of radicals who had purged him in the Cultural
Revolution) , and just after Hua Guofeng was finally named
Premier (he had been acting premier for two months) , Joseph
Kraft observed:
But while sentiments seem to remain constant,
for the time being, China is plunged into domes-
tic turmoil. The present crisis has clearly in-
volved all the institutions and leaders who count
in China. The central committee of the Communist
Party has been, by Peking's own admission, divided,
Mao himself, his wife and her allies on the left
as well as Teng and his allies among the moderates
have all been playing hard ball.
So the Chinese can no longer be expected either
to weigh in so heavily in direct pressure on Moscow,
or to play so large a part in balancing Russia's
influence in the rest of the World. Indeed, it has
been clear for weeks that the Chinese have recently
been pulling in their horns in countries such as
Cambodia, Angola, Tanzania and Cuba where they
used to contest Russian pressure.
If the Soviet Union is to be contained, ac-
cordingly, the U.S. and its allies will have to
undertake a more active policy than has recently
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come easily. Washington, in particular, ought to
be developing much better relations with one set
of countries treated until recently as stepchil-
dren. Those are the underdeveloped countries of
Latin America, Asia and Africa where Russia seems
now to be concentrating its efforts.
Kraft, "China's Future Role on the World Stage,"
p. 19.
207Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia
,
pp. 16, 44, and 68. The Soviet intervention did indeed
result in the consequences some Politburo members are postu-
lated to have foreseen by Valenta:
The invasion contributed to a deepening of the
split with the PRC, as the Chinese leadership ex-
ploited the crisis to condemn the Soviet Union.
Chinese leaders appear to have believed, correctly
or incorrectly, that the intervention was the
manifestation of a new Brezhnev doctrine of 'lim-
ited sovereignty 1 seeking to justify Soviet inter-
vention in any socialist country, including China.
The intervention convinced the Chinese of the im-
perialist intentions of the USSR and served as a
catalyst in Chinese domestic and foreign affairs.
The Soviet-Chinese border incidents of 1969 con-
firmed these convictions. The Chinese leadership
reacted to the intervention by curbing the Cultur-
al Revolution, reinforcing the Sino-Soviet bor-
ders, and establishing better relations with the
United States as a counterbalance to the perceived
Soviet threat.
Ibid
. , p. 163
.
2 8Committee on Government Operations, p. 15.
209The Soviets apparently had a low opinion of President
Carter's resolve and were reasonably confident that his reac-
tion would not entail too high a cost. Jiri Valenta 's as-
sessment of the Soviet view of the U.S. at the time is that:
"The United States was distracted in Iran as it had been dur-
ing the Suez crisis in 1956 when the Soviets invaded Hungary
and during escalation of the Vietnam war in 19 68 when the
Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia. United States' vacil-
lation during the Cuban mini crisis in September 1979--when
an unacceptable Soviet combat brigade suddenly became accept-
able—and its hesitancy and preoccupation with Iran were
probably powerful arguments to the Soviet decision makers who
favored Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." Vernon Aspaturian
believes the Soviet leadership "concluded that his inconsistency,
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rather than concealing a sinister cunning, reflected inde-
cisiveness, lack of resolution, and poor judgement. In
situation after situation, the President would express moral
or political outrage, resort to exaggeration, hyperbole, and
overstatement in his choice of words, issue vague but ominous
threats, then adjust and accommodate to changing situations.
The Soviet leaders discovered that if they held out long
enough, the Carter administration would come around." Alex-
ander Dallin noted the same Soviet perception: "a lack of
American credibility, in particular the remarkable record of
vacillation and contradictory signals from the Carter admin-
istration." (Aspaturian, Dallin and Valenta, pp. 13, 27,
60.)
210Joseph Schiebel has made this point quite effectively:
...the current leadership both in Moscow and
in Peking works under this assumption: that a
serious deterioration in the relationship between
their two nations may lead to a confrontation
that will be qualitatively different from the
conflicts of the past--a confrontation requiring
internal stability and, above all, a secure
international position. The basic motivations,
however, are not symmetrical. Peking's advan-
tage would lie in avoiding any confrontation;
hence its interest in lining up US support and
in wanting to identify with what it perceives
to be American designs for creating an inter-
national environment that would put the Soviet
Union on the defensive. Moscow, on the other
hand, could stand to lose from a perpetuation
of the status quo under which Chinese communist
nations consolidate their relations among them-
selves and with other noncommunist countries.
Moscow, then, would appear to be acting less on
the basis of a favorable prognosis than from a
sense of urgency and a need to take some risks.
Schiebel, p. 83.
211Gromyko, p. 12 7.
212Don Oberdorfer and Michael Getler, "Soviet Restraint
Set as Condition for Pacts," Washington Post , February 13,
1981, p. 33.
For further information on this Reagan Administration
policy, see:
Daniel Southerland, "US Wants Hard Proof of Soviet




Walter S. Mossberg, "Weinberger Links Arms Control
Talks to Cut in Soviet Forces Around Poland, " Wall Street
Journal , April 15, 1981, p. 3.
"Interview With Alexander Haig, Secretary of State,
"
U.S. News & World Report , May 18, 1981, p. 29.
For the Soviet reaction to the Reagan Administration's
'linkage' approach, see:
Anthony Austin, "Soviet Aide Criticizes U.S. on Arms
Talk 'Linkage'," New York Times , April 23, 1981, p. 11.
Kevin Klose, "Soviet Aide Denounces U.S. Policy,"
Washington Post , April 23, 1981, p. 1.
213Craig R. Whitney reported the moderation in China's
demands:
Soviet calls for negotiations at the govern-
mental level to put relations on a more normal
footing have been regular and frequent. But un-
til this spring, the Chinese insisted that the
Soviet Union first pull back its military forces
from disputed territory.
Diplomats believe that the Chinese dropped
this demand in the unpublished note of May 5 . to
which Mr. Gromyko has now replied. The Chinese
reportedly also proposed negotiations on scien-
tific, technological, cultural and trade ex-
changes, and parallel talks on the border issue.
Craig R. Whitney, "Soviet Asks Chinese to Talks in
Moscow," New York Times
, June 6, 1979, p. All.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry statement of January 19,
1980 cancelling the talks shows the linkage approach in
China's policy toward Russia: "The invasion of the Soviet
Union into Afghanistan threatens world peace and China's
security. It creates new obstacles for normalizing rela-
tions between the two countries. Under these circumstances,
it goes without saying that it is inappropriate to hold
these Sino-Soviet talks .
"
Fox Butterfield, "China Cancels Talks With Soviet on
Improving Ties," New York Times , January 20, 1980, p. 11.
214
"Soviet Detente Fraud Exposed," Peking Review , v. 20,
n. 3 (January 14, 1977), p. 32.
215Michael Weisskopf, "Peking Calls for Talks With
Moscow on Long-Standing Border Dispute, " Washington Post
,




For more detailed discussions of the points made in
this paragraph, see:
Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Says It is Not Bound by 2
Arms Pacts With Soviet," New York Times , May 20, 1981, p. 11
—
"New Talks With Russians on Arms Are Still Likely,
Reagan Aides Say," New York Times , February 2, 1981, p. 1.
James Reston, "Reagan Is Prepared to Hold Arms Talks
if Soviet is Sincere," New York Times , February 3, 1981,
p. 1.
"Weinberger Says SALT Talks Can Wait 6 Months While
U.S. Starts Arms Buildup," Wall Street Journal , January 7,
1981, p. 6.
Judith Miller, "Rostow Predicts Delay in Talks On
Arms Limits," New York Times , June 23, 1981, p. 1.
"Arms Control for the 1980s: An American Policy,"
Current Policy , no. 292 (Washington, D.C.: Department of
State, July 14, 1981), p. 3.
Henry Trewhitt, "SALT to Stall 9 Months—or More,
"
Baltimore Sun
, July 16, 1981, p. 2.
217For the Soviet attitude toward resuming the SALT
talks, see:
Ned Temko, "Soviets Don't Like Reagan's Tone, But
Want the Arms Talks," Christian Science Monitor , March 6,
1981, p. 1 .
—
"Vance Trip Gives Moscow Opening to Push Arms
Talks," Christian Science Monitor
,
June 16, 1981, p. 4.
Jim Gallagher, "Key Soviet Official Urges Arms Curb,
"
Chicago Tribune
, June 23, 19 81, p. 2.
Henry S. Bradsher, "Soviet Arms Control View Frus-
trates U.S. Officials," Washington Star , July 7, 1981, p. 7.
218Newhouse, p. 220.
219 In describing the course of the SALT negotiations
during 1969, Newhouse observes:
Over the summer and into early autumn, Moscow
and Washington played rhetorical badminton with
SALT, but not until the Russians could establish
a parallel negotiation with China on the border
issue could they sit down with the Americans.
Soviet leaders had to show that they were no less
concerned with the stability of the Communist
bloc than with stable US-USSR relations. Not
until they had opened communications with Peking
could they adequately defend themselves against
charges of selling out to Washington to solem-
nize a contemptible great-power nuclear monopoly.
Not just the Communist bloc but the third world
was looking on.
Ibid




220 For Kissinger's description of the geopolitical con-
siderations involved in the opening to Beijing, see Kissinger,
pp. 763-764 (similar views of his can be found in note 38
herein)
.
221Jeremy J. Stone, "Arms Control: Can China be Ignored?"
In : Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control , ed. Morton H.
Halperin (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967), p. 91.
Granted that the particular issue of which Stone
writes—-active defenses—was subsequently forestalled, though
not resolved, by the 1972 ABM treaty, Stone nonetheless
identified a phenomenon that has indeed come to pass. Although
his thesis cannot be proven conclusively without access to
Politburo deliberations, there is substantial circumstantial
evidence to support Stone's view: the Soviets do take the
Chinese nuclear threat seriously (see note 105, page 70,
and pages 93-94) , there has been a rapid and sustained ex-
pansion and modernization of Soviet strategic and theater
nuclear forces (far beyond what would be needed to deter
only the U.S.), and over the past few years the United States
has, for the most part, responded to this Soviet build-up
as if its full weight were directed against the U.S.
222Hsieh, pp. 150-170.
J. Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Generals' View of
China in the 1960 's," In: Sino-Soviet Military Relations
,
ed. Raymond L. Garthoff (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 183-192
A brief chronology of the arms control and military
policy-related events that occurred during the critical 1957-
1964 period will help to illustrate that such issues were
deeply involved in, if not central to, the Sino-Soviet split:
15 Oct 1957 USSR and PRC sign 'Agreement on New Tech-
nology for National Defense' in which the
Soviets pledged to aid China develop atomic
weapons
.
13 Jun 1958 PRC starts up its first nuclear reactor.
20 Jun 1959 USSR unilaterally abrogates 1957 agreement,
halts atomic weapon assistance.
15 Sep 1959 Khrushchev visits U.S. for summit with
Eisenhower, proclaiming doctrine of 'peace-
ful coexistence, ' PRC condemns both.
21 Jan 1960 PRC warns that it will not be bound by any




Aug 1960 USSR withdraws technicians from PRC as
ideological attacks in press intensify
31 Jul 1963 PRC denounces negotiations on limited test
ban treaty.
5 Aug 1963 USSR, U.S., and U.K. sign Limited Test Ban
Treaty.
16 Oct 1964 PRC detonates its first atomic weapon.
These incidents occurred in the context of two crises in the
Taiwan Strait (1958, 1962), Sino-Indian border disputes (1959
and 1962, the latter resulting in a Chinese attack on India),
and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), all of which fueled the
growing tensions between Russia and China as the Soviets
repeatedly acted with caution when faced with American deter-
mination to resist belligerent moves by either the USSR or
the PRC.
223Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The Chinese Factor in Soviet
Disarmament Policy, " In ; Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Con -







226Kissinger, pp. 686, 689, 699.
227Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge,
Mass.: Ballinger, 1979), pp. 15, 204, 248.
22 8
David K. Shipler, "Soviet Warns That Policy of U.S.
Is 'Fraught With Dangers' to Peace," New York Times , June
18, 1978, p. 1.
229
V.P. Lukin, "Washington-Beijing: 'Quasi-Allies " ?"
SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologia , no. 12 (December
1979), pp. 50-55. Translated In: Soviet Press: Selected
Translations , no. 80-5 (May 1980), p. 151.
For example:
Chinese official representatives are constantly
attacking the efforts of other countries that strive
to halt the arms race, strengthen detente and re-






As one way to gain world domination Peking is
whipping on the arms race and building up its
war, primarily nuclear, potential. It has not
signed a single agreement to limit its nuclear
arms stockpiles. China goes on with nuclear
testing in the atmosphere in defiance of strong
protests from other countries and refuses to
recognize the treaty of nuclear non-prolifera-
tion. Pretending to protect the right to devel-
op nuclear arms for self-defence needs, it
opposes the treaty on the principles of states
'
activity in outer space and the treaty that pro-
hibits nuclear and other weapons of mass des-
truction being placed on sea-bed and ocean floor.
Self-evident in this respect is Peking's refusal
to support the proposal on the non-use of force
and a ban on the use of nuclear arms. The nega-
tive attitude of the Chinese leadership to these
issues and opposition to the latest Soviet ini-
tiatives only bear out that they aim to turn
China into a major aggressive military power as
is required by their world hegemony ambitions.
"Peking's Foreign Policy," p. 46.
231Stone, p. 93.
232Newhouse, pp. 81, 84.
233Kissinger, p. 705.
234Garner, p. 1225. This article also discusses the
changes in the international political and strategic en-
vironment which are increasing the importance of China in
American arms control policy.
235Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist
China and Arms Control (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 165.
Stone, p. 91.
237Michael Pillsbury noted China's concern for American
reliability in the context of SALT:
Any apparently unreciprocated American conces-
sions in SALT can only heighten Peking's anxiety
and undermine its confidence in the long-range
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utility of tilting toward the United States and
frontally opposing the Soviet quest for global
hegemony
.
Michael Pillsbury, SALT on the Dragon: Chinese Views
of the Soviet-American Strategic Balance (Santa Monica, Ca.
:
Rand Corp., April 197 5), p. 73.
William Garner pointed out the fear that SALT could
lead to a greater Soviet threat to China: "Chinese strate-
gists have likewise revealed their suspicion that Western
'appeasement' of Soviet arms expansion in these negotiations
is designed to deflect Soviet military expansion eastward
into a war with China." (Garner, p. 1227; these Chinese
concerns were also described in note 203 herein.) China's
worries have not been unfounded: the Soviet Union has in-
deed proposed superpower military cooperation against China
in the course of the SALT negotiations (see page 165)
.
2 38
For the Chinese view that SALT cannot halt the super-
power arms race, see:
"Soviet-U.S. Moscow Talks: Scheming Against Each
Other," Peking Review , v. 20, n. 15 (April 8, 1977), p. 29.
"What Does the Failure of Moscow Talks Signify?"
Peking Review , v. 20, n. 16 (April 15, 1977), p. 21.
"New SALT Agreement: A Fraud," Peking Review , v. 20,
n. 45 (November 4, 1977), p. 46.
Chang Hua, "Soviet-US Nuclear Talks: An Analysis,"
Peking Review , v. 20, n. 51 (December 16, 1977) , p. 22.
For the Chinese view that the Soviet Union is using
SALT to achieve strategic superiority over the United States,
see:
"Soviet Social-Imperialism—Most Dangerous Source of
World War, "p. 8.
Chang Hua, p. 21.
"Pacific Ocean: Soviet Missile Tests," Peking Review ,
v. 20, n. 14 (April 1, 1977), p. 32.
"'Detente' Smokescreen: Moscow Steps Up War Prepara-
tions," Peking Review , v. 20, n. 11 (March 11, 1977), p. 28.
239According to Pillsbury the "peculiar historical sensi-
tivity of the Chinese to a potential Soviet-American con-
spiracy against China" was exacerbated by the creation of
the Standing Consultative Commission:
From Pekings ' perspective, it would be diffi-
cult to imagine a more alarming type of potential
Soviet-American 'collusion' than what appears to
be institutionalized secret intelligence consulta-
tions between military officers of the two super-
powers in the SCC.




240Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World
Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979),
p. 480.
241Oksenberg, p. 312.
242 Garner, p. 1238.
243Thomas W. Wolfe perceived this point clearly in his
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Two statements from the Soviet press, both made in
1980, will illustrate that the Soviets still accuse the
Chinese of attempting to wreck Soviet-American relations:
In trying to provoke a clash between the USSR
and the USA, the Chinese leaders accuse the
American Administration of being 'soft' and in-
active, of being reluctant to interfere in
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conflicts and the internal affairs of African
states and aggravate relations with the USSR,
Cuba and the other socialist countries.
Semyonov, p. 35.
The Chinese leadership has its own logic and its
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and do not rule out war as a means of settling
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pation in all international organizations and in
various multilateral arms control and disarma-




trol, food supply, energy supply, nuclear pro-
liferation, protection of the environment, arms
control, underground nuclear testing, use of the
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As any wiley capitalist would expect, this dual rate
system has resulted in a black market for foreign currency
( Ibid ) , and is an incentive for China's own trading companies
to keep their earnings abroad.
"China Orders Return of Overseas Deposits," The Asian
Wall Street Journal Weekly
, January 19, 1981, p. 6.
Such efforts to control the side-effects of the dual
exchange rate system do not appear overly successful, so it
can be anticipated that China will be forced to "officially"
devalue its currency if it is adamant on improving its trade
balance by that means.
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Peninsula Herald (Washington Post News Service report)
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Ching, "Trading Hassles Said to Frustrate," p. 4.
71The $2.5 billion figure is the sum of the loans made
or offered on concessionary (or at least highly favorable
commercial) terms during 1980-81 by Japan (up to $1.5 billion
offered) , the World Bank (about $500 million, over half at
9.6% interest, some interest-free), the United Nations
($142.8 million), Australia ($59 million), and from miscellan-
eous sources. Data from:
Frank Ching, "In Policy Change, China to Ask Firms to
Bid on Contracts," The Wall Street Journal , July 17, 1980,
p. 27.
"China Turns for Aid to Countries It Once Shunned as
Enemies," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly , December 29,
1980, p. 4.
Eduardo Lachica, "World Bank Acts Quickly on First
Loans to China, " The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly , June
29, 1981, p. 4.
The $26 billion figure for commercial and governmental
(at commercial rates) credits is from:
"China Won't Use Its Vast Credits," p. 32.
72Because China's long-term debt management problems are
going to have a major impact on China's development program,
as well as on China's relationship with the West (united
front or no united front, China will not let itself become a
supplicant groveling before Western financial institutions),
it will be worthwhile to examine some of the potential sources
of capital to which China could turn.
Thus far, trade credits have been the financial resource
most available to China. As was noted above, Western govern-
ments and private financial institutions have been falling
over themselves to arrange such credits for China to spur
the opening of the fabled "China market." Unfortunately for
China, these are the financial resource of least value to its
development program. Trade credits are convenient for speed-
ing transactions, and their terms are generally not bad (7 to
9%) , but their terms are generally short (3-5 years) and they
are tied to specific transactions—therefore could not be used
for a large capital construction project. The IMF loans,
which are disbursed to aid in balance of payments problems
(not in advance to fund projects) , are a form of aid due to
their favorable interest charges (4.4-6.7 8%), but not many
long-term development projects can earn even that small of
a return on investment in the time allowed to repay the IMF
loan (3-5 years). As a developing country, China has a $3.14
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billion borrowing limit in the IMF, and over the past two
years has been alloted about $1.1 billion to help it finance
its trade deficits. IMF and trade credit data from:
"China Won't Use Its Vast Credits," p. 32.
"IMF Agrees to Lend China $550 Million," p. 7.
Eugene A. Birnbaum, "The IMF's New Lending Power," The
Wall Street Journal
, September 29, 1980, p. 22.
Second to trade credits in quantity has been various
forms of private capital (direct investment in joint ventures,
commercial loans, and, soon, debentures issued by the China
International Trust and Investment Corporation) , and some
government loans offered at commercial rates. As long as
China remains a good credit risk, private investment should
be available to the extent that China can generate projects
to absorb it. The drawback is that the projects must earn a
competitive return on invesment—but not all development
projects can do this. China is well aware of the massive
debt problems of many of the Third World nations—almost all
developing countries turn to the private financial markets
because the various aid programs cannot, or will not, supply
capital on the scale that is felt to be needed. Although it
appears the World Bank will be making a special effort to
spur private investment in development projects on the best
possible terms as a supplement to aid programs, it is not
likely that such concessionary private capital would ever
be available on the scale that commercial capital is. See:
Pura, p. 2.
Browning, p. 16.
"China Won't Use Its Vast Credits," p. 32.
Ching, "China Attracts Over $1 Billion," p. 2.
Cheng, p. 3.
Frank Ching, "China Is Planning A Debt Offering in
Japan in Yen," Wall Street Journal , March 17, 1981, p. 27.
Richard F. Janssen, "Third World's Debts, Totaling
$500 Billion, May Pose Big Dangers," Wall Street Journal ,
January 28, 1981, p. 1.
"Countries in Arrears: A Threat to World Banking?"
Christian Science Monitor , July 1, 1981, p. 11.
Kenneth H. Bacon, "Clausen Pondering Ways for World
Bank to Stimulate More Private Investment," Wall Street
Journal , May 14, 19 81, p. 9.
June Kronholz, "Rich, Poor Spar at IMF Meeting Over
Easier Credit and Development Aid, " Wall Street Journal ,
May 22, 1981, p. 25.
The type of capital that China, like any developing
nation, desires the most is long-term low-interest "soft"
loans. Most desirable of all, but also the scarcest, are
the interest-free development loans made by the International
Development Association (IDA, associated with the World Bank)
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and the Asian Development Fund (administered by the Asian
Development Bank)
. Various sources of development assistance
potentially available to China are as follows:
Foreign governments. Thus far only Japan and Australia
have offered substantial loans on easy terms. Although Japan
has offered $1.5 billion, only about $498 million was actually
lent in the 1979-80 period. China is reported to have
asked Japan for an additional $2 billion of soft loans for
the financing of the joint ventures cancelled in 1980 (see
note 42) , which would, in effect, transform those commercial
ventures into aid projects. Loans on concessionary terms
from foreign governments are unlikely to be a major source
of development capital for China, and most loans will probably
be tied to projects in some way benefiting the commercial
interests of the lender nations.
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development) . China will be lent about $500 million from the
World Bank in 1981, including at least $100 million from the
IDA, which is interest-free. The World Bank has projected
that its lending to China will increase annually, to about
$1.8 billion in its 1984-5 fiscal year. World Bank presi-
dent Robert McNamera has stated, "Examination of the pro-
jects on the shelf and the capabilities of Chinese institutions
indicates that a lending program on the order of $10 billion
over the next five years could be feasible and would not be
out of proportion to the scale of bank activity in other large
countries." Such an assessment must be reassuring to China's
leaders, who had earlier been reported as seeking loans on the
scale of about $5 billion from the World Bank.
Asian Development Bank. China is not a member of the
ADB and there have been no firm reports that the Chinese seek
membership. It is also quite likely tha China's smaller
neighbors in Asia would be adamantly opposed to China join-
ing, if that meant sharing the ADB's limited capital resources
with China. Since its founding in 1966, the ADB has lent
$4.3 billion, of which $1.2 billion has been Asian Development
Fund concessional loans (amounts as of March 1978). In 1980,
the ADB lent a total of $1.44 billion to 17 developing nations
in Asia; $4 77.2 million of that was in the form of concessional
loans, the rest in hard loans at 9.25% interest. These are
not large amounts, and the ADB has been plagued with funding
difficulties. To make matters worse, India, who had voluntarily
refrained from borrowing from the ADB in the past, has announced
its intention to seek ADB hard loans starting in 1983, and Asian
Development Fund concessionary loans starting in 1986. The
Indian government has stated it will ask for 11.3% of the
$17.8 billion the ADB expects to lend in the 1983-87 time
frame. Thus, it appears that unless the ADB gains an unex-
pected increase in its funding, China will not be able to
seek more than small loans from it—and would probably be
better off, for political reasons, not to seek any at all.
United Nations. China has already been alloted $15
million for technical assistance programs during the 1979-81
period, and will be eligible for at least $142 million in the
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1982-86 period, from the United Nations Development Program.
The United Nations also has financial problems, which has
prompted China to voluntarily relinquish 10% of its 1982-86
allotment. U.N. technical assistance can be expected to
make a contribution to China's economic development, but the
UNDP and the U.N. Capital Development Fund will not be able
to make a substantial financial contribution to China's
development program.
It would appear, then, that China will not be able to
escape reliance upon private capital if it is to continue
its current orientation toward the Western international
economic system as a central element of its development
program. This, in turn, suggests that China will be faced
with the long-term debt management problems that have plagued
many developing nations. In the past, fear of such debt
problems led China to practice "self-reliance" in its develop-
ment programs— a strategy which has undoubtedly hindered China's
economic development. Today, China has decided to carefully
give the Western economic system a try--a decision which, if
successful in spurring growth without overwhelming China in
debt, will be greatly in the interest of the West and the
United States in particular. As China's 1978 "buying spree"
and the subsequent wave of project cutbacks in 1980 warn,
however, China still has much to learn and is not going to
have an easy time of it. It goes without saying that China's
debt management problems will directly impact upon China's
relations with the West, and therefore upon American security
interests in China.
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